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PREFACE 
For anyone standing on the ridge of the Witwatersrand on a 
spring day in September 1886 the sight immediately to the south 
represented a hive of activity and hope. Nearly a hundred years 
later ample evidence stretches away on both sides of the water-
shed to confirm the fulfilment of those early sentiments. It is, 
nevertheless, all too easy to ignore the struggles and failures 
which marked the beginnings of the world's greatest gold field in 
the light of its subsequent abundant success. Only when attention 
is turned to the individual companies formed to exploit the 
discovery does the true picture emerge of the lack of adequate 
technological and . managerial knowledge amongst the early pioneers 
and of the financial frailty of their companies. 
The object of this thesis is to shed light on these beginnings 
by reviewing the histories of four of the earliest companies 
established to work the main reef. The approach adopted is to 
scrutinize the material available with a view to determining the 
motivations and actions of the managements of the various companies 
with regard to their economic environment, whether within or 
without the individual company. 
Clearly, the availability of information is a major determinant of 
the success of any such venture and this was particularly so in 
the case of the companies considered. With the exception of the 
Barlow Rand Limited holding of the H. Eckstein and Company Archives, 
which offers an integral coverage of that firm's dealings with the 
emerging industry, and which is certainly the most comprehensive 
source of information available to the researcher, little material 
relating to specific gold mining companies has survived. · Under 
these circumstances it was necessary to rely heavily for information 
on the local press. These newspapers proved an invaluable source 
in this regard. As a mining camp with a limited capacity for 
generating newsworthy incidents, the newspapers of early Johannesburg 
found an eager readership for information about the industry which 
lay at the heart of the community. For their part, the managements 
of the various mining companies found in the pages of the local 
press an outlet for intelligence both true and false; the press was 
a useful vehicle for the publication of directors' and annual 
reports to meet a wider audience, but similarly it could be and was 
used to disseminate 'spectacular' reports calculated to influence 
the status of a company's stock on the local share market. As a 
research source the press has thus to be approached with caution 
but its value, if the warning is heeded, is in no way diminished. 
Beyond these two sources the next most valuable accumulation of data 
on the early industry is "The Gold Fields Collection" housed in the 
Cory Library for Historical Research at Rhodes University. As a 
collection it is far from complete and it is to be hoped that the 
donors will in future see fit to augment it with further material 
as this becomes available. It neverthess proved an invaluable 
source for the investigation of at least one of the companies of 
the study and for a general backgrcund to the industry. 
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GLOSSARY OF MINING AND RELATED TERMS 
A shaft for mining or drainage driven horizontally 
into the face of a mountain or hillside to intersect 
the ore body. 
An alloy of gold and mercury usually obtained by 
allowing gold concentrates to come into contact with 
mercury. The mercury is driven off by heating to 
leave the gold. 
A means by which the crushed gold ore in solution was 
allowed to flow over mercury covered copper plates to 
effect an amalgam. 
A scientific test to determine the amount of metal in 
a given quantity of ore. 
The built up area around a shaft, higher than the 
natural surrounding ground to prevent the inrush of 
storm water. 
The Dutch term for almond rock confectionery. 
Geologically a conglomerate composed of water worn 
pebbles cemented into a matrix, similar in appearance 
to coarse concrete. Correct term is conglomerate. 
(q. v.) 
A set of 
mortar. 
a mill. 
stamps (usually five) which fall into one 
The term was also loosely used to describe 
An area set aside for the accommodation or storage of 
mining machinery, tailings, or for other purposes. 
The occupiers exercised surface rights only. 
A right of possession which conferred upon the owner 
an indisputable title. The intention of the right 
was to obviate the risk of defeat of title through 
old irregularities or formal flaws engendered in the 
early days of the field with regard to machinery 
stands, water rights, etc. 
A small-diameter hole drilled into the earth, usually 
by rotating diamond drill, to determine the under-
lying geological formation. The sinking of boreholes 
is widely used in modern gold prospecting. 
A process for the precipitation of gold from crushed 
ore by means of dissolving it in chlorine solution. 
Best adapted to high grade concentrates it was never 
very popular amongst Rand companies. 
Claim 
Conglomerate 
Country Rock 
Cross-cut 
Cyanide Process 
Development 
Diggers Licence 
Dip 
Drill 
Drive 
DWT 
Dyke 
Face 
Fault 
vi 
A portion of land on a gold field to which a miner is 
legally entitled. Quartz reef claims measured 150 
feet across the reef and 400 feet in the direction of 
the reef or dip, about 1,44 acres in extent. only 
white persons were allowed to hold claims in the 
South African Republic. No more than one claim could 
be pegged off in the name of one person unless .i.n 
terms of special registration. 
Rock composed of pebbles cemented together. The gold 
of the Witwatersrand is found in this formation. 
Also locally known as Banket. (g.v.) 
The general mass of barren rock adjacent to an ore 
body. 
A horizontal underground tunnel driven through 
country rock usually in the general direction of the 
dip of the reef. 
The process whereby gold is dissolved from crushed 
ore in a dilute solution of cyanide. The gold is 
later precipitated from the solution by the addition 
of zinc shavings or dust. 
Work done in opening up 
preparatory to stoping. 
in country rock as well 
and proving an ore body 
It includes tunnels driven 
as on the reef. 
The licence issued for the systematic working of 
claims at varying rates, fifteen shillings per month 
in the case of claims which were not developed and 
from which are was not being extracted, and twenty 
shillings for claims being actively exploited. 
The direction and gradient of the slope of the reef. 
A steel bar with a chisel-shaped lower end, used in 
mines for making a borehole into which is put an 
explosive charge. 
A horizontal tunnel in a mine driven along or 
parallel to the plane of the reef . If used for 
transporting ore, it is termed 'haulage'. 
See Pennyweight. 
Intruded igneous rock which fills up fissures and 
rents in stratified rocks. Igneous rock is formed 
by the solidification of molten rock matter which 
has risen from the depths of the earth. 
The place in any tunnel or stope at which work is 
proceeding. 
In geology, a break in the continuity of a body of 
rock. 
Footwall 
Free-Milling Ore 
Frue Vanner 
Gangue 
Grade 
Hanging Wall 
Headgear 
Lashing 
Leader 
Levels 
Lode 
Mill 
Mynpacht 
(Mijnpacht) 
vii 
country rock or strata lying immediately below the 
ore body. 
Ore which contains 'free gold' which can be readily 
saved by pulverizing and amalgamating in a stamp 
mill. 
A slowly travelling rubber belt, to which a quick 
lateral reciprocating motion, or side shake, is 
imparted. The belt has a slight inclination in the 
direction opposite to that in which it travels. 
crushed ore fed onto the belt is precipitated by 
vibration onto the rubber and adhering to it is 
carried back up the belt in the opposite direction 
to the flow of the liquid. 
Rock or strata surrounding the ore body. See also 
Country Rock. 
The amount of rock in a ton of ore which is expressed 
as pennyweights per ton. 
Country rock or strata lying immediately above, the 
ore body. 
A structure erected at the mouth of a shaft to carry 
the hoisting rope and to guide the skip or cage in 
the shaft; also to clear it of the mouth of the shaft 
so that ore or waste rock may be landed at a height 
above the surface convenient for its disposal. 
Moving broken rock with a shovel. , 
A small lode running into a larger one'. 
Horizontal drives (or tunnels) in a mine. It is 
customary to work mines by levels at regular 
intervals in depth. 
Any metalliferous vein, a cleft in the earth's crust 
filled with minerals. 
Works for treating ores by means other than smelting. 
A mining lease granted to the owner of a farm declared 
a public digging, or where the owner has leased the 
mineral rights on the property to another, then to 
the lessee of such mineral rights, with or without 
the option to purchase. Its extent did not exceed 
one-tenth of the area of the farm or piece of ground. 
Granted initially for not less than five and not more 
than twenty years, these leases were made indefinitely 
renewable in 1893. The rent payable to the State was 
ten shillings per morgen per annum, in advance. 
The State reserved the right to charge a commission of 
two and a half per cent on the value of gold recovered 
during the year rather than the fixed rent. If sub-
let, in part or in whole, the lessee was liable to the 
State with the lessor for the amount due. 
Ore 
Ore Reserves 
outcrop 
Payable Ore 
Pay Limit 
Pennyweight 
(DWT) 
Prospectors 
Licence 
Raise 
Reef 
Sampling 
Shaft 
Slimes 
Sorting 
Special Regis-
tration of Claims 
Stamps 
Stamp Mill 
viii 
Rock containing minerals a 
Ore bodies blocked out by development and ready for 
stoping; ore proved to be payable. 
The occurrence on the surface of a rock formation. 
Ore which can be mined profitably. 
The lowest value of ore 
by the mine concerned. 
of gold, working costs, 
factors. 
that can profitably be treated 
It is determined by the price 
and other inter-related 
One-twentieth of an ounce. A measure used to express 
the gold content of the ore. 
Such a licence enabled the owner to hold and examine 
ground while paying a small rental. The monthly 
charge for such a licence was five shillings. 
Upward excavation on the reef body to connect drives 
on different levels. 
A quartz lode or vein. The term 'reef' on the 
Witwatersrand usually refers to a cong lomerate horizon. 
Process of obtaining specimens of ore for assay. (q.v.) 
A deep pit or opening sunk from the surface and by 
means of which a mirle is worked or prospected. 
The very fine particles of talcose and · clayey material 
mixed with very fine grains of quartz, · iron oxides 
and sulphides, which form the moist residues of the 
crushed ore. 
Manually picking out waste rock from broken ore. 
A provision by which up to twelve claims could be held 
and worked as a single unit, thus obviating the need 
to show occupation and signs of work on all the claims 
simultaneously. The regulation helped to reduce the 
threat of forfeiture. By the end of 1892 most claims 
on the Witwatersrand were specially registered. 
Heavy pestles for pulverizing quartz. 
An ordinary stamp mill consists of an upright frame, 
heavy iron pestles or stamps - weighing from 400 to 
950 pounds - mortars, screens, inclined tables, and 
other accessories; the motive power is steam or water. 
The weight of the stamps, the number of times they 
drop into the mortars per minute, and the amount of 
ore they crush per day, varies in different localities, 
according to the quality of ore required to be crushed. 
Most early Witwatersrand mills were equipped with 
stamps weighing 750 pounds but by the early 1890's 
Stand 
Stoping 
Tailings 
Ton 
Tramming 
Tributors 
waste 
Water Right 
Winze 
Workings 
Yield 
ix 
these were replaced with heavier ones of up to 950 
pounds. 
A town lot or general allocation for the erection of 
buildings, usually measuring 50 feet by 50 feet. 
A working underground, in which a section or block of 
reef which has as far as possible been opened up by 
levels and their connections, is being removed. 
Stoping includes all the methods and operations which 
result in breaking up the solid ore and placing it in 
a position ready to be trammed away. 
Refuse from workings after the ore has been extracted. 
·Long ton 2 240 pounds, short ton 2 000 pounds. 
Most Witwatersrand companies measured in short tons. 
The transport of rock from place to place in cars. 
A leasing arrangement in which the lessee agrees to 
pay a proportion of the profits, or of the ore mined, 
to the owner in addition to the agreed rental payments. 
Barren rock. 
The grant of the use of a water source for mining 
purposes. A water right did not ves t the ownership of 
the water in the holder of the right and it was 
required that when he had completed using it, it be 
returned to the stream or channel from which he took 
it. 
Excavation of the reef made downwards to connect 
drives on different levels. 
The development of a mine such as levels, stapes, 
cross cuts, etc. 
Net recovery of gold from ore, gold recovered expressed 
as pennyweights per ton of ore treated. 
Early trench mining following the example set by William Knight in 1886. 
(Source: Rosenthal, E .. The Rand Rush, )B.86-1 911, p.27.) 
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CHAPTER I 
THE PATTERN OF MINERAL DISCOVERY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
BEFORE 1886 
The exposed ridges of the Witwatersrand did not impress early pros-
pectors as a good site in their search for gold. One reason suggested 
for this oversight was that the road from Potchefstroom and Krugersdorp 
to Pretoria crossed the 
reef was not visible on 
escarpnent at 
1 the surface. 
a point where the conglomerate 
Perhaps of significance was that 
most of those in search of gold were looking for alluvial deposits which 
they could successfully exploit as individuals. It is thus ironical 
that the first recorded report made by Europeans of the discovery of 
gold in the area north of the Vaal River, which was later to become the 
South African Republic, came from the northern slopes of the Witwatersrand. 
There, in 1853, Pieter Jacob Marais found gold in pannings of sediment 
from the Jukskei and Crocodile Rivers. Marais was originally from Cape 
Town but prior to his arrival in the Transvaal he had worked on the 
alluvial fields of California and Australia, bringing back to Africa his 
experience and a desire to find here the riches which had eluded him on 
two continents . 2 Fate cheated him once more and the ' Witwatersrand 
retained its natural grandeur for another thirty years. 
Between 1853 and 1886 gold was found in several places north of the 
Vaal River. The mineral wealth of the Transvaal was long recognised. 
The Voortrekkers and succeeding generations found ancient iron workings 
in the Lydenburg district, while coal, lead, salt, silver, copper and 
saltpetre were also discovered in small quantities. 3 Could their 
Republic have been the legendary kingdom of Monomotapa? The potential 
threat, real or imaginary, which such discoveries posed to the independence 
of these migrants, who cherished their recently conquered country for 
pastoral bounty rather than its mineral wealth, is reflected in the 
secrecy to which prospectors like Marais were sworn. 4 In 1859 it was 
1. Preller, G.S . , Argonauts of the Rand, p.l09. 
2. Ibid., pp. 26ff. 
3. Walker, E. A., A History of Southern Africa, (3rd Ed.), pp.327-28. 
4. Preller, G.S., op.cit., p.37. 
2 
finally resolved by the Volksraad to allow companies and individuals to 
mine on a royalty basis, while in 1866, when the pinch of depression 
had reduced State revenues to the merest trickle, the first mining 
ordinance was introduced. 5 Yet now, when the attitude of the Government 
of the South African Republic was warming to the beneficial influence 
that a revenue from mining royalties would have on empty state coffers, 
it was from the N'debele country beyond their northern border that news 
of a gold discovery came. Late in 1867 Henry Hartley, an elephant hunter 
from the Albany district of the eastern Cape, and his travelling 
companion, the geologist Carl Mauch, announced the discovery of gold at 
the Tati River. In consideration of the subsequent events on the 
Witwatersrand it is paradoxical that thiS, the first significant discovery 
of gold by Europeans in southern Africa was a quartz reef outcrop . 
Located so far into the interior of a continent poorly equipped with 
natural waterways or other means of communication, the "Victoria Gold 
Fields" soon lost their appeal despite the strenuous efforts of the 
London and Limpopo Mining and Trading Company, established to exploit 
the deposit . 6 A reef deposit required crushing machinery and capital 
if it was to be successfully exploited and the latter was sorely lacking 
amongst most of those drawn to southern Africa by the reports of the 
re-discovery of Monomotapa. 
Fortunately for many of these fortune seekers the plaything of the 
Erasmus children of the farm "De Kalk" in the Hopetown district of the 
Cape Colony was recognised by a neighbour as being potentially valuable 
and later identified by Dr W.G. Atherstone of Grahamstown as a diamond. 
The search for diamonds extended first to the banks of the Vaal 
and subsequently to the "dry diggings" of the future Griqualand 
River 
7 West. 
Such was the nature of the alluvial river diggings and the early workings 
on the diamondiferous pipes of the dry diggings, that they could be 
profitably mined by the individual digger with a minimum of equipment. 
Hence the capital needs of the fortune seeker were small and the diamond 
fields became a power-house which generated a high proportion of the 
residual capital which became available to meet the requirements of the 
infant Witwatersrand gold mining companies. 
5. Walker, E.A., op.cit . , p.328. 
6. Baines, T . , The Gold Regions of South Eastern Africa, pp.2ff. 
7. Doughty, 0., Early Diamond Days, passim . , and McNish, J.T., The Road 
to EI Dorado, pp.15ff. 
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Further gold discoveries in the Transvaal were to follow. Pros-
pectors spread out over a wide area of the South African Republic 
subsequent to Mauch's pronouncements that auriferous deposits existed 
8 in many places within that state. In keeping with the changed attitude 
of the Government towards the state's potential mineral wealth, the 
Volksraad passed a resolution on 21 December 1870 empowering the autho-
rities to grant reasonable rewards for the finding of precious stones and 
minerals. 9 The changed disposition of the State which the resolution 
confirmed, provoked an immediate response. Twelve days after the 
announcement, approximately the amount of time taken for word of it to 
reach the outlying areas, one Edward Button wrote to the Landdrost of 
Lydenburg informing him of his discovery, along with 
and Tom McLachlan, of gold some "five days ride from 
James Sutherland 
10 Lydenburg" . 
Button I S announcement of a subsequent find at "Eersteling" resulted in 
the Volksraad granting him a concession for the mineral rights of the 
area, with which he floated the Transvaal Gold Mining Company with · a 
capital of £50 000 in London. Like the Tati discovery, Button's 
Eersteling mine suffered from inaccessibility and a reef which was 
capricious in its yield. A further find was reported early in 1873 in 
the Lydenburg district. Christened "Macmac" by the visiting State 
President, T.F. Burgers, the field, together with that at Pilgrim's 
Rest, discovered in September of the same year, provided the first 
successful alluvial finds in the Transvaal. Soon a population of over 
a thousand diggers accumulated on these fields, and in response to their 
requests a gold commissioner, Major W. MacDonald, was appointed and a 
diggers' committee elected. In return for a claim licence fee of five 
. 11 
shillings a month, diggers were guaranteed their securLty of tenure. 
As is the case with most alluvial deposits the rich "eyes" are soon 
worked out. Those of Macmac and Pilgrim's Rest were past their peak 
when hostilities broke out between the Bapedi tribe and the South 
African Republic in 1876. There were those diggers like Alois 
Nellmapius who had accumulated considerable wealth on the fields and 
who now proposed some form of consolidation as the next inevitable step 
8. Preller, G.S . , op.cit., pp:76ff. 
9. Cartwright, A.P., Valley of Gold, p.43. 
10. Ibid., pp.43-44. 
11. Ibid., pp.44-47. 
4 
of the mining frontier. 12 The great need for the continued working of 
the fields, and particularly for the opening up of the reefs found in 
the area, was capital. It was estimated that the cost of bringing a 
five stamp battery to Lydenburg was £1 500, much more than most of those 
working the field could afford. 13 In turn the high cost of buying out 
each individual claimholder made the prospect of consolidation 
prohibitively expensive. The impasse could only be resolved by Govern-
ment. 
A new Gold Law was promulgated on 21 June 1875. It included a 
clause which allowed for the granting of blocks of claims to companies 
which would have the· exclusive rights to the ground they owned. While 
the feelings of the diggers were mixed on this issue they unanimously 
rejected the provision which increased the claim licence fee from five 
shillings to ten shillings a month. 14 Resentment against the Government 
was taken a step further with the outbreak of hostilities against the 
Bapedi. Not only did the war result in a mass exodus of the diggers' 
black labourers but the Government did little to protect the fields. 1s 
Under these circumstances the diggers appealed to the Governors of Natal 
and the Cape Colony, suggesting the annexation of the Transvaal and the 
diggings as a solution to their difficulties. While at least one author 
warns against placing too strong an emphasis on these factors as a cause 
12. The concept of a mining frontier can be traced through four 
distinctive phases, the first of which is described as that of 
the individual prospectors and diggers working for their own 
account or in small partnerships. This phase is followed by 
the first of two consolidation periods in which individual owner-
ship gives way to joint stock company formation as a means of 
raising the capital necessary for the more intensive development 
of the find . The third phase is characterised by some form of 
consolidation between the various joint stock enterprises, the 
extent of oligopoly or monopoly formation being a function of 
the peculiar circumstances prevailing on a particular field. 
The final stage is marked by backward integration and diversi-
fication of the large corporations seeking profitable reinvest-
ment opportunities in other types of mining, different fields, 
the purchase of companies supplying mining equipment, or simply 
diversification out of mining sector completely, i.e. using 
capital generated within the mining industry for investment in 
either the general national or international economies. 
13. Cartwright, A.P., op.cit., pp.79-81. 
14. Ibid. 
15. Morrell, W. P., The Gold Rushes, (2nd Ed.), p.339. 
5 
of the annexation of the Transvaal in 1877, their contribution cannot be 
16 
underrated. 
The significance of these events lies in their influence on the 
Government of the South African Republic which followed the restoration 
of self-rule in 1881. The Lydenburg fields had taught two valuable 
lessons, the first of which was that it was difficult for a State with 
limited resources to exercise any form of control over an alluvial field 
with hundreds of independent diggers, particularly with regard to the 
collection of licence and other monies due to the State. Secondly, as 
the vast majority of such diggers were foreigners, whose loyalty could 
not be relied upon in time of crisis, any step which reduced their 
numbers could only serve towards the preservation of the independence of 
the Republic. With these points in mind we find a shift in gold policy, 
no 
to 
longer favouring 
capitalists. 17 
the individual digger but rather making concessions 
It was also recognised that such a concession policy 
18 · 
would facilitate the establishment of industries in the country. 
Thus in November 1881 David Benjamin was granted a concession for the 
exclusive right to mine for gold on the six farms in the Lydenburg 
district which covered the Pilgrim's Rest area, in return for the pay-
ment of £1 000 per annum. The Government reserved the right to convert 
this rental fee into a payment of two and a half per cent of the value 
of any minerals found on the farms. Armed with the concession Benjamin 
proceeded to float the Transvaal Gold Exploration Company and set about 
the serious business of buying out the remaining claimholders. 19 
The effective closure of the Pilgrim's Rest field to the individual 
digger proved the undoing of the Government's concession policy 
regarding mineral discovery as the diggers now spread out in search of 
substitute fields. 20 Alluvial gold was found at "De Kaap" in 1882, on 
a group of farms belonging to G.P. Moodie in 1883, and at the future 
Barberton gold bearing reefs were uncovered by Graham Barber in 1884. 
16 . Ibid. 
17. Ibid., p.340 . 
18. The first factory established in terms of the concession policy 
was one for distilling liquor, the Hatherley plant of Nellmapius 
and Samuel Marks. 
19. Cartwright, A.P., op.cit., pp.16-17. 
20. Morrell, W.P., op.cit., p.341. 
6 
"Bray's Golden Quarry" with its fabulous "Sheba Reef" followed in 1885. 
Clearly a compromise was needed between the holder of the small claim 
and the concession policy fostered by the Government. By 1885 the method 
of granting concessions was dropped in favour of a more sophisticated 
system which would ultimately favour those in possession of capital. 
The new Gold Law of that year still reserved the right for the Government 
to grant further concessions in cases where mining proved unpayable to 
the individual digger, or where the ground, having been worked as claims 
21 by individuals, was abandoned. In tUrn it was now possible for 
diggers to hold up to twelve adjoining claims upon special registrati.on, 
whereupon the working of only one of them was suffici.ent to ensure 
protection against the loss of the others by "jumping" 22 A distinction 
was also drawn between prospectors' and diggers' claims, so that the 
individual holder need only convert the status of his claim or claims 
from the former to the latter once actual gold recovery commenced, 
ensuring a saving of half of the monthly licence monies. 23 In contrast, 
the owners of farms were entitled to a mining lease of one tenth of the 
surface area, which on the Witwatersrand allowed the capitalists who 
purchased the farm to exercise a priority right to claims and to gain 
many of the advantages of the concession policy. 
If the Government of the South African Republic was forced to abandon 
its concession policy in regard to gold mining following the rash of new 
discoveries between 1881 and 1886, the nature of these finds did not 
entirely play into the hands of the independent diggers. The more 
significant discoveries were all in the form of quartz reefs which 
required capital for their development. In this regard the De Kaap 
fields were more fortunate in the provision of capital than was warranted 
by the value of their essentially untried reefs. The year 1886 saw a 
spate of company formations and a stock exchange boom in Barberton as 
capital flowed into the area from the rest of South Africa and abroad. 
In order to appreciate the good timing and fortune of the Barberton 
company promoters, it is first necessary to briefly consider the inter-
vening events in the diamond mining industry between 1871 and 1885. 
21. The Gold Law of the South African Republic (Law No . 5 of 1885), 
published by Celliers, J.F., Pretoria, 1887, Clause 50, p.ll. 
22. Ibid., Clauses 52 and 53, p.12. 
23. Ibid . , Clause 30, p . 7. 
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The alluvial Vaal River diggings were destined for the short, 
meteoric rise of all alluvial fields . Some good finds were made but 
few escaped the clutches of their new-found mistress as wealthy men. 
Relief from the protracted termination characteristic of such affairs 
came with the discovery of the dry diggings at Dutoitspan and Colesberg 
Kopje in 1871. The four diamondiferous pipes of the area, together with 
that at Jagersfontein, represented a confined and concentrated deposit 
which could be systematically mined. Furthermore, they could be worked 
by individuals with limited capital resources. The various pipes of 
diamond bearing material 
th ' f 24 of ~rty eet square. 
were thus soon pegged out in individual claims 
While the claims could be, and when rich 
enough, were further subdivided, the principle of one claim, with a 
maximum of two, per digger was upheld. Thus the dry diggings were 
destined to evolve through all the stages of the mining frontier. 
Difficulties relating to the claims were to emerge in two indepen-
dent directions. The first confronted by the diggers related to their 
security of tenure and the payment of royalties. The hunting-cum-
prospecting party from the river diggings which stumbled upon the 
independent digger on Vooruitzigt farm belonging to De Beer agreed to 
the payment of a royalty of 25 per cent of the value of all stones found 
in return for the permission to dig. In the ensuing rush the Boer 
proprietor found it increasingly difficult to collect any ,form of 
revenue from the diggings and was persuaded to part with his title for 
the meagre sum of £6 000 to Dunell Ebden and Company of Port Elizabeth. 25 
While the payment of royalties was soon dropped in favour of a monthly 
licence fee, part of which would accrue to the farm owner, by 1873 the 
new owners of Vooruitzigt and the other farm proprietors were arguing 
for a raise in the licence fee from ten shillings to five pounds, and 
26 for the richer Kimberley mine to ten pounds per claim, monthly, 
The unpopularity of these measures contributed significantly to the 
political unrest on the field and were only terminated in 1875 when the 
Governor of Griqualand West, Sir Henry Barkly, bought the farm 
Vooruitzigt on behalf of the Government of the Colony . The purchase 
24. Morrell, W.P., pp.313ff, Claims on Colesberg Kopje were initially 
31 feet square. 
25. Chilvers, H.A., The Story of De Beers, pp.19ff. 
26. Morrell, W. P., op.cit . , pp.328-31. 
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27 price of £100 000 was payable in debentures at six per cent. 
The second problem regarding the claims related directly to the 
evolving mining frontier. The principle of claim holding allowed each 
digger to remove the ground vertically downwards within the four sides 
of his claim in his own time. But not all men worked their claims at 
the same pace. Very early in the history of the dry diggings the Orange 
Free State authorities insisted on the preservation of roadways across 
the Kimberley mine, cutting seven and a half feet from the adjoining 
claims to create a passageway of fifteen feet in width. By 1872 the 
roadway system was doomed as some energetic diggers were already working 
at depths of 100 feet and ground falls between adjoining claims in the 
Kimberley mine became a dangerous and regular feature. The haulage 
scheme which replaced the roadways added to the capital outlay necessary 
for the individual digger to survive. Amalgamation was thus increasingly 
recognised as a solution to the rising working costs which came with 
increased depth of working. Compounding the problem for the individual 
digger was the fact that there was a sharp fall in the price of diamonds 
28 in 1872. In 1874, as a consequence of the changing circumstances, 
the mining regulations were altered to allow the individual to own up 
. 29 to ten claLms, while in 1876 the Mining Board removed the restriction 
entirely. 30 Ownership of the blocks of claims thus passed increasingly 
into the hands of the capitalists. 31 Nevertheless,the transition was 
neither immediate nor swift and it was to be six years before Kimberley 
enjoyed its first stock exchange boom and twelve years before the final 
amalgamation of the industry was complete. Very often the first mining 
companies on the field, such as the British and the Central Diamond 
Mining Companies, were formed as a means of overcoming the various 
technical problems of deeper mining experienced by a group of claim-
holders. Thus the shares seldom passed out of the hands of the original 
claimbolders . It was rather the bona fides success of such companies in 
dealing with these difficulties which prompted the subsequent rash of 
27. Chilvers, H.A., op . cit., pp.31-32. 
28. Morrell, W.P., op . cit., p.328. 
29. See Clause 18 of Ordinance 10, 1874 of Griqualand west. 
30. Ordinance 12, 1876 of Griqualand west. 
31. Morrell, W.P., op.cit., p.332 . 
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joint stock enterprises . 32 Very little cash was thus actually involved 
in the formation of the first companies, the claimholders receiving 
vendors' shares in return for the transfer of their claims. Given the 
existing infrastructure and proven natur e of such claims, what little 
working capital was required could easily be borrowed and rapidly 
repaid from the working of the new consolidated property. Nevertheless, 
an unfortunate precedent was thus created which was to feature promin-
33 
ently on the early Witwatersrand in the heavy emphasis on vendor shares, 
while even within the Kimberley experience, the boom of 1881 revealed 
the difficulties generated from the too liberal interpretation of the 
value of vendor assets. It is worth quoting an intelligent observer on 
. . t 34 th~s po~n : 
"It is impossible to dispute the fact that claim property had 
risen enormously in value during the few years previous to 
the establishment of the first joint stock undertaking, and 
it is manifest that if claims were incorporated in a company 
at a price on which they could yield a fair dividend, that 
price was a perfectly fair one. The non-success of many of 
the subsequent undertakings was mainly due to the fact that 
the promoters were blind to this very simple truth, and had 
forgotten, or had never known the first principles which 
should govern joint stock undertakings. In fact people .. • 
invested fre ely in shares in companies, the claims in which 
would have given an admirable return on a small capital, but 
a very poor one, if any at all, ' on the enormous sums at which 
they were pu t in. II 
The Witwatersrand .mines with their heavy commitment to vendor shares 
were to suffer similar disadvantages. Another tendency which was 
borrowed from the early diamond companies by the Rand was the general 
influence of such company formation on the community. The newly created 
companies required managers and secretaries, and these were found from 
within the community as 11 • • • men who before had been content to work 
hard for five or six pounds a week secured positions as managers of 
companies with comparatively enormous salaries, [while] clerks and shop-
men became secretaries, and assumed all the dignity of their new 
positions • • . ,,35 The favoritism and nepotism of the directors of new 
companies, themselves inexperienced, caused inefficient men to be 
32. Matthews, J.W., Incwadi Yami, p.245. 
33. See below, Chapter VI, pp.200ff and Appendix I. 
34. Matthews, J.W., op.cit., p.246. 
35. Ibid., p.251. 
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appointed to posts which the prevailing circumstances of the mines 
demanded should have the utmost practical experience and technical 
expertise. Few of the Kimberley boom companies were ever able to pay 
dividends and by June 1881, when the banks restricted the extension of 
credit, the collapse came. The young Witwatersrand was to borrow 
heavily on Kimberley's early experience. 
The speculative mania of the early months of 1881 in Kimberley 
touched the far corners of South Africa and even attracted some capital 
from Europe. In six months the number of jOint stock companies rose 
from twelve to seventy one and their nominal capital from a cumulative 
total of £2 500 000 to over £8 000 000. 36 For the first time the 
mining industry had united the capital resources of South Africa behind 
it. While the collapse which followed heralded the most 
ression South Africa had to endure during the nineteenth 
severe dep-
37 
century, the 
relatively unsophisticated nature of the agricultural foundation of the 
economies of the various states shielded the bulk of the population from 
the harshest effects of the situation. Rather the mania of 1881 intro-
duced a new psychological element as an extension of the current views 
of the developing mining industries. The discovery of diamonds and gold 
had already served to quicken the pace of the various economies. 
Fortunes were being made, not only in the diggings, but also by some 
amongst those serving them. A speculative element was evincing itself 
as never before. Not only did the new mining industry suggest the 
possibility of undreamt of wealth for the few, but its novelty and the 
seeming ease with which fortunes were made, made it the dream of every 
enterprising man. While all could not succeed at digging, the joint 
stock mania of 1881 offered a participation for anyone with a few pounds 
to spare. The stock exchange became a new focus of attention and 
offered even greater possibilities in the pursuit of instant fortune. 
The collapse of 1881 was a set-back, but the novelty of the situation 
and the comparatively short duration of the mania left many potential 
participants unchastened. The speculative spirit of the society was 
hardly daunted as the following repetitions at Barberton and the Rand 
were to prove. 
36. Morrell, W.P., op.cit., p.333. 
37 . Schumann, C.G.W., Structural Changes and Business Cycles in 
South Africa, 1806-1936, pp.81ff. 
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The collapse of the speculative market in 1881 and the subsequent 
depression played into the hands of the emerging Kimberley capitalists. 
A weakened diamond mining industry lent itself to an increased pace of 
consolidation. By 1885 the trend towards the eventual goal of Cecil 
John Rhodes's monopoly organisation seemed yet to have far to go. 
At the end of that year there were still ninety eight separate holdings 
in the various mines at Kimberley, but weighed against approximately 
3 600 original claims the progress of the process of amalgamation can 
be appreciated. 38 The details of the climacteric years which resulted 
in the creation of the De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited in 1888 need 
not concern us her~, other than to note the increasing involvement of 
foreign capital in the negotiations. Early in his drive to secure a 
monopoly, Rhodes came to rely on the acumen of Alfred Beit and the 
financial resources he represented on the fields, namely, the Paris 
diamond firm of Jules Porges and Company. When this source of funds 
no longer sufficed the Rothschilds were induced to finance him. In 
this way Rhodes's machinations in Kimberley received the blessing of 
financial respectability in the eyes of a capitalist world, while he, 
Beit, and their partners, received a credibility in those financial 
circles which was to allow them access to international capital 
resources for their further exploits on the Witwatersrand. Rhodes's 
consolidation of the diamond mines only occurred in 1888. By then, 
however, the Witwatersrand discovery was nearly two years · old. 
The relationship between the diamond and gold mining industries 
in South Africa has always been a close one. On the level of the 
individual digger and his labour, an ebb and flow between Lhe respective 
39 fields was very much a feature of the 1870's and early 1880's. 
Likewise the capital links were strong, not only in the flow of finance 
from Kimberley first to Barberton and then the Witwatersrand, but also 
in the personalities involved and the technology applied. 
The Barberton field consisted of a scattering of gold bearing 
quartzite reefs, some of which, like Bray's Golden Quarry and its Sheba 
Reef, were fabulously rich, yielding over twelve ounces of gold to the 
ton of rock; others were less well endowed. By 1885, however, South 
38. Morrell, W.P . , op.cit., pp.334-35. 
39. Ibid., pp . 337ff. 
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African gold mining companies had developed a poor reputation with over-
seas investors. Besides the London and Limpopo and the Transvaal Gold 
Mining Companies already mentioned, several Lydenburg properties were 
floated in London in 1883. 40 They too failed to come up to the 
expectations of their proprietors and further helped to alienate foreign 
capital from the fields. Thus when the announcement of the discovery 
of the Sheba Reef electrified the imagination of a South African 
population anxiously seeking instant wealth and new investment oppor-
tunities, foreign reaction remained guarded, as well it might. It was 
from within South Africa and particularly from Kimberley that the 
capital for the speculation in Barberton properties came. Smaller 
capitalists, squeezed out in the rush of the giants for the control of 
the diamond industry were looking elsewhere for investment opportunities. 
Most of the ventures floated at Barberton, with its two stock exchanges, 
were essentially untried, and when eventually worked proved unpayable. 
The 1886 boom, which saw companies floated with a nominal capital ·of 
over two million pounds and a rise in the speculative value of their 
shares to over five million pounds, was soon burst. Unlike the earlier 
diamond boom of 1881, which saw speculation and over valuation of 
properties whiCh, by and large, were inherently valuable, the Barberton 
boom relied more heavily on pure specu1:ation. Clearly, the lesson to 
be learnt was that the presence of gold was insufficient to guarantee 
its profitable working. Too few gained that insight and the stage was 
set for the discovery of the Witwatersrand and the speculation which 
marked its early years. It is perhaps not insignificant that the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange commenced operations in June 1887, only 
ten months after the proclamation of the gold field and a mere two 
months after the first company commenced regular crushings. 41 From 
the outset of their formation, Rand shares were quoted on the Kimberley 
and Barberton exchanges. 
Having stressed the early founding of the stock exchange in 
Johannesburg it is, however, also necessary to point out that the 
Witwatersrand gold field was unique in the nature of its geological 
formation and the consequent capital and labour intensive nature of 
its development. It has been repeatedly stressed that the Rand was 
40 . Reunert, T., Diamonds and Gold in South Africa, p.83. 
41. Hatch, F . H. & Chalmers, J.A., The Gold Mines of the Rand, p.2. 
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, 1 du 1 d' 42 never a f1e d for the indivi a 19ger . The conglomerate nature of 
43 
its "banket" reefs required an investment in capital equipment if 
they were to be mined and reduced successfully. Unlike the Sheba and 
other more valuable reefs of the Barberton area, the Witwatersrand 
reefs were of a generally low gold content. The emphasis from the 
outset needed to rest on large scale production, that is, the crushing 
of large quantities of ore in order to gain a relatively low gold return 
per ton worked. Such conditions were not conducive to the individual 
digger. The capital required for the successful working of the Rand 
mines was drawn from throughout South Africa, with most of it coming 
from Kimberley and , the developing mercantile centres. Rhodes's company 
The Gold Fields of South Africa Limited was the only early concern 
floated in London to work the Witwatersrand. The labour needs of the 
early mines were, in turn, met by a partial diverting of the flow of 
migrant African workers destined for the Kimberley diamond mines. 
Conveniently situated between the latter place and a major source ' of 
its labour supply in Portuguese East Africa and the northern Transvaal, 
the Witwatersrand was able to encourage some of these workers to alter 
, 44 
the1r course. 
The sequence of events leading to the actual discovery of the main 
reef series on the Witwatersrand has generated a controversy the details 
of which need not concern us here. Suffice to say that it is probable 
that the main reef series was discovered by George Harrison in February 
or March of 1886. 45 By June samples of the ore were displayed and 
crushed in Sheasby's produce store in Kimberley46 while in the follow-
• 47 
ing month similar tests were conducted in that of Mr Alexander. At 
this point there were still those who believed that the new field might 
offer encouraging prospects for the independent digger. One report even 
incorrectly suggested that the material being taken from the site was 
42. See for example Neame, L.E., City Built on Gold, p.l08. 
43. See glossary for term "banket". 
44. See below, Chapter VI, pp.224ff. 
45. Gray, E.L., & J., The Discovery of the Witwatersrand Goldfields, 
passim. 
46. The Eastern Star, (Grahamstown) 21 July 1886, quoting the 
Diamond Fields Advertiser, (Kimberley). 
47. Sauer, H., Ex Africa, p.l04. 
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1 . 1 48 a luvl.a . Such misconceptions arose from the structure of the banket 
reef which, with its content of white, water worn, quartz pebbles, 
reflected the ancient alluvial nature of the depositing of the sediments 
which went to form the reef. On the line of outcrop where weathering 
of the reef had taken place over many years, the reef was broken down 
with the result that the nature of some of the samples sent to the 
curious throughout South Africa would have elicited the type of mistaken 
comment which appeared in one journal: 49 
liThe ground we saw washed was alluvium, composed of earth, 
sand, and gravel, and the process adopted was to place a 
small quantity of it into an iron basin, and then continue 
washing it until the dregs were left at the bottom." 
Such words, printed first in the Kimberley press and subsequently in 
other newspapers, were surely music in the ears of the "old timersll. 
A few days later 
waters Rand" was 
it was 
50 
on. 
reported from Barberton that "A big rush to Wit 
Any doubt or hesitation was further dispersed 
by the reports of the extraordinarily rich nature of the ore, which at 
least one account suggested would yield over four ounces of gold to the 
51 ton. Again it was asserted that the reef would be traced for 50 or 
60 miles. Against a background of such reports it is of little wonder 
that news of the discovery caught the imagination of so many. 
One of the best known examples of the participation in the rush by 
the representatives of Kimberley capital is that of J.B. Robinson and 
Dr Hans Sauer, which culminated in the early purchase by Robinson of 
. fib l' th' d h' 52 the portLon 0 Lang aagte e ongLng to e WL ow Oos ULzen. 
Subsequently the Rhodes, Rudd and Caldecott Syndicate, in which Sauer 
held a minor interest, acquired the properties of Klein Paardekraal 
and Roodepoort. Such purchases were, however, not synonymous with the 
acquisition of all the mining rights, but gave the new owners the right 
to a priority claim of mynpacht rights 53 on up to ten per cent of the 
surface area of the farm, for which the minimal fee of ten shillings 
48. The Eastern Star, 21 July 1886 . 
49 . Ibid. 
50. The Eastern Star, 23 July 1886. 
51. The Eastern Star, 21 July 1886. 
52. Sauer, H., op.cit., pp.108-9. 
53. See glossary for the term "mynpacht". 
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54 per morgen per annum was payable to the state. Further, as proprietors 
of the farms, they were entitled to receive half of the revenue collected 
by the State from the issue of prospectors' and diggers' claim licences 
55 gathered from those working the balance of the claims on the property. 
All monies from the issue of stand licences for dwellings, machinery 
sites, and tailings dumps, accrued to the owners alone, while they also 
enjoyed direct representation on any diggers' committee. 
There was soon a good representation of Kimberley capitalists on 
the Rand, with Alfred Beit making a personal appearance and lesser men 
like William Knight striving for success. 56 If we can speak of a 
general trend emerging in these confused times, it would seem that the 
Kimberley capitalists soon saw the merits in the system of acquiring 
control of the farms on which the reefs were discovered, or simply in 
the acquisition of leases on their mynpacht rights. Such action assured 
them a priority participation. on the second level, of the actual 
pegging and staking of claims, whether for mynpacht rights or not; the 
capitalists had to rub shoulders with the lesser mortals in the free-
for- all of the rush. But here their own limited knowledge of geology 
and gold mining gave them no distinct advantages. If anything the 
pessimistic prognostications of an expert 
Rhodes t s search for claims more harm til'an 
like Gardiner Williams did 
57 good. It thus required 
the true spirit of the gambler in deciding which claims to buy; a trait 
Alfred Beit displayed with lasting benefit to himself and -his associates. 
Even here, however, it would seem that with the exception of the future 
Robinson Company property, Beit contented himself in a broad spread of 
claims rather than the purchase of consolidated blocks. Criticism of 
the activities of the capitalists was soon forthcoming, as the following 
quotation indicates: 58 
"On all but two of these farms either the owners themselves, 
or others to whom they have leased their mining rights, have 
taken out Mijn Pacht Brieven, which means that they have 
reserved from all allocation to diggers some ten per cent of 
their holding. As this percentage is laid off along the line 
54. The Gold Law of the South African Republic (Law No.5 of 1885), 
Clauses 14, 18, 19, and 22. 
55. Ibid., Clauses 8 and 15. 
56 . See below, Chapter II, pp.29-30. 
57. Sauer, H. , op.cit., pp.128-29. 
58. The Eastern Star, 13 September 1886. 
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of discovered reefs, the arrangement has the practical effect, 
in many cases, of shutting up the farms as public diggings .•• 
Government is understood to favour this arrangement: ... 
It is not the ordinary Boer who wishes to prevent the influx 
of diggers. He is quite astute enough to perceive the 
advantage of having a good market for his produce; but the 
ruling element, chiefly Hollanders and Paarl Afrikaners, 
are shrewd likewise enough to see that the peaceful invasion 
of the country by thousands of working men would be their 
death knell. Their policy, therefore, is to throw the 
auriferous ground into the hands of mining companies, employ-
ing native labour for the most part, the natives not enjoying 
political rights." 
This analysis of the intentions of the Transvaal Government was followed 
up by a clue to the sequence of events regarding the bulk of the remain-
ing claims scattered out along the various Main Reef, Kimberley, Black 
and Bird Reef Series, which had been actively prospected and staked in 
the months since the initial discovery:59 
"When claims are given out at Witwatersrand it will probably 
be found that nearly the whole are registered in the name·of 
Transvaal Boers ... They will amalgamate their claims up to 
the limit of amalgamation allowed by the law, which is 12 in 
number; risk nothing in development beyond what is necessary 
to prevent the claims being jumped, probably refuse to pay 
licence money, and await the issue of events, leaving such 
companies as that established by Mr. Knight to bear the brunt 
of the risks inseparable from mining upon unimproved ground. 
It is not to be expected, therefore, that there will be any 
speedy development of Witwatersrand." 
The early participation by Transvaalers in the pegging of claims 
is borne out by Sauer's account and the esteem in which he held their 
prospecting abilities. 60 Undoubtedly, however, they were joined by 
numerous other fortune seekers who similarly lacked the capital 
necessary for development. 
A distinguishing feature of the early Witwatersrand mining companies 
is the names which many of them bore and the financial links implied by 
such names as the Tarka Pioneer, Paarl Pretoria, Paarl Ophir, Cradock, 
Worcester, Grahamstown, and other place names. In turn, other companies 
did not express these ties so clearly, although they existed just as 
strongly, as for example, in the case of the Jubilee and City and 
Suburban Companies with Pietermaritzburg, the Primrose Company with 
59. Ibid. 
60. Sauer, H., op.cit., pp.109-10. 
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Harrismith, the Spes Bona with Cape Town, and the George Goch and Wemmer 
Companies with Kimberley's mercantile capital. The early records of at 
least two of these companies suggest clues to the evolution of the 
early links between the various towns and the subsequent formation of 
the companies which bore their names. In pursuing the evidence we are 
also able to gain some insight into the system of syndicates which formed 
an important intermediary connection between the claimholders and company 
formation . 
At least one of the Grahamstown newspapers, The Eastern Star, showed 
an early and lasting interest in the fate of the new Witwatersrand gold 
field. 61 Its function in awakening local interest in the Transvaal 
gold fields can only be guessed but in September 1886 a group of local 
Grahamstown business and professional men banded together to act on the 
news of the recently proclaimed field. On 17 September 1886 an advertise-
ment appeared in The Eastern Star announcing the intended formation of 
the Grahamstown Gold Prospecting Company, which was to have a nominal 
capital of E2 000 in 400 shares of E5 each. The directors of the proposed 
organisation would be Henry R. Wood (chairman) of the famous mercantile 
house of Wood Brothers, Frederick Barr a local store keeper and 
municipal councillor, S.C. Cronwright a local farmer and perhaps better 
known as the husband of the authoress Olive Schreiner, Josiah Slater 
the proprietor of the Grahamstown Journal, and W.H.S: Bell a local 
lawyer. An editorial of the same date elaborated on the proposed 
functions of the Company, which was to send a suitable prospector to 
examine firstly lithe line of the range of auriferous mountains which 
runs from De Kaap to Zeerustll.. The Witwatersrand was also to receive 
attention but events at Berberton then he ld the imagination of the public 
and it was no doubt politic to play to their interests. John Thornhill 
Cook, who was subsequently engaged as the Company's prospector, follow-
ing the successful flotation of 25 September, proceeded straight to the 
62 Rand. The editorial of 17 September also pointed out that a 
significant number of Transvaal farms were owned by Grahamstown residents 
61 . Regular reports on the Witwatersrand began appearing from July 
onwards. At the end of March 1887, the junior partner in the 
concern, George Sheffield, moved permanently to Johannesburg to 
open a branch of the newspaper there, the entire concern making 
the move to the gold field in September of that year. The name 
of the publication was later shortened to "The Star". 
62. The Eastern Star, 27 September 1886. 
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and public institutions, and that arrangements had been made for pros-
pecting to be conducted on these properties for a fee. The Company 
would also acquire the right for working or developing any promising 
finds on a royalty basis. Beyond these prospecting functions the Company 
would also have power for acquiring leases of gold bearing properties 
and for floating mining companies. 63 Only a week was allowed for the 
application of shares, at the end of which the list was oversubscribed by 
24 shares . No further details of the issue are known but it might safely 
be assumed that the bulk of the shares were taken up locally. 
Earlier in September 1886, news of the Witwatersrand was having a 
similar effect on businessmen in worcester in the western Cape . On 13 
September an inaugural meeting of provisional directors was held under 
the chairmanship of Mr J.R. Hugo. A resolution was carried nem con that 
immediate steps be taken to send one of their number to the Transvaal 
"for the purpose of acquiring gold bearing property". The bellman 
paraded the town on 16 September advertising the holding of a public 
meeting of interested parties that evening in the town hall . At the 
meeting Hugo was delegated to proceed to the Transvaal to acquire claims 
on the part of a company yet to be formed. A meeting was duly held on 
30 October at which the trust deed of the Worcester Exploration and Gold 
Mining Company was discussed. The meetIng also heard a telegram from 
Hugo announcing his purchase of five main reef claims in ~lose proximity 
to Ferreira's Camp for the sum of El 250. The directors ·of the new 
company were Messrs Hugo, Meiring, Theron, Sharpe, Liebenberg, Bull, 
Bosman and Heatlie. By mid November Hugo reported the purchase of an 
64 
additional three adjoining claims for El00 each. Once again it may 
confidently be assumed that the capital of the company was raised 
locally. 
The Grahamstown Gold Prospecting Company was also successful in 
its endeavours on the Witwatersrand, with Cook acquiring five and a 
65 half claims on the main reef adjoining those of the Jubilee Company. 
The interests of the Prospecting Company were, however, more extensive 
and by September 1887 included participation in a wide range of ventures 
63. The Eastern Star, 17 September 1886. 
64. Transvaal Archives, Inventory A755, Minute book of the Worcester 
Exploration and Gold Mining Company. 
65. The Eastern Star, 15 April 1887. 
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and syndicates, only some of which were on the witwatersrand. By the end 
of 1888 the Company had considered some 27 different ventures covering 
the Witwatersrand, Klerksdorp, Zoutpansberg, Malmani, Barberton and 
Albany districts. In 1887 twelve claims were held at Potchefstroom, with 
a further quarter share in the Marico Syndicate, both of these ventures 
being related to the discovery of gold in the western Transvaal. A 
number of stands were also owned in the town of Klerksdorp, while shares 
were held in a Vaal River Syndicate, presumably formed for the exploration 
of the coal deposits in the vicinity. On the Witwatersrand, besides the 
main reef claims already mentioned, sixteen Black Reef claims were held 
at Elsberg on the east Rand, later to be abandoned when proved unpayable. 
A further fifty claims were owned on the west Rand as part of the property 
66 
of the Klipspruit Syndicate, which were subsequently sold. The 
Company was also fairly heavily committed in the Barberton area, where in 
1889 two of its ventures were successfully floated as the City of 
67 Grahamstown Gold Mining Company and the Great Scot Gold Mining Company. 
While these successes lay in the future, it is .nevertheless worth noting 
that the net profit for the first year of operations of the Company 
amounted to £4 041 17s.4d., of which £4 000 was distributed to the share-
68 holders. 
The articles of association of the ' Prospecting Company specified 
f th ,69 Th the granting of powers for the formation 0 0 er companLes. e 
first opportunity in this regard came on the Witwatersrand. As already 
indicated, Cook was able to acquire the claims on an area of the main 
reef between Ferreira's Camp and the Natal Spruit. These claims formed 
part of those offered earlier to Hans Sauer at £40 each and which Rudd 
refused to buy because the reef was not visible, being covered with a 
layer of soil. 70 The Company itself was in no hurry to exploit the 
claims, preferring to wait until the adjoining Jubilee Company commenced 
operations. A further debate which delayed any commencement of serious 
66. Cory Library Ms6951, Ventures of the Grahamstown Gold Prospecting 
Company. 
67. Cory Library PR700, Directors Report for the Year Ending 30 
August 1889 of the Grahamstown Gold Prospecting Company. 
68. The Eastern Star, 14 September 1887. 
69. Cory Library MS6965, Articles of Association of the Grahamstown 
Gold Prospecting Company. 
70. Sauer, H., op.cit., pp.117-18. 
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mining activity was whether a new company should be formed to raise the 
necessary capital for developing the claims, or whether the Prospecting 
Company should 
h . 71 s are l.ssuea 
itself raise the funds required by debentures or another 
The initial reports from the Jubilee Company were 
extremely encouraging giving thirty ounces of gold from five tons of 
ore. Samples of their own claims also suggested that returns in excess 
72 
of one ounce per ton of rock might be expected. These results 
indicated that the claims might prove a viable entity on their own, and 
it was thus decided at a special general meeting in Grahamstown on 
Saturday 23 April 1887 to form a new company with a nominal capital of 
£7 000, to be called the Grahamstown Gold Mining Company Limited. 73 
The five and a half claims were duly transferred to the new Company for 
the considerations of 5 000 of that Company's £1 shares, which were then 
distributed on a ratio of ten new shares for every share held in the 
prospecting Company, the balance of 1 000 new shares being placed in 
the custody of the directors. The limited provision made for working 
capital for the new company was typical of so many of the early ventures 
and will be commented on throughout future chapters. The firm hold of 
the Prospecting Company on the new venture was thus assured, while 
considering that the new mining company was floated in Grahamstown it 
is likely that a considerable part of the 2 000 shares offered to the 
public were also taken up there. It is highly probable that a similar 
sequence of events was unfolded in many other South African towns. 
The new Grahamstown Gold Mining Company decided to appoint Mr James 
Butler C.E., previously employed in the construa.tion of the Grahamstown 
to Port Alfred Railway, as its engineer. The Company was indeed 
fortunate in that Butler had spent a little time at the Royal School 
of Mines. He was thus a man of some mining experience and was later 
to establish himself as one of the mining engineers of the Rand. In 
Johannesburg Butler found that the Company would gain considerably from 
an amalgamation of its claims and water rights with those 
. i i l' 74 Brothers, who owned four and a half adJo n ng c a~ms. 
of the Michael 
Their property 
was subsequently bought for £4 500, payable in £1 shares of the 
71. The Eastern Star, 15 April 1887. 
72. Ibid. 
73. The Eastern Star, 25 April 1887. 
74. The Eastern Star, 11 June 1887. 
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Grahamstown Company, which accordingly 
£11 000 and reduced its reserve to 500 
increased 
75 
shares. 
its nominal capital to 
Further details on 
the fate of the Company need not concern us, unless perhaps to point 
out that in December 1888 it was decided to accept an offer of £60 000, 
made on behalf of a Kimberley Syndicate, for the outright purchase of 
76 the property. In this way Grahamstown capitalists severed their 
connections with what became the New Grahamstown Gold Mining Company, 
which was then dominated by the interests of Barnato Brothers. 
Subsequent evidence suggests that the Grahamstonians had not lost 
significantly on the deal! 
The worcester Exploration and Gold Mining Company received an offer 
for its claims acquired by Hugo at a much earlier date. At a special 
general meeting held on 12 January 1887 a letter was read from the 
prominent firm of Pretoria attorneys, Messrs Markel and Du Tait, 
requesting an indication on whether the Company 
claims and, if so, what price it would consider 
was prepared to 
77 
reasonable. 
sell its 
~e 
response arrived at after lengthy debate was to suggest that the Company 
would be willing to sell at a liberal price provided that the greater 
part of the deal consisted of shares in the new company to be formed. 
A further meeting on 27 January disclosed that the interested party was 
. 78 
a certa~n Mr Barber . No further details are provided, and it can 
only be assumed that the person involved was Graham H. Barber, who with 
his brother F . H. Barber, had acquired considerable wealth ' at Barberton 
and who also held an interest in the adjoining Ferreira claims. By 
early February it was decided that the offer of £2 500 in cash and 250 
shares in the proposed company was unattractive and the decision was 
taken to work the claims on behalf of the Company. In addition to this 
direct involvement on the Witwatersrand, the worcester Company in its 
exploration capacity, involved itself in the other Transvaal gold fields, 
showing 
western 
a particular 
79 Transvaal. 
interest for the ill-fated Malmani field of the 
75. ~e Eastern Star, 13 June 1887. 
76. The Eastern Star, 12 December 1888 . 
77. Transvaal Archives, Inventory A755, Minute Book of the Worcester 
Exploration and Gold Mining Company. 
78. Ibid. 
79. Ibid. 
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In many respects the two exploration or prospecting companies out-
lined above may be considered as a more sophisticated form of the 
syndicate established for the purpose of acquiring claims or merely 
"interests" in the various mining ventures then being developed in the 
Transvaal. With regard to the Witwatersrand their activities were 
perhaps more intense than elsewhere, given the timing of their formation 
and the nature of the discovery which left any organisation with avail-
able capital resources in a position to secure advantageous deals. As 
Emden has indicated, the big money on the Rand was not made by those 
who came first and found the gold, but by those who came at the fateful 
moment and exploited it industrially.80 As is clear from the case of 
the Grahamstown Company, such syndicates and the companies they floated 
played a role in the entire consolidation process of the Rand claims. 
In the interlude, while companies and syndicates awaited the 
machinery which would ultimately prove the value of the field, the 
process of consolidation and share sales continued unabated, with" 
particular farms and blocks of claims suddenly taking on a popularity 
which was characterised by minor rushes. The broken nature of the 
various reef series west of Langlaagte made ' this area particularly prone 
to such events, such as that on the farm Leeupoort in the last week of 
october 1886 . 81 The general popularity of the West Rand no doubt also 
influenced capitalists like Rhodes and Robinson in the ultimate choice 
of their spheres of influence. It is an interesting feature of the 
Witwatersrand gold field that many of the earliest writers describing 
it set the date for its beginnings as the early months of 1887. It was 
then that the first companies, such as the Wemmer and Jubilee, commenced 
crushing their ores with their own mills. In the year which elapsed 
since the discovery, the curious and unique nature of the reefs had 
ensured only the desultory fossicking on claims necessary to prevent 
82 them being jumped by others, while the less fortunate and the eternal 
optimists continued the search for further and richer reefs. For some, 
such as William Knight on his Driefontein property, fossicking was 
80. Emden, P.H., op.cit., p.101. 
81. The Eastern Star, 1 November 1886. 
82. The Jumpers Gold Mining Company took its name from the fact that 
some of the claims which went to make up the property were 
unsuccessfully jumped three times prior to the formation of the 
Company. 
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extended to the systematic opening of the reef outcrop by a series of 
trenches, but such activity invariably only followed the fo~ation of 
the mining companies, few of which were formed in 1886. The financial 
resources of the numerous syndicates were more than extended in the bids 
and counter-bids which went towards the ultimate goal of consolidation, 
and which raised the price of claims accordingly. It is also necessary to 
to remember that during 1886 the capital resources of South Africa were 
considerably extended following the general recovery of the economy and 
the boom in Barberton shares, factors which assisted in keeping the 
Witwatersrand lion ice" until 1887 . Much talk and numerous press reports 
on the progress being made in discovering, opening and sampling, of the 
various reefs belies the limited activity actually taking place . 
Rather, the rush of the initial claim stakers had given way to the 
protracted poker game of the claim buyers. That this second phase was 
dominated by Kimberley capital cannot be denied, but similarly it should 
not be over-emphasised. Kimberley's capital was in competition with 
that of the rest of South Africa, in which its expertise was a hindrance 
and its ultimate dominance followed only after the final consolidation 
of the diamond industry in 1888 and the willful self destruction of so 
much South African capital in the collapse of the first Johannesburg 
stock exchange boom in 1889. It was then that the strength of Kimberley's 
capitalists was revealed, not so much in their own r~saurces but in 
their access to international finance. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE WITWATERSRAND GOLD MINING COMPANY 
The Witwatersrand Gold Mining Company was floated in Kimberley on 
1 September 1886. 1 The Articles of Association are dated 4 September 
1886, while the Company was registered at Kimberley on 29 November 1886, 
making it the earliest company formed to work the newly proclaimed 
goldfield. 2 The Company was established to undertake mining operations 
on the mynpacht of the farm "Driefontein" in the district of Heidelberg. 
The owner of the farm, Johannes Phillipus Kraft, took possession of the 
property on 27 January 1862, while on 23 June 1886, prior to the 
discovery of the Main Reef, Kraft -agreed to lease 4892 morgen 322 square 
roods of the farm to Hendrik (Harry) Wilhelm Struben. At this stage 
gold had not yet been discoVered on the property and Struben acquired 
the lease as a speculative prospecting proposition. He and his brother 
F.P.T. Struben took out several -such leases while still concentrating 
their energies on their property at wilgespruit. 3 The terms of the 
agreement with Kraft were for a five year lease, renewable for a total 
of twenty-five years, the rent for the first period being £100 per 
annum, thereafter £150. An additional provision was _that if payable 
gold was found on the farm Kraft would receive three per cent of the 
net profit of any mines established to exploit it.4 
On 19 August 1886 H.W. Struben ceded his lease on Driefontein to 
William Knight, a Kimberley entrepreneur, for £3 000. 5 In terms of 
the agreement F.P.T. Struben undertook the prospecting of the property 
and the subsequent opening of the reef with a pilot shaft which reached 
a depth of fifty feet before water became troublesome and caused the 
1. Diamond Fields Advertiser (Kimberley) 1 September 1886 . 
2. The farm Driefontein, on which the Company held both the mynpacht 
and lease, was the first farm proclaimed as a public digging 
along the Main Reef on 20 September 1886. 
3. For a short Biographical sketch of H.W. Struben see Dictionary 
of South African Biography. 
4. Gray, E.L., & J., The Discovery of the Witwatersrand Goldfields, 
p.167. 
5 . Ibid . 
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cessation of Operations. 6 On 24 August 1886 Knight was granted the 
mynpacht for the property for a period of ten years, whereupon he set 
about the formation of the "Witwaters Randt Gold Mining Company" to work 
the mynpacht and control the rest of the estate as landlord. There 
seems to have been some misunderstanding as to exactly what the agreement 
between Kraft and Struben entailed. In the Prospectus of the Company it 
is stated that the property was " • .. Owned by Mr. Knight on a lease 
from the owner." A dispute arose between Kraft and the Company which 
was taken to court in 1887. The decisiqn in this case7 was that Kraft 
had not made over his owner's rights to Struben in the original contract 
and this meant that Kraft, rather than the Company, remained entitled 
to receive half the licence money paid to the Government for claims sold 
or let from the farm. It appears that up to this time an amount of 
£503 for the sale of licences to diggers and prospectors working on the 
leased property was paid to Knight by the Government. The court's 
decision prompted the calling of a special general meeting of shareholders 
at Kimberley on 1 September 1887, where a provisional agreement was rati-
fied for the outright purchase of the property. Full ownership was 
recognised as essential for the successful exploitation of the estate 
8 
and the farm was subsequently bought for £10 900. 
The Witwatersrand Company was incorporated under Act No.23 of 1861 
of the Cape of Good Hope, and subsequently registered in the South 
African Republic. 9 The capital of the Company was £210 000 divided 
into £10 shares. Here the Company was something of a pathfinder with 
the issue of shares of this denomination and its lack of success with 
the placing of the stock convinced most of the companies subsequently 
formed to work the Witwatersrand of the greater desirability of the £1 
share. British mining stock in the years leading up to 1886 was usually 
issued at between £1 and £10, but the speculative nature of much overseas 
6. Struben Papers. Gubbins Library, University of the Witwatersrand. 
Ref. Al16, annexure F in copies of documents supporting Struben's 
claim to the discovery of the Witwatersrand goldfield. 
7. Gray, E.L., & J., op.cit . , p.167. Case of Kraft vs Bok and the 
Witwatersrand Gold Mining Company. 
8. Barlow Rand Archives. Archives of H. Eckstein and Company 
(Reference code H.E.), Vol . 5, File on the Witwatersrand Gold 
Mining Company Ltd. 
9. Ibid. 
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mining investment made the £1 share more popular with the British 
10 investor. While the Witwatersrand Company's stock was initially 
exclusively taken up by local investors, there can be no doubt that 
the promoters later intended unloading some of the shares on the London 
market. If this was the case the valuation of the shares was too high, 
as is borne out by the later splitting of the shares into £1 units. ll 
Here we must question the promoter's reasoning~ Previous experience 
on the diamond fields suggested to Knight that companies had been 
successfully floated with £10 shares. The diamond fields were, however, 
different in the important respect that they had followed the traditional 
pattern of the mining frontier. The prospectors and discoverers were 
followed by single independent miners who, when conditions for individ-
ual initiative deteriorated, formed partnerships and small companies to 
raise the necessary funds to carryon. These small concerns subsequently 
underwent amalgamation into the listed companies which prevailed down 
to the final consolidation of the diamond industry in the late 1880's. 
The companies thus floated on the diamond fields were formed to work 
blocks of claims which were already proven. Knight's Witwatersrand 
claims lacked this surety and were thus unlikely to draw much popular 
support at £10 per share. It can only be presumed that Knight hoped to 
instil confidence in his venture through the choice of a larger 
denomination for shares, or to attract institutional ,investment. 
The first board of directors were, George H. Goch, chairman, a 
Kimberley merchant, E.J. Earp representing Messrs Maxwell and Earp of 
Cape Town, William Knight, H.W. Struben, Alexander McGregor, the mayor 
of Kimberley, John A. Roger representing Messrs Wood and Company of 
Kimberley, and James Hay representing Messrs Irvine and Company, also 
of Kimberley. In keeping with so much of the early investment on the 
Witwatersrand, all were connected with the diamond mining industry. 
It is possible that Knight and Struben were acquaintances in the 
early days of the Kimberley fields. Struben was not very successful 
there and left in 1871 or early 1872,12 while George Goch moved from 
10. Jefferys, J.B., liThe Denomination and Character of Shares, 
1855-1885." in Carus Wilson, E.M. (ed.), Essays in Economic 
History, pp.344ff . 
11. See below, p.38. 
12. Struben, R., Taken at the Flood, p.136. 
27 
Swellendam to Kimberley in 1872 where he established himself as a 
general dealer. On receiving news of the gold discovery on the Witwaters-
rand, Goch was one of the early travellers to the new find. What he saw 
prompted him to move permanently to the Rand and to eventually relinquish 
all ties with Kimberley. Besides his interest in the Witwatersrand 
Company he also floated two of his own, the George Goch and the Wemmer 
. 13 Compan~es . 
The Prospectus indicated that four conglomerate, gold bearing reefs 
had been discovered on the property. While the thickness of these · reefs 
varied from two to twelve feet, it was not recognised that the thick 
south reef was the .least valuable of the four. Th.e south reef declined 
in value the further east from Johannesburg it was found . It was 
14 
subsequently not mined at all on the Witwatersrand property. It was 
indeed impressive to suggest, as the prospectus did, that the combined 
average thickness of twenty three feet of reef extended over three and 
a half miles in length, all of it supposedly payable. At this early 
stage there was no knowing just how deep the reef extended and not a 
little speculation suggested that it would peter out at no great depth. 
On the basis of the pilot shafts it was estimated to extend for at least 
130 feet down. The actual shape of the mynpacht taken out by Knight is 
a clear indication of 
the importance of the 
the weight given to this factor in determining 
15 property. The narrow foot of the. T shaped 
mynpacht was initially considered important only in that it followed 
the floor of the southward slope of the valley where several storage 
dams were constructed to ensure the water supply of the mine. The 
significance of the land to the south of the outcrop was only realised 
16 
with the development of the deep level properties after 1889. 
In 1886 the length of the property along the line of outcrop was 
considered more important . 
Prior to publishing· the prospectus, Knight entered into a contract 
with Messrs Robey and Company of London for the supply of two crushing 
mills of fifty stamps each, together with the necessary engines to 
operate them, amalgamators and other equipment, at a cost of £21 000. 
13. Ibid., p.1S. 
14 . Hatch, F.H. & Chalmers, J . A., The Gold Mines of the Rand, pp . 39,43. 
15. See maps · facing p. 24. 
16. Cartwright, A.P . , The Corner House, pp.104ff. 
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It was estimated that when fully operational the crushing capacity of 
the battery would be 50 000 tons per annum. As it transpired this target 
was not reached within the first ten years of operation. Knight held 
himself responsible for the fulfilment of the contract and also under-
took the management of the works, without remuneration, until 1 March 
1887. 
The Kimberley public was not given any great length of time in 
which to consider the merits of the prospectus published in the Diamond 
Fields Advertiser on 1 September 1886. All applications for shares had 
to be entered before four o'clock the following afternoon and only 
1 100 shares were taken up by the public . Of the 21 000 shares the 
vendors took 15 000 fully paid up shares and £45 000 in cash as payment 
for the property. The lack of public enthusiasm forced Knight and his 
backers to buy up the balance of the shares in order to complete the 
list, thus giving the bulk of the shares to the directors and the 
interests they represented. Clearly Knight had seriously underestimated 
the Kimberley public's enthusiasm for the Witwatersrand, particularly 
the wealthier capitalist element of that society. It is well known 
that Rhodes remained sceptical of the discovery for some time, while 
those better informed, like Alfred Beit and J . B. Robinson, were 
concentrating their efforts on the richer central Rand. Few were 
willing to be rushed into participation while the denomination of the 
shares largely excluded the smaller investor, who found greater 
opportunity for investment in the Barberton boom. 
The prospectus stipulated that £15 000 of working capital was 
necessary and of ~his amount, one third was to be held by the Company 
in shares, to be issued if and when required. The sale of this reserve 
was made sooner than the directors anticipated. In an interview with 
E.P. Mathers, Knight stated that already while the initial cost of 
machinery and equipment was set at £21 000, additional costs would 
raise the figure to at least £25000 . 17 In the same interview Knight 
estimated that by the time operations commenced some £43 000 would have 
been spent on land, machinery and preliminary works. Of this sum 
Knight was forced by the limited provision for working capital to 
spend £36 000 himself. 
17. Mathers, E.P., The Gold-Fields Revisited, pp.272ff. 
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Again, the cost of moving mining equipment, most of which was landed 
at Cape Town rather than Durban, besides delaying the date for the 
commencement of operations, also raised the transport costs to an 
estimated £10 000. 18 Underestimation of working capital requirements 
was one of the major problems facing all of the early Witwatersrand 
outcrop companies. 19 It was generally believed that sums of between 
£10 000 and £20 000 would suffice for the commencement of mining opera-
tions but such amounts proved totally inadequate as, besides the high 
costs of transport for heavy mining equipment by oxwagon from the 
coast, there were labour requirements and various capital costs. 
Given the shortage of working capital of the Witwatersrand Company, 
Knight made the added mistake of over investing in fixed assets. 
Knight's action regarding the formation and size of the Witwaters-
rand Company suggests that he was a man consumed with the desire to 
achieve great wealth and success on the n.ew gold field. Success had 
not eluded him in Kimberley but it had failed to place him amongst the 
names .by which the early diamond fields are remembered. His was not 
a success of the magnitude of Rhodes, Beit or Barnato. Knight too 
commenced fram humble beginnings when, at the age of seventeen, he 
arrived penniless at the Cape in 1860 . He subsequently established 
himself as a master-builder in Natal before embarking for the diggings 
in 1872, where he built his reputation ·and fortune as· a professional 
mine manager . Commenting on his success a Cape Times correspondent wrote, 
"There is not a failure attached to his name. 1I20 As manager of the 
21 French Company he affected an efficient reorganisation of its working 
methods, while in the case of the Pullinger Company in the Bultfontein 
workings he saved the company from bankruptcy, stepping in when the £10 
shares had fallen in value to 58. each, he " ... took the management 
into his own hands, purchased two-thirds of the shares, which now 
readily Change hands at £6 17s. 6d. and the Company has been paying a 
dividend of two per cent for many months past." Likewise, he started 
the British Company which paid ninety three per cent on the capital as 
dividends in a period of two and a half years.21 This Kimberley 
18. Ibid . , p.273. 
19. This statement is borne out in each of the company histories which 
follow. 
20. The Eastern Star (Grahamstown), 6 September 1886, quoting the 
Cape Times. 
21. Ibid. 
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success stemmed from a determination for deep digging when the blue 
ground was 
element of 
first struck, and from not placing any significance on the 
22 luck. In this way his fortune and reputation had slowly 
grown. 
Encouraged by friends in Pretoria to inspect the Rand he was so 
satisfied that he decided to commit himself heavily.23 One suspects 
that, like J.B. Robinson, he looked to the Witwatersrand not only f~r 
the wealth but also the aura of greatness which eluded them at Kimberley. 
Hence the share capital of his Company was by far the largest of any 
organisation formed to work the early Witwatersrand. 24 An alternative 
viewpoint would be to suggest that he recognised the scale of operations 
required to work what was to prove essentially a low grade ore mining 
proposition. This approach would, however, provide no explanation for 
the limited provision for working capital and the heady predictions made 
by Knight regarding the quality of the ore. As it was, his 100 stamp 
battery, the largest of its kind on the field for some years, represented 
a gross over-investment in fixed assets in relation to the small working 
capital, an imbalance which cost the Company dearly. By contrast, the 
Wemmer Company of George 
25 
with only five ·stamps. 
Goch commenced regular production in May 1887 
Similarly, the first battery erected on the 
field was a three stamp Sandycroft modei on the Jubilee mine which 
commenced operations on 22 April 1887. 26 
By the end of 1887 conceptions of what was required for the success-
ful exploitation of the Witwatersrand had changed. The promoters of 
Knight's Company would have had more success had they embarked on a less 
ambitious venture. The scale of operations was in many respects out of 
keeping with the hesitant beginnings of the Witwatersrand goldfield 
where the stigma of the earlier failures at Eersteling and De Kaap still 
22. Obituary of William Knight in South Africa, 19 February 1900, p.475. 
23. The Eastern Star, 5 December 1888. 
24. By 1891 the nominal capital of 19 companies exceeded this figure. 
In terms of size of property the Simmer and Jack G.M.Co., Rand 
Mines Ltd., and Randfontein Estates G.M. Co. were larger by 
1900. 
25. (W}itwatersrand (C}hamber of (M}ines, Seventh Annual Report, 
Appendix p.l, and see below Chapter IV, p.l08. 
26. Jeppe, C.B., Gold Mining on the Witwatersrand, Vol. I, p.21. 
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clouded the perspectives of many investors in Kimberley and abroad. Yet 
if success was to come capital was needed, not as vendors shares, but in 
the form of working capital. 
On 13 November 1886 F.P.T. Struben began crushing ore from the 
Witwatersrand Company at his battery on the wilgespruit. 27 This meant 
the conveyance of the ore over a considerable distance and it is doubtful 
if any large quantity was crushed at this site. Mathers indicates that, 
" ... later the Company had a test crushing of 50 tons, which gave a 
return of 12,5 dwts.", which is probably a reference to the crushing at 
Wilgespruit. An interesting side light is that the first crushing of 
the Company also showed the presence of nearly twenty per cent silver in 
the retorted bullion. Henry indicates that the Standard Bank thus soon 
became a cautious buyer of bullion, preferring rather to only make 
partial advances against deliveries of retorted gold until it was smelted 
28 
and sold. One of the earliest criticisms of the prospectus suggested 
that ten samples taken from the three and a half miles of outcrop reef 
29 
were hardly a true reflection of the property's worth. Fifty tons 
would allay criticism and evince further the profitability of the mine 
but in this respect a return of only 12,5 dwts. compared unfavourably 
with the five ounces to the ton claimed in the prospectus, a discrepancy 
which could not be attributed to the high silver content. If the crushing 
was a veiled bid to raise the market quotation for the Company's shares 
and to create a market for them as a means of raising working capital, 
the return was a disaster. 30 It also prompted a far greater reticence 
on the part of Knight to make further predictions about the value of 
unmined ore. 3 1 
There was a long delay in the commencement of operations by the 
Company, the Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines giving August 1887 as the 
27. Gray, E.L. & J., op.cit., p.29. 
28. Henry, J.A . , The First Hundred Years of the Standard Bank, p.94. 
29. Diamond Fields Advertiser, 7 September 1886. Review of the 
Company I s prospects by liCensor". 
30. The use of this technique to raise working capital was successfully 
practiced by the Wemmer Gold Mining Company . See below, Chapter 
IV, pp.119-20. 
31. The Eastern Star, 21 November 1887, reported that Knight would 
make no further declaration until fully 5 000 tons of ore, drawn 
from every part bf the mine, had been crushed so as to ensure a 
truly reliable return. 
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first date for an official return from the Knight's property. No 
indication is shown of the tonnage milled or of the number of stamps in 
operation and the figure of 311 ounces persisted for the remaining 
monthly returns of the year 1887, suggesting that the amount should 
rather be considered as an average monthly return. The Wemmer Company 
with its rich ore and five stamps offered a better record. 
An August 1887 report states that the battery was erected on a 
solid foundation, although subsequent reports suggest otherwise. Each 
set of five stamps, with a crushing weight of 750 pounds per stamp was 
fed by a separate stone crusher, from where the ore was allowed to fall 
by gravity into the hoppers which automatically fed each stamp. The 
pulp from the stamps was first led into a Jordan's amalgamator and 
.. 
subsequently onto the amalgamation plates while the tailings were passed 
over Frue Vanner concentrators. The mill was run by two sixty horse 
power engines. 32 By October the automatic feeders were not yet in 
position, requiring that the stamps be fed manually by African labourers. 
It was also soon recognised that the Robey . amalgam plates were less than 
perfect, while the Frue Vanners below them were generally 
be of no practical value and were simply used as settling 
considered to 
33 tanks. Each 
set of 25 stamps had a European overseer "with native assistants to do 
all that is necessary." The two overseers in 1887 were Tom Halliday 
from Fort Beaufort in the eastern Cape, and "the son of the Hon.Colonel 
Schermbrucker", while Mr A.A. Stanton was manager of the mine. The 
credentials of these men are not given. It is possible that they might 
have known Knight in Kimberley but it is doubtful if their knowledge of 
gold mining or the amalgam process of gold recovery was at all substantial. 
No better clue of this needs be given than their rejection of the Frue 
Vanners as part of the reduction process, thus helping to establish the 
myth popular on the Rand before 1889 that all but an insignificant 
amount of gold was captured on the amalgam plates. 
By January 1888 fifty stamps were in operation. Delays in the 
arrival and erection of the balance resulted in the full 100 stamps only 
coming into operation in July 1888,35 while by September of that year 
32. The Eastern Star, 24 August 1887. 
33. The Eastern Star, 19 October 1887. 
34. Ibid. 
35. W.C.M . Seventh Annual Report. Appendix, p.1. 
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only twenty stamps remained in working order. 
The stamp battery proved to be the Achilles heel of the Company in 
the early years of operation. In addition to the over-investment already 
mentioned, technical problems arose. The stamp mill acquired was a 
36 Jordan model, and from the accounts of other early companies it would 
seem that the Sandycroft and Fraser and Chalmers models were both 
sturdier and more efficient in operating on Rand conglomerate. A mining 
engineer also noted that the Jordan model was "the first effort of the 
makers in that direction ... 37 The second mistake was made in the siting 
of the reduction works. Mathers indicated that they were situated a 
mile and a half from the outcrop itself. Knight's reason for doing this 
was to bring water to the mill by gravity rather than having to pump 
water to a site closer to the mine. 38 In this way the necessity for 
an additional pumping engine was overcome together with the expensive 
fuel required to run it. In the long run it would have been far cheaper 
to carry water to the are than vice versa, particularly as electri'c 
39 power was introduced by certain mines at an early date. As it was, 
a water race nearly 4 000 yards long was required to carry water to the 
machinery. A tramway was eventually built to carry the ore to the site, 
replacing the mule carts which operated initially for over nine months. 
The quality of the equipment supplied by Messrs Robey and Company was 
condemned by successive managements and by September -1888, _ or within 
three months of the full 100 stamps assuming operation, fifty of them 
had required major renovation or replacement by castings from the 
40 Sandycroft Company. Despite this patching only twenty five stamps 
remained operational for a total of ninety days in 1890, producing 
2 009 ounces 2 dwts. of gold. 41 
36. Mathers, E.P., op.cit., p.272. 
37. Report on the Property of the Witwatersrand Gold Mining Company. 
by Hennen Jennings, Johannesburg,S November 1893. (Jennings 
Report). See Nourse Family Papers, Gubbins Library, University 
of the Witwatersrand. Item Gc17. 
38. Mathers, E.P., op.cit., p.272. 
39. The first permanent plant on the fields for generating electric 
power commenced operations in May 1892 on the property of the 
Champ d' Or Gold Mining Company. See The Star, 12 May 18-92. 
40. H.E.5. Quoting Directors Report for the Half Year Ending 
30 September 1888. 
41. W.C.M. Seventh Annual Report. Appendix, p.i. 
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As the largest mining company operating on the Rand in the initial 
stages, the Witwatersrand Company held a certain aura of authority which 
lesser companies and their managements took as a guide for many of their 
own operations, particularly in view of Knight's own success at Kimberley. 
Nevertheless, the approach adopted by Knight in the early months of his 
management were 
on this Mathers 
not conducive 
42 
wrote, 
to sound mining production. Commenting 
"Taking their cue from the Witwatersrand [Knight's] Company, 
nearly the whole of the main reef claimholders about Johannes-
burg are engaged purely and simply in surface mining. 
Cuttings or trenches ate made in the ground, and the reefs 
are bared to make what the 'inexperienced investor is to 
consider as a grand mining demonstration. II 
The status of the Company as the leader of the Witwatersrand was 
further enhanced when the mine was chosen as the example of the industry 
to be displayed to the State President on his visit to Johannesburg in 
December 1888. It was hoped that the full 100 stamps could be brought 
into operation but in the end only fifty were prepared in time. The 
event passed without incident, the President being given "a few ounces 
of the month I s production", while he reciprocated by lifting a bar of 
43 gold of over 400 ounces with one hand. 
Wi,th three and a half miles of outcrop Knight saw no urgency for 
determining the possible depth of the reef on the property. Four of 
the shafts were sunk to depths varying from fifty three feet to fifty 
eight feet into the reef. Water seepage then discouraged any further 
attempts to extend them and Knight was probably satisfied in the know-
ledge that the reef continued to that depth. This information confirmed 
the claims made in the prospectus and, as he pointed out to Mathers, his 
, , i 1 'bl 44 ~ntentLon was to pursue open cast min ng for as ang as POSSL e. 
The mining technique bred at Kimberley died hard, even if the gold 
bearing reef was only a fraction of the width of the diamondiferous 
pipes. Mathers saw this "superficial banket panorama II as yet another 
way in which scarce working capital was wasted and correctly predicted 
42. Mathers, E.P., op . cit . , p.272. 
43. The Eastern Star,S December 1888. 
44. Mathers, E.P., op.cit., p .273. 
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that it was ultimately the shareholders who would bear the painful 
45 
smart. What was required was the rapid exposure of the reef by con-
ventional shaft and stope mining practice. The confined width of the 
reef and the necessity for eventually adopting pit mining suggested that 
the sooner this was done the greater would be the chances for an early 
return to shareholders. 
One can only speculate whether it was the intention of Knight to 
attempt open cast mining as a labour intensive, and hence cheaper, 
method of gaining an early profit from the venture. The funds raised in 
this way could then be used for the conventional exploitation of the 
property. Open cast mining, as he suggested to Mathers, overcame one of 
the problems confronting the early Rand capitalists. This was the 
shortage and subsequently higher cost of skilled labourers and miners. 
46 When depth became a problem, Knight suggested, 
"We simply require [skilled] miners then, and we can soon 
train enough natives to do that. We have very few white men 
mining at Kimberley; the natives soon get into the way of 
it . " 
There was also a shortage of black unskilled labourers. About 100 
were employed on the mine in 1887, while Knight expressed the need for 
about 300 such workers. The following year stanton sent to Basutoland 
and Zululand in search of 600 men to work for the Company but without 
47 
any marked success. Knight was obviously more confident 
the additional Africans, who were also very much cheaper to 
of finding 
48 
employ. 
Time and growing experience, Knight hoped, would overcome the lack of 
a large skilled white labour force. He nevertheless recognised the 
disadvantages of the early black labour force, namely its mobility. 
Every effort was made in the summer of 1887/88 to push development of 
the works to a point where there would be sufficient ore in reserve to 
keep the stamps operating in the winter months of 1888 when he correctly 
49 
anticipated a black labour shortage. 
45. Ibid., p.267. 
46. Ibid.,p.273. 
47. The Eastern Star, 21 May 1888. 
48. Johnstone, F .A. , Class, Race and Gold, pp.20ff. 
49. The Eastern Star, 4 April 1888. 
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In the early months of 1888 the first superficial attempt was made 
at pit mining when the level of over 2 000 feet was driven at a depth of 
ninety feet to link the various shafts which had been sunk to that depth. 
The intention was to use the level for upward stoping of the ore which 
lay between the surface excavations and that depth. One result of this 
practice was that most of the ore so mined reached the surface in a very 
sodden state. The surface excavations in the wet summer months of 1887/ 
88 acted as reservoirs and much of the water percolated down into the 
underground workings. The effect of the water was to make even a 
superficial sorting of the are from the barren casing rock impossible, 
so that it all had to pass through the mill. It would seem that Knight 
did not view the scene with too much trepidation. There is no mention 
of an are reserve in the early references, so that it was probably 
necessary for him to feed all material coming from the mine into the mill 
simply to keep the average of twenty five stamps operating. Weighing 
against this was the fact that such indiscriminate crushing of rock 
resulted in a lower return of gold per ton crushed and a higher 
total working cost. These higher costs in turn meant a more rapid 
erosion of the financial reserves without the prospect of any significant 
profit margin. By April 1888 Knight was already speaking of the 
necessity for another capital infusion 0f £40 000. 50 
The failure of the mining operations to yi.eld a · satisfactory 
return, the lack of ready working capital, and the virtual collapse of 
the crushing plant, all contributed to the defeat of Knight's plans. 
By 1888, faced with seemingly insurmountable problems, Knight and his 
fellow directors began seeking the means to extricate their capital 
from the crippled Company. The first Johannesburg stock exchange boom 
of 1888/89 presented the opportunity they were seeking. By mid 1889 
the Witwatersrand Company's shares had been boomed and Knight and 
Struben had rid themselves of their major shareholding in the Company. 
The early days of the Witwatersrand goldfield .reveal a period of 
general uncertainty in the financial state of most of the companies 
formed to work the outcrop reef. Rumour of the profitability of 
various ventures was rife and share prices fluctuated widely . Under 
these circumstances too much emphasis was placed by shareholders and 
management of the various mines on the speculative value of shares. 
50 . Ibid. 
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Too little attention was given to the dividend earning capacity of the 
companies. Many properties were not yet proved; they awaited machinery, 
men and expertise to render their operations viable. Everyone "knew" 
the gold was there and that was sufficient to encourage the orgy of 
speculation. Most share prices rested on this speculative basis. 
Under these circumstances directors showed little inclination to keep 
shareholders properly informed of company progress. Not that there was 
any legal requirement that they should do so. Emden gives the example 
of the Jumpers Gold Mining Company, where in the London Stock Exchange 
Year Book for 1889 the authors could only print that they "believed" 
51 the capital of the company was E42 000. By 1888 the situation was 
reached whe:e share prices were out of all proportion to actual 
conditions. This presented a "golden" opportunity for mine directors 
and managements to raise necessary finance by speculating in shares of 
their own companies. In this way some of them overcame the initial 
shortcomings of limited working capital as provided by their promoters. 
It also often resulted in the foolish forCing of output and yield per 
ton by working selected rich ores in an attempt to influence the market. 
Emden suggests that in this way technical management also assisted in 
preparing the era "which without exaggeration may well be termed a 
swindle. ,,52 The industry early developed the habit of keeping a 
weather eye on the stock exchange lists. These were as important to 
many early companies as technical developmen~ or output and were often 
directly related. The seemingly insatiable need for additional capital 
insured this. Only for the very richest mines was the limited initial 
working capital sufficient to allow them the opportunity of declaring 
early dividends. 53 In low grade properties, like Knight's, additional 
capital for development was imperative. The Company needed the .infusion 
in order to re-equip the battery and open the mine to a point where it 
could supply the capacity of the mill. Given the low 
the are, even when sorted, large scale production was 
51. Emden, P.H., Randlords, pp.229ff. 
52. Ibid., p.231. 
gold content of 
. 54 
essentl..al. 
53. Within a month of the commencement of operations, the Jubilee 
Gold Mining Company on 20 May 1887 paid a dividend of 5 per cent. 
See Jeppe, C.B . , op.cit., p.22. 
54. The average gold content of the ore worked on the Witwatersrand 
property in 1890/91 was 4,9 dwts. per ton. See Jennings Report, 
p.3. 
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The directorate became increasingly reluctant to undertake this invest-
ment and while the shares were boomed in the conventional manner, the 
intention was no longer to plough the profits into the mine. 
The early press was a useful organ for the dissemination of 
information in regard to the mining companies and the directors of the 
Witwatersrand were not shy in using this facility. In the Diamond 
Fields Advertiser of 18 September 1886, it was reported that Harry 
Struben anticipated that working expenses on the Rand would not exceed 
five shillings per ton. In the first ten years a figure of thirty 
shillings was a more accurate average. Nevertheless on the basis of 
his calculations it was estimated that the Company would show an annual 
profit of ElSa 000. 55 At this stage there was very little evidence to 
indicate either working costs or ore qualities. When crushing on the 
property was delayed owing to the faulty battery, the press was resorted 
to as a means of keeping share prices up. The Daily Independent 
reported on 1 June 1887 that Knight estimated a grand return of twenty 
five per cent on the full capital of the Company "soon after the first 
crushing has taken place." All this was not lost on the speculating 
public and share prices stood at between E20 'and £22 las. The disap-
pointing return for the first month of production, however, dropped 
56 the price to below par. The balance sheet for the half year ending 
31 March 1888 indicated that the Company was in debt to the extent of 
£23 000. 57 
The inglorious results from initial production came at an 
inauspicious time. The need for working capital had never been greater. 
In a desperate attempt again to encourage speculators a meeting of 
shareholders was held on 11 April 1888, when it was decided to sub-
divide the El0 shares into El units. It was also agreed to increase 
the capital of the Company to £250 000 by the creation of 40 000 El 
shares. The additional capital was ostensibly intended for the erection 
of another mill of 100 stamps. The new battery would replace the faulty 
works while these stamps were repaired. Knight informed the press that 
by the time the new battery was erected the water storage dams would be 
55. Daily Independent, (Kimberley) 31 August 1887. 
56 . H.E.5., p.5 . 
57. H.E.5, p.8 
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completed, locomotives in use on the tramway carrying ore to the mill, 
and certain unspecified shafts sunk to depths of between 300 and 500 
feet. Hence the mine would be developed to a point where "with the 
minimum of labour" the 200 stamps could be regularly supplied with ore. 58 
Only four shareholders were present at the meeting while seven others 
were represented by proxies, a good indication of the concentration of 
ownership of the Company at this stage. It is doubtful if it was ever 
intended to actually acquire the new battery. The wildness, or naivity, 
of Knight's pronouncements suggest otherwise. If, however, we accept 
the good intentions of the board of directors, then we can see that 
while in the long term it was hoped that the second mill would 
substantially help to reduce the marginal cost of each ton of ore crushed, 
the short term gain would be the reflection of continuing director con-
fidence. Such confidence would hopefully help to raise share prices, a 
move which would assist the directors in their intentions, whatever 
these were. Stock market manipulation could be used to settle immediate 
debts and carry the Company over the rough patch before increased output 
reduced working costs; or it could be used for the wholesale unloading 
of the Company's shares onto the well prepared market. In the event, 
a special meeting held on 14 November 1888, some eight months later, 
decided to appropriate the additional capital to the liquidation of 
59 debts. Little was said of the proposed development project. 
The directors and major shareholders at this stage started actively 
seeking an alternative solution to the Company's problems . At the same 
November meeting the chairman, Mr J.A. Rogers, announced that the board 
had received "some very satisfactory offers for a portion of their 
mynpacht, the sale of which would place their Company in a highly satis-
factory position." This news alone caused share prices to rise. 
Struben, who was in London at the time, decided that the fate of the 
Company was such that the sooner he parted with most of his large share-
holding, the better. He later confessed to having a very unclear picture 
60 
of the events taking place in Johannesburg. This led him to unload 
a large block of his shares at prices between 27s. 6d. and 45s. to 
Wernher, Beit and Company, while at the same time this firm was buying 
58. The Eastern Star, 18 April 1888. 
59. H.E . S., p.8 and The Eastern Star, 21 November 1888. 
60. The Star, (Johannesburg) 16 March 1894. 
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61 Knight out in Johannesburg at 65s. In a letter to G. Lys from 
London in November 1888, Struben wrote, 62 
"There was no movement in Knight's and I knew of nothing 
having been done in the way of milling or [mining] to warrant 
a rise so got taken on the hop by Jim Taylor and Beit who 
were better informed and sold them a big parcel at 27/6d. 
and 45/- and only got Langerman's cable after the business 
was done. Knight might have let us know of the business 
considering that he got the ground from us ..... II 
By 11 December 1888 it was decided to negotiate the sale of 204 
claims of the Company's mynpacht. As indicated above, H. Eckstein and 
Company and their London principals, Wernher, Beit and Company, were 
kept very well informed on the affairs of the Company. In late October 
H. Eckstein communicated to London that E. Lippert was treating for 12 
of the Company's claims for an amount of £75 000. Inquiries had shown 
that the extent of the Company's debt amounted to £50 000 to £60 000, 
63 
so that little of this amount was expected to go to the shareholqers. 
On the other hand it was felt that news of the negotiations would cause 
a rise in share prices, and as already indicated, both the Johannesburg 
and London offices began buying into the Co~pany in anticipation of 
these events. 
At the special general meeting held in December it was decided to 
accept three of the four offers made for the purchase of parts of the 
mynpacht. The offer from E.A. Lippert for seventy two claims, twelve 
on the line of reef, for £75 000 was accepted and the ground, on the 
western boundary of the property, was subsequently included in the 
properties which went to constitute the May Consolidated Gold Mining 
Company. A second offer from Messrs Liddle, Fletcher and Forbes, for 
the seventy two claims adjoining those sold to Lippert also raised an 
amount of £75 000. These claims were subsequently floated as the 
Glencairn Gold Mining Company. The same firm, acting on behalf of 
different clients offered an amount of £75 000, £60 000 in cash and 
61. Ibid. 
62. Struben Papers. Letters, H.W. Struben to G. Lys, 7 November 1888. 
63. H.E.51. H. Eckstein & Co. to Jules Porges & Co., 26 October 1888, 
p.26. Wernher and Beit were partners in the firm of Jules 
Porges and Company, taking it over and altering the name to 
Wernher, Beit and Company on the retirement of Jules Porges in 
1889. For convenience the partnership is referred to as Wernher, 
Beit and Company throughout the text. 
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15 000 shares in the company to be formed to work the ground, for the 
sixty most easterly claims of the mynpacht. This ground was 
subsequently floated as the Balmoral Gold Mining Company. A fourth 
offer, submitted by Mr Godfrey Lys, a nephew of H.W. Struben, of 
£125 000 for twenty claims on the line of reef and also extending the 
full width of the mynpacht, was rejected. 64 There seems little reason 
to doubt that H.W. Struben was involved in this offer, the refusal of 
which helped to colour 
65 in subsequent years. 
his attitude towards the directors of 
At least one director, Mr Shiels,66 
the Company 
opposed 
the sales on the grounds that the Company should work the claims itself. 
In reply the chairman suggested that the existing property was too 
vast for any single company to work effectively. Given the low grade 
of the ore in the property" a point at least recognised in the need to 
increase the crushing capacity, there was little to justify the decision 
to sell other than as a means of raising fresh working capital. 
The one point which was not specifically mentioned at the meeting 
but which intimately influenced the future prospects of the Company 
and made the retention of a sizable proportion of the income from the 
sales essential, was the nature of the land ' sold. While no systematic 
sampling of the property had taken place, it was generally recognised 
that the claims in the western portion ' were richer, although the reef 
was more fragmented, making mining more difficult. 'Anoth,er factor was 
that most of the mining and development work. undertaken since the opening 
of the mine fell within the claims sold for the formation of the 
67 Balmoral Company. The Witwatersrand Company was thus left to make 
what was virtually a fresh start at the end of 1888. It had the sum 
of £210 000 in cash with which to begin and required only the commit-
ment of the directorate successfully to relaunch the Company. 
On 7 February 1889 the chairman announced that the sale had been 
effected. On the strength of the cash inflow the board decided to bow 
to their own inclinations and the expectations of shareholders and 
64. The Eastern Star, 17 December 1888. 
65. See below, pp.54ff. 
66. Shiels also opposed the later sale of the tributor claims. 
He was, nevertheless, accused by Goch in 1894 of "grasping 
avarice" and complicity in the 1888 transactions. 
67. The Star, 19 June 1889. 
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speculators and distribute the bulk of the proceeds as a special 
dividend. It was decided to payout fifteen shillings per share or 
seventy five per cent on the issued capital, which absorbed an amount 
of £187 500. The Balmoral shares were also distributed as a scrip 
dividende Needless to say the price of Witwatersrand shares rose to 
between £3 5s. and £3 lOs. The decision to distribute this amount 
led to a belated protest from three Johannesburg directors namely, 
Goch, Hay and Page, not at the principle of the distribution but on 
the grounds that the £22 500 left was insufficient for the successful 
exploitation of the property. The motive for the action of the 
majority of the board is clear. They had little intention of retain-
ing their control of the Company and wished to recoup their investment 
in the seemingly unprofitable venture. As early as November of the 
previous year Knight gave the refusal of the balance of his holdings 
68 
at 55s. to H. Eckstein and Company. 
By 30 May 1889 Knight and Hay had resigned as directors. Knight's 
resignation was prompted by his sale of shares and by a report sub-
mitted to the Company by the consulting engineer H.G. Humby. In this 
report was revealed the "very unsatisfactory condition of affairs on 
69 the property" and served as an indictment of Knight as managing 
director and Stanton as manager. Stanton duly resigned in June 1889, 
leaving the Company's service at the end of August when a Mr Osborne ' 
70 took over the management. Humby suggested that the best portion of 
the property had been sold. Existing mining operations were condemned 
as being superficial, while the methods of haulage were considered 
primitive. The winding and pumping engines were erected on totally 
insufficient foundations of brushwood and rubble. No systematic plan 
of operation had been devised for the property. In part this reflects 
the haphazard methods of Stanton's management but one is also left to 
surmise whether the directors had any serious intention of seeing the 
property correctly and effectively mined following . the initial setbacks. 
Humby was appointed on the instigation of Struben, which might help to 
cast light on Knight's failure to inform him of the share dealings. 
68. H.E.51. H. Eckstein & Co. to Jules Porges & Co., 16 November 
1888, p.l00. 
69. H.E.5, p.13. 
70. The Star, 3 September 1889. 
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The resignation of these directors and the large investment in the 
Company's stock by Wernher, Beit and Company meant that the opportunity 
existed for this firm to exert a growing influence on the activities of 
the Company. Not that the involvement of the firm did not fluctuate. 
The initial reason for the interest expressed in the Company was to 
cash in on the handsome gains to be made from the fore-knowledge of the 
impending land sales in 1888. But having made good profits on the rise 
in the value of the Company's shares and from the subsequent dividend 
payment, Wernher, Beit and Company still chose to retain an interest 
in the Company. The first evidence of their growing influence was the 
appointment of Mr H.A. Rogers, on the proposal of Alfred Beit, to the 
Company's board. On 6 July 1889 the firm's commitment was brought 
into the open with the appointment of Mr J.B. Taylor as an alternate 
director to Shiels. 71 
The modus operandi of Wernher, . Beit and Company and their Johannes-
burg partners, is clearly stated in a letter written by J.B. Taylor 
to the London office on 16 ·August 1889 when the extent of their 
participation in the Witwatersrand Company was being reviewed. He 
72 lists the firm's interests in the Company at that date as follows: 
J.B. Taylor 1 000 shar~s 
Charles Rube 2 250 shares 
H. Eckstein 35 710 shares 
F. Eckstein 4 650 shares 
E. Bruch 5 512 shares 
A. Beit 4 577 shares 
53 699 shares of the 250 000 issued 
In this way, by parcelling out shares to various directors, the 
firm could always deny the full extent of its commitment while at the 
same time quickly rallying the voting power of the shares when needed. 
Another outcome of the dividend debacle and the shift in control of 
the Company, was the decision in June 1889 to remove the head office 
from Kimberley to Johannesburg, where closer control of the activities 
of the mine could be monitored. 
The philosophy of Wernher, Beit and Company and their Johannesburg 
partners is given in a letter written by J.B. Taylor to M. Rodolphe 
71 . H.E.5, p.12 . 
72. H.E.5, p.15. 
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Kann in July 1888, to enlist his and the Paris Rothschilds' financial 
support for the activities of the group. Taylor pointed out that they 
had never undertaken to support any company indulging in surface mining. 
He felt that the older outcrop companies could show good returns if 
correctly worked. It was Wernher, Beit and Company policy to stand by 
ready to take over these campa.nies as soon as trouble beset them in 
order that, II ••• we will be able to give them a new life with great 
profit to ourselves.,,73 It was undoubtedly in this spirit that the 
group decided to retain an interest in the Witwatersrand Company. 
Beit also noted that the shares of the Company were a fair investment 
even without dividends, as the 
capital from the income of the 
Company paid about six per cent on its 
74 
estate. The group's position was 
further strengthened with the appointment of Lionel Ji'hillips to the 
Company's board in January 1890. 
The chances for making quick profits were to prove as elusive to 
the new board as they had been to the old. The reconstituted board was, 
however, that much more determined that the Company be given the 
opportunity to prove itself. There was not a great amount of working 
capital available but it was decided to use it judiciously in the 
interests of the Company. In the half yearly report for September 1889 
a plan for the proper development of the property was placed before the 
shareholders. There were two parts to the scheme. It was recognised 
that the ore currently being crushed left no profit margin and that 
the state of development of the mine was such that it offered no 
continuity of ore supply' for the mill. In turn, the mill required 
extensive modification. The first section of the programme therefore 
entailed the closing of the mill and its rectification while a serious 
effort was made to push forward the development of the mine to a point 
where a regular and profitable ore supply was assured. The second part 
of the plan concerned the estate and an improvement in its revenue 
earning capacity. Current revenue from the estate. amounted to about 
E8 500 per annum and it was intended to increase this amount to at 
least E12 000 through the establishment of a plantation of trees to 
meet the timber needs of the mine and its neighbours, and a dam 
73. Cartwright, A.P., op . cit., p.76. 
74 . H.E.59. London Letters. A. Beit to L. Phillips, 3 March 1894, 
p.4. 
, . 
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A sketch by Ida Mae Stone showing the Witwatersrand Company 0 s battery 
house still incomplete in 1889. 
(Source: Leyds, G. A., A His tory of Johannesburg, p. 55. ) 
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construction programme for the sale of water to the surrounding mines. 75 
By the end of 1889 the financial state of the Company was such that 
only £8 250 19s. 6d. remained of the £22 500 retained from the sale of 
claims. 76 This amount was insufficient to meet all the capital 
requirements for the new programme . It was calculated that the cost of 
the eight dams envisaged in the plan could be met from the inflow of 
estate revenue. The total cost of the dam project was estimated at 
£7 400, while agreement was soon reached with the May Consolidated and 
Glencairn Companies for the supply of water early in 1890, which 
promised an income of £2 500 per annum. The first contract was therefore 
already providing a return of thirty four per cent per annum on the 
estimated expenditure. The signing of this contract for the sale of 
water was well timed for in the depressed conditions prevailing after 
the collapse of the 1889 boom, the estate revenue from stand and claim 
licences began falling Off. 77 
The capital requirements for the development of the mine and 
renovation of the mill were greater than any possible surplus from 
estate revenue or Company reserves. The alternative options were not 
mutually exclusive, and the board decided to plunge the Company once 
more into debt, while cherishing the hope that Eduard Lippert could 
again be prevailed upon to purchase another block of the Company's 
claims . 78 Mention is made of an offer of £225 000 for half of the 
Company's remaining mynpacht but the details 'of this proposal, declined 
by the board, have not survived. 79 The lack of any suitable offers 
placed a strong emphasis on the cheapest possible development of the mine 
and a speedy resumption of milling operations. 
To assist in the promotion of cheap mining Wernher, Beit and Company 
were responsible for importing a mine manager from America who boasted a 
reputation for working cheaply. He was Mr Henry Morris, late manager of 
the Caledonla Gold Mining Company in the Black Hills of Dakota, who 
75 . The Diggers' News, (Johannesburg) 31 January 1890. 
76. The Star, 21 June 1890. 
77 . Ibid. 
78 . H.E . 149. H. Eckstein & Co. to Wernher, Beit & Co., 4 April 1890, 
p . 175. 
79. The Diggers' News, 31 January 1890. 
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80 
replaced Osborne on 15 February 1890 . Phillips was sceptical of 
Morris's claims to make ore of less than ten pennyweights per ton pay, 
and the relationship between the two men remained strained down to 
b h . . d 81 Octo er w en Morr~s res~gne . His comment on Morris's resignation 
was, "He is an economical man but lacks grip of the concern. I hope we 
may get a better . II The replacement was Mr B.W. Blaine, who was destined 
to see long service with the Company and its tributors. The resignation 
of Morris and appointment of Blaine without the post being advertised 
evoked strong criticism from the press, which commented on Morris's 
success in making six dwts. ore pay two shillings profit per ton while 
Blaine supposedly had very little mining experience. 82 
The development of the mine was pushed forward rapidly in 1890 
under Morris so that by June some 16 650 tons of ore were in sight for 
stoping, a situation which 
crushing with 25 stamps in 
prompted 
83 July. 
a decision by the board to restart 
Unfortunately, a breakdown in one 
of the pumps draining the mine soon afterwards caused extensive flooding 
in the mine and the loss of 84 working days. Thus the recommencement 
of milling was delayed until 2 September 1890. Some 820 tons of ore 
were crushed that month yielding 284 ozs. or an average of six dwts. 
to the ton . Working costs amounted to 18s. 8d. per ton, a significantly 
low figure which at a gold price of 725. per ounce assured a profit in 
84 
excess of two shillings per ton. The chairman announced the 
intention of moving fifty of the stamps to the pit head as a means of 
saving on the cost of ore transported to the battery. The move would 
also allow a restructuring of the drive shaft of the mill. Its major 
weakness was that groups of twenty five stamps were all operated from 
the same drive shaft and pulley, so that if a fault developed in one 
stamp all twenty five were brought to a halt. Shut downs for the 
battery continued to be a regular featUre in the life of the Company 
during 1891 and 1892. 
80. The Diggers' News, 22 February 1890 . 
81. H.E.149. H. Eckstein & Co. to Wernher, Beit & Co., 25 October 
1890, p.412. 
82. The Standard and Diggers' News, (Johannesburg) 22 January 1891, 
quoting the Financial Times of London . 
83. The Diggers' News, 23 June 1890. 
84. The Star, 27 November 1890. 
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Phillips was able to report favourably on the Company to London 
in December 1890. The November output had increased to 612 ozs. and 
with the assays of the reefs improving he hoped for an even better 
result in December . 85 In keeping with the firm's philosophy he wrote,86 
"Generally speaking I think a safe and profitable business [is] to be 
done by putting companies on their legs (where prospects warrant it) 
giving loans at 10-12% and getting options ... " The December output 
was disappointing, falling short of 200 ounces. Once more the battery 
and poor amalgamation were seen as the chief cause of the weak result. 
Efforts were now made to bring forty stamps into regular production 
and Phillips set the dead-line of February 1891, after which, if no 
profit was shown, the mill would be shut down. Alternatively, if a 
profit was made then Phillips suggested that serious attention be given 
87 to the prospect of reconstructing the Company. 
In correspondence Wernher, Beit and Company showed a growing 
88 
anxiety in the poor performance of the Company and it is probable 
that they would have cut their ties with it but for the news in 
February 1891 from Johannesburg that the junction for the Cape railway 
with the Netherlands Company's "tram-line" would be sited on the 
89 property. Phillips hoped to have a large part of the farm de-
proclaimed for the laying out of a township, following which he hoped 
to see a dramatic rise in estate revenue. It was therefore decided to 
allow the Company to continue operations for -a little longer. The 
news proved false and the site for the terminus was finally located at 
Germiston on the estate of the Simmer and Jack Gold Mining Company. 
During March 1891 fifty stamps were brought into operation and 
3 018 tons of ore were crushed at an average cost of 15s. 3d. per 
ton, resulting in a profit of £543 4s. 3d. for the month. The total 
for the six months ending in March was 10 320 tons crushed at an 
average cost of 18s. 7d. per ton and yielding an average of 5 dwts. 
85. H.E.149. H. Eckstein & Co. to Wernher, Beit & Co., 6 December 
1890, p.473. 
86. Ibid., 13 December 1890, p.485. 
87. Ibid., 31 January 1891, p.541. 
88. H.E.56. Wernher, Beit & Co. to H. Eckstein & Co., 6 March 1891, 
pp.471-72. 
89. H.E . 149. H. Eckstein & Co. to Wernher, Beit & Co . , 7 February 
1891, p.552. 
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90 6 grs. per ton. Assay results indicated that about fifty per cent 
of the gold in the ore was escaping as a result of poor amalgamation 
and a high concentration of pyritic ore. The need for concentration 
equipment to capture the pyritic gold was recognised. Serious 
attention was thus given by Phillips and the board to the raising of 
a loan for the Company. Already in debt to the extent of E3 500 it 
was estimated that some El0 000 was needed to relocate, restructure, 
and generally overhaul the mill,91 which was considered the first 
priority. The loan was duly raised 
coinciding with the shut down of the 
with the National 
92 battery. 
Bank in July, 
The directors' report for the period ending 31 September 1891 gave 
as the reason for the decision to stop the mill the fall in the yield 
of gold which only averaged 4 dwts . 12 grs . in the months between April 
and July. Hence only the small profit of E381 13s. 6d. was shown for 
the six months under review. It was thus decided to confine operations 
once again to developing the lower levels of the mine in the hope of 
finding payable ore . Attention was also given to opening the old north 
reef workings on the suggestion of the former manager Stanton. 
Mr Stanton remarked at t he May meeting that during his tenure ore 
yielding nine to twelve pennyweights to the ton was taken from the 
north reef. The directors expressed their incredulity, but subsequently 
confessed to the November meeting that stantonts 
in " an old book [found] on top of a shelf in 
statemen,t was verified 
h f i ' .93 teo f ce ..• 
An issue which was also brought to the attention of the share-
holders for the first time in November 1891 was the action of the former 
Company's secretary, Robert Young, in pegging out certain houses 
belonging to the Company as prospectors' claims. An interdict was 
brought against Young in October but privately the board was not hope-
ful of winning the case. 94 The action arose out of the fact that the 
Company had built certain houses for its employees on ground proclaimed 
90. The Standard and Diggers' News, 27 May 1891. 
91. H.E.149. H. Eckstein & Co. to Wernher, Beit & Co., 30 May 1891, 
p. 679. 
92. Ibid., 18 July 1891, p.726. 
93 . The Star, 18 November 1891. 
94. H.E.149. H. Eckstein & Co. to Wernher, Beit & Co., 24 October 
1891, p . ,803. 
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as a goldfield but not actually lying on the Company's mynpacht. As 
the freehold owner of the farm Driefontein the Company had not 
doubted its rights in so acting. Nevertheless, as the farm was pro-
claimed, the houses stood on what was considered public ground on which 
individuals could peg and work claims on payment of the fees for the 
necessary prospectors' or diggers' licences. As it was, the Company's 
mynpacht exceeded the usual limit of size of ten per cent of the 
proclaimed farm, and there thus seemed little excuse for the siting of 
the houses off the mynpacht, other than that of convenience. As land-
lord of Driefontein the Company had considered its action as legal 
and secure but in terms of the Gold Law this was not the case, unless 
the Company itself paid the necessary licence fees on the claims on 
which the houses stood, or had taken the necessary action to have the 
area deproclaimed as a goldfield and instated as a township. As 
secretary, Robert Young saw the danger to the Company and urged the 
directors to take the necessary steps to secure a good title for .the 
ground on which the buildings stood. In consequence applications were 
made to the Mining Commissioner at Boksburg to create a special reserve 
for the Company on the ground in question. The applications were 
rejected on the grounds that the mynpacht already exceeded that contem~ 
plated by the Gold Law. The Mining Commissioner did, however, offer the 
assurance that no licences would be issued for the claims and the 
Company allowed the matter to drop. Young subsequently cut his ties 
with the Company and proceeded to peg the clai-ms for himself. An 
action in the Mining commissioner's Court decided in favour of Young, 
whereupon the Company took the matter to the High Court in Pretoria. 
Here the decision of the lower court was reversed with costs amounting 
95 to £294 15s. 2d. too the Company. It was held that Young's action 
was male fides, the object being to secure the buildings rather than the 
pursuit of mininr;r operations. Further, the portion of ground in 
question was not open ground in that the plaintiffs occupied it with the 
knowledge and tacit consent of a Government official. 96 
The case was seen as a significant test of the rights and security 
of tenure of mining companies in their position as estate holders and, 
95. South African Mining Journal, Vol.II, 17., p.256. 21 January 1893. 
96. Digest of Transvaal Law Reports 1877-99, in Reports of Cases 
Decid"d in the High Court of the South African Republic. Case 
of Witwatersrand Gold Mining Company vs Robert Young. 
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while the final victory went to the Company, the consensus of opinion 
was that it would only be when adequate provision was made for the 
amendment of the relevant section of the Gold Law that the position of 
these companies would be finally secured. The necessary changes were 
made in the subsequent amendment of the Gold Law in 1893. 97 
The mill which was closed down in July 1891 did not resume crushing 
until 1894. By March 1892 the Company had incurred a net liability of 
£9 091 5s., mainly due to the development work being undertaken in the 
mine. The belief that £10 000 would suffice for opening up a second 
level proved erroneous and it was thus decided not to incur any further 
debt by closing down the mine altogether. The estate and property 
were placed in charge of a caretaker and it was intended that the 
98 
revenue from the estate would be used to gradually work off the debt. 
The decision to cease operations entirely prompted the board to 
search for an alternative source of revenue to assist that from the 
estate in reducing the liabilities of the Company as quickly as possible. 
Phillips, in announcing the decision to London noted that if the 
Glencairn Company, floated on a section of the mynpacht, continued its 
satisfactory progress, it might be possible to interest someone in 
99 purchasing the adjoining section of the Witwatersrand mynpacht. 
In this way the capital for restarting the Company's operat'ions could 
be acquired. In keeping with this view it was decided to· lease the 
western section of the property adjoining the Glencairn Company to 
Messrs Lace and Thomson in May 1892. 100 
The idea of leasing a portion of the Company's mynpacht on tribute 
was not new. As early as 1890 Phillips had entered into negotiations 
to lease a block of claims in this way.101 He saw in the measure an 
additional source of income for the Company at a time when capital to 
increase the scope of its operations was desperately needed and difficult 
97. For a discussion on the Gold Law of the South African Republic 
see below, Chapter VII, pp.288ff. 
98. The Star, 21 May 1892. 
99. H.E.149. H. Eckstein & Co. to Wernher, Beit & Co., 2 April 
1892, p.933. 
100. The Star, 7 May 1892. 
101. H.E.149. H. Eckstein & Co. to Wernher, Beit & Co., 27 June 
1890, p.263. See glossary for term tributors. 
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to acquire. While the concept was familiar on the diamond fields, it 
has not yet been attempted on the Rand. It seems that Phillips's plan 
broke down as nothing more is heard of the concept as a solution to 
the Company's problems before 1892 . The Company's own erratic results 
could have discouraged the potential tributors, or perhaps they had 
decided to await the further development of the Glencairn mine before 
coming forward with a definite proposal. The timing of the agreement 
with the shut down of all the Company's operations could also have 
resulted in more favourable terms for the tributors. 
The agreement with the tributors was for a period of two and a 
half years. Walter Blaine, late manager of the Witwatersrand Company, 
was appointed manager and the tributors soon set about the rapid 
development of the sixty claims let by the Company. In terms of the 
agreement, the tributors would pay a monthly rental of E100 and ten 
per cent of the gross profits from the sale of gold over eight penny-
102 
weights per ton. As a result of the contract the financial position 
of the Company improved rapidly. A year later on 31 March 1893 the 
103 debt had fallen to E802. A large part of the debt repayment had, 
however, been financed from the sale of "all surplus machinery". 104 
Once again when the decision was made to restart operations those doing 
so would suffer from this disadvantage '. 
The profitability of the tribute ground encouraged the syndicate 
to make a direct offer to acquire it in May '1893. Messrs Lace and 
Thomson, together with their partners in the syndicate, the ReIly 
brothers, offered E50 000 for the sixty claims leased to them. 106 
A counter bid was entered by Messrs Solomon and Thomson for E55 000. 
The Witwatersrand Company's board of directors decided that both the 
bids were too low, whereupon Lace and Thomson withdrew their offer while 
the other party's improved offer of E60 000 was accepted. Solomon and 
Thomson were acting for Messrs Stroyan and Barnato Brothers. The deal 
was not entirely fortuitous. Correspondence from 'London dated 6 May 
102. H.E.5. Quoting a letter from G. Rouliot to H. Eckstein, 25 
February 1892, p.18. 
103. Ibid . , pp.18ff. 
104. The star, 14 November 1892. 
105. South African Mining Journal, Vol.II, 9. p . 123. 19 November 1892. 
106. H.E.5 . , p.20. Quoting Minutes of Directors Meeting of 2 May 1893. 
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1893 indicates the prior knowledge of Wernher, Beit and Company of the 
107 deal . It was even suggested that Barnato "should make the offer". 
Woolf Joel later confirmed this fact 
108 in Johannesburg on 30 May 1893. 
at a shareholders' meeting held 
A letter from Wernher, Beit 
109 Company to H. Eckstein and Company of 12 May 1893 states, 
and 
"Mr. Barnato informs us that Mr Lace has a q~art\....:r share and consequently 
we have half the balance . We take it you will get the whole transaction 
confirmed in Johannesburg so that there is no doubt about our position 
in the business." In fact negotiations regarding the sale of the claims 
went back at least until November 1892, when, asked for his opinion on 
the extent to which the group should involve themselves in the deal, 
Phillips offered a cautious reply . He noted that while the tributors 
were getting eight and a half pennyweights per ton, the reefs were 
badly fractured and faulted and hence difficult to work. In summing 
110 
up he wrote, " ... of course we have our large interest in the 
Knight's property to consider. In view of our extensive interest else-
where and as far as I have thought over the matter since I got your 
cable this morning, I feel rather inclined to recommend selling out of 
the property than taking a larger interest j ust now." 
On 26 May 1893, when a storm of protest against the deal was 
already brewing, a letter from the London office to H. Eckstein and 
Company stated, rather cryptically, " . . . we had overlooked that you 
are interested and on the board." 111 Many shareholders 'felt that the 
Company should have taken over the tributor's operations rather than 
selling them and strong protest was also made that the shareholders 
were not informed of the deal in advance. Here, however, there was no 
obligation on the directors to do so in terms of the Articles of 
Association. Finally, it was seen that the role of Wernher, Beit and 
Company and H. Eckstein and Company in the transaction suggested a 
conspiracy for the destruction of the Company and its property . What 
107. H.E.59. Letter from A. Beit to H. Ecks tein & Co., 6 May 1893, 
p. 19 . 
108. H.E . 5, p.22. 
109. H.E . 59. Letter from A. Beit to H. Eckstein & Co., 12 May 1893, 
p. 22. 
110. H. E.151. Letter from L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit & Co., 19 
November 1892, p.272 . 
111. H.E . 59. Letter from A. Beit to H. Eckstein & Co . , 26 May 1893, 
p.32. 
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the Standard and Diggers' News chose to call the "Battle for the 
112 Wi twatersrand II had conunenced ~ 
The first question to be asked concerning the deal is why feeling 
should have run so high among shareholders. The answer lies in the 
returns shown by the tribute workings. Between September 1890 and 
August 1891 the Company's own operations yielded 6 068 ozs. 13 dwts. 
from 24 672 tons of ore, or an average of 4,90 dwts. to the ton. By 
contrast between November 1892 and September 1893 the tribute syndicate 
returned 12 609 ozs. 30 dwts. from 27 218 tons of ore, or an average 
113 
output of 9,26 dwts. per ton. This latter return yielded a good 
profit to the tributors and a fair revenue to the Company. The 
Company's debts had largely been removed and, as the lease was for a 
short duration, shareholders looked forward to the time when the Company 
could resume operation of the mine for its own benefit . Their wrath at 
seeing this first glimmer of hope disappear can be appreciated. But 
why then did the supposed villains of the piece, Wernher, Beit & Company, 
limit themselves to a three-eighths interest in the seemingly pro,s p erous 
venture? The answer lies in a letter from G. Rouliot to the principals 
on 29 April 1893, in which he, like Phillips before him, expressed a 
low opinion of the area. While the tributors had 
patch he felt sure that it covered only a limited 
struck a very rich 
114 
area. 
H. Eckstein, as early as November 1892, stated he would 
sell the claims for E60 000 than buy them for ourselves 
IImuch sooner 
. 115 for less." 
The reef was very broken in the area and it was known that the 
tributors' luck could run out. A three-eighths interest constituted a 
good hedge in case that luck held. 
The immediate response of Wernher, Beit and Company in professing 
to have overlooked the connection between Rouliot as a director and 
their own interest in the Company is unconvincing. Throughout 1892 
the letterbooks of the Johannesburg firm confirm their major interest 
in the Company and in the speculation and arbitrag·e deals in its shares. 116 
112. The Standard and Diggers' News, 13 March 1894. 
113. Jennings Report, pp.3ff. 
114. H.E . 5, p.20. 
115. Ibid., p.18. 
116. H. E.59, passim. 
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Once the storm of protest began, it was decided to give the Company the 
benefit of the option they had acquired from Barnato Brothers. The 
offer was duly turned down by the board. Meanwhile, private negotiations 
with the leading dissentient shareholders were opened with the intention 
of buying off their hostility to the deal. In a letter from London on 
26 May 1893, Beit pointed out that the principal agitator was Shiels 
and that Barnato was prepared 
further bother ..• ,,117 Shiels 
Struben, Slatter, Chisholm and 
"to offer him a share and thus settle any 
was supported in his opposition by Messrs 
118 Morrogh. This group was prepared to 
bargain but wanted a half share in the Beit portion of the deal. Their 
legal counsel soon assured them of the legality of the actions of the 
directors in concluding the deal without the permission of the share-
holders. In turn Beit stuck to his offer of returning the Wernher, Beit 
and Company portion of the deal back to the Company at cost. The only 
recourse open to the dissentients, short of backing down, was to work 
towards the removal of the board of directors. Towards this end they 
commenced the accumulation of shares and voting proxies. By late May 
1893 they held 53 000 shares and in June Beit wrote that while Struben 
was still threatening legal action, there were also about 70 000 shares 
in the opposition camp.119 
The refusal of the Beit group to bow to the demands of the 
dissentient shareholders encouraged him to believe the issue would soon 
blow over. As late as September Beit wrote,· lIWe have nothing to fear 
and Struben and Company did not improve their position by entering into 
negotiations and bargaining. ,,120 By October, however, the continued 
meetings of the dissentients l eft him feeling uneasy and he commenced 
his own campaign to collect votes. Besides the handicap of a late 
start, 11 our position in this matter is such a delicate one, that 
we can only ask proxies from friends ... We shall send you by next mail a 
list of persons into whose names you can transfer shares for the sake of 
creating votes and we ask you to subdivide your holding as much as 
possible. ,,121 
117. H.E.59. Letter from A. Beit to H. Eckstein & Co., 26 May 1893, 
p .32. 
118. H.E.5, p.24. 
119. H.E.59. Letter from A. Beit to H. Eckstein & Co., 17 June 1893, 
p. 59. 
120. Ibid., 8 September 1893, p.123. 
121. Ibid., 28 October 1893, p.174. 
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Struben's role in the agitation deserves mention. As already 
indicated he reduced his holding in t he Company in November 1888 along 
with Knight, but unlike the latter did not relinquish his interest 
entirely. He thus had a vested interest in seeing the Company again 
become profitable. As he later pointed out, the deal further limited 
the potential of the Company. Struben was also probably a partner in 
the Lys bid to acquire a portion of the property in 1889, while in 1891 
Phillips reported a meeting with the two Struben brothers at which they 
attempted to secure his support for a move to oust George Goch from the 
chairmanship of the Company . 122 The Strubens had confidence in no 
Goch's direction of the Company. It is possible that Goch, as a director, 
was instrumental in blocking the Lys offer in 1889 . Beit believed that 
his current opposition stemmed from the fact that he had been one of the 
participants in the bid made by Lace and Thomson for the tribute claims. 
As Lace held a quarter share in the Barnato deal, 
Struben's intention was simply to enlarge his own 
it is possible 
h ld ' 123 o ~ng. 
that 
rt is 
possible that both factors prompted his strong opposition to the sale 
of Company land. 
The furore stirred up by the deal had a sequel in the decision by 
the board on 16 May 1893 to appoint a competent mining engineer, "with 
a view to starting mining operations and ... to report on intended 
124 
works. II It was decided to approach Mr Hennen Jennings for this 
purpose . Jennings was 
th l ' d 125 e ear y ~n ustry. 
undoubtedly one of the great mining engineers of 
If he was at fault at all in this instance it 
was that he was already the consulting engineer and mining adviser of 
H. Eckstein and Company and their London principals. His competence 
was above question; it was the 
whi ch is suspect. He was duly 
motive of the board in approaching him 
, 126 
employed for a fee of 500 gu~neas. 
At the same meeting at which Jennings's letter of acceptance was 
read, the board resolved to lend E10 000 of the recently acquired 
122. H.E.149. H. Eckstein & Co. to Wernher, Beit & Co., 31 January 
1891, pp.54lff. 
123. H. E.59. Letter from A. Beit to H. Eckstein & Co., 1 July 1893, 
p. 62 . 
124. H.E.5, pp . 23-24 . Quoting Minutes of Directors Meeting of 16 
May 1893. 
125. Cartwright, A.P., op.cit., p.98. 
126. H.E.5, p.29. Quoting Minutes of Directors Meeting of 14 June 1893 . 
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£60 000 for six months at six per cent interest to the Wemmer Gold 
Mining Company. The chairman of this Company was George Goch, who also 
occupied the chair of the Witwatersrand Company, while H. Eckstein and 
Company held a controlling interest. 127 Again, on 4 July, the board 
authorised a loan of £10 000 on the same terms to the George Goch 
Amalgamated Gold Mining Company, while in October a further £6 000 was 
128 lent to the Wemmer Company. It can be and was argued that this 
money was lent to earn interest on the capital while the Company awaited 
the report being compiled by Jennings. At issue is why it was lent to 
these particular companies under the control of the chairman and 
without proper guarantee of repayment. 
An investigation of the affairs of these companies reveals their 
own financial difficulties at the time. Commenting on these companies 
in 1891, Goldman reports that the liabilities of the George Goch Company 
at the commencement of the financial 
a 
year amounted to £19 530 
deficit of £10 703. 129 
lOs. 
In 1894 The profit and loss account showed 
the company was 1I1abouring under a load of debt". 130 To overcome this 
debt it was proposed to capitalize the entire amount by the issue of 
debentures to the extent of £60 000. Of the Wemmer Company Goldman 
notes, liThe mine is one which has not been managed in the past as well 
as it might have been ... " Under new management and the interest of 
H. Eckstein and Company it was "fast pushing on deve"lopment", but for 
this capital was needed. 131 These could not be classified as finan-
cially healthy companies or investments which required no security on 
the part of the lender. 
Further loans were made, or renewed, by the board before March 
1894. In November 1893 a loan of £10 000 at seven per cent interest was 
made to the Johannesburg Estate Company, another Wernher, Beit and 
Company interest. It was only after E.A. Lippert, who bought into the 
Company at this time, had criticised the board on the issue and adverse 
127. Ibid. 
128. Ibid . , pp . 29ff. 
129. Goldman, C.S., The Financial, Statistical, and General History 
of the Gold and Other Companies of the Witwatersrand, South 
Africa, pp.70ff. 
130. South African Financial Record, 29 September 1894, p.275. 
131. Goldman, C.S., op.cit., p.265. 
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comment appeared in the South African Financial Record, that the 
interest rate was raised and the 
132 by bonds. 
renewed loans to the Wemmer and Goch 
Companies secured 
The Jennings Report was submitted to the board on 7 November 
1893. 133 Shareholders received copies of it between 16 and 20 
December, 
1894. 134 
while the meeting to consider it was only held on 13 March 
It would seem that Wernher, Beit and Company were 
with a preview of the report prior to the shareholders. 135 
honoured 
At the 
meeting on 14 March 1894, E.A. Lippert raised the issue of the delay 
in publishing the report, noting that the board withheld it from the 
November meeting at which shareholders had severely criticised the 
directors.. The board survived 
holders agreed to wait for the 
that meeting 
136 
report . 
only because the share-
At face value the Jennings Report is hardly controversial. As 
George Farrar suggested, it was largely a "record of past histor~(' .. 137 
If there is a weakness in it, it is that Jennings's investigation was 
fairly superficial. The mines were full of water and he did not 
consider it worth while to clear them f or an in situ inspection, 
relying rather on the records of operations, managers' and directors' 
reports and various existing plans . He also 
a borehole sunk on the central section of the 
followed the findings of 
138 property . In con-
sidering the financial position of the Company he revealed a total net 
working loss from its operation of E108 986; 139 Jennings discounted 
the existing development of the mine, suggesting that any further 
development be from scratch. Two alternatives for future policy were 
suggested. The Company could once more attempt to re-equip itself by 
132. H.E.5, pp.31ff, and South African Financial Record, 30 December 
1893. 
133. H.E.5, p.31. 
134. The Star, 13 March 1894. 
135. H.E.59. Letter from A. Beit to H. Eckstein & Co., 13 January 
1894, p.265, reads: "Mr. Struben has not yet seen Jenning 
Report nor does he know we have it . II 
136. The Star, 14 March 1894. 
137. Ibid. 
138. Jennings Report, pp.1ff. 
139. Ibid., p.l1. 
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its own devices, or it could let on tribute various sections of the 
property for a few years. The second alternative would also involve 
placing existing working capital "on gilt edge securities II pending the 
results of the tributors. 140 
After considering the pros and cons of the alternatives, Jennings 
concluded in favour of leasing the property on tribute. This con-
elusion dove-tailed admirably with the decisions and actions of the 
board of directors. From the outset at least one publication saw the 
report as "nothing more but a huge and elaborate apology for the said 
misdeeds of the nominee of his [Jenning ' S] employers. ,,141 More to 
the point was that the records of the management's past failures in 
mining, prospecting, milling and development were used as the basis of 
prognostication of future results, notwithstanding the encouraging 
results of the tribute ground and other adjoining properties. 
The meeting to discuss the Jennings Report commenced on 13 M?rch 
1894 . It represented a show-down between the opposing groups of share-
holders, and when finally terminated on 20 March a new board of 
directors had been appointed. By then too, much of 
Company had been well laundered in the Johannesburg 
the history 
142 press. 
of the 
In a 
circular following the calling of the ~eeting, the board gave notice 
of its intention to resign. Its resignation followi~g the discussion 
of the report would have limited the acrimonious debate, but this its 
members refused to do. Struben was also unwilling, in responding to 
Jennings's statements, to limit discussion to the immediate report. 
He openly attacked the actions of the board in his reply. This led 
Goch, Carl Hanau and others to reply to these accusations, bringing 
much of the past history into the open. Goch also refused to put any 
motions to the vote before he and the other directors had had the 
opportunity of replying. 
Struben was less critical of the Jennings Report than of the 
board whose actions, he suggested, limited its relevance. He saw 
Clause 72 of the Articles of Association, which gave unlimited power 
140. Ibid., p.12. 
141. South African Financial Record, 30 December 1893. 
142. See The Standard and Diggers' News and The Star for verbatim 
reports . 
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to the directors to act on behalf of the shareholders in all matters, 
as the chief reason for the Company's difficulties. The measure was 
introduced in 1889 following the moving of the Company's head office to 
Johannesburg. In their position of unbridled power the directors had 
manipulated the Company as they saw fit. Struben asked whether it had 
been sound financial policy to sell the tribute ground for less than 
the value of the gold the tributors had extracted from it in a mere 
fourteen months with a twenty stamp mill. In turn the interest on the 
money so acquired was little over £3 000 per annum, compared to the 
royalties of £7 266 7s. 6d. gained from these claims over the previous 
twelve months. It was also asked whether it would not have been better 
to have ordered an investigation by a mining engineer prior to the sale 
of the claims. 
Goch, in his reply, levelled a personal attack against Struben, 
suggesting he had been largely responsible for the early failures of 
the Company. I t was on Struben's advice that the original battery had 
been accepted. He too had offered no opposition to the 1'889 dividend 
distribution. Turning to the sale of tribute land, Goch saw no need for 
the board to justify its actions, other than to suggest that the Company 
had received a fair bargain. The accusation that the claims were sold 
to help finance his other companies was met by the remark that it was a 
full forty days after the conclusion of the Barnato deal that the Wemmer 
Company received its loan. Little beyond this was offered in exoneration 
of the board's activities. In response to the suggested involvement of 
Wernher, Beit and Company, Phillips decided to bow out gracefully. He 
is reported as having stated that, "after the speeches which had been 
made, it would not befit their dignity [Wernher, Beit and Company and 
H. Eckstein and Company] to agree to serve on the board any longer." 
On 20 March a resolution to postpone the meeting for three months 
was defeated by 14 740 votes to 12 260 votes, or 110 249 shares to 
67 932 shares. A motion introduced by Struben that the policy to be 
followed in regard to the Jennings Report be left for the new board to 
decide, was unopposed. Goch, recognizing the hopelessness of his 
position, then submitted his board's resignation. None of the outgoing 
directors had been nominated for re-election, so that a completely new 
board came into office. Farrar and other shareholders expressed some 
reservations about the move, feeling that not all of the nominees were 
competent. The new members of the board were, H.W. Struben, H. Nourse, 
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E.W. Thomson, C.L. Redwood, James Hay, W. Ross and A.A. Stanton. 
Under the new management the Company was slowly brought to a 
position of profitability and continued as a gold producer down to 
1937. In one sense, however, the "Battle for the Witwatersrand" proved 
a hollow victory. To the Standard and Diggers' News the essence 6f 
the conflict had been the dispute between the shareholders and the 
board of directors over the authority of directors to act without 
constant responsibility to the shareholders. The newspaper applauded 
the resurgence of the shareholder who "is at last in earnest mood and 
143 
means to find out whether he or the director is master." In this 
respect the shareholders had won by ousting the board. At a deeper 
level the status quo remained. It was the South African Financial 
Record which hinted at the true situation: 144 
lilt has become an article of faith here that a numerically 
small faction, backed up by the prestige imparted by 
wealth, was able to dominate every company in which it 
acquired a holding, regardless of the interests of the 
many. For so long has this despotic rule gone unquestioned 
that by popular verdict it has been enshrined as an article 
of the unwritten law of this land." 
The ability of a firm like Wernher, Beit and Company through its 
financial resources to achieve a commanding presence on the Rand had 
been challenged. It is fairly obvious that this firm and its Johannes-
burg partners had decided the fate of the Witwatersrand Company should 
be its fragmentation into a number of smaller companies. Again, in 
this regard they were thwarted, but the heavy capital requirements of 
the industry and the growing reliance on sophisticated technology ensured 
that those who could command these vital factors would playa dominant 
role and exercise a pervading influence on the future growth of the 
industry. 
143. The Standard and Diggers' News, 21 March 1894. 
144. South African Financial Record, 24 March 1894. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE SIMMER AND JACK GOLD MINING CCMPANY 
On the plateau of the eastern Transvaal highveld, approximately 
140 miles east of where Johannesburg arose as a mining camp, .lies Lake 
Chrissie, a body of water subject to the vagaries of the summer 
storms. In a wet season the circumference can swell to over fourteen 
miles, while in a drought it all but disappears. In 1864 the lake 
formed the central focus in plans for a settlement submitted to the 
Government of the South African Republic by Alexander McCorkindale. 
In return for the provision of a loan and a "constant and cheap supply 
of ammunition", McCorkindale was given various concessions, the most 
important of which was the right to purchase a block of 200 farms, 
some one and a quarter million acres in extent, for E8 000. The farms 
would be used for the establishment of the settlement of .300 
.. 1 llllnugrants. In January 1867 the first party of approximately fifty 
Scotsmen were located close to the lake on forty farms. While 
McCorkindale's scheme subsequently collapsed and many of the farms 
proved unsuitable for agriculture, sane of the Scots remained in lINew 
Scotland". One of these was John Jack, who together -with a German 
immigrant, August Simmer, established a trad~ng store at Lake Chrissie 
to service the needs of the surrounding farming community. In time 
the settlement found itself on the coach route from Natal to the 
Lydenberg, or Macmac, goldfields, to which place had gone many of its 
erstwhile settlers. 
The partners, Simmer and Jack, conducted the usual business of 
small general dealers throughout South Africa, extending credit to 
their farming customers against the surety of the next season's crops. 
Schalk Willem Jacobus Meyer farmed near Lake Chrissie, where he had 
commercial dealings with the partners. Meyer also owned a portion of 
the farm Elandsfontein, situated on the Witwatersrand in the district 
of Heidelberg, where gold was discovered in 1886. 2 It seems probable 
1. Theal, G.M., History of South Africa From 1795 to 1872, Vol.IV, 
pp.469ff. 
2. Gray, E.L. & J., The Discovery of the Witwatersrand, pp.179-80. 
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that Simmer and Jack were given an interest in the Elandsfontein 
3 property for the settlement of debts. Nevertheless, on 2 January 1886 
Meyer leased a portion of the farm to Pieter Cornelis van der Walt for 
a period of two years at a minimal rent, an amount which could possibly 
. 4 
cover his outstanding debts over that t~me. 
An alternative interpretation of their subsequent interest in 
the Elandsfontein property suggests that this arose only through the 
partners' activity in serving as a post office for the Lake Chrissie 
district. Following the discovery of the Main Reef by George Harrison 
on Langlaagte, Elandsfontein No.1 was prospected by Henry Nourse 
without the owner's permission or knowledge. Under the Gold Law of 
the South African Republic the owner of a farm automatically became 
entitled to stake out an owner's claim, or mynpacht. Nourse's actions 
became known to H.B. Marshall who contacted Simmer and Jack as a means 
of negotiating with Schalk Meyer for the property. Jack duly secured 
the option to purchase the mynpacht rights from Meyer and then hurried 
to the new field to stake out the mynpacht on Meyer's behalf. 5 
A flaw in this interpretation is that Marshall did not feature 
prominently in the early history of the Company. He was neither a 
director of the subsequently formed Company, nor did he list as a major 
shareholder. The relationship of Henry Nourse to the Company is also 
unknown , although a T.M.C. Nourse did feature on the' first list of 
major shareholders. From the early minute books of the Company it is 
clear that Simmer and Jack were co-owners of the property with Meyer 
and the only area for speculation is how they arrived at that position. 
There was a certain amount of confusion surrounding the pros-
pecting of the Elandsfontein farm. Mathers suggests that by July 1886 
it was generally recognised and had been proved in places that the 
6 
main reef ran through the property. It is his contention that F.E. 
and D.C. Geldenhuis "were fortunate in their prospecting on Elands-
fontein before July 6. ,,7 Nothing in these statements indicates 
3. Cartwright, A.P., The Gold Miners, p . 87. 
4. Gray, E.L. & J., op.cit., p.leD. 
5. Rosenthal, E., Gold! Gold! Gold!, pp . 163ff . 
6. Mathers, E.P., The Gold Fields Revisited, p.262. 
7. Ibid., p.s8. 
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that Mathers was specifically referring to the section of Elandsfontein 
owned by Schalk Meyer. What is known is that van der Walt, as lessee 
of the property, enquired of the Government on 19 July if he had the 
right to prospect on his leased portion of the farm without a licence. 
The next day he sublet one third of the property to Pieter Johannes 
du Preez and Company for seventeen months, the term of the unexpired 
lease, for £50. On 2 August, presumably in response to the Govern-
ment's reply, van der Walt took out a prospecting licence for one 
8 
month. Another less reliable source suggests that Simmer and Jack 
also leased a portion of the farm. 9 As has already been stressed 
above, however, the Company subsequently formed treated with all three 
men as part owners . The prospecting activity of the lessees, who 
resided on the property or in close proximity, presumably was conducted 
prior to Meyer and his partners becoming aware of the mineral 
potential of the property, or of their rights regarding it. This 
awareness of the lessees would also discount the interpretation of 
Nourse having a free hand in the prospecting of the property. Simmer 
and Jack, in turn, would have heard of developments on the Witwaters-
rand soon enough from their connections with the eastern Transvaal 
goldfields and acted accordingly. 
Elandsfontein, along with the neighbouring farm Driefontein, was 
declared a public digging on 20 December 1886. By this date Schalk 
Meyer and his partners had registered their mynpacht, the last to do 
so before the proclamation of the field. 10 Du Preez remained unaware 
of the granting of the mynpacht to Meyer and applied to the Mining 
Commissioner, Capt. von Brandis, for seventy five licences for claims 
in terms of the proclamation . These were granted and paid for on 23 
September, before the error was recognised that the mynpacht covered 
the same area. Du Preez then resorted to legal action, basing his 
case on the unlawful acquisition of the mynpacht by Meyer and partners 
on 11 September. The Gold Law was not clear on whether an owner could 
exercise a mynpacht right on a property let to another . In submitting 
his application for the mynpacht Meyer declared that he had not given 
anyone permission to prospect the farm and neither had he disposed of 
8. Gray, E.L. & J., op.cit . , p.180. 
9 . The Eastern Star (Grahamstown), 22 September 1886 . 
10 . Cartwright, A.P., Gold Paved the Way, pp.77-78 . 
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the mineral rights. Du Preez's exparte application of October 1886 was 
to prevent Meyer or van der Walt from selling the mynpacht right to a 
third party pending the hearing of the case. It is clear from the' 
timing of Du Preez's lease that the reason for he and his partners 
obtaining the sub-lease on a portion of the farm was the intention of 
gaining control over the mineral rights. The interdict was duly 
granted, on the grounds that their grazing rights might be interfered 
with by mining activity. It seems strange that the Court should have 
granted such an interdict, given that the farm had already been 
proclaimed as a public digging. 
The legal wrangle extended into 1887 and delayed any progress being 
made in the formation of a Company to work the property before August 
of that year . The Court interdict against the sale or lease of the 
mynpacht did not prevent Meyer and the partners from having a proper 
survey made of the property. Two water rights were also acquired. 12 
What had now become known as "Jack's Mynpacht" consisted of an area of 
127 morgen 570 square roods, which together with a half Claim on the 
continuation of the Main Reef on the eastern boundary of the mynpacht, 
previously registered in the name of A. Milne, became the mine 
13 property of the Simmer and Jack Gold Mining Company. This block 
of ground contained 186 claims in all, 'being 31 claims or 4735 yards 
in width along the line of the Main Reef . On expiry ' of the grazing 
lease the claims and other landed property were made over ' to the 
Company on a ninety nine year lease. As the vendors and promoters of 
the Company, the three partners received in settlement an amount of 
£11 200 in cash and 40 800 shares of £1 value, fully paid up, or an 
amount equivalent to £52 000. 14 The nominal capital of the Company 
was set at £75 000 in £1 shares, 20 000 of which were offered to the 
public to provide working capital while 3 000 were held in reserve. 
Amongst the largest of the initial shareholders, besides the 
partners, were Charles H. Pearse who held 6 087 shares, Charles Knox, 
11. Gray, E.L. & J., op.cit., p.180. 
12. The Eastern Star, 13 June 1887 . 
13. Cory Library, Rhodes University, MS16 072, "Memorandum of 
Association of the Simmer and Jack Gold Mining company." 
14. Ibid. 
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who was appointed the first manager, had 3 395 shares, while T.M.C. 
15 Nourse held 2 602 shares and H.W. Struben 2 692 shares. The first 
board of directors were H.W. Struben, who served as chairman, John 
Jack, William Ross, F.H. Barber, E.J. Wicke, E. Brayshaw and George 
Farrar. Messrs Meyer, Simmer and Jack, as the chief promoters were 
entitled, in terms of the Articles of Association, to nominate two 
directors yearly so long as they collectively or individually held not 
less 
than 
than 14 000 of their 
16 7 000 shares. 
vendor shares; and one director if not less 
The outcrop of the Main Reef passed diagonally through the 
mynpacht. At the western end of the property this reef was 2 000 feet 
from the dip of the boundary. There was, however, an extensive fault 
in the reef series in the property which threw the western portion of 
the beds out of their true line by about 750 feet. The greater part 
of the property, some 3 200 feet of the outcrop line of 4 735 feet, fell 
to the west of the fault. To the east of the dyke the average distance 
between the Main Reef and the dip boundary was 900 feet. · In the 
western section the dip of the beds averaged an angle of about fifteen 
degrees; in the east this angle varied between twenty five and thirty 
degrees. 
The fault which ran through the property all but divided it into 
two separate mines which required their own individual shafts and 
underground facilities. During the early years of the Company several 
attempts were made to float the eastern section of the property as a 
separate company. While these attempts failed, the efforts of the 
directors in this regard reflect the thinking of management and share-
holders alike towards the scale and financial requirements of their 
undertaking. 17 The position of the dyke in relation to the property 
is also an indication of the haste with which the mynpacht was pegged 
and the relative ignorance of the local geological structure by those 
who undertook the task. 
It was perhaps inevitable that mining operations would commence 
in the western or larger portion of the property. Towards this end, 
15. Ibid . 
16 . Ibid. 
17. See below, pp.69ff. 
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Knox used the interlude while waiting for the expiry of the grazing 
lease to acquire the necessary mining machinery for the future 
18 Company. In keeping with so much early Witwatersrand mining act-
19 ivity, a trench was cut to expose the reef . The usual "encouraging 
prospects" were reported in the press to maintain shareholders' interest 
and bolster share prices during the t edious wait for the arrival of all 
the necessary machinery and equipment. The shallow dip of the reef 
did, however, prevent the quarrying method from being used successfully. 
At an angle of only fifteen degrees the overburden soon became a 
problem and the expense involved in supporting the roof discounted any 
further use of the technique. Here it must be borne in mind that the 
Witwatersrand was far removed from an adequate supply of timber which 
could be used for mine props and supports. Timber of any description 
found a good price as firewood as well and the price subsequently rose 
to a level where its use was minimized. 
In November 1887 a plan was drawn up for the more systematic 
exploitation of the property. The scheme involved driving an adit into 
the slope of the Witwatersrand from the western boundary, thus obtain-
ing a stoping level of about ninety feet on the crown of the property 
and providing a natural drain from the mine at this level. Incline 
shafts from the outcrop were sunk at 200 foot intervals to a depth to 
meet the adit level as it was driven forward. To the south a vertical 
prospecting shaft of large enough dimensions-to serve later as a 
hauling shaft, was sunk to strike t he reef at a depth of about 160 feet. 
A vertical shaft was also sunk in the eastern section to test the reef 
20 
at a similar depth. 
The adit was driven 315 feet before it encountered a clay dyke of 
about 150 feet in width. The loose pot clay would have required 
timbering throughout if a level were driven through it. Rather than 
incur such expense it was decided to commence a second adit. This adit 
no.2 was carried a distance of ninety six feet before the Main Reef was 
struck . Where the connection was made a drive was also pushed out to 
intersect the south reef. In all, five incline shafts were sunk 
18. The Eastern Star, 20 May 1887. 
19. The Eastern Star, 14 September 1887. 
20. The Eastern Star, 20 June 1888. 
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before the end of May 1888, and over 1 000 tons of ore extracted from 
the shafts and adits. Tramlines were laid out in the adits to connect 
the mine to the mill site while a branch line linked up the mouths of 
the five shafts. 
The presence of H.W. Struben as chairman of the board of directors 
all but guaranteed the choice of a Sandycroft mill for the Company, as 
he was the local agent for that company. A twenty five stamp battery 
was duly ordered soon after the Company's formation and by March of 
the following year a large proportion of the various parts of it had 
arrived at the mine. 21 The appointment of Knox as manager for the new 
Company was confirmed in December 1887. He had supposedly had "a long 
22 
mining experience in Australia. 1I 
While the Company awaited the completion of the erection of the 
battery efforts were made to bring the other surface facilities to a 
point where production could commence. Quarters were erected for both 
black and white workers, while the usual blacksmith's shop, store rooms 
and stables were laid out. A house for the manager and cottages for 
the married white miners were in the course of erection by May 1888. 23 
The decision was taken early in 1888 to secure the tenure of the 
Company by purchasing the farm Elandsfontein from the partners for an 
amount of £10 000. Not only would this obviate the payment of a 
rental to them but it was recognised that the property could become a 
valuable source of revenue from the sale of claim licences, stand 
licences in the village of Germiston, and finally from any water rights 
established on it. It was initially estimated that the revenue could 
24 
amount to £1 800 per annum . Just how lucrative the estate became 
to the Company is borne out by the fact that for the half year ending 
30 June 1889, revenue amounting to £2 391 6s. ed. accrued from this 
25 
source. The greater part of this income was generated by the 
growing village of Germiston. Named after the farm outside Glasgow 
where John Jack grew up, the village was destined to become the 
21. The Eastern Star, 5 March 1888. 
22. The Eastern Star, 7 December 1887. 
23 . The Eastern Star, 20 June 1888. 
24. Ibid. 
25. The Star (Johannesburg) , 30 July 1889. 
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terminus between the "Rand Tram" line built by the Netherlands company as 
a light railway running along the line of the reef connecting Boksburg 
with Krugersdorp via Johannesburg, and the railway from the Cape which 
linked up with it in 1892. 26 
The twenty five stamp battery was erected by August 1888 and given 
its trials. It was powered by a twenty horse power compound engine 
which from the outset did not provide sufficient force to operate the 
stamps at maximum efficiency.27 The Company also endeavoured to 
experiment with a new type of amalgam plate. One set of five stamps 
was equipped with electro-silvered plates as opposed to the usual copper 
plates . All the plates had fifteen foot "blanket strake" concentrating 
devices attached to them from the outset. It was clearly recognised 
that a t least in its upper levels, the Simmer and Jack mine was not one 
of the richest on the field with regard to the value of its ore, and 
that every device possible was necessary if yields per ton were to be 
kept at a profitable level. 
The evidence of early operations on the mine suggest that the 
Company was fortunate in the choice of its first managers, Charles Knox 
and William Pope. While Knox left the Company's service at the end of 
September 1888, the first month of production, his contribution to the 
proper and effective opening up of the mine was a positive one. It is 
difficult to isolate the reason for his dismissal from the post. As 
a large Shareholder in the Company, he no doubt exercised considerable 
power and could have challenged the decision had he so desired. It 
seems probable that he recognised the ability and reputation of the man 
who was to succeed him and bowed out gracefully. William H. Pope, 
late manager of the Pigg's Peak Gold Mining Company in the eastern 
Transvaal, was duly appointed on a renewable six month contract. He 
was to remain as manager down to the restructuring of 
the Company by the Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa Ltd. in 
1894. From the date of his appointment the operation of the Company 
was conducted along efficient technical lines. Lacking spectacularly 
rich ore there was little temptation for the Company to embark on a 
26. Marais, J.S., The Fall of Kruger's Republic, pp.33ff and also, 
Van der Poel, J., Railways and Customs Policies in South 
Africa, p.69. 
27. The Eastern Star, 8 October 1888. 
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ruinous course of mining purely with the intention of influencing share 
prices. Rather, the emphasis rested on reducing working costs and 
maximising profits for the benefit of the shareholders. This was ,per-
haps an inevitable course for a Company without a large body of high 
yielding ore. A correspondent of a Natal newspaper visiting the mine 
in October 1888, was surprised to find the Company unwilling to publish 
an official statement regarding the yield of are and the extracting 
power of the mill . 28 At a time when more and more Rand mining 
companies were publishing glowing reports with an eye to influencing 
their share prices on the growing bull market, such a reaction seemed 
strange indeed. It does, however, epitomize the attitude and approach 
of the management of the Company. 
The speculative inclination of the Board was rather involved in 
using the rising stock market boom to float a subsidiary company on 
the eastern section of the mynpacht . The position of the Company with 
regard to the potential and requirements of its property very soon 
became evident to those in control. Perhaps the strongest realisation 
on the part of the board was the inadequacy of the existing mill and 
plant in coping with the vast ore reserves discovered to lie under the 
property . It is not clear whether at this stage the thinking of the 
board extended to evaluating the relationship between existing facil-
ities and high working costs and the benefit of a lower marginal 
production cost which could result from an ~ncreased scale of operations. 
Reports indicate only that the twenty five stamp mill was recognised 
by January 1889 to be "totally inadequate" to crush the amount of ore 
29 
on hand. The mine was being developed at a far more rapid pace 
than the existing mill could cope with. The directors therefore 
decided to increase the crushing power dramatically by ordering a 
further fifty five stamps, together with an engine adequate to drive 
100 stamps. The equipment would require an additional outlay of 
approximately £20 000. To open a second level, below that of the 
adits, also meant that for the first time the mine would have to face 
the expense of installing proper pumping and hauling equipment, so far 
obviated by the use of the adits. The opening of the second level 
28. Ibid. 
29 . The Eastern Star, 21 January 1889. 
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would also require an estimated £12 000. In all · the directors anticip-
ated an expenditure of approximately £50 000. 30 
The original working capital of the Company was £20 000. This 
amount was augmented by the sale of the 3 000 reserve shares in October 
1888 for an amount of £5 754 7s. 6d., but from this sum was drawn 
£10 865 ls. Od. for the purchase of the Elandsfontein estate. The 
balance of approximately £15 000 was long since invested in machinery 
and plant and the development of the property. A special general 
meeting was called for 22 January 1889 at which the directors proposed 
to increase the capital of the Company to £100 000 by the issue of a 
further 25 000 shares. At the same meeting the chairman, Mr R.R. 
Hollins, suggested that the property was too large and that even with 
a 100 stamp mill it was estimated that the ore in one level would take 
up to four years to deplete. The board therefore proposed to f l oat a 
separate company to work the claims which lay to the east of the 
intrusive dyke. It was proposed that such a company would also have 
a nominal capital of £100 000, one share in the new company being 
allotted for each held in the existing Company, with the bal ance of 
£25 000 being raised by public issue for the purposes of working capital 
- and thus ensuring the new company the same sort of financial 
difficulties which had caused the Simmer and Jack board to dream up 
31 the scheme. 
It appears from reports of the meeting that the board attempted to 
offer the deal for the creation of the new company as part of the same 
package as the increase in capital for the mother Company. Led by 
Messrs Barnato and Wicke, a counter proposal was offered which 
suggested that the Company issue the shares itself and use the funds 
for the working of the whole property. It was eventually decided to 
increase the capital of the Simmer and Jack Company to £85 000 by 
the creation of a further 10 000 £1 shares, while the directors were 
instructed to invite tenders for the purchase of the eastern claims. 
A special general meeting would be called as soon as possible to consider 
the tenders offered. 
As early as December 1888 Messrs H. ECkstein and Company were 
aware of the impendi ng move to float a separate company. It was their 
30. Ibid. 
31. ·The Eastern Star, 23 January 1889. 
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intention to take a share in such a scheme if it could be acquired at 
32 
reasonable cost. By early January it was reported to London that 
so many groups and individuals were "fighting for these things It that 
it would be impossible to acquire them on the terms which the London 
principals of the 
accustomed in the 
firm, namely Wernher, Beit and Company, had become 
33 past. The Johannesburg partners, H. Eckstein 
and Company, had shown interest in the Simmer and Jack property for 
some time. It was a company which, due to its size, was seen to be of 
particular importance. While the Company straddled the dyke it was 
considered to be at a distinct disadvantage and the firm hoped to 
benefit from the split . The separation and acquisition of the eastern 
34 
section was not contemplated as an end in itself by the Corner House, 
but rather as a means for increasing the size of the promising adjoin-
35 ing property, the Primrose Gold Mining Company. 
The special general meeting to consider tenders was held on 14 Ma~ch 
1889 at the peak of the speculative boom in Johannesburg. Considerable 
interest was generated in the affair and the gathering was well attended. 
The tender of the syndicate of which H. Eckstein and Company were 
partners was submitted to the meeting by Julius G. Mosenthal. The offer 
for the ten and a half claims on the line of reef and a suitable water-
right was for £120 000 in cash and 40 doo shares in the new company to 
36 be formed. Cecil John Rhodes held a two-thirds share in the offer, 
the Corner House one tenth, while E.A. Lippert also had an interest. 
This is the first evidence of the interest of Rhodes in the Company, 
which was to reach fruition in the virtual take-over of the Simmer and 
Jack Company in 1894. 
32. Barlow Rand Archives. Archives of H. Eckstein and Company 
(Re ference code H.E.), Vol. H.E.51, H. Eckstein and Company to 
Jules Porges and Company, p.229, 28 December 1888. 
33. Ibid., p.270, 11 January 1889. 
34. tiThe Corner House" was the popular name for the firm of H. 
Eckstein and Company in Johannesburg, being a reference to 
their business premises on the corner of Commissioner and Simmonds 
Streets. Given the dominance of the firm in the early affairs of 
the gold mining industry it is also possible that the name had a 
double meaning for Johannesburg investors. 
35 . H.E . 51, H. Eckstein and Company to Jules Porges and Company, 
p. 366, 1 March 1889. 
36. Ibid . 
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In all six tenders for the claims were received. Besides the one 
already mentioned, there were others from C.P. Crewe, who offered the 
Simmer and Jack Company 125 000 El shares in the company to be formed 
together with E50 000 in cash. The capital of the proposed company 
would be E250 000, the balance being made up of E50 000 in working 
capital with 20 000 reserve shares and the remaining 25 000 shares going 
to the promoters. A third tender was from J.D. Celliers and Company on 
behalf of var ious principals, whereby the Simmer and Jack Company would 
receive 170 000 El shares in a company with a capital of E240 000. 
The balance of the capital would come from E50 000 in working capital, 
10 000 reserve shares and 10 000 shares to the promoters. The fourth 
tender was an alternative offer from J.G. Mosenthal for a straight cash 
sale of the claims for E140 000. The fifth offer was from B.I. Barnato 
for E185 000, of which E35 000 would be in cash and the balance in the 
shares of the company to be formed. Finally J. Stroyan and Company 
offered E250 000, E50 000 in cash for working capital, 25 000 reserve 
shares, 150 000 shares to the Simmer and Jack Company, and 25 000 as a 
37 ten per cent commission to the promoters. 
From the correspondence of the firm of H. Eckstein and Company and 
the events at the meeting, it would appear that the d irectors had before 
the meeting broken silence on the subject and entered into written 
correspondence with J.G. Mosenthal regarding the provisional acceptance 
38 
of the first tender. The meeting was chaired by Dr C;W . Neebe who 
had recently taken a seat on the board and had immediately been given 
the chairmanship of the Company. At least one of the directors, the 
former chairman R.R . Hollins, expressed his contention that none of 
the offers be accepted. In expr essing their combined opinion the rest 
of the board, through their spokesman George Farrar, proposed the 
acceptance of the J.G. Mosenthal first tender. Farrar pointed ou~ that 
the redemption of the 40 000 shares at par after the stipulated period 
of four months would make this offer worth E160 000 in cash. Barney 
Barnato expressed his anger at the directors entering into correspondence 
with Mosenthal prior to the meeting to ask for a guarantee for the one 
tender. He felt that all participants in the call should have been 
asked for similar guarantees. A long debate ensued in which Hollins 
37. The Eastern Star, 15 March 1889. 
38. H.E.51, H. Eckstein and Company to Jules Porges and Company, 
p .375 , 8 March 1889. 
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condemned the action of the board in acting beyond the bounds of the 
resolution, which merely requested the board to call for the tenders. 
In his defence of their actions, Farrar suggested that the board had 
only "taken steps to find outll if a proper guarantee would be forth-
coming. Farrar also pointed out that by comparison with the offer 
recently accepted by the Witwatersrand Gold Mining Company the Mosenthal 
offer was most favourable, being more than double the amount that 
company had received per claim. 39 Regarding suggestions for the 
formation of a subsidiary company, Farrar eloquently stressed the high 
costs such a move would entail~ A subsidiary company would also involve 
a delay of at least eighteen months before any return would accrue to 
the parent Company's shareholders, while the high cost of transport 
prevailing as a result of the current drought conditions would make the 
cost of such a venture most expensive. Farrar felt that the Simmer and 
Jack Company still stood to retain the better portion of the mynpacht, 
the Elandsfontein estate and the growing township of Germiston. 
Acceptance of the Mosenthal tender could give shareholders one new 
share for every two already held, or , after payment of a bonus of thirty 
shillings per share, would leave their Company with about E45 000 in 
cash to augment the working capital. 
The defection at the meeting of John Jack from the stand of the 
rest of the board to the views of Hollins and Barnato was a major blow 
for the directorate. Thus weakened, there seemed no alternative but 
to propose an adjournment of the meeting. Privately, Barnato removed 
his opposition to the Mosenthal tender in return for a E50 000 interest 
in the undertaking~ Barnato also agreed not 
amalgamation of the claims into the Primrose 
to oppose the proposed 
40 Company. Before the 
adjournment of the meeting Hollins put forward a counter-proposal that 
a subsidiary company be floated with a n ominal capital of E200 000, in 
which the shareholders of the parent company would receive 150 000 
shares, leaving 10 000 shares as a reserve while the balance of 40 000 
were offered to the public for the raising of working capital, after 
first being offered to the shareholders of the parent company on a pro 
rata basis. 
39. See above, Chapter II, pp.40-41. 
40. H.E.51, H. Eckstein and Company to Jules Porges and Company, 
p.386, 15 March 1889. 
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The meeting was duly adjourned to 18 March 1889. From the speech 
made by Hollins at the second meeting it would seem that his main 
objective was to see the establishment of a separate company on the 
claims. He even went so far as to suggest that he would rather support 
the adoption of Barnato l s tender as an alternative if his own proposal 
was rejected, in that this tender also specified the establishment of 
a separate company. Hollins believed that the incorporation of the 
claims into the Primrose amalgamation would not serve in the best 
interests of the Simmer and Jack shareholders. Whether there was any 
personal antagonism between Hollins and the other members of the 
Mosenthal syndicate has not been established. There seems little reason 
to believe that the incorporation of · the claims into the Primrose 
amalgamation would have resulted in any less benefit to the Simmer and 
Jack shareholders. In the short term there was the promise of a better 
cash reward and a shareholding in a venture which would yield a dividend 
return that much sooner than a company starting from scratch. Shares 
in the Primrose amalgamation were also likely to respond , more rapidly 
on the market. As Farrar noted, in terms of Hollins's scheme, the new 
company would be expected to raise capital for both the old Simmer and 
Jack Company , as well as for its own requirements. It would seem that 
the only real opposition to the Mosenthal tender could lie in the 
nature of the cash to shares balance of the offer, in terms of which 
the Simmer and Jack Company was fobbed off with cash rather than being 
given an inside deal on the Primrose amalgamation which was considered 
as a very favourable prospect. 
Hollins's proposal was eventually put to the vote and carried by 
24 votes to 22, whereupon a ballot was demanded. The result of the 
ballot was 543 votes in favour of Hollins's proposal and 588 accepting 
Mosenthal's tender. As the total number of votes only represented 
5518 shares, there were insufficient shares accounted for 
either proposal and the meeting was adjourned for another 
to carry 
41 
week. 
By now the writing was on the wall as far as H. Eckstein and Company 
were concerned and they withdrew from the Mosenthal syndicate. 42 
During the intervening week an additional offer was received from 
41. The Eastern Star, 18 March 1889. 
42. H.E . 51, H. Eckstein and Company to Jules Porges and Company, 
p.400, 22 March 1889. 
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Mr Abe Bailey and provisionally accepted by the directors. The Simmer 
and Jack Company shareholders would receive 140 000 shares and £35 000 
in cash in an amalgamation deal involving their ten and a half claims 
and the property of the Primrose Gold Mining Company. The new company 
so formed would have a share capital of 500 000 £1 shares, with a 
working capital of £50 ODD and a reserve of 15 000 shares. Bailey 
would, besides the usual rights, have the choice in the appointment of 
four of the seven directors 'of the new company a An amendment proposing 
the alteration of the structure of the offer to 150 000 shares and 
£25 000 in cash was accepted by the Simmer and Jack shareholders. It 
was then resolved that of the 150 000 shares, 131 250 would be divided 
amongst the shareholders and the balance left in the hands of the 
directors as working capital. Once 
ficient shares represented to carry 
ag ain, however, 
th . 43 e mot~on. 
there were insuf-
Nevertheless from 
the tone of the meeting it is clear that the shareholders present were 
seeking a greater proportion of any offer for the claims in the form of 
company shares. With the stock exchange at the height of the boom this 
was inevitable. Such shares could hopefully be unloaded onto the 
market at considerably higher prices than their nominal value, thus 
making the offer worth far more than would initially seem the case. 
The drive to part with the ten ana a half claims did not end here 
and was again revived later in 1889. In the interim', however I the stock 
exchange collapsed and the Company had to face the financial 
implications of the debt incurred in the opening of the second level 
of the mine and in the purchase of additional stamps and equipment. 
Having intended to use the funds from the sale of the claims for this 
purpose, the board now found itself in financial straits. To add to 
their discomfort was the fact that the collapse of the share market 
rendered the sale of the 10 000 reserve shares an unprofitable way out 
of the problem. Simmer and Jack shares peaked in value in February 
1889 when they were quoted in Johannesburg at 214 shillings. 44 
Thereafter they slid back to around eighty shillings. As Dr Neebe 
pointed out to the half yearly meeting in July, the financial position 
43. The Eastern Star, 27 March 1889 . 
44. Goldman, C.S., The Financial, Statistical and General History 
of the Gold and Other Companies of Witwatersrand, South Africa, 
p.xxi. 
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of the Company would have been that much healthier but for the cancel-
lation of the scheme to sell the claims. The directors were left in a 
position where they had personally to stand surety for the granting of 
loans to the Company. An amount of £30 000 was borrowed from the 
Transvaal Mortgage, Loan and Finance Company to pay for the new stamp 
battery and other equipment which arrived at the mine throughout the 
course of 1889. By 9 September 1889 the debt of the Company had again 
risen to £22 749 17s. 6d. and the directors were prompted to sell half 
of the reserve shares. Share prices had risen in the interim since 
April to over 160 shillings so that 4 000 were sold at £8 2s. 6d. and a 
further 1 000 at £8 3s. 6d. With the proceeds of these sales the debt 
45 
was eliminated and a credit balance of £17 656 13s. 10d. restored. 
A decision was also taken to increase the order for new stamps from 
fifty five to seventy five, in order to bring the milling strength up 
to 100 stamps. It was also resolved to acquire a rock drilling plant 
which necessitated a further outlay of £4 000. The overdraft at the 
loan company remained undiminished but the sale of the 5 .000 reserve 
shares had at least allowed for the extra stamps and the drilling plant 
to be acquired without the need for a second bond on the property. 
Like many companies on the Witwatersrand, the collapse of the stock 
exchange in 1889 prompted the directorate of the Company seriously to 
consider increasing output as a means of ensuring regular profitab-
ility and the payment of dividends. 
The sale of the shares prompted a query from shareholders as to 
why they were not offered by public tender. There was of course no 
compulsion on the board to offer them in this manner, the trust deed 
giving the board carte blanche in the matter. In reply to the 
question, Hollins pointed out that there was a well known technique 
used by speculators whenever a company offered shares in this way. The 
speculators invariably resorted to bearing operations on the price of a 
company's shares as soon as such tenders were called for. As it was, 
news of the impending sale resulted in the ma~ket price of Simmer and 
Jack shares being beared down by 7s. 6d., while the price rose by a 
further lOs. immediately it became known that the stock was placed. 
W. P. Taylor's weekly financial report on the Witwatersrand 
published on 11 October 1889, noted the intention of the Simmer and 
45. The Star, 19 September 1889. 
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Jack board to attempt yet again to float the ten and a half claims as a 
subsidiary company. The total capital of the new company would be 
£180 000 in £1 shares, 127 500 of which would go to the parent company, 
40 000 to be sold to raise working capital and the balance of 12 500 
. 46 held ~n reserve. Taylor's information proved accurate and the 
proposal was duly laid before the shareholders on 4 December for their 
approval. Despite the large turn out of shareholders, only 52 044 
shares were represented, 4 622 short of the quorum number of 56 666, 
or two thirds of the total share in the Company. To pass the sale of 
claims a majority of three quarters was needed of the voters at a 
meeting with the required quorum. 47 Hence the meeting was once more 
adjourned to 13 January 1890. The necessary number of shares were 
represented at t he January meeting and a resolution authorising the 
48 board to float a subsidiary company was duly passed. 
By July 1890 it was the board who had changed their minds regarding 
the floating of a subsidiary company. The growing awareness of the 
influence of pyritic ore in the second level of the mine 'and the 
increased costs which were unavoidable in its working, were given as 
the main cause for this change of heart. For the first time the 
considerable body of unworked, free milling, ore in the upper levels 
of the eastern section of the mine was recognised for the true asset 
it was. The realisation had dawned of "the considerable advantage to 
be derived from a large mining area of free milling are ~~.1I49 
As the chairman indicated, "Wider experience had brought home to the 
Directors of the various Companies on these fields that it was more 
advisable not to cut up a property as mining operations could be 
conducted more economically and advantageously [on a larger unit]." 
There was also a greater awareness that the costs of the reorganisation 
of the mine would not accumulate indefinitely_ The existing twenty 
five stamp mill continued to show a small monthly profit throughout the 
period of the attempted sale and suggested the higher profits which 
could be earned with the larger mill and lower working costs. It was 
46. The Star, 11 October 1889, quoting W.P. Taylor's Report. 
47. Cory Library, Rhodes University, MS16 072, Articles of Association 
of Simmer and Jack Company dated 9 November 1887, p . 19. 
48. The Diggers' News (Johannesburg), 14 January 1890. 
4 ~ The Star, 2 July 1890. 
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thus recognised that a debt in the region of £30 000 to £50 000 could 
easily be serviced and refunded out of the antic i pated future earnings. 
While such a debt would limit dividend payments in the short term, it 
would make possible the payment of a more substantial dividend on the 
smaller nominal capita l in the future . Evidence of this change in the 
thinking of the board was the decision to raise a further loan for 
£25 000 at ten per cent per annum for one year through the Transvaal 
50 
Mortgage, Loan and Finance Company from 29 March 1890. 
The Simmer and Jack Company was from the outset considered one of 
the most economically worked mines on the field. At the first annual 
general meeting the low cost of mining was alluded to . The figure of 
21 shillings per ton was indeed remarkable and a considerable period 
of time elapsed before costs were again reduced to such a low figure. 51 
It is, however, doubtful if this figure was an accurate reflection of 
all the costs involved as no breakdown was given. Another unsubstantiated 
figure of 245. 7d. was shown as the average cost for the first six months 
of 1889. 52 Nevertheless a factor which would contribute substantially 
to these low figures was the physical structure of the mine in this 
period . The presence of two adits significantly reduced the cost of 
draining the mine, as well as lowering the cost of haulage, both of 
which were done by gravity . The various incline shafts from the 
surface served as little more than winzes and all are was .drawn from 
the mine via the adits. For this purpose two mules were used, being 
found sufficient to draw up to 100 empty trucks into the mine daily, 
while the full vehicles were run out to the mill by gravity. Under 
these circumstances the mine was able to show a good profit from 
relatively poor ores. For the six months ending on 31 May 1889 5 548 
ounces of gold were extracted from 8 790 tons of ore, or an average of 
12,62 dwts. to the ton, which yielded a net profit of £8 620 17s. 2d. 
to the Company from the mine. With the revenue from the estate, the 
amount was increased to £11012 3s . 10d. 53 It was with the assistance 
of such profits that the d irectors decided to undertake the improvement 
programme. By June 1891 an amount of £50 337 5s. 7d. from profits had 
50. Ibid. 
51. The Eastern Star, 23 January 1889 . 
52. The Star , 30 July 1889. 
53. Ibid . 
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been invested in re-equipping the mine . 54 The Company declared its 
first dividend of ten per cent in February 1889 . Thereafter profits 
were channelled into the reconstruction and improvement programme .50 
that the next dividend, again for ten per cent on the nominal capital, 
was only declared in April 1891. 
The Company was also fortunate from the cost viewpoint in that the 
three payable reefs, namely, the north, main and main reef leader, were 
all contained within an area of width of between fifteen and twenty 
feet. The south reef lay 300 feet to the south and while it 
contained some gold, it was found unprofitable to work until 1895. 55 
In the period until 1895 the ore mined from the property had an 
average assay value of little over 13,5 dwts., while the mill yielded 
an average of about 8 dwts. The Company was, however, fortunate in 
possessing a shoot of higher grade ore in the central section of the 
western portion of the mine which averaged about 18 dwts. to the ton. 
It was probably to this body that the press repcrt alluded when it 
mentioned the discovery of a "leader of extraordinary richness" in 
56 November 1888 . The rest of the mine contained ore of a much lower 
grade and the fairly uniform output from the mill was achieved by mixing 
ores from the various sections. 
During the course of 1889 the Company experienc.ed an increase in 
working costs, particularly in the second half of the year . The 
greater part of the increase was incurred in mining. During the year 
the decision was taken to extend the development of the mine to keep 
pace with the new mill when it commenced operations. It was also 
proposed to open the second level where ore of a better quality was 
known to exist. Unlike some other companies,S7 all development costs 
were immediately reflected in working costs for the month in which 
they were incurred, and hence the rise in these cos'ts in the second 
half of 1889. In the half year ending 30 November 1889 the average 
in working costs had risen to 27s. 8, 75d., while lor the month of 
54 . Goldman, C.S., op.cit., p.218. 
55. Hatch, F.H. & Chalmers, J.A., The Gold Mines of the Rand, 
pp.82-3. 
56. The Eastern Star, 23 November 1888. 
57. See below, Chapter V, P .. 175. 
80 
58 November these costs had risen to 33s. 1,25d. 
Cost consciousness was very evident in the management of the 
Company. A good example of this awareness is found in the handling of 
the contracts for the supply of coal. A contract for the supply of 
coal to the mine was revised in September 1888. Previously coal had 
been supplied to the Company at a price of 7s. 6d. per bag (probably 
per hundredweight), while it would now cost thirty shillings per ton 
delivered. 59 Consumption of coal averaged about two tons per day. 
Another area in which cost consciousness was a regular feature of 
management was in the hiring of African labour. The recurrent 
difficulty experienced by the Company in the recruiting of black labour 
would also suggest that it was not prepared to pay as high a wage as 
offered by some of the other Rand companies. In October 1888 the 
Company employed fourteen whites and 100 blacks, the Africans being 
paid between ten shillings and twelve shillings a week and white miners 
60 £4 per week. A saving was also effected in the accommodation for 
these black workers who were housed in wood and iron sheds, a factor 
which, in consideration of the harsh highveld winters, could not have 
enhanced the reputation of the Company as an employer. Nevertheless, 
the fact that such accommodation was provided could have acted against 
the Company in the eyes of its employees . Such a rudimentary compound 
system was not yet generally in operation on the Witwatersrand and 
would be recognised by black employees as a means for the· Company to 
exert more stringent control over their lives. On mines where they 
were allowed to fend for themselves, Africans often lived off the 
company's premises which made desertion to a company offering higher 
wages that much easier. Attempts were made by Charles Knox, when he 
was manager, to r ecruit "Natal boys" for the Company, but the 
recurrence of the complaint of an insufficiency of black labour suggests 
61 that he was not very successful. 
Another cause of the increase in working costs exper i enced towards 
the end of 1889 and into 1890 was the severe drought which held the 
58. The Diggers' News, 24 December 1889. 
59. The Eastern Star, 21 January 1889. 
60. The Eastern Star, 8 October 1888. 
61. The Eastern Star, 20 J une 1888. 
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whole of the country in its grip. The lack of grass cut off the 
interior, and thus the Witwatersrand, from the coast for the only means 
of communication, the ox wagon. The price of all supplies soared as a 
result, black labour being no exception. Not only did the price of 
labour itself increase but also the cost of food to maintain those 
workers. The price of coal also rose steeply due to the scarcity of 
transport. It was estimated that in consequence of the drought the 
cost of supplies had risen by approximately 50 per cent, while the price 
for meal alone raised expenses for the Company by 3s. 6d. per ton of ore 
worked in November. 62 
The occurrence of drought during the summer of 1889-90 was 
abnormal. Every highveld winter was, however, a period of natural 
drought. In 1887 and 1888 many companies were forced to a stand-still 
for want of water for their batteries. The possession of a good water 
right was of the greatest importance to the success of a.ny company. 
The Simmer and Jack Company acquired two water-rights at an early date, 
and they proved sufficient for the needs of the twenty five stamp mill. 
With the decision to enlarge the battery to 100 stamps it was recog-
nised that this water supply wou.ld no longer suffice. It was thus 
decided to apply to the Mining Commissioner for a new water-right some 
880 yards below the Company's dam built on the initial water-rights in 
1887, where a larger reservoir could be erected. Conside~able delay was 
experienced in the granting of the new water-right and this in turn 
prevented the erection of the new mill, as the granting of the water-
right directly influenced the choice of a site for the mill. In July 
1889 it was reported that the application, made originally to the 
Diggers' Committee, was transferred to the Department of Mines when the 
former body ceased to exist in 1888. 63 The application rested with the 
Mining Commissioner for six months before the Company was informed in 
May 1889 that the water-right applied for had already been granted to 
the syndicate which floated the Stanhope-Geldenhuis Deep Level Gold 
Mining Company, and that the Simmer and Jack application was therefore 
invalid. The directors immediately entered into an arrangement with the 
62. The Diggers' News, 14 January 1890. 
63. The Diggers' Committee was a body formed amongst the 
diggers to exert some form of control on the early field. 
Its functions were subsequently recognised by the State. 
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Stanhope-Geldenhuis Company, in which the Simmer and Jack Company would 
bear the costs for the construction of the dam wall in return for the 
use of water from this source. When completed the dam had a capacity 
of 34 million gallons, which proved ample for the needs of both 
. 64 
compan~es • 
The decision to delay the erection of the battery until negotiations 
on the water-right were completed proved fortuitous. A site was 
subsequently chosen and excavation work commenced on the foundations. 
The Company was then notified that this location lay astride the route 
surveyed for the Netherlands Company's IItram line". The choice of an 
alternative site was not painless for the Company and resulted in 
serious extra expenses. A mOre powerful pumping plant was required to 
raise water to the new 
the battery house were 
site, while 
65 
needed. 
various alterations to the design of 
Excavations on the new site commenced 
in August 1889 and tenders were called for the erection of the new mill, 
h · h . t h d ld b 1 t d . th . 66 w LC ~ was ope , wou e camp e e WL Ln a year . The continuing 
drought delayed the delivery of some of the machinery, particularly the 
altered pumping equipment. The mill was, nevertheless, essentially 
complete by August 1890 but delays 
prevented crushing from commencing 
in the delivery of the water mains 
67 f or another man th . 
In time the presence of the railway passing through the property 
of the Simmer and Jack Company was to prove financially ~dvantageous. 
Not only was the price of coal significantly reduced but the choice of 
Germiston as the terminus between the railway line from the Cape and 
the IIRand tram" line in 1892 ensured the Company a significant boost in 
income from its freehold title on Elandsfontein. The opening of the 
Rand tram line brought an immediate gain to the Company from the sale 
of stands in the village of Germiston. Even prior to this the estate 
was responsible for generating in excess of five per cent of the 
Company ' s income. 68 
The presence of these railway lines on the property did, however, 
interrupt certain mining activities. As has already been mentioned 
64. The Star, 30 July 1889. 
65. The Dig2erst News, 14 January 1890. 
66. The Star, 24 August 1889. 
67 . The Star, 2 July 1890. 
68. The Diggers I News, 14 January 1890. 
83 
the advent of the railway disrupted the original plans for siting the 
battery. In 1890 the Railway Company took the Simmer and Jack Company 
to court. William Knox, as manager of the mine, was charged before 
the Landdrost with contravening Clause 3 of Executive Council D.ecision 
No.663, by laying a wooden aqueduct under the Rand tram line without 
the permission of the Netherlands Railway Company. In evidence the 
plaintiff suggested that the aqueduct was constructed the previous 
January, whereupon notice was served on the Company to remove it. 
Under cross-examination it was admitted by the Railway Company's 
spokesman that the aqueduct in no way threatened, weakened or inter-
fered with the line, the Railway Company basing its case purely on the 
failure of the mining company to gain permission for its actions. 
69 Judgement was subsequently reserved. The incident is not significant 
in reflecting the legal, but rather the physical problems encountered by 
the Company from the presence of the railway. Coming between the mill 
and its water supply, probl ems were inevitable. 
A decision was taken in the second half of 1889 to establish a 
redemption fund, separate from the depreciation account, into which 
woul d be paid a set amount of 2s. 6d. per ton of quartz mined. The 
amount written off for the depreciation continued to be an arbitrary 
amount determined by the profitability of the Company in any period. 
The redemption payments, however, became an additional fixed cost 
contributing to the total of working expenses. 70 The redemption 
account was only maintained for a year before being dropped. Reporting 
to the half yearly general meeting in July 1890 the chairman stated 
that the board had rather decided to write off the whole of the out-
standing debt. 71 
The appointment of William Pope as manager of the mine on 1 October 
1888 reflected an interesting attitude by the board towards the position 
of mine manager. Knox was from the outset of his appointment given a 
72 permanent position and the opportunity to secure shares in the Company. 
It is possible that the favourable terms granted to Knox were due to his 
69. The Star, 7 March 1890. 
70. The Diggers' News, 14 January 1890. 
71. The Star, 2 July 1890. 
72. Cory Library, Rhodes University, MS16 072, Articles of Association 
of the Simmer and Jack Company dated 9 November 1887, p.5. 
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friendship with Jack. It also seems likely that Knox was another of 
the MCCorkindale settlers. No such favoured status was given to Pope. 
His appointment was for six months with an extension of time 
conditional upon his performance. At the end of the probation period 
he was considered to have given "entire satisfaction, working econom-
ically in 
a further 
the best 
73 year • 
interests of the Company" I and was thus engaged for 
No further mention is made of a renewal of the 
annual contract, so that he was presumably given a permanent appointment. 
Pope continued to serve the Company for the duration of this study. 
The year 1889 was marked in the history of the Simmer and Jack 
Company by a serious fraud scandal, involving the Company's Johannes-
burg secretary and the London agency. The Company became aware of the 
irregularities only after the disappearance of the secretary, Mr George 
P. Lofthouse, from Johannesburg in ear ly September 1889. Lofthouse was 
secretary to various Rand gold mining companies, some of the better known 
of which were the Jumpers, Aurora, Aurora West, Stanhope-Gel denhuis and 
Leeupoort Companies, in addition to the Simmer and Jack Company. The 
forger's position became increasingly tenuous in 1889 when many of the 
Rand properties underwent major reorganisations and reconstructions. 
In addition to the recalling and reissuing of scrip which some of the 
reconstructions required, the banks also became large holders of scrip 
following the collapse of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange boom. The 
banks, in sifting through these share certificates encountered 
irregularities which were communicated to the several companies. 
A few weeks before an investigation of the share register of the Aurora 
West Gold Mining Company left over 1 000 shares unaccounted for. 
Lofthouse disappeared from Johannesburg on Sunday 1 September and all 
74 
companies connected with him took possession of their books. Rumour 
suggested that he was subsequently seen in Australia. 
It immediately became known that there was "something wrong" with 
the issue of Simmer and Jack shares but the press suggested that it 
75 
was "nothing of serious account". The investigation was routinely 
extended to the checking of the London register as well, and once again 
73. The Star, 30 July 1889. 
74. The Star, 6 September 1889. 
75. Ibid. 
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the records were found wanting. By February 1890 the local board 
recognised that fraud had been perpetrated both in London and Johannes-
burg and that the situation called for immediate and drastic action. 
A member of the Company's board of directors, Mr W. Gilchrist had been 
despatched post haste to London in November to lead the investigation 
there. Gilchrist spent six months in London before matters wer~ brought 
to a head with the conviction of the London secretary, Woodbine Claete, 
and a clerk, McPherson, in the Guildhall Police Court. Two other 
clerks were said to have also left for Australia in a hurry. The 
investigation involved the Company in considerable expense. In the 
half year down to 30 November 1890 an amount of E469 2s. 6d. was spent 
on sending Gilchrist to London and 
th h b h . 76 e Jo annes urg s are reg~ster. 
on arranging for a proper audit of 
In the following period a further 
amount of E1 847 7s. 3d. was spent on keeping Gilchrist in London and 
in payment for the services of Deloitte, Dever, Griffiths and Company 
77 for a proper audit of the Company's London books. Gilchrist also 
immediately transferred the London agency to the offices of the 
Transvaal Mortgage, Loan and Finance Company. This move was probably 
made at the request of that company, which stood as the main creditor 
of the Simmer and Jack Company. 
By February 1891 the full extent of the fraud was realised. 
Acting independently, the two parties were responsible for the fraud-
ulent issue of 1 760 shares. Initially it was believed that Lofthouse 
only was responsible for the issue of 500 of these shares but time and 
careful investigation proved him to have issued 700 as against the 
1 060 of the more skilled operators in London. 78 While no connection 
was traced to suggest a conspiracy between Lofthouse in Johannesburg 
and Cloete and McPherson in London, it seems likely that shares 
fraudulently issued in the one centre had found their way to the other, 
thus giving a clue to the other party that conditions in the Company 
were conducive to such activity. 
Having assessed the extent of the damage it now remained for the 
board to decide what action to take. Fairly early in the investigation, 
76. The Star, 29 January 1891. 
77. The Star, 20 February 1891. 
78. South African Mining Journal, Vol. I, 3, p.40. 17 October 1891 . 
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when it was recognised that those involved were all former employees 
of the Company, the decision was taken against seeking litigation, at 
least in Johannesburg. With Lofthouse in Australia it would have been 
extremely difficult to have achieved anything in this manner. At the 
half yearly meeting held in June 1891 the question was raised as to 
whether the reserve shares should be used to substitute good for bad 
scrip. In reply the chairman, R.R. Hollins, was not prepared to 
commit the board to any particular course of action, or at least until 
the investigation in London was complete. An extraordinary general 
meeting was then called for October 1891. 
Another blow now befell the troubled directorate. The chairman 
R.R. Hollins, did not oppose a provisional order of sequestration 
brought against him in July 1891. In anticipation of these events he 
resigned his seat on the boards of all companies of which he was a 
director. It was suggested that he had failed to distinguish between 
the market and the industry itself. 80 Like many a lesser speculator 
he was taken short in the depressed market which followed the 1889 
collapse. His resignation removed a key coordinator in the fraud 
investigation at a crucial time. Mr H. David was called to .fill the 
breach and it was under his chairmanship that the extraordinary general 
meeting was held. 
In addressing the extraordinary meeting David stressed the stand 
of the board against litigation and asked for the approval of the 
meeting for a proposal that the board undertake to simply substitute 
good scrip for bad, without having recourse to the sale of the reserve 
shares. Anticipating this course of action the board had slowly been 
buying up shares at favourable prices. It was felt that the reserve 
shares should be kept as a contingency against any possible future 
capital requirements of the Company. The meeting was well handled by 
81 David and the board was given the authority it sought. 
It is rather surprising that the board was so well treated by the 
shareholders at the meeting. As one member of the press was quick to 
point out, they were not even asked what the 1 760 good shares had 
79. The Standard and Diggers' News (Johannesburg), 26 June 1891. 
80. The Star, 13 July 1891. 
81. The Star, 14 October 1891. 
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cost the Company. An amount of £6 000 was guessed at, which would have 
brought the total cost, with investigation expenses, to nearly 
£9 000. 82 The directors hardly stood blameless in the affair. Had a 
proper audit been regularly made, and had the board exercised greater 
control over the secretary in Johannesburg, the opportunity for his 
malfeasance would have been greatly diminished. 
Turning to the actual operation of the mine, it is evident that 
all aspects were brought into readiness for the starting of the new 
mill in August 1890. Commenting on the actual battery, Lionel Phillips 
of H. Eckstein and Company reported the rumour that the machinery had 
83 been badly assembled, although his personal inspection only revealed 
"some defects", perhaps the worst of which, in Phillips I s opinion, was 
84 
that the stamps were made by Sandycroft. The firm of H. Eckstein 
and Company wer e convinced of the merits of the Fraser and Chalmers mill. 
In the period down to the end of 30 November an average of 53 stamps of 
the new mill were in operation and some 26 078 tons of ore were milled 
at a cost of 8s. Sd. per ton, a substantial reduction compared to the 
past average of about 11s. 6d. per ton, even though the Company was 
confronted with the expense of operating two mills during the period. 
Mining development was also pushed forward to meet the requirements 
of the new mill. A reserve of 149 879 tons of ore !lin sight" was 
developed, sufficient for an eighteen month supply for the 100 stamp 
mill. The increased rate of mining was responsible for a considerable 
reduction of 45 per cent in the cost of mining per ton. Including 
depreciation and development costs, the total working costs were 24s.8d. 
per ton, a remarkably low figure given that the Company had two separate 
mills in operation. With profit per ton at lOs. 8d. the net profit for 
the year was brought to £21 841 Os. 11d., sufficient to allow the 
Company to repay the outstanding balance of the loan and look forward 
to the resumption of dividend payments, the first of which, for ten per 
cent, was declared in April 1891. 85 
82. The Standard and Diggers' News, 15 October 1891, and The Star, 
2 July 1892. 
83. H.E.149, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, p.307, 
1 August 1890. 
84. Ibid . , p.323, 23 August 1890. 
85. The Standard and Diggers' News, 30 January 1891. 
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The increased stamping power and lower costs of production allowed 
the COmpany to consider increasing the overall ore reserve by lowering 
the quality of the ore worked. Thus the average yield declined from 
16,98 dwts. per ton in the half year down to 31 May 1890, to 9,84 dwts. 
86 in the period down to 30 November 1890, a fall of 42,05 per cent. 
At least part of the decline was due to the i ncreased crushing capacity 
which resulted in a greater quantity of gangue and casing rock passing 
through the mill and the crushing of greater amounts of pyritic ore. 
There was a concerted drive during 1891 to reduce the total working 
cost per month to below the figure of twenty shillings per ton. In the 
six months down to 31 May 1891 an average cost of 19s. 8,04d. was 
achie ved, without the inclusion of an amount to cover depreciation. 
When such an amount was added the total was brought up to 22s. 6,OSd. 
per ton, a reduction of two shillings on the previous period. It was 
estimated that half of this saving was due to ninety five stamps being 
in operation since 1 March under one roof. In considering indiviaual 
months, the target was largely achieved . Hence the mine became one 
of the most efficiently worked on the field, and the advantages of the 
increased reduction facilities became clearly evident. 
During the second half of 1891 preparation was made for the open-
ing of the third level of the mine. Here again the Company was 
fortunate in the discovery that at the depth of the proposed level the 
reef dipped more 
. 87 
steeply than in the area nearer the surface, and so 
again increased the quantity of ore calculated to exist within the 
property. 
The very fact that another level was being opened brought the 
prospect of working only pyritic ore so much closer. The attitude of 
management towards the inevitable problem was one of caution. It was 
stated that the board recognised the problem but due to the size of its 
ore reserves the Company would sit back and allow others to trouble 
over the search for an economic solution to the treatment of pyritic 
ore. Nevertheless, in keeping with its cautious approach, the board 
authorised Pope to experiment in a small way_ 
86. Cory Library, Rhodes University, MS16 071(4), Sixth Annual 
Report of the Simmer and Jack Gold Mining Company, p.10 . 
87. The Standard and Diggers' News, 11 July 1891. 
89 
As in the case of the old twenty five stamp mill, the new battery 
made allowance for amalgamation on a series of apron plates, be l ow which 
concentration was achieved by blanket strakes. The concentrates were 
reground and again subjected to the amalgam process. 88 This relati vely 
crude method of concentrating was considered adequate to the needs of 
the Company. As it was the Company was showing a substantial profit 
on the basis of 9 dwts. to the ton . By mid 1891 it was recognised, 
however , that an amount of up to five pennyweights per ton was being 
lost in the tailings and that the quantity was likely to increase as the 
aggregate of ore passing through the mill increased. It was thus decided 
to experiment with a small concentration p l ant which would extract gold 
by means of the Plattner's Chlorination Process. The equipment consisted 
of a small furnace for oxidising the concentrates and a single vat in 
which chlorine leached the ·gold from the pulp. Such a unit was fairly 
inexpensive to erect and it was hoped that it would make some contribution 
to the total output of gold. The plant was taken into operation in J une 
1891. 89 For July, the first ful l month of operation, it contributed 
90 163 ounces to the g o ld output. In the first year of operation i t 
averaged an e xtraction rate of about sixty p e r cent at a cost of 78. per 
ton of pulp treated . 
Within the year it was recognised that such a small crude p l ant 
could scarcely meet the expectations of the Company for a profit of 
between £600 and £700 a month from this source. It had, however, served 
a very useful purpose in giving the management of the Company a clear 
insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the chlorinati on pro cess 
for the extraction of gold. The intervening period had also been 
instrumental in proving the superi ority of the MacArthur-Forrest Cyanide 
Process. By mid- 1892 Sidney H. Farrar, the Company's consultant 
engineer, and Carl Hanau, as a member of the board, strongly advocated 
the erection o f a cy anide plant. As an amount in excess of £65 000 of 
working profits had already been invested in equipment and plant, Hanau 
advocated the sale of 
E7 000 needed for the 
the reserve shares to raise the approximately 
91 plant. In addition to the 2 000 unissued 
88. South Af rican Mining Journal, Vol . I, 20, p.372, 13 February 1891. 
89 . The Star, 10 June 1891. 
90. The Star, 13 August 1891. 
91. The star, 2 July 1892 . 
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reserve shares, the Company was also in possession of 260 shares 
remaining from those purchased in the open market to compensate the 
holders of the fraudulently issued scrip. 
In November 1892 the Company entered into negotiations with the 
Rand Central Ore Reduction Company for the erection of a cyanide works 
on the property capable of treating 15 000 tons of tailings monthly. 92 
The agreement was for the Reduction Company to undertake the erection 
of the cyanide plant on the Company's property and for it to treat 
tailings bought from the Simmer and Jack Company . The contract specified 
the sale of 100 000 tons at a set price of lOs. per ton. Tests on the 
tailings were carried out at the Reduction Company's Caledonia works in 
93 August 1892. The Simmer and Jack Company had by now built up a 
considerable stockpile of approximately 150 000 tons of tailings and it 
was hoped that the treatment thereof would result in a further profit to 
the Company of £1 500 per month. The contract was due to expire on 
94 31 July 1894. The agreement lef t the reserve shares free and they 
were subsequently sold at seventy shillings each on 27 October 1892, 
the proceeds being invested in the acquisition of a new rock drilling 
plant of thirty drills. 95 
The construction of the cyanide pl~t only commenced in the second 
half of 1893 and was completed in December of that year. The reason for 
the delay in the erection of the plant was the difficulty .experienced by 
the board in finding a suitable location for it. The problem emanated 
in large part from objections raised by the Netherlands Railway Company. 
It was finally sited to the south of the railway line. 96 Another 
possible reason for the delay could have been a certain reticence on 
the part of the Simmer and Jack directorate. In the directors' report 
for the half year ending 30 November 1893 it was admitted that the 
agreement had proved less favourable to the Company than was originally 
anticipated. In the light of subsequent knowledge it was recognised 
that a better deal could have given substantially larger profits to the 
92. South African Mining Journal, Vol. II, 10, p.133, 26 November 1892. 
93. South African Mining Journal, Vol. I, 48, p.852, 27 August 1892. 
94. Cory Library, Rhodes University, MS16 071(4), Sixth Annual Report 
of the Simmer and Jack Gold Mining Company. 
95. The Star, 11 January 1893. 
96. South African Mining Journal, Vol . II, 49, p . 769, 2 September 1893. 
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Company. In mitigation the shareholders were reminded that the agree-
ment dated back to December 1892, when the costs and full technicalities 
97 
of the cyanide process were not generally known . Nevertheless, the 
proceeds from the sale of tailings contributed substantially to the 
forty per cent dividend payment made in 1893. By mid-1894 the renewal 
or revision of the contract was undertaken on terms more favourable to 
the Company. Earlier intentions to purchase the plant outright had, 
however, to stand in abeyance pending a major reconstruction of the 
Company . 
The year 1892 opened on an inauspicious note. The yield of gold 
fell drastically in December and January from an average of about 9 dwts. 
to less than 5 dwts . per ton . Commenting on this phenomenon the chair-
man admitted that the fall in output was caused by a mistake in the 
working of the mine. In the eastern section it was found that as the 
stapes were driven further into the ore the quality became indifferent. 
A large quantity of this ore was crushed as progress in the opening of 
an alternative area of the level was being hampered due to the poor 
ventilation. The board duly called for the entire area of the second 
level in the eastern section to be resampled and assayed and informed 
the manager in writing that II ••• he is expected to inunediately 
communicate to the Board, in writing, in a direct and unequivocal manner, 
any change, 
of the mine 
affecting in any important way, the position .or prospects 
98 
and works. 11 The January yield was a slight improvement 
on that of December and with working costs as low as 16s. 11,25d. per 
ton, 
£784 
it was still possible to show a net profit for the month of 
99 6s. 6d. Thereafter conditions improved as i s shown in the 
table below: 100 
Average Yield per Ton 
Month Average Yield Average Cost Net Profit 
February 1892 7,74 dwts. 16s. 4,5d. £2 267 4s. 9d. 
April 6,76 19s. 5,5d. 1 680 18s. 4d. 
May 9,15 19s. 6,75d. 3 403 11s. 9d. 
June 8,22 19s. 5,25d. 2 912 15s. 4d. 
97. South African Mining Journal, Vol. II, 17, p.259, 20 January 1893. 
98. Cory Library, Rhodes University, MS16 007, Minutes of Meetings 
of the Board of Directors, p.42, 8 February 1892. 
99. The Star, 6 February 1892. 
100. Compiled from various monthly reports appearing in The Star. 
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The rise in working costs which averaged 21s. 10,27d. per ton for 
the six months ending 31 May 1892, including depreciation charges, 
reflected the additional expense involved in the opening of the third 
level. Nevertheless, the amount was considerably l ower than the figure 
of 28s. l,242d. of the previous period . The average cost of mining 
had, however, risen from 6s. O,92d. in the former period to 6s. 5,99d. 
in that ending in May 1892, while the average yield was 7,899 dwts. 
per ton . Net profit for the half year amounted to £9 857 13s. 6d. 101 
During the next half year ending on 30 November 1892 the average 
yield increased to 8,21 dwts. and the net profit to £24 247, while 
mining costs again slipped back to 6s. O,21d. per ton. The improved 
profitability of the Company in the second half of 1892 again encouraged 
the board to look to the expansion and improvement of the mine and its 
equipment. Whereas six months previously the chairman had again raised 
the prospect of working the eastern portion of the property as a joint 
venture with the Primrose Company, it was now decided that the share-
holders would be asked to increase the capital to make provision for 
th " 102 e ~mprovements. As early as the February meeting in 1892, Carl 
Hanau informed shareholders that the value of the deep levels were 
growing and that their Company could become involved in negotiations 
with other parties interested in the working of the first row of deep 
level c l aims. Already the Rothschild Exploration Company had formed a 
syndicate and bought up the deep levels below the Simmer " and Jack 
103 p r operty. In keeping with this trend the Company entered into a 
contract with Messrs Reid Brothers to sink two boreholes on the property 
104 
to ascertain the depth and value of the reefs. A December report 
noted that one of the boreholes had struck 
feet, some 1 000 yards to the south of the 
the reef at 
105 battery. 
a depth" of 250 
The reef 
struck measured six feet and one inch in width and assayed at 
106 21 dwts. 14 grs. 
101. The Star, 2 July 1892. 
102. The Star, 11 January 1893. 
103. The Star, 3 February 1892. 
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105. The Star, 10 December 1892 . 
106. South African Mining Journal, Vol. II, 16, pp.249-50, 
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The amount of capital required for the expansion project, which 
would see the sinking of two new main shafts, fully equipped with 
hauling and pumping gear, the opening of the fourth and lower levels 
and the overhauling of the mill, was estimated to be between £30 000 
and £40 000. 107 Coinciding with this decision was a move by the 
board , to write off the substantial amount of £25 853 9s. 1d. on 
depreciation for the ostensible reason that now that the Cape railway 
had reached the terminus at 
could be acquired at a much 
Germiston, machinery and 
108 
cheaper rate. In the 
1893 a further amount of £10 240 1s. 10d. was written 
other necessities 
second half of 
off. 109 There 
seems little reason to doubt that a secret fund existed which would 
now be used to assist in covering the costs of future development. 
Further justification for this statement is found in the fact that 
throughout 1893 no call was made on the shareholde~s for an increase in 
capital and nei the r wer e debentures issued or a bond raised . Neverthe-
less, during the course of 1893 the initial steps were taken in the new 
development programme. As has already been noted, the erection of the 
cyanide plant was left to the Rand Central Ore Reduction Company, 
while the sale of the r e serve shares for £7 910 was used for the 
acquisition of the new drilling plant. 110 
The renovat ion plan involved two distinct stages. In the first 
attention was given to the sinking of the new vertical main shaft on 
the western portion and the conversion of the No . 1i incline shaft into 
a main shaft on the eastern section of the mine. Consideration was 
also given to the erection of the necessary hauling and pumping equipment 
and the modification of the mill engine in anticipation of the second 
phase which, commencing in December 1893, involved the overhauling of 
the battery. The intention was to increase the crushing power of the 
mill by the substitution of heavier 950 pound stamps for the 750 pound 
ones then in operation. The frames of the battery also required modi-
fication and automatic feeders were installed. In . order not to have 
too adverse an effect on output, only five stamps were hung up for 
107. Ibid. 
108. The Star, 11 January 1893 . 
109. Cory Library, Rhodes University, MS16 071(4), Sixth Annual 
Report of the Simmer and Jack Gold Mining Company. 
110. See above, p . 90. 
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renovation at a time. lll It was estimated that this modification to 
the mill would result in a fifteen per cent increase in the output of 
the battery. 
Down to 1893 the concept of using large general purpose shafts was 
not practiced on the mine. There was rather a series of small incline 
shafts sunk on the outcrop, some of which were used for hauling, while 
others were utilised for pumping water or for ventilation. It was 
inevitable that under these conditions costs of maintenance and 
operation were higher than necessary. Besides the wear and tear on a 
number of small plants there were also wages paid to the staffs of each 
hauling and pumping plant to be considered. Finally, each shaft 
required some form of engine which resulted in a considerable outlay on 
coal. A rationalisation of these hauling and other functions was bound 
to result in savings. 
The decision of the board to reorganise the property also extended 
as far as the management of the various factions. Despite the blunders 
surrounding the decline in yields in the early months of 1892, the 
board reconfirmed its faith in the manager, although one correspondent 
was surprised on visiting the mine, II ••• to notice the extent to which 
the manager, permits the general e~cellence of his management to 
be marred by want of proper attention to the conditions of the surface . 
It costs very little to be tidy • 112 Less fortunate was Mr S. Goff 
who had served as mine engineer for the past three years. He was 
replaced by Mr M~C. Moorhouse, "a mechanical engineer of considerable 
repute in Australia ll , and who had been responsible for the erection of 
several large stamp mills on the various fields of that continent~ 
A new battery manager, Mr Abraham, was also appointed~ His foreign 
experience extended to Mexico but he was also previously employed by 
the City and Suburban,New Chimes and Geldenhuis Main Reef Companies of 
the Witwatersrand. 113 
A decision was taken in December 1893 to institute a proper form 
of inventory control for stores as a way of overcoming theft and 
111. South African Mining Journal, Vol. III, 11, p.167, 16 December 1893. 
112. South African Mining Journal, Vol. III, 17, p.214, 27 January 1894. 
113. South African Mining Journal, vol. III, 7, p.102, 18 November 1893. 
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r ecurrent shortages. 
not supplied. 
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Unfortunately the details of the system are 
At the annual general meeting held to consider the affai rs of the 
Company down to 30 November 1893, the directors again proposed i ncreasing 
the capital of the Company. It was suggested that the nominal capital 
be increased to £110 000 by the issue of 20 000 shares on a pro rata 
basis to shareholders at a price to be agreed upon, while 5 000 shares 
would be kept in reserve. 115 A special general meeting was called for 
12 March to sanction the increase in capital, but due to a lack of 
116 quorum, the meeting was postponed to 1 May 1894. The announcement 
and subsequent delays resulted in a renewed interest in the Simmer and 
Jack Company by the l arge financial firms of Consolidated Gold Fields of 
South Africa, Barnato Brothers and H. Eckstein and Company. 
By 189 1 The Gold Fields of South Africa Ltd. had reached a low ebb 
i n its financial affa irs. With four fifths of its cap ital sunk in De 
Beers diamond stock and in the Briti sh South Africa Company, its fate 
was intimately linked to those organisations, neither of which were doing 
particularly well. Diamond shares slumped following the discovery of 
the Wesselton pipe early in 1891. Thus while De Beers sharehol ders 
feared the spectre of an unlimited dis~overy of further diamondiferous 
p i pes to flood the market, the awaited golden stream from Mashonaland 
proved no more than a reluctant trickle. Under these ci~cumstances, 
Charles Rudd, as a joint managing director of the firm commented, 
" . . . it is useless to pretend that we desire new business on the Rand 
b h h · If· .. 117 h t t · f th ecause we ave not t e cap~ta or ~t... Teat en 10n 0 e 
firm was concentrated on Mashonaland for the rest of 1891 until the 
success of the MacArthur-Forrest cyanide process and the speculation on 
the possibility of opening up the deep levels profitably again drew 
the attention of Rudd and C.J . Rhodes to the Witwatersrand. 118 The 
first borehole sunk on ground to the south of the outcrop companies 
struck the reef at 5 17 feet on the property of the· Village Main Reef 
114. So uth African Mining Journal, Vol. III, 11, p.167, 16 December 
115. South African Mining Journal, Vol. III, 16, p. 241, 20 January 
1893. 
1894. 
116 . South African Mining Journal, Vol. III, 25, p.376, 24 March 1894. 
117. Cartwright , A.P. , Gold Paved the wax, pp . 57ff. 
118. Ibid. , p.61. 
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Company in 1890, confirming the continuation of the reef at that depth. 
Acting on this information H. Eckstein and Company, under the incentive 
of Lionel Phillips, began rapidly b uying up the deep level properties 
with the approval of the London principals, Wernher, Beit and Company. 
Acting with virtually no competition, this firm came to monopolize the 
first and second rows of the deep levels of the central Rand. A large 
b l ock of these claims was subsequently floated as Rand Mines Limited. 
Beit then offered The Gold Fie l ds of South Africa Ltd. par t icipation 
in the venture, the acceptance of which in 1892 marked the return of 
that firm into the sphere of the Witwatersrand. As cartwright has 
suggested, however, Beit recognised in the person of Rhodes the 
opportunity for the re-establishment of the financial links between 
Johannesburg and London, broken after the collapse of the stock market 
in 1889 . 119 Furthermore, the inclusion of The Gold Fields would also 
spread the financial risk of the deep level undertakings, as well as 
bringing Rhodes back into the Witwatersrand arena as a friend rather 
than as an outrigh t competitor. 
With rekindled enthusiasm for the Witwatersrand, and particularly 
the deep l evels, the problem confronting The Gold Fields was a lack of 
cash with which to participate to a greater extent. Neither De Beers 
nor the Charter Company's shares were selling at good prices and i t 
would be difficult to sell sufficient of them without further adversely 
affecting the ir prices. It was H.E.M. Davies, former secretary and 
currently a director of the firm, together with Percy Tarbutt, the 
firm' s consultant mining engineer, and owner of various blocks o f deep 
level claims which he wished to sell, who devised a scheme for the 
reorganisati on of the firm. Their intention was to absorb three smaller 
companies, the African Estates Agency, the Africa n Gold Share Investment 
Company, and the South African Gold Trus t and Agency Company, which held 
either good portfolios of Rand shares or vital deep leve l claims or 
capital, into the reconstructed company. Through the connections of the 
promoters with the boards of these various companies they were induced 
to join the scheme . The proposals placed b e fore the shareholders of 
The Gold Fields of South Africa in August 1892 were duly accepted. 
The new company, to be known as The 
Africa Limited, had a capital of E1 
119 . Ibid . , p . 65. 
120 . Ibid . , p.69. 
Consolidated Gold F ields of South 
120 
250 000 divided as follows : 
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The Gold Fields of South Africa 
To the three companies absorbed (plus 
the right to take 61 625 shares at 
par) 
To the Founders (Rhodes and Rudd) 
To the Founders (to be subscribed 
at par) 
In reserve 
£500 000 
308 125 
80 000 
25 000 
336 875 
£1 250 000 
One of the blocks of claims which The Consolidated Gold Fields 
now acquired lay immediately to the south of the Simmer and Jack 
Company's property a nd was duly floated as the South Simmer and Jack 
Gold Mining Company in late 1892. The establishment of this company 
caught the Simmer and Jack's board napping, or at least most of it. 
One director, Mr Eric Brayshaw accepted the position of managing director 
of the South Company, a move which sufficiently incensed his fellow 
board members of the old Company to 
h ' d k d' t 121 t e S~rnmer an Jac ~rectora e. 
propose that he be excluded from 
The board would generally seem to 
have been very slow in understanding the value of the deep level claims 
to the south of their mynpacht. In part there was undoubtedly a great 
deal of complacency due to the size of ' their own property, whose 
reserves could be measured in millions of tons of ~ie and which 
included a substantial area of what might be termed the "first row" of 
the deep levels. A half-hearted attempt was 
known as the Salmon Block of claims in terms 
made to acquire what became 
, 122 
of the Bez~tsrecht. 
The Company was advised to drop the case against the Salmon Prospecting 
Syndicate by its lawyer Charles Leonard in late 1892, when conditional 
transfer of the claims was made in favour of the syndicate. An appeal 
was subsequentl y made against the decision, which was finally granted 
in favour of the syndicate in March 1894. 123 These claims were then 
121. Cory Library, Rhodes University, MS16 007, Minutes of Meetings 
of the Board of Directors, pp.155-56, 19 December 1892. 
122. Bezitsrecht was the law relating to ownership rights . As the 
owners of the freehold of the farm Elandsfontein, the Company 
directors felt that it had a prior right on the claims. In 
terms of the Gold Law there was no allowance made for such a 
claim on a farm proclaimed as a public digging. 
123 . Cory Library, Rhodes University, MS16 007, Minutes of Meetings 
of the Board of Directors, p.11S, 12 September 1892, and p.313, 
5 March 1894. 
98 
immediately acquired by Consolidated Gold Fields and amalgamated with the 
124 South Simmer Company. The great virtue of these deep level blocks 
now being a ,cquired by The Consolidated Gold Fields was that because of 
the comparatively gentle gradient of the reef they coul d be worked at 
a shallower depth from the surface than was the case with claims of a 
similar distance from the outcrop on other parts of the field. The reef 
was struck at 400 feet of depth on the South Simmer property, whereas on 
a small property like the Ferreira Company depths of 600 feet were 
125 
reached within the property of the original outcrop company . Hence 
fewer difficulties and lower development costs were anticipated. 
Problems were, however, inevitable, as in the case of the sinking of the 
main shaft of the South Simmer Company, where water seepage into the 
126 
shaft was a constant threat. 
The next conquest for The Consolidated Gold Fields was the 
acquisition of the large block of 177 claims held by Fredrick Alexander 
English on the south east corner of the Elandsfontein property. These 
were bought on 17 April 1894 for £90 000. 127 The same month saw the 
conclusion in negotiations with P.W. Tracey and W4G. Beattie for 229 
claims and two water rights known as the Rand Victoria Claims, for which 
it was agreed to pay £20 000 in cash and shares to the equivalent value 
128 
of £30 000 in any company formed to work the property. A borehole 
sunk on these claims in 1893 struck the main reef at a depth of 
approximately 2 500 feet. 
The initial overtures of The Consolidated Gold Fields to the 
Simmer and Jack Company were also made in April 1894. It seems likely 
that these official overtures followed on some form of private negoti-
ations between individuals representing the two companies, as no surprise 
was recorded at the directors' meeting and matters progressed remarkably 
129 quickly and smoothly. By the end of the month The Consolidated 
124. South African Mining Journal, Vol. III, 20, p.298, 17 February 
1894. 
125. See below, Chapter V, p.185. 
126. The Star, 2 June 1894. 
127. Cory Library, Rhodes University, MS14 944. 
128. Cory Library, Rhodes University, MS14 947. 
129. Cory Library, Rhodes University, MS16 007, Minutes of Meetings 
of the Board of Directors, pp.326ff, 9 April 1894. 
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Gold Fields representatives, namely, Ernest Rhodes, E.S. Birkenruth and 
C.J. Thomson, had met the directors of the Simmer and Jack Company and 
agreed that the basis of any amalgamation would rest on the absorption 
of the deep l evel blocks by the Simmer and Jack Company. There were 
various reasons for this concession by The Consolidated Gold Fields. 
The inclusion of the outcrop company, with its existing infrastructure, 
would greatly facilitate the opening and operation of the deep levels 
and would also allow the new company so formed the advantage of paying 
a regular dividend out of the working of the outcrop property in the 
short term. The importance of this latter feature cannot be too strongly 
emphasised. The British investing public had developed a healthy 
scepticism of Witwatersrand mining shares after the collapse of the 1889 
boom, and if capital from this source was to be lured again it was 
essential that some return on the investment be shown as soon as possible. 
In the immediate case of The Consolidated Gold Fields, the poor showing 
of their investments in general and in the British South Africa Company 
in particular, made the payment of early dividends from their renewed 
departure into the Witwatersrand imperative. 
In keeping with the jaundiced views of the Simmer and Jack board 
towards the South Simmer Company, it was agreed that every asset of that 
company would be handed over to the new company. The Consolidated Gold 
Fields also guaranteed the consent of the South Simmer Company to these 
terms. Agreement was made even easier for the Simmer and Jack Comppny 
by the granting of an unconditional loan for £75 000 at the low interest 
rate of six per cent by Consolidated Gold Fields and the guarantee of 
the election of four of the seven seats on the board of the new company. 
As far as the working capital of the proposed company was concerned it 
was agreed that the shares be offered pro-rata to the shareholders in 
the existing companies at a price of £6 each. Regarding the future 
works of the companies, it was agreed that after the provisional 
acceptance of the scheme, the companies would cons~lt each other on work 
to be undertaken, with the costs of such works being a first charge on 
the newly established company. The two consulting engineers of the 
Simmer and Jack Company and Consolidated Gold Fields, namely S.H. Farrar 
and John Hays Hammond, were also instructed to compile a report on the 
various properties. Finally, to cover the board and lend moral support, 
The Consolidated Gold Fields agreed that at the date of the special 
meeting called by the Simmer and Jack board for the discussion of the 
I 
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proposals, they would hold a minimum of 24 000 Simmer and Jack shares. 130 
The Simmer and Jack board were not slow in making use of the loan 
and by mid-May sent notice to The Consolidated Gold Fields that a 
decision had been taken to invest £42 010 of the loan in improvements. 131 
Even then not all members of the Simmer board were satisfied with the 
agreement. One director, Adolphe Wagner, was dissatisfied with the 
number of vendor shares The Consolidated Gold Fields would receive in 
return for their property contribution. In terms of the provisional 
agreement they were to receive 98 000 shares of the 250 000 to be issued 
in the new company. Wagner felt that an amount of 75 000 shares was 
sufficient, that is thirty per cent of the nominal capital rather than 
thirty nine per cent. Ernest Rhodes was adamant and Consolidated Gold 
Fields was not prepared to bargain on this matter as the 39,2 per cent 
holding, together with a proportionate share of the working capital 
stock, would guarantee them at least 115 640 shares or 46,256 per cent 
of the total number of shares, a position from which the acquisition 
of the majority interest was within easy reach. The matter was 
strenuously debated by the Simmer and Jack board in the hopes that the 
dissentients could be convinced and so allow the board to present a 
unanimous decision to the shareholders. Here again, there were more 
than the immediate interests of the SiIDmer and Jack Company at stake. 
Wagner was joined in his opposition by Woolf Joel"and together their 
actions in no small way represented the interests of Barnato Brothers, 
whose flagship, the New Primrose Gold Mining Company, adjoined the 
Simmer and Jack Company 1 s property. Barnato Brothers were only given a 
small consideration in the proposed amalgamation, along with the Farrars, 
132 . 
R.R. Hollins and others. We know that the Farrars were given a 
133 £20 000 interest in the "Simmer scheme" on "ground floor terms", 
and even if the Barnato's were given an interest twice as large it was 
relatively insignifiGant when measured against the estimated £830 000 
invested in the project. Even the Corner House ha? to rest content 
130. Ibid., p.332, 30 April 1894. 
131. Ibid., pp.339, 341, 15 May Ui94 . . 
132. H.E.59, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.469, undated (November 1894). 
133. Cory Library, Rhodes University, MS14 947. 
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with a share of E60 000. 134 The "Simmer scheme" was The Consolidated 
Gold Fields' grand re-entry to the Witwatersrand and like any poor 
relative it could not afford to be too liberal with its largesse. 
The opposition of Wagner and Joel received some support from Carl 
Hanau, although in the final vote he threw in his lot with the majorit.y. 
As a small independent operator he had to hunt with the hounds. It is 
interesting that these three members were absent from the second 
special board meeting held with The Consolidated Gold Fields 
representatives, and the chairman, George Farrar, was forced to delay 
the gathering and send messages to the three to "remind" them of the 
appointment. 135 The opposition of Wagner and Joel persisted and 
culminated in the resignation of Wagner from the board a month later. 
Hanau saw the chance that the Barnato's might be able to increase their 
share of the deal and it seemed worthwhile to support them with a 
similar i~tention in mind, but once the opposition hardened on the part 
of the majority 
the adoption of 
of the board, "Hanau 
137 
the scheme. 
went on to propose the motion for 
The provisional acceptance of the "Simmer scheme" by the majority 
of the directors of the Simmer and Jack Company on 19 May 1894 started 
a sequence of events which, by the time the proposal was ratified by 
the shareholders on 14 August, saw the internal operations of the 
Company already firmly in the grip of The Consolidated Gold Fields of 
South Africa. Rumours of the impending agreement immediately led to 
same anxiety on the part of the Simmer and Jack staff. A letter from 
the manager, Mr Pope, on 14 May sought assurance regarding his tenure 
and salary. He was guaranteed his salary and profits to a minimum of 
E2 100 138 per annum. Still not content he wrote again in June remind-
ing the board of his past services to the Company. The same meeting 
which heard his second letter decided that as Mr Gilchrist had vacated 
his seat for more than three months (he was in London) Captain Ernest 
134. H.E.59, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.469, undated (November 1894). 
135. Cory Library, Rhodes University, MS16 007, Minutes of Meetings 
of the Board of Directors, p.336, 7 May 1894. 
136. Ibid., p.355, 4 June 1894. 
137. Ibid., p.342, 19 May 1894. 
138. Ibid ., p.340, 15 May 1894. 
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director of the new Company and who had been given a "ground floor" 
t ' 't' 'th 144 h ' h k d f h' h par ~c~pa 10n 1n e venture. T e pr1ce e as e or 18 s ares was, 
145 however, considered too high at £7 each and the deal fell through. 
The firm of H. Eckstein and Company also considered it an affront that 
they were not offered a seat on t he board of the new Company. Wernher, 
Beit and Company suggested to Johannesburg that unless the oversight was 
rectified "I think we should not re-elect their representative on the 
Rand Mines Board ... 146 The object of obtaining a directorate seat was 
explained in the good impression it would create for the stock amongst 
the Paris associates of Wernher, Beit and Company, thus facilitating 
147 
their dealings in the shares in that market. Tpe issue of the seat 
was presumably amicably settled for it does not appear again in the 
Corner House correspondence. An unspoken and unwritten reason for 
wanting such a seat on the board was the access it presented to the 
firm regarding the internal operation and developments of the Company . 
The object of acquiring the seat seems to have been at least 
partially met when The Consolidated Gold Fields agreed to give the 
Paris Syndicate an option on 10 000 shares at £12 each "in order to 
assist us in making a market in paris~1I148 The intention of Wernher, 
Beit and Company was, having created this market, to unload their entire 
holding of Simmer and Jack shares, amounting to about 16 000 shares, 
onto the market at a profit. The timing for the move was set as the 
l ast week of December 1894, at the end of which Johannesburg was in-
formed of the 
d 149 one ay. 
sale of about 27 000 shares, 22 000 of which were sold in 
Having c reated the market, Wernher, Beit and Company began 
slowly unloading their own holding, the successful and profitable termi-
nation of which was reported at the end of May 1895. 150 The final 
agreement reached with The Consolidated Gold Fields and a ccepted at the 
144. Ibid., p.396, 7 September 1894. 
145. H.E.60, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and company, 
p.56, 7 September 1894 and p.72, 29 September 1894. 
146. Ibid. , p. 78, 29 September 1894. 
147. Ibid. , P .160, 19 November 1894. 
148. Ibid. , p.191, 14 December 1894. 
149 . Ibid . , p.211, 29 December 1894. 
150. H.E.61, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p. 236, 31 May 1895. 
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meeting of the Simmer and Jack shareholders on 14 August did not differ 
substantially from that agreed upon earlier. A total of 98 000 shares 
were issued to The Consolidated Gold Fields in return for the blocks 
of deep level claims, while 22 000 new fully paid up shares were issued 
pro rata to their holding, to existing Simmer and Jack shareholders~ 
As Consolidated Gold Fields already owned nearly half of the stock of 
the Simmer and Jack Company, a large proportion of these shares found 
their way back into the Consolidated Gold Fields camp. The 45 000 
working capital shares were offered to existing shareholders at "£6 
each with the subscription being guaranteed by Consolidated Gold Fields. 
Thus with the directors empowered to increase the capital of the 
Simmer and Jack Company to £250 000 and with the acquisition of several 
blocks of claims on the deep levels to the south, the original Company 
passed squarely into the hands of Consolidated Gold Fields, to become 
the larges t gold mine in the world in terms of the size of its property. 
While it was later surpassed in size, it is a fitting monument to its 
founders that the Company is still listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange nearly a century later. 
The creation of the n~w Simmer and Jack Company seemed poised to 
create a political incident. Once more fears were expressed that the 
amalgamation of these properties could invoke a chain reaction which 
would result in the consolidation of the Witwatersrand field in the 
hands of a few large capitalists. There wer"e even calls made for the 
specific inte rvention of Pretoria in the affair, with the purpose of 
imposing anti-trust legislation in the Transvaal along similar lines to 
that recently introduced in the United States of America. But as at 
least one journal pointed out, the analogy between the Simmer and Jack 
Company and the American trusts was a poor one. While gold mining 
companies faced a fixed price for their production, it would require 
151 international collusion to bring about a similar effect. There 
were, however, certain rumblings in Pretoria and the rumours which 
emanated were sufficient to cause a temporary collapse in the price of 
152 Simmer and Jack shares in late September and October 1894. As it 
151. South African Mining Journal, Vol. III, 46, pp.787-88 , 
18 August 1894. 
152. H. E. 60, Wernher, B'ei t and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
9.90, 8 October 1894. 
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was, a large portion of the property was in isolated blocks and it was 
thus decided in 1895 to undertake the working of these various properties 
by means of subsidiary companies. In this way three companies were 
formed, the Simmer and Jack West, the Simmer and Jack East and the Rand 
Victoria Mines. 
Two views of the property of the Simmer and Jack Gold Mining Company 
showing the cyanide plant (above) and the battery house in 1895 (below). 
(Source: Cory Library, Gold Fields Photograph Collection.) 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE WEMMER GOLD MINING CCMPANY 
The Wemmer Gold Mining Company was floated early in 1887 to work 
twenty claims on the Main Reef, ten of which were on the outcrop and 
ten on the first line of the dip to the south. The comparative narrow-
ness of the property, running along the line of the outcrop, rather 
than with the dip, was a common feature of the early Witwatersrand 
companies, where the depth and value of the reef were as yet unknown. 
The property was named after Samuel Christian George Wemmer, one of 
the early pioneers of the Rand who, with his friend, Colonel Ignatius 
Ferreira, pegged out claims following the proclamation of the farm 
Turffontein in September 1886. Born at Cradock in the Cape Colony in 
1846, Wemmer met Ferreira on the Kimberley diamond field in the early 
1870's. He subsequently moved to Middelburg in the South African 
Republic where he established himself as a merchant. 
joined by Ferreira, who farmed in the district. Both 
way to the Low-veld gold fields and thereafter to the 
Here he was 
men found their 
1 Rand. It has 
been suggested that Wemmer, together wtth George Goch, the Kimberley 
merchant and Rand speculator, 
in the floating of the Wemmer 
were responsible as the principal partners 
2 Company. If this was the. case, then 
Wemmer would appear to have been a dormant partner, as his name is not 
listed amongst the original board of directors. 3 His income from the 
4 
mine is stated to have been £20 000 a year. Given the early history 
of the Company this was more likely to have been generated from share 
deals and speculation which would also help to explain the poverty to 
which he was reduced at his death in Johannesburg in 1903. 5 It seems 
rather doubtful that Wemmer was involved with the Company at all, and 
that he merely gave his name to it . The inauguration ceremony of the 
1. Macdonald, W., The Romance of the Golden Rand, p . 161. 
2. Shorten, J.R., The Johannesburg Saga, pp.65-66. 
3. Goldman, C.S., The Financial, Statistical and General History of 
the Gold and Other Companies of Witwatersrand, South Africa, 
p. 253. 
4. Standard Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa, Vol. II, p.396. 
5. Obituary notice in The Star, 24 October 1903. 
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Company's battery was performed by Miss Wemmer and a toast was drunk to 
Mr Sam Wemmer at the subsequent festivities but beyond this 
little to indicate that the Wemmers had much to do with the 
there is 
6 Company. 
As early as 9 March 1887 reports reached newspapers in the Cape 
'h h d h l' 7 Colony of the r~c ness of t e quartz faun on t e Wemmer c a~ms. In 
the same copy of the Eastern Star was published the prospectus of the 
new Company. The capital of the proposed Company was to be £12 000 in 
£1 shares, 2 000 of which were "especially reserved for the Johannesburg 
public." Whether this was the case or not, 2 000 shares were held in 
reserve to be distributed later, in October 1887 amongst the shareholders 
8 
at the rate of one reserve share for every five already held. Also in 
October 1887 the amalgamation of the Wemmer Company with the Wemmer 
Extension Company took place. The capital of the Wemmer Company was 
increased to £28 000 in order to absorb the 16 000 £1 shares of the 
Extension Company, in return for which the Wemmer Company received the 
assets of 
and fixed 
£1 100 in cash and a ten stamp mill, 
9 property of the defunct company. 
in addition to the claims 
While early claims to the richness of the Wemmer ores were 
undoubtedly partially motivated by the desire for a successful flotation 
of the Company, these reports very soon received sound confirmation . 
An early visitor to the mine was 
of the property in its formative 
E.P. Mathers who gave a good description 
10 ' 
months. He tells us that four tons 
of rich ore yielded thirty eight ounces of gold, or an average of nine 
and a half ounces to the ton.. It was "magnificent stuff, soft friable 
cong lomerate, heavy and visibly impregnated with gold." The Company at 
the time was taking twenty tons a day from the rich south reef and hoped 
to increase the figure to fifty tons. Like so many early Winwatersrand 
companies, much of the initial work took the form of exposing the 
outcrop by means of open trenches. Initially this would appear surp-
rising as the first manager, Mr EO' Hancock, supposedly came "straight 
from Brazil". 11 The extent of his experience was of course unknown 
6. Diamond Fields Advertiser (Kimberley), 25 May 1887 . 
7. The Eastern Star (Grahamstown), 9 March 1887. 
8. Goldman, C.S., op.cit., p.253. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Mathers, E.P., The Gold Fields Revisited, pp.283-85. 
11. The Eastern Star, 11 April 1887. 
108 
and many a manager was appointed on even slimmer credentials . Neverthe-
less, shaft sinking also commenced early as only one reef, the south 
reef, was being worked in its richer places , which caused the rapid 
sinking of mining operations to a depth where the quarrying technique 
became dangerous. 
By mid-April 1887 the reduction machinery had arrived, ·while water 
rights were taken out on a vlei some one and a half miles to the south 
of the mine. 12 The vlei has subsequently been known as "Wemmer Pan". 
The mill was situated here for its easy access to water, albeit a great 
distance from the mine. Again, this was a common feature of many of the 
early companies. When Mathers visited the site the five stamp Sandycroft 
mill was already erected while an additional five stamps were in the 
course of being assembled. It was these five stamps which Miss Wemmer 
13 
set in motion on the afternoon of 18 May. The mill was driven by a 
sixteen horse power Hornsby steam engine', which also provided the motive 
force for a pump drawing ninety gallons of water a minute from the Pan 
for the mill. The ore was free milling and no consideration was given 
to reduction processes other than mercury amalgamation table~. The 
first wash-up of the amalgamation plates yielded 294 ozs. 9 dwts. of 
gold from 35 tons of ore - an astonishing result. 14 In May the Company 
produced 887 ozs. and stood virtually alone as a producer on the Rand 
15 
until the following July. By the end of 1887, 5 ·230 ozs. 18 dwts., 
valued at £18 309, had been won from 2 
average of approximately 2,6 ounces of 
001,25 tons of are, or an 
16 gold per ton. The first 
dividend was declared on 23 July 1887, paying eight shillings per share, 
or forty per cent on the issued capital of £10 000 . 
These production figures and the publicity given them caused 
Wemmer shares to rise in price on the various South African stock 
exchanges. In April 1887 when production commenced, Wemmer shares 
traded at between £1 and £1 2s. 6d., while reports of the yield of nine 
12. Mathers, E.P., op.cit., pp.283-85. 
13 . Diamond Fields Advertiser, 25 May 1887. 
14. Mathers, E.P., op.cit., pp.283-85. 
15 . Spencer, F., "Gold Mining at Witwatersrand", in Noble, J. (ed.), 
Illustrated Official Handbook of the Cape and South Africa, 
1893, p.497. 
16. Goldman, C.S., op . cit., Appendix, p.55B. 
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ounces to the to~ in July caused share prices to rise to between 
17 £3 105. and £3 125. 6d. Talk of the proposed amalgamation with the 
Extension Company also caused share prices to rise and by August the 
announcement of the payment of an early and substantial dividend caused 
I 
a minor boom with the price of the shares rising from £6 to £10 in a 
single morning and peaking around £12. 18 A great deal of uncertainty 
surrounded this short-lived boom and within a week prices were down 
again to around E5. There were two reasons for the hesitancy expressed 
in these fluctuations. Firstly, although shafts had proved the depth 
of the reef to between fifty and eighty feet, popular wisdom still 
favoured the view that the reef would pinch out at no great distance 
from the surface . These views were well cultivated by Barberton men 
whose own companies were experiencing the aftermath of a speculative 
boom i n 1887 and who had no desire to see the limelight captured by the 
upstart Rand. Secondly, as a correspondent visiting the mine at the 
d f I . d 19 en 0 Ju y quer~e , 
"Is it fair to crush rich leader20 week after week, and 
leave other large stacks of stone waiting, which, I venture 
to say, will not yield near half what is now being obtained 
from the leader mentioned? Any observer can see that it is 
impossible much longer to continue crushing this leader 
without great inconvenience and unnecessary expense to the 
Company. II 
Just how prophetic these words were is borne out i'n the subsequent history 
of the Company. The deviation of the Company's management from sound 
mining principles was thus recognised and already there seemed to be an 
ulterior motive in the determination of mining activities, namely the 
manipulation of the stock exchanges. The same correspondent noted, 
III have heard many remarks passed on this proceeding by the knowing ones, 
some of whom hold scrip in the Company. They say that when shares reach 
a certain figure, they intend selling." 
The year 1888 saw the Company mining on a more realistic basis. 
Production figures for the year indicate a yield of 6 266 ounces, valued 
17. The Eastern Star, 13 July 1887. 
18. The Eastern Star, 1 August 1887. 
19. The Eastern Star , 10 August 1887 . 
20. This refers to the south reef, considered as a "leader reef ll of 
the main reef .. 
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at £21 934, from 5 437 tons of ore , or an average of 1,15 ounces per 
ton. The fall in output is at least partly attributable to the lower 
value of the ore once that in close proximity to the surface was worked 
21 
out. From September onwards Goldman indicates that the Company 
commenced crushing a small proportion of main reef ore in addition to 
22 
that from the south reef, suggesting another reason for the fall in 
value. With a monthly yield of between 400 and 500 ounces and a high 
rate of working expenses the net profit return was considered 
. 23 
unsat1sfactory. In the last quarter of 1888 1 709 tons of reef were 
crushed giving 2 496 ounces of gold or 1,47 ounces to the ton on 
average. This output suggests that despite the introduction of main 
reef ore into the mill, yield per ton actually increased. The first 
quarter of 1889, however, reflects a fall in output per ton to 0,91 
ounces per ton, more accurately accounting for the lower value of the 
main reef ore. Considered monthly, yields per ton of ore began falling 
the previous September. This situation is reflected in the table" 
24 below: 
Gold Production from September 1888 to April 1889 
Date 
1888 
Sept. 
Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
1889 
Jan. 
Feb. 
March 
April 
Tons 
Crushed 
281 
386 
421 
616 
1447 
1543 
1735 
1312 
No. of 
Stamps 
10 
10 
10 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
Yield of Gold 
Ozs. dwts. 
512 
579 
640 
763 
1637 
1620 
1457 
1150 
10 
10 
10 
12 
00 
00 
00 
00 
Av . p e r 
ton 
36,48 dwts. 
30,03 
30,42 
24,79 
22,63 
16,34 
16,79 
17,53 
Value of Gold 
Av. per 
Total 
£1794 
2030 
2241 
2673 
5730 
4410 
5100 
4026 
ton 
£6. 7. 9. 
5 . 5. 1. 
5 . 6. 5. 
4. 6. 9. 
3.19. 3. 
2.17. 1. 
2.18. O. 
3. 1. 4. 
21. The presence of rich ore on the surface is a geological feature 
common to most outcrop situations where, due to weathering down 
of the exposed reef over time, ore in proximity to the surface 
has a higher concentration of metal . 
22. Goldman, C.S., op.cit., Appendix, p . 55B. 
23. Barlow Rand Archives, Archives of H. Eckstein and Company 
(reference code H.E.), Vol. H.E.51, H. Eckstein and Company to 
Jules Porges and Company, p.8, 18 October 1888. 
24. Compiled from data in Goldman, C.S., op.cit., Appendix, p.55B. 
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The disturbing position reflected in these figures caused the 
management to take action to reduce working costs. It wou ld, however, 
be wrong to attribute the declining yield entirely to the main ree f 
ore now being crushed. The i ncrease in the size of the mill to thirty 
stamps from December 1888 onwards would, by virtue of the increased 
demand for ore have resulted in more casing and barren rock being fed 
into the mill. By February 1889 the board reported that the steps taken 
to reduce working costs had resulted in these being reduced to about 
£1. 17s. 9d. per ton; but for the whole period since the opening of the 
25 
mine they had averaged £2 las . ad. per ton. These amounts can only 
refer to mining and milling costs alone with no consideration of develop-
me nt and redemption costs. The inference which can be drawn here is 
that the mine was by early 1889 no longer returning a regular monthly 
profit. The cost mentioned was still considered by management to be 
excessive and i n May 1889 the Company took the drastic step of cutting 
back on its production and seeking an alternative solution to its· lack 
of profitability and poor mining technique . The number of stamps in 
operation was reduced again to ten in a bid to stem the declining yield 
per ton and to allow the mine to catch up with the are requirements of 
the mill . 
On 28 March 1888 management saw fit to increase the share capital 
of the Company from £28 000 to £33 000 by the creation of 5 000 new 
shares. A reserve of £5 per share was initially placed on the issue, 
but this being unobtainable, the shares were disposed of in three lots 
during the course of 1888. The average prices for the sales were 
£2 as. 4d., £2 8s. lad. and £7 as. ad., reflecting the increasing 
buoyancy of share prices generally in the Johannesburg stock exchange 
boom of 1888-89. In all an amount of £20 906 was raised in this way 
for an increase in liability of only £5 000 to the company .26 Wemmer 
shares peaked in January 1889 when they reached £16 each, giving a 
market valuation to the 33 000 issued shares of £608 000 . Management 
was certainly more as tute in raising capital than in its determination 
of mining activities. At least part of the additional capital was 
earmarked f or the purchase of an additional ten stamps for the battery. 
25. The Diggers' News (Johannesburg), 16 May 1889. 
26. Goldman, C.S., op.cit., pp.253-54 . 
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AS already indicated the twenty new stamps were taken into operation on 
21 December 1BBB with the management's confident expectation that the 
extra crushing power would reduce working expenses sufficiently to 
render the operations of the Company that much more profitable. 
A dividend payment of ten per cent per month from January 1B89 was 
anticipated. 27 Hermann Eckstein had nrave doubts as to the Company's 
ability to live up to this expectation following an inspection of the 
28 property, and the subsequent suspension of twenty of the stamps in 
May confirms his judgement. H. Eckstein and Company nevertheless 
continued to maintain interest in the Company as it was seen as the key 
29 
mine in the line south of Johannesburg. Dividends were duly forth-
coming in January and February 18B9 of five and ten per 
ively but no further payments were made until September 
cent respect-
30 
of that year. 
The directors' report issued on 19 April 1BB9 gave the capital in 
hand as £6 357 17s. 9d. Total receipts from the sale of gold since the 
inception of the Company amounted to £51 255 13s. Od., while totaOl 
dividends, including payments down to March 1889, accounted for 
£18 310 Os. Od. As total profit and depreciation figures are not given, 
it is impossible to determine the state of liquidity of the Company at 
this point. It can only be assumed that the figure for capital of 
£6 357 17s. 9d. is a residual figure left after capital gains and 
profi ts had been transferred into a depreciation ace'cunt, or used to 
payoff the debts of the Company. Like most· Wi twatersrand companies, 
little provision was made for working capital, and we can therefore 
anticipate that a considerable amount of profit was ploughed into 
rectifying this deficiency in addition to the specific provision made 
for the increase in the issued capital. 
With the intention of reducing working costs and enhancing future 
profits in the face of declining yields and the collapse of the 1B89 
boom, the board of directors saw fit to call in the services of a 
mining engineer. He was Mr A. Woodhouse F.G.S., who with the newly 
27. H.E.51, H. Eckstein and Company to Jules Porges and Company, 
p.192, 14 December 188B, and p.206, 21 December 18B8. 
28. Ibid., p.206, 21 December 1888. 
29. Ibid., p.238, 4 January 1889. 
30. Goldman, C.S., op.cit., Appendix, p.26A . 
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appointed manager, Mr s.c. Williamson, set about a major reorganisation 
of the property. Little is known about Woodhouse but Williamson, who 
assumed the management in May 1889, had previously served as manager at 
Moodies and the Pilgrims' Rest gold fields in the eastern transvaal. 
He was thus a man of some practical experience. We can only assume 
that the previous manager, Bainbridge, had fallen foul of the board 
following the unspectacular results which came with the enlargement of 
the battery. It is possible that Williamson was recruited for the 
Company by H. Eckstein and Company, who in a letter to the London 
prinCipal s, Wernher, Beit and Company in February 1889, suggested this 
course of action not only for its immediate merits but also as a means 
31 
of gaining better information about the Company. If this was the 
case then it might also account for the stipulation by Williamson in 
accepting the position that he be given a completely free hand in the 
management of the mine. In either case, this stipulation i s a clear 
indication of the reputation gained by the directorate of the Company 
for instructing the manager to mine to the dictates of the stock 
exchange. 
A report by Woodhouse was duly submitted to the board, the essence 
of which was the suggestion to shut down the mill for a period of 
approximately twelve months while a major reorganisation took place of 
the entire property. Amongst the priority suggestions was the need 
effectively to open the mine so that an ore reserve could' be built up 
and a larger, more efficient, mill supplied on a regular basis. The 
shortcomings of the existing battery were clearly recognised. It would 
seem that at least some of the thirty stamps were second hand. A fifty 
stamp battery was envisaged which would be constructed as close as 
possible to the main shaft of the mine . In March 1889, the former 
manager, Mr ,Bainbridge, stressed the necessity for moving the mill as 
he saw that the accumulation of tailings at the Wemmer Pan site was 
restricting the ability to operate efficiently.32 Unlike other 
companies who dumped their tailings into the streams and water courses 
in the hopes that they would be washed away in the summer storms, this 
31. H.E.51, H. Eckstein and Company to Jules Porges and Company, 
p.317, 15 February 1889, Quotes, "will probably engage a new 
manager who will be debted to us so that in future we shall be 
well informed as to what is going on. II 
32. Ibid., p.383, 15 March 1889. 
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expedient was impossible at the Pan without damaging the interests of 
the Company. It was calculated that the resiting of the battery at the 
mine would result in a reduction of thirty per cent in milling costs, 
while a more extensive development of the mine would lower mining costs 
to between five shillings and seven shillings per ton of ore raised to 
the surface. A large part of the saving in milling costs woul d result 
from the reduced outlay on labour in handling quartz between mine and 
mill. The original motivation for locating the mill at the Pan, 
namely the scarcity of fuel for the engines and the capital outlay on 
a second engine,33 would be overcome by pumping from there any water 
requirements whieh could not be met from the drainage of the mine it-
self. Many of the mines were experiencing problems with subterranean 
water and if this could be turned to useful effect it could help to 
reduce mining expenses. In order to reduce the initial capital outlay 
for a pumping plant at the Pan, the d irectors entered into a provisional 
agreement with the Ferreira Company for the erection of a joint pllmping 
plant. The scheme was taken a step nearer fruition in 1890 when the 
machinery was ordered. By the end of 1890, however, the plan was 
dropped as the Wemmer Company, then drawing sufficient water from the 
34 
mine to meet its immediate requirements, withdrew from the agreement. 
With the mill located near the mine it . was planned to dump the tailings, 
after treatment, into the spent stopes of the mine.~5 This step was 
considered necessary on account of the small surface areq of the 
property. 
The report estimated that the cost of replanning and renovating 
the Company's mine and equipment would be about £31 000. Of this amount 
a new forty stamp mi ll, already a reduction on that envisaged in the 
r eport, would cost £12 000, the Company's share of the joint pumping 
project, £7 000, new buildings would absorb a further £2 000, while 
the balance of £10 000 would go towards the development and proper 
33. See below, Chapter VI, pp.233ff. 
34. See below, Chapter V, p.164. 
35. While this was never done at the time, it is perhaps ironic 
that nearly a century later the Company which subsequently 
absorbed the Wemmer Company, the Village Main Reef Gold Mining 
Company, is currently occupied in reworking the tailings of 
many of the nineteenth cen t ury companies, and is pumping the 
reprocessed material into the stopes of the old mines. 
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opening of the mine to meet the requirements of the enlarged mill. A 
far larger amount would have been necessary for a thorough organisation 
of the mine workings, which required sinking more or improving existing 
shafts, erecting more efficient hauling gear and the laying of under-
ground tramlines to expedite the m?vement of ore. The required capital 
was raised by the creation of 7 000 new shares, increasing the nominal 
capital of the Company to £40 000. Two thousand of the new shares 
remained unissued at the end of 1889, while the balance raised an amount 
36 
of £20 000 for the Company. The sale of the 5 000 shares at a price 
of £4 each in the steadily worsening economic conditions of 1889 
suggested the inherent strength and faith of the investor in the Company. 
The sale of the shares had a sequel at the subsequent half yearly 
general meeting of shareholders held in Kimberley in October 1889. 
Discord arose amongst those attending "in regard to the disposal by 
the directors of the reserve shares", and IIpersonalities were freely 
indulged in 11 . 37 No further clues are provided by the press, other 
than that the directors had sufficient support to carry the day. What 
probably transpired was that the shares were sold as a block, on tender, 
rather than being offered to the shareholders on a pro rata basis. 
Such a sale was not illegal in terms of the trust deeds of most of the 
early companies . The system did, howev'er, lend itself to abuse as 
"friendly" directors could, and did, advise those submitting tenders of 
the offers of competitors. It was also an effective way for the large 
firms like H. Eckstein and Company to use the situation to manipulate 
the market and gain control relatively cheaply of any company in which 
they were interested. The Wemmer Company was one in which H. Eckstein 
and Company showed a lasting interest, and it is likely that this firm 
would have a share in any such deal. While the price of £4 per share 
was undoubtedly above the ruling market price, it was, nevertheless, a 
sum which a firm with substantial financial resources and backing could 
afford, particularly if it gave that organisation ~ controlling interest 
in the Company . 
The new battery was never ordered. The Company availed itself of 
the opportunity of acquiring locally a "practically new" ten stamp mill 
and a forty horse power Marshall engine. 38 These were re-erected 
36. Goldman, C.S., op.cit., pp.253-54. 
37. The Diggers' News, 26 October 1889. 
38. The Star, 24 September 1890. 
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along with the twenty best stamps from the Company's old Pan mill at the 
mine. The Company commissioned Mr Judd Coppach, a mechanical engineer 
previously employed by Fraser and Chalmers of Chicago, and now in the 
39 
employ of H. Eckstein and Company, as an agent to buy the pumping 
equipment in America. 40 
It is interesting that in September 1889 an advertisement appeared 
in The Diggers' News in which the Wemmer Company, in terms of its 
original reorganisation p.lan, offered for sale twenty of the stamps of 
the old Pan mill. 41 The proposed sale was never executed and it would 
be interesting to know how the amount of E12 000 for the purchase of the 
new battery was reallocated. The most likely reason for the decision to 
retain the old mill was an under-estimation of the cost of a new battery 
and of the reorganisation of the mine in general. The failure to 
increase the capacity of the mill also negated .a major portion of the 
benefits to be derived from the reorganisation and can thus be seen as 
one of the major errors of management in the period. The new battery 
layout was nevertheless viewed as a model for emulation by other 
companies, 
thought of 
which prompted the press to ask why the plan had not been 
42 before on the Rand. A major feature of the new mill was 
the site, which allowed for the movement of the are through major 
functions in the mill by gravity. In this way the amount of labour 
required for handling the are between the various operations was reduced 
to a minimum. There remained, however, the fundamental we"akness of 
machinery which had already seen a good deal of wear and tear. 
AS part of the centralisation programme the Company decided to 
subcontract for the treatment of the tailings lying at the Wemmer Pan 
site. By 1889 there was a growing awareness of the value of gold which 
was allowed to escape in the tailings which, if recovered, would prove 
a valuable additional source of revenue. Previously it was generally 
accepted that all but a small residual of gold was extracted from the 
ore by careful use of the amalgam process. There was a certain 
inevitability that some gold would be lost, the amount depending on the 
39. Taylor, J.B., A Pioneer Looks Back, p.133. 
40. The Diggers' News, 8 June 1889. 
41. The Diggers' News, 21 September 1889. 
42. The Diggers' News, 24 May 1890. 
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skill of the amalgamators; a c onsideration whi ch placed skilled 
amalgamators at a premium. Attitudes changed with the more careful 
sampling and assaying of all ore which passed through the mill. The 
realisation dawned from such results that even in supposedly 
efficiently operated . reduction works, up to twenty five per cent and 
sometimes more, of the gold remained in the tailings. Awareness was, 
however, slow in encouraging the applicatiqn of additional extraction 
processes due to the expense involved and the inefficiency of most of 
them. 
By 1889 several Witwatersrand companies were operating their mines 
at depths where they encountered pyritic ores. This s ituation brought 
the problem of the gold residual in the tailings into more urgent per-
spective, as the pyritic covering of the gold particles prevented even 
greater amounts of gold from amalgamating with the mercury coating of 
the amalgam plates . Given the existing high cost structures of most of 
the mines, the potential fall in yield per ton of ore threatened the 
profitability of the whole industry. The reaction on the Witwatersrand 
was twofold, attempting to reduce costs as much and as quickly as possible 
in the short term, while a keener search was made for an efficient method 
f th ' 1 ' 43 or e treatment of ta~ ~ngs. 
In this regard the Wemmer management underto ok to allow the trial 
of a process developed lOGally in Johannesburg on the Wemmer Pan site. 
Again, we can only speculate whether this experiment was encouraged by 
H. Eckstein and Company, whose access to superior technical knowledge 
involved them at an early stage in the search for an efficient system 
for the treatment of tailings. It was hoped by Wemmer management that, 
if successful, the application of the "Julian Process" would yield 
sufficient profit from the tailings to enable the board to maintain the 
payment of dividends during the period o f inactivity of the mill. 
This was certainly a grand hope, or an admission of the failures of 
amalgamation in the past. By early September 1889' the machinery of 
the patentees was erected and a tramway l aid to facilitate the movement 
44 
of tailing sands to the plant. The Julian Process involved the 
treatment of tailings through a combination of two known methods, 
43. See below, Chapter VI, pp.264ff. 
44 . The Star, 4 September 1889. 
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namely, the dissolving of gold by a chlorine solution, followed by the 
introduction of mercury with the purpose of amalgamating the gold in 
solution. The process of amalgamation was assisted by the introduction 
of electric current to the mercury bath, which acted as a cathode; an 
idea borrowed from the use of electricity in copper refining. The 
unique feature of the process was that the ore did not have to first 
be roasted in a furnace, as was common to most of the processes 
involving the use of chlorine. Eissler, who describes the process, was 
dubious of its ability to support the claims made for it, commenting,45 
"It is very doubtful if any of the above reactions will take 
place in practical working, except the amalgamation of the 
bright [non-pyritic] gold '" and perhaps a decomposition 
of the gold chloride while passing through the cells." 
The operation of the plant commenced on 9 December 1889 with three 
machines at work, each capable of treating twenty five hundredweights 
every three hours, or so the patentees claimed. 46 In February the press 
declared the experiment an "unqualified 
traces of gold remained in the tailings 
success", reporting 
47 
after treatment. 
that only 
Despite 
these encouraging initial reports the Wemmer Company soon discontinued 
its support. By April 1891 the Company had entered into a new contract 
with the Adair-Cruickshank Company for the treatment of the tailings at 
th ld b . 48 e 0 attery slte. 
In August 1890 the annual report of the Elect~o-Chemical Extracting 
Company, the patentees of the Julian Process, reported on the trials at 
Wemmer Pan. The chairman, F.F. Lazard declared that he felt the 
machines had not received a fair trial, while the Wemmer Company had 
broken its agreement with them by not publishing the results of the tests 
and not intimating its intentions whether or not it would take over t he 
h . 49 mac ~nes. In response to these statements Williamson, as manager, 
replied that two major factors were responsible for his Company's 
rejection of the process. Firstly, t he system, while being fairly 
effective in the treatment of free gold, seemed to have no impact on 
45. Eissler, M., The Metallurgy of Gold, p.374. 
46. The Star, 11 December 1889. 
47. The Star, 6 February 1890. 
48. The Standard and Diggers' News (Johannesburg), 10 April 1891. 
49. The Star, 5 August 1890. 
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the pyritic gold which was left in the tailings. Secondly, the costs of 
operating the process 
50 treated. In turn, 
process were less than 
were excessive at between lOs. and 138. per ton 
the early results from the Adair-Cruikshank 
expected. 51 
It was not until 5 May 1890 that the newly located mill began its 
trial runs. 52 In the interim the energies of the staff of the Company 
were directed 
the Woodhouse 
towards 
53 plan. 
the proper development of the mine in terms of 
The object was to open up a new first level at 
125 feet underground before the recommencement of milling, while also 
beginning work on a 200 foot level. The old first level, at 45 feet, 
was largely worked out by 1889, much of it being excavated from the 
surface. This fact delayed stoping upwards from the 125 foot level 
until the empty spaces above the 45 foot level were filled in. The 
mine was to operate from three shafts, a vertical main shaft and an 
incline shaft on the eastern section, and an incline shaft following 
the reef from the 45 foot level, put down by a former manager when 
quarrying ore from the surface became too dangerous. The 125 foot 
level was completely opened up between the boundaries on the south 
reef by January 1890. Far less work was done in opening the main reef, 
only 300 feet being driven by that date, with stoping just commencing. 
The angle of the dip of the reef remained about eighty degrees from 
the horizontal at the 200 foot level, which meant that it would con-
tinue to a considerable depth within the Company's property. Also of 
significance was that pyritic ore was encountered at about 150 feet. 
Without a complete set of financial records it is difficult even 
to estimate the amount of capital involved in the reorganisation of the 
mine. What is known is that early in 1890 a further 300 reserve 
shares were sold for £1 500, while in September of that year the 
nominal capital of the Company was again increased from £40 000 to 
£55 000 by the creation of 15 000 new shares which were placed under 
the control of the directors. By this time the debts of the Company 
amounted to £23 730 13s. 2d., which would explain the need for a 
further increase in capital. The needed capital was not raised against 
50. The Star, 13 August 1890. 
51. The Standard and Diggers' News, 29 September 1891. 
52. The Diggers' News, 7 May 1890. 
53. See above, pp.112-115. 
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the sale of the existing 1 700 reserve shares, as 1 300 were placed 
as collateral with the Transvaal Mortgage, Loan and Finance Company 
against the loan of £7 327 13s. Od., and the balance of 400 shares , 
with Messrs Hirsh, Birch and Company against a further loan of 
£1 978 lOs. 6d. 54 In any event, at the ruling market price of £3, 
the 1 700 shares would only raise an amount of £5 100, far short of 
the Company's cash requirements. 
Early in 1891 eight thousand of the new shares were sold at £2 . 10s. 
each, raising an 
t ' 55 propor l.ons. 
amount of £20 000, which reduced the debt to manageable 
Thus between October 1887, when the Extension Company 
was absorbed, and April 1891, an amount of £62 406 was raised on share 
issues against an increase in liability of £18 300. This is a fine 
example of the use of the share market to raise working capital, and 
can be offered as exoneration for the early bad mining practice. The 
early plundering of the mine had earned the Wemmer Company a reputation 
as a good financial proposition which enabled the management success-
fully to raise capital in thi s way. Despite this infusion of capital, 
the Company had also to raise loans, the most important of which, 
besides those already mentioned, was one from the Heidelberg Gold 
56 Mining Company. At a later date loans were also raised from the 
Witwatersrand Gold Mining Company which caused a great deal of 
57 dissention amongst the shareholders of that Company. ' It is likely 
that the debts accumulated down to 1891 were , liquidated by the fresh 
infusion of capital. The bulk of the new money was now absorbed in the 
procurement of capital equipment, development and the settlement of 
outstanding debts. ' Nothing in the statements studied suggests undue 
extravagance in the reorganisation on the mine. As we know, the mill 
was not replaced. The obvious conclusion to be drawn is that manage-
ment 1 s estimation of the costs of reorganisation were grossly inaccurate. 
There is evidence to suggest that the objective of cost reductions 
was being partially met despite the failure fully to implement the 
reorganisation plan, and that small profits were being shown on opera-
tions. In a statement to the half yearly meeting of shareholders in 
54. The Star, 24 September 1890. 
55. Goldman, C. S., op.cit., p.254. 
56. Ibid . 
57. See above, Chapter II, pp.55-56. 
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April 1891, the directors pointed out that working costs had been 
reduced from 36s. to 32s. 9,25d. per ton of ore. Mine development 
costs were reduced from £6 to an average of £3 13s. lld. per foot, or 
£4 4s. Od. where rock drilling machines were used and £2 15s. Od. where 
58 hand drilling was employed. Likewise, in the next six month period 
ending on 30 September 1891, average development costs rose to 
£4 Os. 2d. while rock drilling costs fell to £3 19s. 0,5d. and hand 
drilling rose to £4 3. Od. 59 The discrepancy between hand and machine 
dr illing costs was in large part a function of the type of rock being 
worked by the respective processes. What it also suggests, however, 
is that the superiority of the machine drill was not yet absolute. 
In April the statement also noted that a small profit was recorded on 
milling operations, suggesting either an improved ore yield or a greater 
level of efficiency from the relocated battery, or a combination of 
both . 60 On total operations, however, a loss of £5 368 l s. lld. was 
recorded. 
The April 1891 statement indicated a fairly equal balance between 
the quantities of main and south reef ore developed for reserves; 
3 480 tons of south reef and 3 700 tons of main reef, sufficient for 
11,5 months of milling at curren t rates. By September 1891 the ore 
"in sight" amounted to 7 126 tons of south reef and only 874 tons of 
main reef, due to the intrusion of a 100 foot thiak ·dyke .which dis-
placed the main reef down to a depth of about 600 feet. ·This 
information provides a useful clue to the milling position. By April 
only ten stamps were operating despite the capital infusion from the 
sale of the 8 000 reserve shares. Clearly, the mine had not been 
developed to a point where it could adequately supply the are require-
ments of the new mill, while it is also possible that some difficulty 
was experienced with the Irnewlr mill itse lf . The drastic fall in 
tonnage resulted in a loss being incurred on total operations. Only 
3 197 tons were crushed in the six months ending on 31 March 1891, 
yielding 4 719 ounces 13 dwts., or 1 oz. 4,5 dwts. of gold per ton. 
The average assay of tailings was 1 oz. 12,25 dwts., so that 72 ,25 per 
cent of the gold was recovered by amalgamation. By contrast, the 
58. The Standard and Diggers' News, 10 April 1891. 
59. The Standard and Diggers' News, 29 September 1891. 
60. The Standard and Diggers' News, 10 April 1891. 
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figures for the six months ending on 30 September 1891 indicate that 
6543 tons of are were crushed yielding 6 264 ounces 14 dwts., or an 
average of 19,3 dwts. of gold per ton . The average assay of tailings 
was 19 dwts. 18,5 grs. so that only 66,5 per cent of the gold was 
recovered. Two points emerge from these figures. Firstly, there was 
a decline in gold yield per ton of ore resulting from the increasing 
proportion of pyritic ore crushed. Secondly, the decline in the 
extraction effi~iency of the mill reflects the failure of management 
to institute an additional recovery process to assist that of amalgama-
tion, and which thus offset some of the gains achieved from the 
reduction in milling costs. Despite this s ituation, a small profit of 
£4 404 8s. ld. was recorded for the period ending September 1891, after 
an allowance for depreciation of £1 924 was deducted from gross profits. 
On the strength of this profit management announced a ten per cent 
dividend, the first s ince February 1889. It is also worth noting that 
down t o October 1891 the Company had not yet been able to bring the 
full complement of thirty stamps into operation. 61 
Thu s the experiment to rationalize the operations of the mine had 
not yet met with any marked success by September 1891. The reduction 
in working costs achieved by the reorganisation of operations and the 
introduction of machinery like rock drl11s was not sufficient to offset 
the reduced revenue from working larger quantitie~ df poorer or pyritic 
are. Nevertheless, the returns i ndicate cl~arly that the scale of 
operations, currently retarded by the slow development of the mine and 
the faulty mill would be the major factors in determining future 
profitability. Here the failure of management to carry through its 
original intentions of increasing the size and efficiency of the 
battery was a serious mistake, matched only by the inability of the 
mine manager to create a sufficiently large ore reserve to guarantee 
the uninterrupted operation of the full mill. 
Early in 1890 reports of rich finds of ore in the mine were noted 
in the press. In January a reef was struck at the 200 foot level which , 
62 
whi le full of pyrites, showed visible gold. It can be speculated 
61. The Star, 10 October 1891 . 
62. The Diggers' News, 17 January 1890, and H.E . 149, L. Phillips 
to Wernher, Beit and Company, p.77, 30 January 1890. 
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that this discovery, the publicity given to it and a subsequent find in 
63 February, together with the financial straits in which the Company 
found itself, all rekindled the waning interest of H. Eckstein and 
Company in the Wemmer Company. This firm and its London principals had 
shown an interest in the Company since 1888 related, 
growing investment in the neighbouring Ferreira Gold 
no doubt, to their 
, . 64 M~n~ng Company. 
In March 1891 Lionel Phillips reported to London that Wemmer shares 
"could be the cheapes t 
the mine could be made 
thing on the Rand" I and a good proposi tion if 
65 
to pay~ Closer investigation during the year 
revealed the Company I s debt and that it was "in a mess from a working 
standpoint .. ,,66 The major attraction of the Wemmer Company to the 
Corner House was its low issued capital of £38 000. With share prices 
fluctuating between 40s. and 50s., it seemed possible that a good deal 
of money could be made if the Company was properly reorganised . There 
was also the lingering possibility of being able to arrange an 
amalgamation of the Company with the neighbouring F~rreira and Worcester 
, 67 
Compan~es . 
In January 1891 the first positive steps were taken towards a 
serious commitment in the Wemmer Company by H. Eckstein and Company 
when Phillips arranged to be allowed to inspect the mine. Accompanied 
, . 68 by the firm's mining engineer, Hennen Jenn1ngs, Phillips visited 
69 
the property on 10 January 1891. The first impressions gained by 
Phillips were mixed.. The mill was described- as "an awful poor 
ramshackle affair" but the mine foreman was seen as "an intelligent, 
active man". A less favourable opinion was held of the former manager. 
Williamson would seem to have recognised what was coming to him and 
resigned in November 1890 to take up a position on a Natal colliery.70 
63. The Diggers' News, 18 February 1890 . 
64. See below, Chapter V, pp.149-51. 
65. H.E.149, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, pp.149-50, 
22 March 1890. 
66. Ibid., p.306, 1 August 1890. 
67. Ibid., pp . 493ff, 26 December 1890, and see below, Chapter V, 
pp.157, 163-4, 186ff. 
68. See above, Chapter II, pp.55ff for other activities of Jennings. 
69 . H.E.149, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, p.521, 
10 January 1890. 
70. The Star, 10 November 1890. 
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While he had improved the surface conditions of the mine, particularly 
by providing proper quarters for the men, it would seem that his mining 
activity was less successful~ Phillips commented, "Judging by mere 
observation, I think the late manager did miss the south reef and in 
fact worked in a most ill considered manner. II 
Phillipsts overall impression was ·such that H. Eckstein a~ Company 
took up the 8 000 reserve shares in 1891 and the refusal on the balance 
of 8 71 700 shares. H. Eckstein and Company thus became 
appoint a director to the board and Phillips duly took up 
eligible to 
72 
the seat. 
At the April 1891 general meeting of shareholders, George Goch as 
chairman welcomed Phillips, s tating that the connection with the firm 
of H. Eckstein and Company would be of great benefit to the Wemmer 
Company. He aiso expressed the hope that they would exercise the option 
on the balance of the reserve shares. ' A~ it was, they failed to do so 
despite the movement of the market -in their favour. 73 This would 
suggest that the firm was prepared to forego the profit it could have 
made, possibly as an act of appeasement to other shareholders, despite 
the firmer grip on the Company which the manipulation of the 8 700 
shares would have given them. The inference to be drawn here is that 
their position in the Company was already secure enough. Wernher, Beit 
and Company had also been active in the London market buying up Wemmer 
74 -
shares for some time before the Johannesburg deal., As always, a 
member of the firm on the board of a company- served as a useful 'source 
of exclusive and timely information in the lucrative arbitrage business 
between Johannesburg and London. 
While the report which Jennings compiled after visiting the mine 
remained the private property of H. Eckstein and Company, Phillips agreed 
to give the Wemmer Company an abridged version, being essentially a set 
of suggestions for placing the property in a profitable position. These 
75 ideas were submitted to the board by Phillips in May 1891. The 
71. See above, p.120. 
72. H.E.146, L . Phillips to Secretary of Wemmer Gold Mining Company, 
p .561, 17 January 1891. 
73. The Standard and Diggers' News, 10 April 1891. 
74. H.E.56, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.402, 23 January 1891. 
75. H.E.146, L . Phillips to Chairman and Directors of Wemmer Gold 
Mining Company , pp.674ff, 6 May 1891. 
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report concentrated on three main areas for improvement, namely, access 
to the ore, that is shafts, the actual mill, and finally the location 
of the mill. Regarding the shafts, Phillips was in favour of a new 
inclined main shaft on the main reef which would replace the existing 
vertical shaft below the third level. Given the financial state of the 
Company a new main shaft was seen as being of less importance than the 
generally recognised need for a new mill. The supply of free milling 
ore was sufficient to offset any further sharp fall in the yield per 
ton for another six months, after which there would be a drastic need 
for concentrating equipment to separate as much of the pyritic gold from 
the tailings as possible. It was therefore suggested that a twenty 
stamp Fraser and Chalmers mill be procured together with twelve Frue 
Vanners for concentrating. Tests recently conducted at the Robinson 
Gold Mining Company indicated that three Frue Vanners per five stamps 
was the optimal ratio. Various other suggestions were made regarding 
the positioning of rock breaking equipment at the pit head and the 
procurement of more efficient multi-tubular boilers. - While Phillips 
professed not to have given any serious consideration to the exact 
ldcation of the mill, a site between the mine and the water right was 
suggested. No specific advantages for such a location were mentioned 
and it seems likely that Phillips's motivation here was governed by the 
longer term plans of H. Eckstein and Company. A mill in this area would 
be very conveniently situated for any amalgamation between the three 
small' outcrop mines, namely, the Wemmer, Ferreira and Worcester and the 
Village Main Reef Company to the south. 
The estimated cost of implementing the proposals was £25 000 
excluding any amount raised from the sale of the old boilers and parts 
of the mill. The Company's cash assets amounted to £9 000 with the 
balance of 8 700 reserve shares which could also be realised . In the -
event of the reserve shares not being sold, or unable to be sold, then 
Phillips was in favour of the Company incurring a debt of between 
£10 000 and £15 000, rather than not effecting the improvements. He 
stressed that no anxiety need be felt about the Company's abiiity to 
sell the reserve shares or to payoff any debts out of future profits. 
The warning was also given, however, that operations since July 1887 
had cost the high amount of £4 per ton and that the Company had spent 
about £18 000 more than its receipts from gold in its operational life. 
In conclusion, he strongly urged that any attempts to patch up present 
appliances would be useless; a clean sweep was necessary. 
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The tone of Phillips's report indicated the overall strategy of 
H. Eckstein and Company and the London principals towards the Wemmer 
Company. In March 1891, in correspondence to London, Phillips expressed 
76 
the following stand, 
"So far I am simply the indifferent observer of the bad work 
being done there. If you favour amalgamation with the 
Ferreira I will not push any improvements, if not I will do 
everything possible to bring this mine to the fore as a 
producer ••.. Unless good terms could be got from the 
Ferreira it would suit me better to demonstrate the value 
of the Werruner before any amalgamation takes place." 
The renewed interest shown by H. Eckstein and Company was largely due to 
Phillips's insiste"nce and he no doubt saw i t as a project which, if 
financially successful, would promote his own interests within the firm. 
As the climate for amalgamation with the Ferreira Company seemed 
unfavourable, Phillips was given the necessary encouragement to push 
forward the development of the Wemmer Company. Phillips seemed confident 
that following the sale of the reserve shares, on which his firm held 
the refusal at 52s. 6d., an amount of approximately £33 000 would be 
available for the second major reorganisation of the Company. He was, 
however, early to express fears that if the reserve shares were not taken 
up, the Wemmer board would be unlikely , to raise the necess ary funds by 
means of a loan. It was recognised that the board and shareholders were 
more anxious over the early resumption of dividend payments than any 
77 -
long term consideration for the future of the Company. 
The board's initial r eaction to Phillips's plan was to reject it 
out of hand. No doubt there were several reasons for this. The Company 
had only recently undergone a reorganisation which many shareholders 
considered sufficient. OUtright agreement with the plan would only 
serve to compromise the directors I own position regarding the recent 
past events. Nevertheless, the directors were not entirely opposed to 
the idea, as is borne out in the evidence of a court case about this 
time, when an applicant for the post of manager was required to submit 
a report on the mine recommending changes and improvements he would 
make if appOinted to the position. 78 Likewise, the board was being 
76. H.E.149, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, p.610, 
10 March 1891. 
77. Ibid . , p.673, 7 May 189!. 
78 . A full report on the case appears below on pp.130-31. 
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asked to act on an abridged version of a report they had not seen and 
on the recommendations of the interests of a new major shareholder with 
whose longer term objectives they were not familiar. They had also 
learnt the lesson of how cost ly such reorganisations were and there was 
nothing in what Phillips had suggested to guarantee that the figure of 
£25 000 would be any more accurate than those compiled by Woodhouse 
earlier. If anything, Phillips proposed a great deal should be done 
with very little more than woodhouse's original estimate. 
In order to preserve his own position Phillips persuaded the board 
to stay its decision,79 and then to compromise by accepting the report 
in principle but deferring the implementing of its suggestions. This 
also allowed Phillips to save face within his own firm and keep his seat 
on the Wemmer board. Phillips had badly misjudged the mind of the 
Wemmer directorate. The presence of the Corner House on the board was 
welcomed, its interference was not. Such rebuffs were usually overcome 
by the mere threat of resignation from the board by the firm's 
representatives80 and the company's ostracization in technical and 
other matters. Such a ploy was here impossible given Phillips's own 
delicate position in the .matter and the fact that he firmly believed in 
the future prospects of the Company. Alternative methods were clearly 
called for. 
It was considered necessary by Phillips that the Company be shown 
indirectly the advantage of close association with the Corner House. 
The first step in this direction was to abandon the option held on the 
reserve shares. This in itself was insufficient to move the board and 
Wernher, Beit and Company were asked to let the market know indirectly 
that they had declined to buy the reserve shares a t 52s. 6d. In this 
way the market for Wemmer shares would be kept below that figure. The 
market was also informed that the Company was basically insecure and 
spent its money and resources patching up defective machinery . 
Phillips, as a director, intended to arrange to have the reserve shares 
put into the name of a trustee and .would then attempt to obtain the 
voting power over them. The final link in the strategy would be for 
79. H.E.149, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, p.661, 
10 May 1891. 
80. See below, Chapter v, p.164 for Phillips's handling of the 
Worcester Gold Mining Company. 
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the two firms in Johannesburg and London to begin slowly buying up the 
shares in the Company at the lowest possible prices. In this way the 
present board could be eased out of office. 81 At least one press 
attack, albeit as late as October 1891, has been found , and is perhaps 
82 
worth quoting at some length in view of the aforesaid strategy, 
"The dilapidated mill of th;'s Company is still kept working. 
Why do not the directors consider the advisability of either 
amalgamating their interests with the Ferreira, as the 
Worcester has done,83 or with their neighbour the Salisbury? 
Their present policy seems to be that of patching up, which 
is nearly always the most costly in the long run. II 
These words cou ld as well have been dictated by Phillips for they express 
his sentiment exactly. Amalgamation or some form of working arrangement 
with the Ferrira Company became even more attractive to the eyes of 
H. Eckstein and Company as it was known that the Ferreira mine would 
84 
strike a diorite dyke in the Bijou Claims below the fourth level . 
The fault ran into these claims from the eastern boundary, leaving the 
ground behind it essentially cut off from the rest of the Ferreira 
property. It was too small an area to warrant a separate shaft but 
Phillips's proposed new Wemmer shaft would be conveniently situated to 
85 
work both properties east of the dyke. 
The Company's decision, in september 1891, to declare a ten per cent 
dividend drew an immediate and legitimate r esponse,from Phillips. In 
a carefully detailed letter he indicated his.objections to the move. 
By now Phillips was only attending sufficient board meetings of the 
Wemmer Company t o enable him to retain his seata He was not at the 
meeting at which it was decided to declare the dividend and objected 
86 
strongly to his name being attached to the particular report. His 
strongest objection was nevertheless reserved for the declaration of the 
d ividend, as he recognised that not all the funds which were to be distri-
buted could be legitimately attributed to Company profits but came partly 
81. H.E.149, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, pp.666ff, 
23 May 1891 . 
82 . South African Mining Journal, Vol. I, 3, p.41, 17 October 1891. 
83. See below, Chapter V, p.164 for a discussion on the joint milling 
project between the Ferreira and Worcester Gold Mining Companies. 
84. See below, Chapter V , p.189. 
85. H.E.149, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, p.721, 
18 July 1891. 
86. Ibid ., p.781, 3 October 1891. 
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from a bookkeeping appreciation of the assets and from the profit m~de 
on the sale vf r~serve shares . This was tantamount to paying the 
87 dividend, at least partly, out of the capital of the Company. 
There was, however, also a second side to Phillips's indignation. The 
declaration of a dividend by a Company which his firm was attempting 
to portray on the share markets of the world as a poor proposition had 
effectively turned the tables on such careful s cheming. Coinciding 
with the declaration of the dividend was the news that the manager, 
Flemming, had discovered better ore with a resultant improvement in 
yields. Phillips was forced to admit that with the resultant surge in 
Wemmer share prices to over 70s., the prospects for amalgamation on 
88 his terms looked poor. 
It would, however, be incorrect to suggest that the activities of 
the Company progressed smoothly without the involvement of H. Eckstein 
and Company in its affairs. The strategy and planning of the board 
remained short sighted in the extreme with the inevitable resultant 
costs to the Company. By December 1891 an amount of over £10 000 had 
been spent on patching up existing machinery, and in the acquisition 
of a new boiler for the mill. Earlier mistakes were also coming home 
to roost.. The mill was experiencing a severe shortage of water and was 
depending on a provisional supply from ' the Salisbury company.89 In 
October it was admitted that the mill had operated- for five of the 
preceding 
90 
stamps. 
efficient 
six months, with an average of only t wenty of {ts thirty 
Flemming 
f t ' 91 00 ~ng 
did his utmost to place the machinery on an 
but by January 1892, considering the task hopeless, 
he resigned. The inherent strengths of the Phillips plan were by now 
clear to the board and an accornmcxiation with the Corner House was sought. 
A request was made to H. Eckstein and Company for Mr J.H. Johns to 
serve as consulting engineer to the company.92 Thus Harry Johns, 
already general manager of the Ferrira Company and consulting engineer 
87. H.E.146, "Remarks on the Wemmer Balance Sheet, August 31, 1891", 
pp.915ff. 
88. H.E.149, L . Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, p.769, 
19 September 1891. 
89. Ibid., pp.854ff, 12 De cember 1891. 
90 . The Star, 10 October 1891. 
91 . South African Mining Journal, Vol. I, 5, p.77, 31 October 1891 . 
92. H.E.149, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, p.889, 
21 January 1892. 
130 
to the worcester Company, received the additional position of consulting 
engineer to the Wemmer Company, to which he was also to act as general 
manager until a successor was appointed. 93 In late 1894 he was still 
serving in this capacity. The superior technical resources of 
H. Eckstein and Company had again proved their effectiveness in bring-
ing a recalcitrant company's board into line. It was the combined 
strengths of financial and technical control which assisted this firm 
in its dominance of the field. 
The events occurring between the resignation of Wil l iamson as 
manager in November 1890 and the appointment of John Flemming as his 
successor give us an interesting insight into the approach of the 
Wemmer board in the hiring of managers. The press reported an inter-
esting court case between H. Ainsworth and the Wemmer Company in 
January 189 1 . Ainsworth, in evidence, stated that he was approached 
the previous October by the Company's secretary, George Hesse , with a 
request from the directors that he submit an application for the 
position of manager following the resignation of Williamson. In a l l 
between 70 and 100 applications were received, the great majority 
unsolici ted by the Company. As part of the applicati on Ainsworth was 
required to submit a report on 
f f th ,,94 or ur er reorgan~sat~on. 
the feasibility of closing down the mine 
In his 'report Ainsworth proposed that 
the mill be closed down for a short time while the .mine was further 
developed. Within the exi~ting mode of operations he saw " two areas for 
improvement and consequent savings. The mine then had fifteen stamps 
operating by day and the same number at night. By running al l thirty 
stamps simultaneously for a single twelve hour shift a considerable 
saving of labour and wages cou l d be effected. Likewise, he found that 
the low pressure cylinder of the c ompound steam engine was shut off, so 
that only the high pressure one was used. Use of the whole engine coul d 
result in a saving of forty per cent in the amount of fuel used in terms 
of power output. Despite these suggestions, Ainswqrth's application was 
unsuccessful and he subsequently claimed £100 for services rendered to 
95 the Company in the form of his report. The evidence gives interest-
ing clues for the departure of Williamson. Mr A. Webner was appointed 
93 . The Standard and Diggers' News, 14 January 1892. 
94. See above, p.126. 
95. The Standard and Diggers' News, 14 January 1892. 
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the new manager but fell ill so that his services were terminated after 
a week and John Flemming was appointed in his place. 
The practice of inviting individuals to submit reports in the 
recruiting of management was commented on at the trial as an innovation. 
It was certainly an effective way of assessing the potential of any 
applicant. Ainsworth, for instance, would seem to have overlooked the 
important consideration of whether the engine at full power was capable 
of operating the full thirty stamps, and he also mentioned little on 
the poor state of the mill. Events subsequent to the Phillips report 
do, however, make it difficult to determine whether such information was 
what the board actually wanted to hear. Ainsworth's willingness to 
submit a report suggests that the Company enjoyed a fair reputation as 
an employer, a fact also borne out by the over seventy applications 
received for the job. In retrospect, the board seems to have gone to 
considerable lengths in the appointment of a successor to Williamson, 
which suggests their awareness of the need for a sound man to manage 
the interests of the Company. That they needed to resort to the specific 
methods adopted reflects the fact that H. Eckstein and Company were 
unwilling to assist with the provision of a technically competent man. 
Flemming appears to have been a capable man and the lack-lustre perform-
ance of the property during his tenure 'must in large part be attributed 
to the "ramshackle" equipment. 
In considering the failure of the reorganisation attempt between 
1889 and 1891, it is not surprising to discover that in the years 1892-
93 the mine and plant once again underwent major modification. As the 
new manager, Mr Johns was immediately required to make an exhaustive 
report on the property. In March 1892 Phillips was able to write that 
the board had altered their views regarding future policy and were now 
willing to spend the amount of E35 000 on improvements. They were also 
considering approaching the Wemmer, Ferreira and worcester Deep Level 
Gold Mining Company with a view to acquiring more dip claims, and the 
Grahamstown Gold Mining Company with a take-over bid. 96 Little came 
of the latter two projects but the nature of them suggested a belated 
attempt by the Barnato group to secure an interest in the Wemmer Company. 
As early as 1888 they had secured an interest in the Grahamstown Company 
96. H.E.149, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, p.925, 
25 March 1892. 
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which was subsequently floated as the New Grahamstown Gold Mining 
97 Company. This bid again fueled a steady share buying campaign . 
In May, Wernher Beit and Company reported holding as few as 3 000 
shares in the Wemmer Company but by August the number had trebled to 
over 9 000, or a sixth of the shares in the Company, thus once again 
. th f' ,. t 98 secur~ng e 1rm S 1nteres . 
It was inevitable that the Johns report would closely mirror the 
earlier one of Phillips. Once again Johns stressed the need for a new 
main incline shaft, emphasising the saving in cost and time which 
would result from the elimination of cross cuts. It was estimated 
that in sinking to the 1 200 foot level an incline shaft would cost 
£25 668 less than a vertical shaft with the cross cuts needed to reach 
the reef. He also stressed the need for a new 30 stamp mill, preferably 
of the Fraser and Chalmers make, which would be erected in an unspeci-
fied position and supplied with water from Wemmer Pan. The total cost 
of improvements was estimated at £36 000. The annual general meeting 
of shareholders held on 7 April 1892 was informed that the directors 
concurred with the plan which would be implemented as speedily as 
possible. 99 In order to finance the reorganisation, the reserve shares 
were offered to shareholders pro rata at 50s. each in May 1892, thus 
raising an amount of £21 750. The decision to offer the shares at this 
price was poorly judged as the current market price was 70s . The result 
was a sudden fall in the price of shares in .the market as shareholders 
unloaded their newly acquired holdings. 100 As a major shareholder 
H. Eckstein and Company must have made a good profit. 
The increasing drain on the Company's finances in the upkeep of its 
machinery proved conclusively the need for the reorganisation. Share-
holders were informed that in the half year down to April 1892 a working 
profit of £9 228 was incurred, enough to warrant the payment of another 
dividend. Unfortunately , however, an amount of £5 720 had to be spent 
on the machinery, only £1 300 of which was for new equipment. The rest 
97. H.E.51, H. Eckstein and Company to Jules Porges and Company, 
p.162, 7 November 1888, and see above, Chapter I, p.21. 
98. H.E.58, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and company, 
p.32, 28 May 1892, and p.169, 6 August 1892. 
99. The Star, 7 April 1892. 
100. The Star, 1 June 1892. 
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was absorbed in maintenance and patching up the old plant. The 
intention was to run the existing mill until the new one was operational. 
In this way the shortfall on capital requirements for the new plant, 
after the sale of the reserve shares, would be made up from working 
profi ts. 
Johns used the intervening period before the arrival of the new 
plant to extend the development of the mine as rapidly as possible. 
By October 1892 the ore reserves were increased to 24 776 tons from the 
8 700 tons available in April that year, despite 11 583 tons being 
crushed during the period. The decision by the directors to finance a 
large part of the reorganisation programme from profits required that 
Johns work the existing plant at the greatest possible efficiency. 
In this regard he was very successful, but high working costs 
continued to eat away at the gains being made. Revenue for the six 
months ending 31 September 1892 was £32 050 but as costs remained at 
the high rate of 35s. 6d. per ton, or £26 559 in total, only £5 4'91 
was left to help finance the improvement programme. 101 
It was also announced in September 1892 that the Company would 
erect an electric pumping plant to raise water from the Wemmer Pan to 
the mill, thus obviating the need for a separate pumping engine 
station. 102 The intention was to att~ch a dynamo to the drive shaft 
of the mill engine which would generate the electr'ic current needed for 
the pumps situated at the Pan. This plan wa's subsequently dropped in 
favour of joining the Salisbury and Jubilee Companies in a joint 
pumping scheme. In December the Wemmer Company received permission to 
connect their main pipe line to the service reservoir of the other 
companies, thereafter receiving water on a rotational basis with special 
provision being made for .the recycling of as much of the water as 
. bl 103 POSS1 e. 
The new site chosen for the mill was on a narrow corridor of 
claims linking the mine and Wemmer Pan water rights. The location was 
half a mile from the Pan and roughly two miles from the mine. It was 
long suggested that the Company consider linking its battery to that 
101. South African Mining Journal, Vol. II, 2, p.24, 8 October 1892. 
102. Ibid., Vol. I, 49, p.871, 3 September 1892. 
103. H. E.147, Report of Joint Pumping Scheme to Directors of the 
Wemmer Gold Mining Company, p.475, 14 December 1892. 
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of another company, as had been done in the case of the Ferreira and 
Worcester companies. 104 As was pointed out by the South African 
Mining Journal, close co-operation with neighbouring mines could only 
result in considerable cost savings. Among those savings envisaged by 
this publication were the possible connection of the levels of various 
mines, which would, amongst other things, greatly assist in the matter 
of ventilation~ It was recognised that any revision of mining regula-
tions would more than likely call for all mines to be in possession of 
at least two shafts linking all the levels of the mine. Both the Wemmer 
and the Worcester Companies would, in terms of such regulations, be 
forced to sink a second shaft. The connection of l evels between various 
mines would overcome this requirement and could also reduce hoisting 
costs if a company assisted its neighbour in the raising of the are. 
Amalgamation between the Wemmer and Ferreira Companies was once 
more given serious attention by Wernher, Beit and Company and the 
Johannesburg office towards the end of 1892. By now these firms had a 
1 1 . h d h dl . h' 105 arge ho d~ng of Wemmer s ares an ar y any 1n t e Ferre1ra Company. 
Their sentiments towards the Ferreira Company verged on hostility and 
Wernher 's comment, "I would give a great deal to make the latter 
[Ferreira Company] disappear from the lists", expresses that feeling 
106 
very well. A great deal of the fluctuation in the attitudes of 
H. Eckstein and Company and their London principals was the result of 
the short term, and thus often conflicting, information r·eccived about 
particular mining properties. We have already commented on the promise 
of high yields which rekindled their interest in the Wemmer Company. 
In contrast, calculations made by the manager Johns in November 1892 
poured chill into the capitalists' hearts. Only 200 000 tons of payable 
ore remained in the mine and given the quality of that ore, the ruling 
market price of the Company's shares at £5 was given as being too high. 
The advice was to sell. 107 
104. See below, Chapter V, p.164, ' and South African Mining Journal, 
Vol. I, 26, p.461, 26 March 1892 . 
105. See below, Chapter V, pp.188ff. 
106. H.E.S8, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.492, 24 December 1892. 
107. H.E.1SI, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, p.264, 
19 November 1892. 
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Amalgamation now h ad the added incentive of an attempt to prolong 
the lives of both mines while also serving to lower their working costs. 
By May 1894 the main reef was proving payable in the lower levels, so 
much so that a further life of seventeen years was confidently 
predicted for the mine . lOB But a s London complained, liThe news about 
th · . h f k ,,109 ~s m1ne c anges every ew wee s,.~. making it difficult to 
attempt any broad strategy towards the Company, and perhaps more 
important, successfully to undertake lucrative arbitrage deals in its 
shares. Thus London was frequently caught on the wrong foot. For 
example, in January 1895 it had mournfully to report, "We are not 
prepared for such results of 
could not hold any with your 
course. We have no shares to sell. 
110 
news. II 
We 
The interesting and important point which emerges from the above 
is to query the cause of such conflicting information. It is inevitable 
that in any mining venture the value of unopened reef or ground remains 
unknown. In these circumstances it i s necessary to open up considerably 
more reef than is required for immediate crushing , in order that selec-
tive mining 
. ld 111 Yl.e • 
can take place to meet or maintain a relatively constant 
The controlling firm in the group, namely, Wernher, Beit 
and Company would appear to have been only indirectly interested in 
actual mining activity. Their chief concern was in the manipulation of 
the financial environment of Johannesburg and thus. they attempted to 
apply the same criteria for judging information from the ·mines as that 
from the stock exchange. Short term fluctuations are the essence of 
stock exchange speculation, but the same cannot be said for mining 
activity. The result was evident in the sometimes violent shifts in 
the approach and attitude of London, and hence of the local Johannesburg 
office, towards particular mining ventures. Whi l e these shifts were 
not always immediately felt by the mining companies involved, some 
influence on their development was inevitable. This point will again 
108. H.E.59, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.455, 26 May 1894. 
109. H.E.60, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.49, 31 Augus t 1894. 
110. H.E.61, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.38, 10 January 1895. 
111. See above, Chapter III, pp.91 - 92 for an example where 
insufficient opening up of the reef resulted in difficulties 
for the Simmer and Jack Gold Mining Company. 
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112 be considered in a later chapter. 
An immediate example of the influence of such actions in London 
on a Rand company is that of the ebb and flow of attempts to amalgamate 
the Wemmer with other companies. In 1892 Wernher, Beit and Company 
were anxious to be rid of their commitments in the Ferreira Company, 
not because of any immediate or inherent weakness in the mine, but 
because they had grown apprehensive regarding the size of their 
investment in the venture. The short-sighted reaction was to reduce 
their shareholding in the Company to a minimum and to encourage their 
financial connections in Europe to follow suit. 113 The liquidation of 
the Ferreira Company and its merger with the Wemmer, while on one level 
having very definite economic advantages, would also salve the 
consciences of the London principals who remained convinced that the 
Ferreira mine was over-capitalised and that they had given the lie to 
their financial "friends" regarding the venture. It is interesting 
to note that despite the near hysteria of the London firm, friends 
like Rodolphe Kann and the Rothschilds saw fit to retain a Significant 
114 interest in the Ferreira Company. Once more the proposals for 
amalgamation between the two companies came to naught, largely because 
Wernher, Beit and Company 
115 Company. 
had relinquished their shareholding in the 
Ferreira 
The exte nt of the reorganisation of the Wemmer mine can be gauged 
from the expenditure over the period of 1892-93 which, while incom-
plete, had already absorbed £79 530 by August 1893. An amount of 
£23 592 was spent on the development of the mine, including in the sum 
the cost of sinking a new main incline shaft on the south reef; 
£25 675 on machinery and plant, in addition to the £11 811 spent towards 
acquiring a new forty stamp Fraser and Chalmers mill; £4 672 on build-
ings; £2 943 on a concentration plant of thrity Frue Vanners; £1 897 
on underground and surface tramways and trucks; and finally £2 047 on 
" 
1 . " 116 . genera 1mprovements . Nor was the expenditure complete. By 
112. See below, Chapter VI, p . 204. 
113. See below, Chapter V, pp.166ff . 
114. See below, Chapter V, pp.168-69. 
115. H.E.58, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p. 449, 17 January 1893. 
116. South African Mining Journal, Vol. III, 3, p.42, 21 October 1893. 
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April 1894 it was decided, that given the failure of the amalgamation 
negotiations with the Ferreira Company, the Wemmer should have its own 
'd 1 t 117 cyanl. e p an f for which a further amount of £30 000 was 
118 
a llocated. The new working plan and the bulk of the equipment 
recommended by Johns in February 1892 were in operation by April 1894, 
work at full capacity with the new forty stamp mill only beginning in 
December 1893 . The general efficiency of the new battery is indicated 
in its increased crushing capacity of 3,79 tons per stamp per day, as 
119 
compared to the 2 ,53 tons with the old battery. 
What distinguishes Johnsls reorganisation of the mine from those 
which went before was that with the exception of the amount of £21 750 
raised from the sale of the 8 700 reserve shares, the rest of the 
capital requirements were generated from the working prof its of the 
Company. Thus the capital of the Company remained at £55 000 throughout 
the period. By 1895 the Wemmer Company was able to boast the third 
lowest nominal capital of any main reef company, which also meant that 
substantial dividend payments were possible once the reorganisation was 
completed. The first of these payments since 1891, for 20s. a share or 
120 100 per cent on the issued capital was paid on 30 June 1895. 
Amongst the improvements instituted by Johns perhaps none was more 
significant than the system for the regular sorting of the ore, whereby 
a large percentage of the barren rock, mixed into 'the ore in blasting 
and mining operations , was removed from the ore before crushing. The 
result of this operation was a reduction in milling costs, as less are 
was crushed for a given return of gold, and the y i eld per ton was raised 
proportionately. In April 1894 it was calculated that sorting raised 
the yield per ton crushed by 4,356 dwts. per ton. I n the half year 
ending February 1895 some 37,57 per cent of the rock brought to the 
surface was thrown 
could be raised to 
out. Johns confidently predicted that this figure 
121 
nearly 50 per cent. Sorting was introduced as 
117. H.E.59, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.394, 13 April 1894. 
118. South African Mining Journal, Vol. III, 29, pp.449-50, 
13 April 1894. 
119. Goldman, C.S., South African Mines: Their Position, Results and 
Development, Vol. I, p. 454. (1895-96), 
120. Ibid. 
121. Ibid . , p. 448. 
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early as September 1892 and alone would have contributed significantly 
to the profitability which allowed for the more rigorous and complete 
reconstruction to take place. 
ore sorting presupposed a proportionate increase in the scale of 
mining operations if the mine was to keep pace with the enhanced size 
of the mill and the fact that a considerable quantity of rock was now 
rejected. To a certain extent Johns was fortunate here in inheriting 
the work of his predecessor . The demand for increased efficiency in 
the mine was also prompted by the 66,75 per cent increase in the 
stamping capacity of the ·mill. The increased output of the mine is 
reflected in the table below, which also indicates the lower ore 
quality which could be worked at this scale of operations: 122 
Increased Scale of Operations 1890-95 
Total Total 
% Total per ton pet ton 
Half year 1'on5 Tons sorted yield milled mined 
ending mined milled out ozs. dwts. dwts. 
Feb. 1890 2989 2989 0 2451 16,40 16,40 
Aug. 1890 4020 4020 0 3051,80 15,18 15,18 
Feb. 1891 4431 4431 0 4719,60 21,30 21,30 
Aug. 1891 6803 6803 0 6274,75 18,45 18,45 
Feb. 1893 12347 10822 16,00 9648,30 17,80 15,63 
Aug. 1893 15344 12913 16,66 11506,96 17,82 15,00 
Feb. 1894 25103 18891 27,80 12029,95 11,03 9,58 
Aug. 1894 42673 27640 35,14 16659,60 12,05 7,81 
Feb. 1895 49573 29535 37,57 19110,21 12,94 7,71 
Another indication of the increased scale of operations is reflected 
in mine development. By the end of 1891, or some 57 months after the 
commencemen t of mining, development of the 300 foot level was just begin-
ning. By June 1895, or 40 months later, an entire new shaft had been sunk 
to a depth of 950 feet while the 300, 400 and 500 foot levels were 
completely opened up and the 620, ,720 and 830 foot levels had experienced 
considerable development. By the latter date 108 017 tons of ore were 
122. Ibid., pp.448, 453, and Goldman, C.S . , op.cit. (1892), Appendix, 
p. 55B. 
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deve l oped, equal to 68 000 tons of clean reef for the mill once sorting 
123 had taken place. 
Also contributing to an increase in the returns per ton milled were 
the systems introduced to further process the tailings. The first to 
be instituted in 1893 was a set of Frue Vanners, whi ch concentrated the 
heavier solid particles from the sludge of the tailings after these had 
passed over the amalgamation plates. The amount and value of the 
concentrates caught by these vanners is reflected in the table below: 
Half year 
ending 
Feb. 1893 
Aug. 1893 
Feb. 1894 
Aug. 1894 
Feb. 1895 
Return of Concentrates 
Total ore 
crushed 
tons 
10822 
12913 
18891 
27640 
29535 
concentrates 
caught 
tons ozs. dwts. grs. 
180, 15 7 13 8,17 
255,75 8 10 9,30 
422,37 5 9 19,2 
618 ,00 5 3 1,76 
800,00 6 3 o 
Cone. as 
% of total 
ore crushed 
1 , 665 
1,748 
2.,236 
2,236 
2,709 
A better reflection of the value of the vanner can be gathered from a 
124 
consideration of the contribution made to tota l revenue: 
Half year 
ending 
Feb. 1893 
Aug. 1893 
Feb. 1894 
Aug. 1894 
Feb. 1895 
Contribution of Concentrates to Total Revenue 
Value of Gold 
Amalgamation 
E.s.d. 
35174. 1.3 
42309.19 . 6 
43773 . 3.1 
60453.19.6 
69813.19.7 
Value of Gold 
Concentrates 
£.s.d. 
4136.18.0 
6427.18.4 
6639. 6.0 
9185. 7. 1 
16090.19.4 
Total 
Revenue 
E.s.d. 
41925. 1. 0 
55736. 7.10 
52829 . 19. 1 
69724. 6. 7 
99269. O. 6 
·Cone.as 
% of 
Amalg. 
11,76 
15,19 
15,17 
15, 19 
23,05 
Conc.as 
% of 
Revenue 
9 ,87 
11,53 
12,57 
13,17 
16,21 
From these figures it can be seen that the efficiency of the Frue 
Vanners was steadily improving throughout the period, not only in the total 
amount of concentrates caught as a, function of the total are milled, but 
also in the value of these concentrates to revenue. Subsequently, in 
September 1894 a cyanide plant, capable of processing 4 000 tons of 
123. Goldman, C.S. , op.cit. (1895-96), pp.447-48. 
124. Ibid., p.452. 
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tailings per month, was taken into operation.
125 The plant incorporated 
the latest technology in the field, and the result of this additional 
process for the winning of gold is reflected in the steady improvement 
126 in the yield from the are: 
Yield of Gold per Ton of Ore 
Date Yield in dwts. 
per ton 
Sept. 1894 9,99 
Oct. 1894 10,80 
Nov. 1894 12,17 
Dec. 1894 15,89 
J=. 1895 13,93 
Feb. 1895 14,13 
Mar. 1895 16,09 
Apr. 1~5 15,31 
The increased scale of operations in mining and milling as reflected 
above, together with the improved yield as a result of sorting, 
concentrating and finally, cyaniding, all contributed towards the 
successful operation of the Company in the period after 1892. The 
importance of these factors becomes even clearer when an analysis of 
costs is made. Commenting in April 1894, the Soutn African Mining 
Journal still found costs to be unacceptably 'high, 127 despite the 
reflection of a profit of Ell 264 15s. 9d., or of 40,96 per cent on the 
nominal capital per =num for the half year ending 28 February 1894. 
The Journal quoted working costs per ton for the period as amounting to 
38s. 7,59d., down from 47s. 9d. for the previous half year, figures 
drawn from the half yearly report . It was felt that a figure of 35s. 
per ton was a more reasonable cost level, given the state of the equip-
ment on the mine. The Journal also, however, criticised the method used 
for calculating costs suggesting that these should 'be determined upon 
the amount of are put through the mill rather than on the quantity 
raised to the surface a Calculated 'in this way c osts were nearer 44s. 
125. South African Mining Journal, Vol. III, 51, p.899, 22 September 
1894. 
126. Goldman, C.S., op.cit. (1895-96), p.449. 
127. South African Mining Journal, Vol. III, 29, p.449, 21 April 
1894. 
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per ton. The profit of Ell 264 ISs. 9d. is also significant when 
reflected against the report that the yield per ton had 
128 28,56 per cent compared to the previous half year. 
fallen by 
At a gold price 
of 72s. 6d. this meant a return of 46s. 1,75d. per ton, so that profit 
per ton fell to somewhere between 75. and 2s. per ton depend i ng on how 
the costs are calculated. 
Using the figures quoted by Goldman for costs, less the amount 
allowed for depreciation, and the figures given for the tonnage of ore 
mined and milled, some idea of the cost structure for the period 
between February 1893 and February 1895 can be gained: 129 
Production Costs per Ton 
po" " 
Half year Tons Tons Total Costs Costs/ton Costs/ton 
ending mined milled less deprec. mined milled 
Feb. 1893 12347 10822 E 27634 12.11 44,76s. 51,07s. 
Aug. 1893 15344 12913 33942 12.10 44,24s. 52.57s. 
Feb. 1894 25103 18891 40626.12.00 32,37s. 43,01s. 
Aug . 1894 42673 27640 52572 6.11 24,69s. 38,11s. 
Feb. 1895 49573 29535 60405 4. 3 24,37s. 40,90s. 
These figures, like any for this period of mining history, are not 
necessarily accurate, as no pressure was exerted on 'companies to publish 
correct statistics. They do, however I -g i ve ,us some idea 'of the magnitude 
of working costs over the period. 
By August 1894 the directors instructed Johns to report on the 
possible remaining life-span of the mine. The rate of development and 
t he relatively small size of the property raised this as a pertinent 
issue. In his report, Johns noted that the south reef and the main reef 
l e ader remained payable throughout the depth of the property, the south 
reef actually improving in quality with depth. On the basis of a stam-
ping capacity of forty stamps, and a rejection rate of forty five per 
128. The figures quoted by the South African Mining Journal are 
17,82 dwts. and 12,03 dwts. for the half . years ending August 
1893 and February 1894 respectively . These do not correspond 
with the figures printed in Goldman (1895-96) and used else-
where in the Chapter. Using Goldman's figures the decline is 
38,10 per cent. 
129. Goldman, C.S ., op.cit . (1895-96), pp.442 - 43. 
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cent of t he ore mined, Johns e stimated a further life of eight years for 
the mine. The critical factor for an extension beyond that time was the 
value of the main reef . J ohns estimated that the intrusive dyke would 
clear below the 650 foot level, when if the main reef proved to be 
about four feet thick and payable, the life of the mine could be 
130 increased to about fifteen years. These calculations did not take 
into account the 34 claims which the Company held in connection with 
its water right and bewaarplaatsen, but did include the 1,3 claims 
acquired from the liquidators of the Salisbury Extension Gold Mining 
Company, for an amount of £1 499 5s. ld. in the half year ending 28 
February 1894. 131 By February 1895 the only debt outstanding was an 
amount of £20 274 for claims, which would suggest that the Company was 
purchasing property and that Johns' calculations were made for a 
property somewhat larger than that with which the Company was formed. 
As we know, the Company owned a narrow line of claims linking its 
water right to the main property, while the 23 claims of the water 
right and the eleven bewaarplaatsen claims had by 1895 become a valuable 
deep level i nterest . 
Thus by 1895 the successful development of the mine under the 
management of Johns had turned the Company from an organisation 
struggling for its existence, into one which was capable of producing 
substantial profits and which now sought to maximize its productive 
capacity through the expansion of the size of the property. 
What distinguishes Johns' management from that of his predecessors 
is the shift in emphasis away from direct cost minimization to the 
maximization of output. Johns clearly appreciated the advantages to 
be gained from this approach and spared no costs in re-equipping the 
mine in order to achieve it. With regard to the mine itself, his 
attitude and approach are clearly exemplified in the rapid development 
of the lower levels to build up a substantial ore reserve, and in the 
sinking of an enti rely new main shaft to expedite the attainment of 
his objective. In milling, his acquisition of the new forty stamp 
battery, the concentrating, and subsequently the cyanide plant, were 
all geared towards obtaining a maximum yield of gold per ton of rock 
worked . 
130. Ibid., pp.453-54. 
131. South African Mining Journal, Vol. III, 29, pp.448-50, 21 April 
189 4. 
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The most effective innovation for the reduction of costs, and one 
which cannot be too strongly emphasised, was the system for the sorting 
of ore. The rejection of thirty per cent or more of the ore which 
would otherwise have passed through the mill was not only an effective 
means for reducing milling costs but also contributed significantly to 
the viability of the concentrating plant and cyanide works. A more 
dilute form of concentrates and tailings, in the sense of containing 
less gold, would have raised the costs of operating these processes 
significantly. On the other hand, the system of sorting can also be 
viewed as a means of maximizing output per ton of are milled. Seen in 
this way the process raised not only the cost per ton of ore milled but 
also the cost per ton mined, as up to thirty or forty per cent more ore 
and rock had to be mined to maintain crushing rates in the mill. For 
the system to have been adopted the saving in milling, concentrating 
and cyaniding costs, must have outweighed the additional mining expenses. 
The fact that total costs remained high throughout Johns' management 
suggests that any analysis of gold mining history which concentrates on 
cost structures only is likely to be misleading. The single pursuit of 
output maximization and the resultant profitability as a resu lt of lower 
marginal costs , suggests that a more cautious, balanced, approach is 
needed. 
By 1895 the Wemmer Company had emerged as a potentially prosperous 
company, capable of returning its shareholders' capital as dividend 
payments many times over. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE FERREIRA GOLD MINING COMPANY 
In June 1886 Colonel Ignatius Ferreira Qutspanned his wagon near 
the outcrop of the main reef on the farm Turffontein. In time the 
settlement which grew up around his camp site became known first, as 
the "Pretoria Camp" and s ubsequently as "Ferreira I 5 Camp". Following 
the procl amation of the farm as a public diggings on 8 September 1886 , 
Ferreira pegged out certain claims which were destined to become part 
of the property of , the Ferreira .Gol d Mining Company, one of the best 
dividend-paying outcrop companies. Jeppe writes that as early as mid-
J uly a start was made on opening up the outcrop on what were later the 
Ferreira and Wemmer mines. 1 The extent to which this "opening up" 
went beyond the accurate determination of the position of the main reef 
and its leader reefs is difficult to establish. J.B. Taylor suggests 
that as late as the early months of 1887 the reef on the Ferreira claims 
2 had only been penetrated to a depth of ten feet. In terms of the 
Gold Law of the South African Republic it was essential to show evidence 
of mining operations on at least one of any block of clai ms, if claim-
jumping was to be forestalled. It would thus seem that only the 
necessary minimal activity was undertaken in advance of the earlier 
exploratory digs on the clai ms between September 1886 and· May 1887. 
Like most of the initial claimholders, Ferreira lacked the 
necessary capital and number of claims to promote a gold mining company 
on his own. The pattern which was reproduced so often on the Witwaters-
rand field thus followed, with the creation of a promotion syndicate. 
The 
two 
members of the syndicate were, Colonel Ferreira , Carl Hanau and the 
3 brothers G.H. and F.H. Barber. The exact ownership and financia l 
apportionment of the syndicate are not known. Early in 1887 Cecil John 
Rhodes and Alfred Beit held the option to purchase the syndicate's claims. 
The purchase price was £30 000. J.B. Taylor recalls that Rhodes, Beit , 
Gardiner Williams and himself journeyed from Pretoria to inspect the 
1. Jeppe, C.B., Gold Mining on the Witwatersrand, Vol. I , p.20. 
2. Taylor, J.B., A Pioneer Looks Back, pp.112ff. 
3. Cartwright, A.P., The Corner House, pp.59ff. 
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clai ms. Taylor was responsible for taking samples which, on being 
ass~yed, were found to contain between one and one and a half ounces 
of gold to the ton of ore, presumably from the leader reefs, as the main 
r eef was very poor on this property. Rhodes remained sceptical and 
asked for Williams's opinion. Willi ams accurately predicted that at a 
depth of between one hundred and two hundred feet the nature of the ore 
would change from its oxidized, free milling state to a sulphide 
condition. Mi ning would then require more sophisticated reduction 
machinery which would substantially raise working costs. The increase 
in costs could well render operations on such a small property unprof i t-
4 
able. In additi on, Williams noted the lack of an adequate water supply. 
As a result of this prognosis Rhodes again hesitated5 and the option was 
al lowed to lapse. 
Hav ing found no suitable offers, the syndicate decided to undert ake 
the establishment of a mining company to work the proper ty themselves . 
The Ferreira Gold Mining Company was duly formed in May 1887 with" a modest 
nomi na l capital of £12 000. 6 The vendor syndicate took 6 000 of the £1 
shares as payment for the property, the balance of 6 000 shares being 
fully subscribed by the local Witwatersrand and Pretoria populations. 
The extent of the property at this stage was nine claims on the line of 
t he main reef, each being 150 feet in length and 400 feet in width. The 
reef on the property dipped down at an angle near the surface close to 
ninety degrees to the horizontal. Under these circumstances the 
promoters saw little reason for invol ving themselves with claimholders 
to the south of their property, and there was, as yet, no knowing how 
far down the reef extended. The purchase of the greater part of the 
share issue i n the Transvaal was favourab l y commented on by the Graharns-
town newspaper, The Eastern Star, which suggested that the local popu -
7 
l ation were in a good position to know and judge the val ue of a property. 
4. Taylor, J.B., op . cit., pp.112ff. 
5. For furthe r evidence of Rhodes's hesitant approach to gold mining 
see Sauer, H. , Ex Africa, pp.t04ff. 
6. Goldman, C.S., The Financial, Statistical, and General History of 
the Gold and Other Companies of Witwatersrand, South Africa, 
p.viii (1892). 
Taylor, J.B., op.cit., incorrectly stat es that the capital of the 
Company was £33 000 of which the vendors took £30 000 in shares, 
"which l eft E3 000 for proving the mine . " 
7. The Eastern Star (Grahamstown), 18 April 1887. 
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The commencement of full mining and milling operations was delayed 
due to the non-arrival of the mill. Thus while newspapers reported the 
early and spectacular progress of mines like the Wemmer and the Jupilee, 
8 the Ferreira simply c ontinued to "take out the reefl1.. In part the 
delay was inevitable . The formation of the company in the autumn month 
of May meant that by the time its orders reached Europe and were responded 
to, the South African winter had set in, reducing the grazing for the 
oxen which powered the only form of transportation from the railway 
terminals or the coast. The arrival of some machinery was reported in 
July but crushing with a five stamp battery, bought locally to placate 
. 9 
shareholders, only commenced on 2 September 1887. 
The delay in the arrival of the t en stamp Sandycroft mill ordered 
from overseas proved fortuitous. The site chosen for the erection of 
the five stamp battery in the winter and spring of 1887 seemed firm 
enough but following the good spring rains, which also flooded the open 
workings and generally retarded mining operations, it was found that the 
site chosen was on unstable, marshy ground. By 7 November the foundations 
were no longer sufficiently firm to ensure the continued safe operation 
of the mill. The decision was thus taken to relocate these stamps a 
short distance of twenty yards from the original site on higher ground 
where a solid rock foundation existed. 10 It was generally considered 
a sound practice on the Witwatersrand to locate mi~ls at a lower level 
than the pit head or quarry lip in order to facilitate the transport of 
ore. Likewise the early mills were nearly always located in close 
proximity to the water supply. In both respects the· Ferreira's manage-
ment seems to have been too ambitious. Cartwright points out that the 
Company did not wait for the water to come to it and erected the mill 
on the Sans Souci water right on the farm Braamfontein , some two and a 
half miles from the mine. 11 As Braamfontein lies to the north-west of 
the position of the mine it is difficult to imagine a route between the 
two pOints which did not involve an inclined slope from the mine to the 
water right, which lay on the opposite side of the Witwatersrand ridge . 
The choice of a water right so far ,from the mine could only have been 
8. The Eastern Star, 3 June 1887. 
9. The Eastern Star,S September 1887. 
10. The Eastern Star, 7 November 1887. 
11. Cartwright, A.P., op.cit., pp . 59ff. 
1~ 
motivated by the known permanence of the flow of the Braamfontein Spruit. 
Prior to the arrival of the machinery and the commencement of 
operations with their own mill, a test crushing of 113 tons of the 
Company's ore was made at the Struben ' s Wilgespruit battery. The Struben 
mill was the only existing one in close proximity to the Witwatersrand 
following the discovery of gold there, and it was thus involved in test 
crushings for many of the early companLes.'2 A yield of 109 ounces was 
received from material reputed to be a mixture from the various reefs on 
13 
the property~ Johnstone, the first mine manager, was a conscientious 
worker, if not a good miner. By the. time the first five stamps came 
into operation in September 1887 a vertical shaft had been sunk to a 
depth of 63 feet from the surface and drives were being cut to meet 
14 
the reef. Nevertheless, most of the work was still being done by 
quarrying the ore from along the line of reef. In this way a considerable 
reserve of some 100 loads or more of ore was built up at the mill site. 15 
A battery shed was completed during September which allowed for day and 
night crushing virtually from the commencement of operations until the 
mill closed down in November 1887. Illumination for the night work was 
supplied by means of oil lamps 4 Concentrators were also used, although 
exactly which type was not specified, the press report stating only that 
they were of tlan American patent so perfect in its operation that the 
possibility of loss [of gold] in the tailings was reduced to a minimum. ,,16 
The relocated battery, together with the ten new stamps, started 
crushing operations 
not yet being quite 
on the afternoon of 29 December .1887, the premises 
17 
complete. The mill ran for only three weeks 
before again closing down. The reason given for this decision was that 
the results were not sufficiently encouraging to justify the continued 
operation of the mill . With ore which supposedly assayed at over one 
ounce to the ton, the decision must have come as a great surprise to 
early Johannesburg. The board also decided to "make a clean sweep of 
12. See above, Chapter II, p.31 . , 
13. Mathers, E.P., The Gold Fields Revisited, p . 287. 
14. The Eastern Star, 24 August 1887, and 5 September 1887. 
15. Mathers, E.P., op.cit., p.287. 
16. The Eastern Star, 17 October 1887. 
17. The Eastern Star, 30 December 1887 . 
18 its battery employees." 
148 
A more probable explanation for the board's action was that they 
had exhausted their limited working capital. The reason offered by the 
board was short-sighted in the light of the influence any such statement 
must have had on the price of Ferreira shares at a time when the 
manipulation of the local stock exchange was as important to directors 
19 
as was the mining of gold. A more detailed explanation subsequently 
followed at a special general meeting of shareholders held on 24 
February 1888. 20 The chairman, Mr W.J. Quin, elaborated that the 
yield from the mill in no way corresponded with assays taken from the 
ore awaiting crushing. An inspection of the battery after the dismissal 
of the battery manager and his staff revealed leakages from the mortar 
boxes. An assay of the material returned an average value of 16 dwts. 
9 grs. per ton, an amount in excess of that being caught by the amalgam 
plates. On the strength of this evidence the directors decided to appoint 
a mining engineer, Mr T.W. Farrell, to investigate the condition of the 
mill. His report confirmed that the leakages were due to "the defective 
manner in which the plates were fixed", and suggested considerable 
repairs and additions before the mill could again be taken into use. 
In response to these allegations the former manager, Johnstone, 
retorted that there were two classes of ore stacked at the mill and 
claimed that samples of the rich ore were taken for the directors' assay, 
while he was occupied in crushing the poorer material. Again, he alleged, 
the tailings mentioned by the chairman were taken fr~m stamps then being 
used by a Mr Easterbrook for experiments with a IIfloat-gold machine". 
These counter-charges were not denied by the directors and the 
subsequent delays in the recommencement of crushing operations suggests 
a motive other than managerial incompetence as the true cause for the 
shut down. A regular check on the operations of the mill would have 
very soon shown up such a leakage and resulted in a call for repairs or 
readjustment. The alternative inference, of the manager being involved 
in pilfering, would surely have resulted in prosecution. Also, any 
truth in the directors' allegations' is certainly an indictment of them 
in the execution of their functions and responsibilities to the share-
18. The Eastern Star, 1 February 1888. 
19. See above, Chapter II, pp.36ff. 
20. The Eastern Star, 27 February 1887. 
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holders. J.B. Taylor suggests that the staff were fired as part of a 
restructuring of the Company under the guidance of H. Eckstein and 
Company. 21 
More telling as to the true cause of the closure of the mill were 
the statements of the chairman to the special meeting, stressing the 
bleak financial position in which the Company found itself. It was made 
quite clear that without an infusion of fresh working capital it would 
be impossible to undertake any further operations on the property. The 
dismissal of the manager ~nd staff of the mill Obviously reduced the 
expenses of some of the highest paid employees from the Company until the 
finances necessary for continued operations could be found. Johannesburg 
at this time enjoyed a surplus of people claiming to have experience as 
managers and amalgamators, so that the task of filling their positions, 
when circumstances required, would be relatively simple . 
The disproportionate cost of salaries and wages is borne out in the 
financial report for the year ending 31 March 1888. This component 
constituted an amount of £2 185 16s. 3d. out of a total expenditure of 
£3 923 165. 8d. Income from .gold sales and transfer fees amounted to 
£1 683 12s. 7d~, leaving a deficit on the profit and loss account of 
£2 044 95. ld. It was Johnstone's misfortune to have run his mine in such 
a manner that he was able to present his employers with an excuse to fire 
him. Likewise, the directors undoubtedly felt that little good would 
come of allowing the Company to slip deeper into debt before a thorough 
investigation was made of the future potential of the property. It would 
seem that Johnstone was given reasonable opportunity to produce the good 
results which would have raised Ferreira share prices and allowed the 
directors to manipulate the market in order to raise fresh working 
capital. His 
on mines such 
failure to work only the richest ore, as was general practice 
22 
as the Wemmer, and his inability to work poor ore well, 
resulted in his downfall. A sense of integrity and a lack of amalgamating 
skill made a poor combination for management on the ear ly Witwatersrand. 
Another factor which must be considered as a possible influence on 
the decision to suspend operations: is the shift in the shareholding and 
21. Taylor, J.B., op.cit., pp.112ff. 
22. See above, Chapter IV, pp.109ff. 
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consequent change of directorships which o c c urred about this time. 
In October 18 87 three of the directors, Mes s r s Neumann, Wolhuter and 
Bennett, resigned in favour of Messrs C. Hanau, J.B. Taylor and W. J. Quin, 
while Quin also succeeded Bennett as the managing director. 23 The 
appointment of J.B. Taylor to the board heralds the beginning of the 
long association between the Ferreira Company and the firm of H. Eckstein 
and Company. 
Taylor was not happy with Beit's decision to drop the option on the 
Ferreira clai ms which he and Rhodes had exercised earlier in 1887. 
Taylor felt the mine could become a profitable venture and with Beit's 
approval began buying up shares in the 
sufficient to ensure himself a seat on 
Company. By 
24 
the board. 
October he held 
In his autobiography 
Taylor asserts that upon gaining control of the Company, H. Eckstein and 
Company dispensed with the services of the manager and restructured the 
25 board, which would account for the election of C. Hanau and W.J. Quin, 
two men frequently given minor interests in the ventures of H. ECKstein 
and Company. The turnover in directorships durin g the first year of the 
Company's existence was high, some seven men serving on the board of 
five in this time. Ferreira was the only member of the original board 
to survive the first year, being disqualified on 3 July 1888,26 when 
he sold the majority of his shares in the Company. 
The domination of the shareholding of the Ferreira Company by 
H. Eckstein and Company was soon followed by "rumours of a proposed 
amalgamation between the Wemmer and Ferreira companies. 27 The advantages 
of such a move were obvious and offered a solution to many of the problems 
23. The Eastern Star, 17 October 1887. 
24. Cartwright, A.P~, op.cit., is misled by an e rror of Taylor's at 
this point. Taylor (op.cit . , p.114) mentions the purchase of 
some 25 000 shares in the Ferreira Company at between 30s. and 
355./ causing Cartwright to comment, "He h ad to pay some 
£40 000 for the 25 000 shares ..• but it was one of the most 
profitable transactions that Eckstein's ever made." There were 
only 12 000 shares in the Com~any at the time. The relation-
ship between the Corner House and the Company is considered in 
detail below. 
25. Taylor, J.B., op.cit., gives Gutman as the name of the manager 
at the take over and suggests that J . H. Johns replaced him. 
This is inc orrect. 
26. Goldman, C.S., (1 892) op.cit., p.57. 
27. The Eastern Star, 21 November 1887 . 
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faced by these mines which, following such a step, would be able to 
reduce management costs and achieve other economies of scale in this way. 
The amalgamation of two or more of the small companies which occupied 
the central portion of the reef immediately to the south of the devel-
oping settlement of Johannesburg remained an objective of H. Eckstein 
and Company for many years, but it was only with the development of the 
deep level properties that this goal was reached. The rumour had little 
chance of being substantiated at this point as H. 
was not yet the majority shareholder in the Wemmer 
Eckstein and 
2B Company. 
Company 
There 
was also the fact that while the Wemmer Company now reported spectacular 
results, the recent poor performance' of the Ferreira Company was unlikely 
to encourage the interest of Wemmer shareholders to such a move. The 
Wemmer Company was, however, also in need of fresh working capital but 
was able to raise this by means of an increase in nominal capital. 
One of the early moves to consolidate its hold on the Ferreira 
Company by H. Eckstein and Company was through the alteration of the 
trust deed. It was towards this end that a special general meeting was 
called for 17 February 1BBB. The number of shares represented at the 
meeting fell short of the three quarters of the total shareholding 
required for the purpose of altering the deed, an ironical situation 
when 
very 
it is considered that the purpose of the meeting was to reduce this 
figure to two thirds. 29 The lower figure WOuld have given the 
firm a stronger hold on the Company without qaving to substantially 
increase its shareholding. The meeting was duly postponed to 24 
February, when the poor financial state of the Company was used as a 
lever against reticent shareholders. In his speech W.J. Quin stated 
that before any proposition to increase the capital of the Company could 
be considered by the directors, they would have to be assured of share-
holder loyalty, "And as one step towards the -attainment of such objects 
the shareholders would be asked to sanction the amendments to the trust 
deed ..• ,,30 The proposal to alter the trust deed was then carried 
unanimously. 
The firing of the manager and 'closing of the mill at the end of 
1BB7 marks the termination of the first phase in the history of the 
2B. See above, Chapter IV, pp.112ff. 
29. The Eastern Star, 20 February 1BBB. 
30. The Eastern Star, 27 February 1BB8. 
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Ferreira Company. No production figures are available to indicate the 
efficiency or otherwise of the mine and mill. Likewise, the extent of 
development in the mine is not known~ It seems probable, however,' that 
the decision to assume a controlling interest in the Company on the part 
of H. Eckstein and Company would not have been based on sheer speculation 
of the future potential of the Company. Undoubtedly, an element of risk 
was a factor in gauging all mining investment but one would like to believe 
that the members of H. Eckstein and Company must have given some 
consideration to the early results of the Company, as well as those of 
adjoining properties, in deciding on the investment . If so, then the 
results could not have been uniformly bad for the potential of the 
property to be recognised, and the failure of the Company to establish 
itself can be largely attributed to the initial lack of working capital. 
An important considerati.on which would substantiate this viewpoint 
is the fact that for the greater part of the development during the first 
ten years of the mine's existence, it was only the south reef and small 
portions of the main reef leader which proved payable. There was thus 
a far greater need on this property for rapid development of the mine to 
ascertain a continuity in the supply of ore, and for large scale 
operations to ensure a greater marginal revenue from each ton of ore 
mined. The required scale of operations could never be achieved with 
the limited capital resources available to the first 'management of the 
Company. It was this capital which the firm .of H. Eckstein and Company, 
through its principals in London, Wernher, Beit and Company, and their 
Paris associates, could supply a 
Confident in the prospects of the mine, the step to increase the 
capital of the Ferreira Company was undertaken in spectacular fashion at 
a meeting held on 16 April 1888', when the nominal capital of the 
Company was raised from £12 000 to £28 000. A small part of the 
increased capital, namely 4 000 £1 shares, was set aside for payment of 
four claims to be acquired from the Bijou Syndicate. The balance of 
12 000 shares were offered to Ferreira shareholders at par. 31 The 
capital raised in this way was used for the development of the property. 
In the discussion on these proposals at the special general meeting, it 
was pointed out by Abe Bailey and others that the Bijou 'claims were 
untried and that there was no guarantee that the reef would be found 
31. The Eastern Star, 16 April 1888; 
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to pass through them, despite their location in line with the main reef. 
Disappointment in this regard had already been met with in the case of 
the Grahamstown and Metropolitan Companies. The offer to the Bijou 
Syndicate was thus altered to an outright payment of 3 500 shares, 
the balance of 500 being kept as a reserve. The amended proposal was 
carried and subsequently accepted by the Syndicate. Only 11 000 of 
the shares offered to shareholders were subscribed, so the reserve was 
32 increased to 1 500 shares. 
The removal of the manager and battery staff in February 1888 was 
soon followed by speculation and rum.,ours as to a replacement for the 
manager. The Eastern Star incorrectly announced the appointment of an 
amalgamator at the Witwatersrand Company's mill, Mr Thomas Halliday as 
33 the new manager. This statement was subsequently denied by the board 
of the Ferreira Company, and it was only in April that Mr Wells, 
previously employed by the Wemmer Company and supposedly "one of the most 
capable managers on the Randt", was appointed. It seems possible' that 
his appointment was arranged by H. Eckstein and Company. The tenure of 
Mr Wells as manager was dominated by the development of the mine. The 
first great difficulty to be overcome was that of clearing the mine works 
of water. Like all the outcrop mines, the Ferreira Company had indulged 
in a good deal of quarrying of the outcrop ore along the line of reef. 
In the wet summer of 1887-88 these open workings became reservoirs, 
hindering further mining by this technique and causing water to percolate 
down into what underground workings there were. The problem persisted 
well into June 1888, as only a horse-whim was used to operate a system 
of buckets for the raising of water from the underground workings. 
Suitable hauling and pumping equipment was amongst the machinery ordered 
after the fresh infusion of capital but delivery was delayed when Johannes-
burg was virtually cut off from the coast during the winter of 1888. 
Horse- whims were also used on the four shafts being sunk on the 
property. The sinking of at least two of these shafts, including the 
proposed main vertical shaft, was given out on contract. The contract 
price for the incline shaft was 28s. 6d. per foot, so the expense of 
the main shaft, which was also to be timbered, must have been considerably 
32. The Eastern Star, 11 July 1888; 
33. The Eastern Star, 1 February 1888, and see above, Chapter II, p.32. 
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34 
more. Shaft sinking and general mining both suffered from a lack of 
African labour in the winter of lBBB, a problem which dogged all 
Witwatersrand mines. Black workers, coming mainly from the Transyaal 
low veld and Portuguese East Africa were unaccustomed to the cold high 
veld winters, a feature made so much worse by the damp conditions 
35 prevailing underground. 
Much of the mine development work done during lBB7 was condemned 
by Mr Butler, of the partnership of Jones and Butler, who was now 
employed as a consulting engineer . A great deal of the earlier work was 
undertaken without any reference to planning so that considerable 
expense was met with in rectifying it. The greatest expense in this 
regard was incurred in filling in the open workings, which in many 
places were over fifty feet deep. By the end of August, when Mr Wells 
resigned as manager, the battery while still idle, had been brought into 
a state of readiness. The main feature of Wells's tenure was the shaft 
sinking, some five shafts being opened in this time to between 23 feet 
and 100 feet. Development underground was limited to the 
winzes and by the end of July only 1 130 tons of ore were 
opening of two 
36 
on hand. 
In a letter to · Rodolphe Kann in the same month, J.B. Taylor intimated 
that the mine had 9 450 tons of ore worth one and a half ounces to the 
ton, and lB 400 tons worth about half an ounce per ton, in sight. 37 
The slow development of the mine can be attributed to several 
factors. There was the labour shortage already referred to, while a 
second factor was the lack of adequate technology and equipment. Horse 
whims were no substitute for pumps and hauling engines. Likewise the 
development of the mine as envisaged by the consultant engineer, Butler, 
required substantial modification of existing workings, particularly 
the filling in of the trenches, which diverted labour and resources from 
the ultimate objective of exposing greater quantities of the ore. 
As regards the departure of the manager Wells, no substantial clues 
exist to suggest a reason for his going. His tenure of less than five 
months suggests incompetence. Certainly his stay with the Wemmer 
Company was not sufficiently long for it to be noted in the reports of 
34. The Eastern Star, 4 April lBBB. 
35. See below, Chapter VI, p.229. 
36. The Eastern Star, 3 August lBBB. 
37. Cartwright, A.P., op.cit., p.75. 
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any of the half yearly meetings. If it is considered that he was 
probably drawn away from the Wemme·r Company by the offer of higher wages, 
there is no reason to believe that he might not once again have 
succumbed to the lure of a higher salary. Staff poaching was a recog-
nised malaise as far as black labour was concerned and there seems little 
reason why it did not apply to skilled white labour as well, particularly 
where the man had a good reputation as being a competent manager. 
The new manager appointed to replace Wells was Mr lIes, who had 
previously been a manager on the De Kaap gold field in the eastern 
Transvaal. He was reputed to have "considerable experience in under-
ground mining operations u38 possibly reflecting an area of weakness in 
his predecessor. It is quite possible that Wells was appointed in the 
first place for his skill as an amalgamator, considering the supposed 
weakness of the first manager, Johnstone, in this regard. If this was 
the rationale behind the appointment of Wells, it was most unfortunately 
timed. Wells was appointed in early April and following strenuous 
efforts on his part the mill stood ready to commence operations by the 
39 
end of that month. It did not run, however, for the entire duration 
of his tenure. The high cos t of fuel due to increased transportation 
costs during the winter, the scarcity of labour, and the decision by the 
board to concentrate on the opening up of the mine, could all have left 
Wells in control of a situation for which he was largely inexperienced. 
In either case, the major consideration was the slow progress made in 
the opening up of the mine during his tenure, and his replacement was a 
man with a reputation for 
alone in experiencing the 
underground work. The Ferreira Company was not 
40 difficulties of finding a suitable manager. 
Likewise it would seem to have been a problem to find one who was equally 
good in his control of both the mill and the mine. 
One of the features which marked the development period of the 
Ferreira Company was the attention devoted to the surface of the property. 
If all was not well below ground at least the appearance of the property's 
surface works could be made to look respectable in the eyes of potential 
shareholders. By October 1888 the six monthly statement of the board 
announced that for the first time the property was enclosed with a 
38. The Eastern Star, 3 August 1888. 
39. The Eastern Star, 27 April 1888. 
40. See above, Chapter IV, pp.1 12,130, and Chapter II, pp.42 ., 45-46. 
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substantial fence and that all squatters had been removed. Likewise, 
the erection of a HKaffir barracks" was nearing completion, so that . 
sufficient accommodation would be provided on the mine for both blacks 
and whites. The provision of accommodation for whites was more than 
ad~quate, one house being converted into a blacksmith's shop . A possible 
reason for this situation was the close proximity of the mine to the 
growing settlement of Johannesburg, which could account for white 
employees wishing to live in the town rather than on the mine. The 
provision of accommodation for black workers was probably a step towards 
exerting greater control over their movement. It is interesting to 
note that, as in the case of shaft construction, the erection of the 
living quarters for black labourers was undertaken by a contractor~ 
At this time the staff complement of the mine consisted of the manager, 
secretary, two carpenters, 
miners and fifty two black 
one blacksmith, one overseer, four white 
41 labourers. Assuming the carpenters and 
blacksmith had one or two black assistants, this would give a ratio of 
roughly 1:12 of whites to black workers underground. An interesting 
insight into the extent of the development undertaken in the period 
following october 1888 is that by May 1890 staff numbers had increased 
to 35 whites, including the manager, secretary and foreman, and 250 
42 blacks. 
In October 1888 H. Eckstein and Company informed their London 
principals that there was sufficient capital-to continue the development 
of the mine for no more than another four months. 43 As yet, however, 
the opening up or development of the mine had not reached the satis-
factory stage where it could continuously supply the contemplated 25 
stamp mill. The requirement of the rapid development of the south reef 
caused the Ferreira mine to sink its workings more rapidly than most 
other properties on the Rand who could draw are from more than one reef 
which did not slope so steeply. While the Ferreira reef sank at an 
41. The Eastern Star, 26 October 1888. 
42. The Diggers' News (Johannesburg), 7 May 1890. 
43. Barlow Rand Archives. Archives of H. Eckstein and Company 
(H.E.), Vol. 51, H. Eckstein and Company to Jules Porges and 
Company, p.8, 19 October 1888. The firm of Jules Porges and 
Company became Wernher, Beit and Company on the retirement of 
Porges from the partnership in 1889 . For purposes of convenience 
the firm is referred to as Wernher, Beit and Company throughout 
the text. 
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almost perpendicular angle from the surface, at depth the angle began 
to decrease . This information prompted the firm to cast eyes to the 
area south of the Ferreira property into which mining operations could 
extend in the foreseeable future. In November two and a half claims 
were bought on joint account with C. Hanau for E1 450. 44 Similarly 
negotiations were opened for the purchase of a large water right 
adjoining that of the Wemmer Company on Wemmer Pan. The size and 
reliability of a water right was considered the determining criterion 
for the eventual size of the mill to be erected. Negotiations were 
also opened for the purchase of more south dip claims. Clearly, if it 
was impossible to achieve a larger scale of production through the 
amalgamation of the Ferreira with some other company, then it was 
recognis~d as essential to expand the scope of its own operations. Not 
that attempts at amalgamation were altogether abandoned. 
Private negotiations behind the scenes between the Ferreira direct-
ors and the boards of the neighbouring Wemmer and Worcester Companies 
continued and eventually resulted in some joint activity and co-
45 
operation. The press, ever sensitive to rumours regarding amal-
gamations between companies, even when not fully informed, announced 
in December 1888 that a scheme for the amalgamation of all properties 
between the worcester and Jubilee Companies was once more under 
consideration by "the wealthy capitalists". 46 Suc;:h ' an amalgamation 
would have involved the Worcester, Ferreira, .Wemmer, Salisbury, 
Grahamstown, Royal and Jubilee Companies. The move, if successful, 
would have resulted in the richest gold mining company on the Rand. 
The prospect alone was sufficient to send these companies' shares 
soaring, the price of Ferreira shares reaching £25 each on the Johannes-
burg Stock Exchange. It is doubtful if there was much substance to 
the rumour, given the financial strain the move would have placed on 
any initiator wishing to acquire the properties through the market, 
while agreement to amalgamation amongst the various companies would 
have faced insurmountable difficulties. It is difficult to divorce 
the disclosure from the prevailing ,boom on the stock exchange. While 
44. H.E.51, H. Eckstein and Company to Jules POrges and Company, 
p.147, 20 November 1888. 
45 . See above, Chapter IV, pp.114, 129-30 . 
46. The Eastern Star, 3 December 1888. 
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there certainly were low key negotiations in progress between various 
companies, the scope of the scheme published seems more akin to a blatant 
attempt to fuel an already bullish market. As far as the Ferreira 
Company was concerned, the growing co-operation with the Wemmer Company, 
under the watchful eyes of H. Eckstein and Company, bore fruit in a 
joint management scheme, while a joint milling venture was agreed upon 
with the Worcester Company on the Robinson Company's mynpacht. 
The limited success of the co-operation schemes convinced 
H. Eckstein and Company of the need to expand the scope of the Ferreira 
Company's operations. At the beginning of 1889 the Johannesburg office 
was still calculating the Ferreira's operations on the basis of a 15 
or 25 stamp mill. 47 Thereafter the scale envisaged expanded rapidly. 
The hint- of success in negotiations for additional claims and a l arger 
water right, together with the general confidence inspired by the 
rising share market of late 1888 and early 1889, swung the Ferreira 
board in favour of a more ambitious venture, as it did the boards· of 
H. Eckstein and Company and their London principals. A mill of forty 
to fifty stamps was now considered possible. There was also the 
cons ideration of the arrival of a technically competent manager from 
Europe. The resignation of Mr lIes coincided with the arrival of 
48 Mr J.H. Johns on the Rand. Johns, previously manager of the Niri 
Reefs Company in India, was referred to Jules Porg~s' and Company in 
London who in turn offered him to H. Eckstein and Company in Johannes-
burg as a "very sui table person II, who "understood everything about 
mining and milling". The Johannesburg office readily agreed to pay 
his passage out and his salary of £500 for the first year. 49 In turn 
he was offered to the Ferreira Company where he commenced his long 
and distinguished career as manager at the beginning of April 1889. 
Johns was a product of the Royal School of Mines and brought to South 
Africa twenty years of practical experience gained in the mines of 
Cornwall and India. 50 With a manager of his calibre the risks of an 
enlarged venture were considerably reduced. The necessity for sound 
47. H.E.51, H. Eckstein and Company to Jules Porges and Company, 
p.278, 18 January 1889. 
48. Ibid., p.383, 15 March 1889. 
49. H.E.49, Jul es POrges and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
8 February 1889. 
50. The Diggers' News, 27 January 1890. 
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mining and technical expertise in managers was increasingly recognised 
by the leading financiers even before the collapse of the fi r st 
Johannesburg stock exchange boom in 1889 and the following recessi9n 
disciplined the industry into concentrating on mining rather than 
financial manipulation. The firm · of H ~ Eckstein and Company was to 
play a major role in the supply of such competent men . 
By the time Johns arrived on the Rand the previous managers had 
successfully whittled away the Company's financial resources in develop-
ment which did little to prepare the mine for large-scale production. 
On 19 March 1889 a special general meeting of the Ferreira shareholders 
was called to consider the raising of the finances necessary for the 
envisaged expansion project. r ·t was estimated that an amount of 
between £40 000 and £50 000 was needed to place the Company in a 
position to acquire several south dip claims and the water r ight on 
Wemmer Pan, to lay down a connecting tramway between the mine and the 
mill, and to erect a fifty stamp mill, besides leaving an amount . 
sufficient to develop the mine to a point where it could effectively 
51 
supply the new battery. The meeting duly authorised the issue of a 
further 5 000 shares, thus increasing the nominal capital of the Company 
to £33 000. The funds were to be appor tioned as follows: 500 shares to 
be given to W.J. Quin for the water right, 1 750 shares as payment for 
the seven south dip claims acquired, while 2 000 s~ares were allocated 
to 
in 
mine development and machinery, with the ~emaining 750 - shares held 
52 
reserve. The claims and water right were purchased directly but 
it was decided to hold back the sale of the shares until more auspicious 
times. The collapse of the boom in 1889 was followed by a financial 
crisis both in South Africa and Europe, with the result that ruling 
share prices made such a move unwise. It was only in August 1889 that 
a tender for a block of 1 500 shares at £17 each was accepted from 
F . Mosenthal and Company, raising an amount of £25 500. 53 As the need 
for capital was pressing when the special meeting was called in March, 
H. Eckstein and Company offered to furnish a loan for £55 000 for the 
Company at eight per cent interest with the entire property as security 
, 
51. H.E.51, H. Eckstein and Company to Jules Porges and Company, 
p.383 , 15 March 1889 . 
52. Goldman, C. S., op.cit . , p . 61. 
53 . Ibid., pp.57-58 , and H. E . 49, Jules P orges and company to 
H. Eckstein and Company, 30 August 1889 . 
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and the right of calling the reserve shares at £17 lOs. at any time 
54 before repayment. It was left to the London principals, Wernher, 
Beit and Company, to raise the money for the loan, H. Eckstein and 
Company being quite content that it would be a relatively easy task. 
After a personal inspection of L~e property in M~~ch both Messrs 
Porges and Kann55 had expressed interest,56 Rodolphe Kann stating 
his willingness to commit himself to a loan of £30000. 57 It was, 
however, necessary to call a meeting of the Company to empower the 
board to raise the loan as the trust deed made no provision for 
borrowing by the Company. The bond was passed at a shareholders 
meeting held in June. 58 In the interim the London principals set 
about raising the amount of the loan, which was duly accumulated with 
the involvement of the "Paris friends", namely, Messrs Rann and 
Rothschild, and the Rand associate S. Neumann, erstwhile 
the Company and a man with financial links to the German 
director 
59 banks. 
of 
When Harry Johns assumed the management of the Ferreira Company 
in April 1889, he found that despite the efforts of his predecessors, 
little had been achieved in the development of the mine. The main 
vertical shaft was sunk and timbered to a depth of 120 feet, while of 
the four smaller shafts three were so positioned that they missed the 
reef. These were all subsequently turned into winzes following on 
the incline of the reef. In addition only 246 fee~ were driven on 
the south reef at the 120 foot level. By Ja~uary 1890 Johns extended 
these developments by sinking an additional vertical shaft on the 
Bijou claims which struck the south reef at 120 feet, whereupon it 
became inclined to follow the reef. Likewise, a further two winzes 
were sunk on the original property and 1 555 feet of drives extended 
54. H.E.49, Jules Porges and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
18 April 1889. 
55. Porges, by now resident in London had undertaken a visit to 
Johannesburg with Kann with the intention of encouraging the 
French financier to invest in various Rand undertakings. 
56. H.E.51, H. Eckstein and Company to Jules Porges and Company, 
p.374, 8 March 1889. 
57. Ibid., p.436, 27 March 1889. 
58. H.E.52, H. Eckstein and Company to Jules Porges and Company, 
p.122, 20 June 1889. 
59. H.E . 56, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.236, 2 October 1890 . 
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along the south reef and 265 feet on the main reef. The main shaft was 
also lowered 92 feet below the 120 foot level at the greater size of 
14 feet by 5 feet, as opposed to the 12 feet by 4,5 feet above that 
level. The number two shaft was lowered to a depth of 178 feet with 
similar dimensions. Both shafts were timbered throughout and were 
intended eventually to follow the incline of the reef. 
One of the major technical problems encountered by Johns in the 
underground workings was the faulting which occurred in the reef. 
The south reef was discovered to be faulted in at least seven places 
in the area exposed by January 1890. Five of these were ordinary 
faults but the remaining two were overlap or reverse faults, caused by 
an intrusive dyke which cut the reef obliquely and threw the reef 35 
feet to the south and 25 feet to the north respectively, while causing 
an overlap of 69 feet and 50 feet at the ends. The reef was success-
fully relocated with a minimum of profitless driving by the careful 
measurement of the dip and direction of both reef and fault at eaCh 
point of fracture. This type of problem caused weeks of delay to 
previous managers. As it was, the extent of operations undertaken in 
the first few months of Johns's tenure was staggering by comparison with 
those of his predecessors. Nor were surface activities ignored. By 
January 1890 the site for the new battery had been chosen and prepared 
for the arrival of machinery. This work, however, ,was pu~ out on 
contract, but the tramline linking the two main shafts and the mill had 
also been laid •. 
The unsuitability of the old battery location and water right were 
recognised at an early date. Planning for the new developments included 
the resiting of the 15 stamps and their augmentation with varying 
numbers of new stamps. It was ultimately decided by the engineers that 
a forty stamp mill would be the optimum number for the size of the prop-
erty and Mr Judd Coppach was despatched to the Fraser and Chalmers works 
60 in Chicago to procure the latest equipment for the Company. 
In November 1889 Jules Porges and Company reported that they had paid 
the sum of £7 437 to the American company for the mill on behalf of the 
61 Ferreira Company. 
60. See Taylor, J.B., op.cit., pp.122ff, for some biographical detail 
on Judd Coppach. 
61. H.E.49, Jules Porges and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
28 November 1889. 
vertical shaft headgear and engine house of the Ferreira Gold Mining 
Company. Note the old incline shaft headgear in the foreground . (1895) 
(Source: Hatch, F . H. and Chalmers, J.A., The Gold Mines of the Rand, 
facing p.141.) 
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The first trial crushings with the new mill were only made in 
December 1890. Some of the causes for the delay are to be found in 
the search for an ideal location for the mill and the desire to develop 
the mine a s far as possible before the commencement of full scale 
crushing operations. The intention in acquiring the water right on 
Wemmer Pan in March 1889 was to site the mill here on ground hired 
from the Wemmer Company. Pumping water would then not constitute ' a 
problem and the engines used to run the mill could double in the capacity 
for driving the pumps. This thinking was very much in keeping with the 
time, when it was accepted as necessary to convey are over great dis-
tances to the source of water. The idea was soon dropped in favour of 
locating the mill in close proximity to the main shafts, and pumping 
water to this site. An agreement was accordingly entered into with the 
Wemmer Company for a jOint pumping project and the necessary pumping 
equipment acquired . 62 This plan, in turn, was shelved during the 
course of 1890 in favour of a steeper, and thus more suitable site for 
the gravitational feeding of the mill and clearing of the tailings, 
situated on the Robinson Company's mynpacht. The choice of this location 
was also prompted "with a view to the future fusion ll of the Ferreira and 
Worcester Companies with the Robinson. 63 The Johannesburg office 
suggested that an amalgamation of the Robinson and Crown properties 
could be followed by the inclusion of 
subsequently the deep levels, into one 
the Ferreira, Worcester, and 
, 64 
large concern. .The choice of 
the site had a sequel for which H. Eckstein and Company had not anticip-
ated. The owner of the farm, Langlaagte, on which the Robinson rnynpacht 
was situated, Mr Bezuitenhout, took exception to the agreement between 
the Robinson and Ferreira Companies to erect the mill on the Robinson 
mynpacht. Although the Robinson Company held a perpetual lease on the 
property, Bezuitenhout and his legal advisers saw the erection of the 
mill as an infringement of the lease agreement. While the action 
against the Robinson Company was duly quashed, the incident caused not 
a little consternation in London and Europe as to the insecurity of the 
62 . H.E.51, H. Eckstein and Company to J u les Porges and Company, 
p.285, 25 January 1889, and pp.296-97, 6 February 1889. 
63. H.E.56, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.85, 16 May 1890. 
64. H.E.149, H. Eckstein and Company to Wernher, Beit and Company, 
p.211, 9 May 1890. 
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land holding 
slumped even 
agreement of many of the Rand companies and share prices 
65 further. 
The choice of the site would not have altered the existing pran 
for a joint pumping project on the Wemmer Pan but for the drought of 
late 1889 and the winter months of 1890 which cast doubt on the Pan as 
a permanent source of water supply. In May 1890 it was reported that 
the Pan was lower than anyone could remember. Prompted by this news 
H. Eckstein and Company encouraged the Ferreira Company to buy a water 
right next to that of the Worcester Company on the Turffontein spruit. 66 
The water right was duly acquired fo~ 400 reserve shares or approximately 
£2 000. The new water right necessitated the erection of a dam wall 
at a cost of £2 SOD, which was constructed as a joint venture with the 
Worcester Company. Another reason for dropping the joint pumping 
venture with the Wemmer Company was that this Company had also cooled 
to the idea, intending to meet most of its requirements from water 
pumped from the mine. 67 Lionel Phillips, as one of the directors of 
H. Eckstein and Company, on behalf of the Ferreira Company, then care-
fully endeavoured to buy the Wemmer Company's half share in the equip-
ment through an agent for between £3 500 and £4 000. The plant 
originally cost £10 150, and in this way Phillips 
for the Ferreira Company for a total cost to that 
hoped to procure it 
68 Company of £8 500. 
There was also a saving of £5 ·000 made from the sa:).e· of unnecessary 
piping, so that Phillips could announce to the half yearly meeting of 
the Ferreira 
been made on 
Company on 21 
69 
the deal. 
January 1891 that a satisfactory profit had 
The erection of the new mill was supervised by John F. Walsh, 
engaged for H. Eckstein and Company by Judd Coppach during his visit 
to Chicago to acquire the equipment. The Corner House then offered to 
cede Walsh's services to the Ferreira Company as a mill superintendent. 
Walsh agreed to serve for a period of two years from the date of his 
65. The Star (Johannesburg), 11 A~gust 1891. 
66. H.E.149, H. Eckstein and Company to Wernher, Beit and Company, 
p.217, 6 May 1890. 
67. See above, Chapter IV, p.114. 
68. H.E.149, H. Eckstein and Company to Wernher, Beit and Company, 
pp.278ff, 11 July 1890. 
69. The Standard and Diggers' News (Johannesburg), 22 January 1891. 
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departure from New York (12 February 1890) at a salary of £50 in gold 
per month. First class travelling expenses and an allowance of £25 per 
month from the date of his appointment until his arrival in Johannesburg 
were also provided. His expenses prior to joining the Ferreira Company 
70 
amounted to £273 14s. Od. and were duly paid by the Company . 
The failure of negotiations for the amalgamation of the Ferreira 
and Wemmer Companies and the subsequent collapse of the joint pumping 
project were to some extent parallelled by similar negotiations with 
the Worcester Company. H. Eckstein and Company attempted to purchase a 
major shareholding in the Worcester Company with a view to effeeting an 
amalgamation with the Ferreira, but by May 1890 had admitted defeat. 71 
The Worcester Company, named after the town in the Cape Colony which had 
supplied most of its early capital, still remained firmly in the grip of 
these shareholders. A desultory plan was suggested later to use a share 
issue for the exchange of new Ferreira stock for worcester 
bid to gain control of the company but nothing came of the 
shares in a 
72 scheme~ 
The rapidly burgeoning debt of the Ferreira Company caused a great deal 
of hesitation on the part of the Worcester board of directors to enter 
into any kind of agreement with the Company. Under the auspices of 
H. Eckstein and Company a joint milling agreement was finally hammered 
73 
out, but it required the threat of resignation on the part of Lionel 
Phillips from the Worcester board to coerce his fe~low members into 
agreement. The project was one drawn up by Johns and Phillips, whereby 
the Worcester Company, rather than establishing its own separate mill, 
combined their twenty stamps with those of the Ferreira Company, to 
74 
create a single large unit of sixty stamps. The combined effort 
resulted in substantial savings in the operating cost, as only one 
battery staff and source of power were required. Each company kept its 
gold separate while the Worcester Company paid one third of the total 
costs of running the mill. Part of the assurance given the Worcester 
70 . H.E.146, H. Eckstein and Company to Wernher, Beit and Company, 
pp.270-71, 7 June 1890. 
71. H.E.56, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.80, 9 May 1890. 
72. H.E.149, H. Eckstein and Company to Wernher, Beit and Company, 
p.369, 27 September 1890. 
73. Ibid., p.378, 4 October 1890. 
74. Fraser, M. and Jeeves, A., All that Glittered, pp.42ff. 
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Company by Phillips was, that the Ferreira would soon increase its 
share capital to £45 000 in 
shares was made in December 
orde r to 
1890 . 75 
reduce the debt . The iss ue of new 
The rapid and thorough development of the mine instituted by Johns 
was greedy of funds a vast sums of money were spent on developing the 
mine and re-equipping the surface works, while throughout 1890 no 
revenue accrued to the Company. During the course of 1890 the 
realisation gradually dawned of the serious under-estimation of capital 
requirements made by Johns and the Ferreira board. A good example of 
this situation was the costing of the mill. Originally budgeted at 
£1 3 000 it had absorbed £19 000 by July 1890, while a further expend-
iture of £20 000 was anticipated for its completion. 76 The additional 
amounts were now requested as loans from H. Eckstein and Company, and a 
second bond for £15 000, for six months at twelve per cent per annum, 
77 
was granted in Junea By now the capitalisation cost of the 
reorganisation of the property had risen to £100 000 or double the 
original estimate. 78 In January 1891 the Company's indebtedness amounted 
to £91 331 12s. 10d., while by April of that year the burden had in-
creased to £111 15'1 3s. 9d. 79 Against this mounting debt the only 
assurances offered were the results of perfunctory operations undertaken 
during the early stages of the Company's development and the assay 
results taken from ore samples as the mine was opeQed up . . 
Neither did these assays present a uniformly rosy picture. 
Initially results were good with reports in early 1889 of reef panning 
80 
up to five ounces of gold per ton. It was the promise of returns of 
such magnitude which prompted the London principals and their Paris 
associates to keep their ,shares in the Company and to arrange loans for 
it. Disquieting reports began to appear in 1890. In a private report 
75 . The Star, 3 December 1890. 
76 . H.E . 149 , H. Eckstein and Company to Wernher, Beit and Company, 
pp.278ff, 11 July 1890 . 
77 . H.E.146, H. Eckstein and Company to Wernher, Beit and Company, 
p.258, 3 June 1890. 
78 . H.E.56, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.80, 9 May 1890. 
79. Goldman, C.S., op.cit. (1892), p.61. 
80. H.E.51, H. Eckstein and Company to Jules Porges and Company, 
p.265, 11 January 1889. 
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prepared by the manager, Johns suggested that an average return of one 
ounce per ton was a more realistic assessment of the value of the 
property. Even before this, the early optimistic prediction gave way to 
what was considered a conservative figure of one and a half ounces per 
ton. By now the principals, rather than hoarding their Ferreira shares, 
were trading small parcels of them in the market, but with the intention 
of keeping sufficient shares to be in for the killing when the above 
average gold yield was expected to ~ommence. The impact of yet a lower 
assay value on both the share price and the dividend paying capacity of 
the Company was clearly recognised. Commenting on the Johns report, the 
81 London principals wrote, 
"This makes a tremendous difference in the value of the 
property, and we cannot understand that you with these facts 
advise us to cover our previous sales. If shares were worth 
on the basis of 1,5 ounces £14, they are surely not worth 
more than £7 on the basis of 1 oz .••. If Mr. Johns's last 
estimate is correct, we expect a severe fall in Ferreira 
shares .. n 
Up to the issuing of the report in April 1890, the overall strategy 
of Wernher, Beit and Company and its associates regarding the Ferreira 
Company was to ·minimize the size of the issued share capital, and to keep 
as many of these shares as possible in "friendly hands".. In this way the 
anticipated high dividends could be kept amongst the right people. Thus 
the Ferreira Company, while retaining its joint stock identity, had 
become something of a "fiefdom" of the firm and its associates. A fair 
amount of dealing in shares was certainly done for the sake of maintaining 
prices and public interest, but never sufficient to threaten the majority 
interest of these firms. 
Following the Johns report the attitude and approach of Wernher, 
Beit and Company towards the Ferreira Company began to change. Doubts 
about the yield from the property and the seemingly inexhaustible demand 
for new capital suggested a running down of their interests. The lower 
levels of the mine failed to prove the main reef and main reef leader 
payable and thus the working life of the mine was recOgnised to be far 
shorter than for its contemporaries. A higher yield was then essential 
to cover the ever growing capital investment in the property. Now that 
Johns had questioned the seemingly only remaining reason for continued 
81. H.E.56, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
pp.65-66, 25 April 1890. 
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involvement, the only option was to cut their losses and get out of 
what in London was termed a "bad business II. The Ferreira Company was 
now tying down what seemed an inordinate proportion of capital for a 
single company. The golden swan had become an ugly duckling. The 
urgent cash requirements of the Company about the time of the report 
left the principals with little choice but to follow their previous 
practice of raising a loan for the Company. When in July a fresh call 
was made, the response from Wernher, Beit and Company was to advocate 
increasing the share capital. 82 By then the Company already o~'ed 
E70 000 and a further E20 000 was called for. A pro rata issue to share-
holders was suggested which would raise about E90 000 to meet immediate 
capital needs and substantially reduce the debt. Shares, both old and 
new, could always be fed into the market once Johns had organised a 
"good result l1 from the first month 1 s crushing . The "friends", however, 
were still of the opinion "that shares should not be issued at 
83 present" . The Baring Crisis had, after July 1890 weakened the. 
financial market and left no option but to raise the urgently needed 
funds for the Company against a third bond. The stalwarts, Kann, 
Mosenthal and Neumann were again amongst those approached to raise the 
. 84 
E3 5 000 needed. 
The growing anxiety and loss of confidence shown by Wernher, Beit 
and Company in the fate of the Ferreira Company is,clearly shown in 
the correspcndence to Johannesburg. When reminded in August that 
H. Eckstein and Company had the refusal of the remaining 850 reserve 
shares at £5 4s. Od., the response was definite, "we do not wish to 
avail ourselves of any advantages which at some later time may be used 
. "BS aga~nst us. The Johannesburg office was also reminded that, "our 
understanding with those friends who contributed towards the advances 
made by us is that they participated pro rata in a first mortgage bond, 
or rather that they stand exactly on same footing with uS and that in 
case of loss we have no preferences - this must be strictly adhered 
The Ferreira Company was now "bad business" and attention 
82. Ibid. , p. 160, 1 August 1890. 
83. Ibid. , p. 201. 28 August 1890. 
84. Ibid. , pp.210-11, 11 September 1890. 
85. Ibid .• p. 201, 28 August 1890. 
86. Ibid. , p . 230, 26 September 1890. 
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turned in London towards preparing the shareholders for a share issue 
which would relieve the direct burden of accumulated debt from the 
shoulders of H. Eckstein and Company and its principals. A first .step 
in this direction was to exercise the option on the 850 reserve shares, 
so recently rejected, at £10 each, an amount sufficient to show 
H. Eckstein and Company in charitable light,87 but aimed at removing 
the remaining stumbling block in the way of a new issue of shares . 
A letter was then addressed to the Ferreira board from the principal 
shareholders in Paris and LondOD, calling on them to make a new issue 
and suggesting an amount of 11 000 shares which could be offered at 
88 £7 each. 
An announcement from Johannesburg that trial crushings would begin 
in December was greeted with relief in London as it would leave no 
doubt in shareholders' minds to take up the new issue. It was now 
considered vital to ensure that the first crushing of ore provided 
"satisfactory results ... it does not 
crushed, so long as the average yield 
so much matter how many tons 
89 does not come below 1 OZ.II 
are 
To ensure such a result it was suggested that the Corner House's mining 
engineer, Hennen Jennings, supervise the starting of the mill~ It was 
similarly agreed that an additional capital outlay on a set of Frue 
90 Vanners be made to ensure the maximum recovery of gold~ Johns was 
duly instructed to produce above average results f9r · the first few 
months & 91 
With Johannesburg standing ready and the Ferreira directors ordered 
to call a special general meeting to authorise the share issue as soon 
87. Ibid., p .236, 2 October 1890, and H.E.146, L. Phillips to the 
Secretary of the Ferreira Gold Mining Company, p.449, 26 
September 1890, Phillips wrote, "In view of the higher prices ruling 
for shares and my desire to do everything to advance the interests 
of your Company, I have decided to credit you with £10 per share 
instead of £5 as per option." Earlier, he had suggested to London 
appropriating them as a commission on the third bond. See H.E.149, 
pp.291ff, 18 July 1890. 
88. H.E . 56, Wernher, B~it and Co~any to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.236, 2 October 1890. 
89. Ibid., p.244, 9 October 1890. 
90. Ibid., p.294, 13 November 1890, and H.E.149, H. Eckstein and 
Company to Wernher, Beit and Company, pp.399ff, 18 October 1890. 
91. H.E.149, H. Eckstein and Company to Wernher, Beit and Company, 
p.491, 26 December 1890. 
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as possible, Paris balked. It was ascertained through Kann that the 
Rothschilds were prepared to take up their allocation of shares at £7 
each, but they were generally disinclined to move before the new year. 
Kann likewise expressed the feeling that the meeting, or at least the 
issue of shares, should be delayed until after the news of the first 
trial crushing. wernher was thus dispatched post haste to Paris to 
ff . 92 e ect a compro~se. Meanwhile a special general 
93 
the increase in capital was held in Johannesburg. 
me~ting authorising 
The Paris friends 
were loath to compromise, feeling that the issue of new shares within 
weeks before the first crushing result was due would only serve to show 
the Company in bad light. London could only comment, "Would have 
preferred the issue before [crushing results], but the position has been 
so extremely critical that we could not venture doing so. ,,94 The 
weakened state of the financial market in the aftermath of the Baring 
Crisis was no doubt also a sound reason for such a delay_ Another 
reason given by London for the unwillingness of Paris to move was the 
compromised position of M. Gustave de Rothschild,95 the largest single 
shareholder in the Ferreira Company who, as a result of spectacular 
various ventures was "sent away to Algiers" by losses incurred in 
96 his relatives. If anything is to be proved by the whole issue in 
the months leading up to the first trial crushings in December 1890, 
it is the extent to which Wernher, Beit and Company had lost their 
nerve in the handling of the finances of the Ferreira Company. 
The new issue of 11 000 shares at £7 each was duly made on 15 
January 1891, before the results of the first complete working month 
were known, but after the returns from trial crushings had been made 
public. Wernher, Beit and Company, lito help matters along", assisted 
the market at £9,97 a not too painful operation as the shares were 
92. H.E.56, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.330, 5 December 1890, and p.350, 19 December 1890. 
93. The Star, 3 December 1890. 
94. H.E.56, Wernher, Beit and Com?any to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.350, 19 December 1890. · 
95. Presumably Gustave Solomon Rothschild, second son of James Mayer 
de Rothschild, born 17 December 1829, died 28 November 1911. 
See Morton, F., The Rothschilds. 
96. H.E.56, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.375, 2 January 1891. 
97. Ibid., p.385, 15 January 1891. 
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98 later unloaded at £9 lOs . The new issue was well received and by 
the end of January the London f irm had rece ived applications for 9 62 3 
99 
shares. Of the 11 000 new shares 1 000 were kept in reserve while 
the balance were offered to shareholders on a pro rata basis of one 
new share for every three already held. In due course 10 292 of these 
were taken up. The amount so raised was used to reduce the liability 
of the Company. London was anxious to be paid out and as early as 23 
January cabled the Ferreira Company's secretary in Johannesburg to 
begin making payments to them. These funds were then used to repay the 
participants in the bonds, while Wernher, Beit and Company also slowly 
began unloading their Ferreira shares on to the market. In March they 
100 
reported that they had reduced their holding to about 1 000 shares. 
By the end of April 1891 the Company's debt was reduced to £34 157 3s.9d. 
which it was considered could be met from gold production now that 
101 
regular crushing had commenced. 
H. Eckstein and Company were equally anxious to be paid back " the 
money lent to the Ferreira Company . By January 1891 the prospects for 
the Witwatersrand gold mining industry seemed brighter than at any time 
in the past. The lean months of 1889 and 1890 following the first boom, 
and the doubts they had cast in the minds of everyone connected with 
the mines, were now behind. The Rand was beginning to reve~l its 
inherent value under the guidance of more responsi91e man~gement in 
the form of a steady increase in total monthly output. More and more 
of the mines were undergoing the necessary reorganisation to place them 
on a sound production footing. All this activity re"quired capital 
investment and H. Eckstein and Company and the ir London principals felt 
keenly the seemingly disproportionately large investment made in the 
Ferreira Company~ In Johannesburg the virtues of the involvement with 
the Ferreira Company were not doubted to the same extent as in London, 
but H. Eckstein and Company also wanted its hands free to involve itself 
in new ventures, particularly the acquisition of deep level claims and 
properties. 
Anything which might adversely influence the first month's crushing 
result of the new mill received immediate attention. An engine driver 
98. Ibid. , p. 445, 20 February 1891. 
99. Ibid. , p.413, 30 January 1891. 
100 . Ibid. , p . 471, 6 March 1891. 
10l. Goldman, e.s. , op. ci t. (1892) , p.58. 
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was summarily dismissed when an engine's bearings failed causing a 
102 
sixteen hour delay. It is important to understand the position of 
H. Eckstein and Company and their London principals in the matter .. 
They had invested what was considered for the times a very large amount 
of money in a company in the form of loans and direct share capital. 
These loans were used to equip the mine with the very latest and best 
mining equipment. The reputation of the firms, especially that of 
H. Eckstein and Company, as the leaders on the field in the areas of 
expertise, technology and good mining practice, were thus at stake. 
The Ferreira had to succeed spectacularly if the status of the firms 
on the fields was to be maintained in the critical year of new oppor-
tunities, 1891. Success was even more essential if the two firms were 
to stand as the major conduits for British and European capital into 
the fields. European financiers like Kann and the Rothschilds in 
France and the Neumann contacts in Germany had been brought in on this 
"good thing". Failure would have questioned the abilities of the!?e 
firms to assess investment opportunities, with the result that the 
supply of capital, so essential to the extent and scope of their 
operations, could have been jeopardised. It is important to remember 
that the trial of the two firms Wernher, Beit and Company and H. Eckstein 
and Company as the major channels for investment in the capital hungry 
deep level ventures was made on the outcrop mines. 
There was sufficient ore on the surface to keep the mill running 
throughout January 1891, the first full month of production. The need 
was, however, to ensure a steady future supply . Johns had used the 
interim to expose a large body of ore for working. This development 
consisted of shaft sinking and the opening of levels contiguous to the 
reef, together with the sinking or raising of winzes through the ore 
itself. In other words the ore was prepared for mining or stoping but 
remained to be actually removed from the mine. In order to perform 
this operation a large increase in the "labour force was required, a 
figure of 300 lIboys" being mentioned . Difficulty was experienced in 
acquiring the additional labourers at a time when all mines were anxious 
to increase their staff complement. It became essential to try to out-
bid competitors in the labour market as, in the words of Phillips as 
102. H.E.149, H. Eckstein and Company to Wernher, Beit and Company, 
p.500, 3 January 1891. 
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chairman of the Ferreira Company, nit would never do to run the mill 
for six weeks and then have to shut down for want of labour. II European 
shareholders might attribute such a stoppage to other causes. 
By mid-January 1891 it was estimated that the production figure 
for the first month would be between 3 800 and 4 000 ounces. A figure 
of 4 000 ounces was duly announced although it was admitted in private 
that a proper clean up of the plates could have yielded 300 to 400 ounces 
103 
more. The decision was taken rather to establish a reserve of gold 
to meet any future shortfalls. In the same letter to London, notice was 
taken of the recently promulgated Government regulation requiring sworn 
returns of monthly output from the mining companies. The inability of 
the State to determine an accurate figure for any mine was clearly 
recCXjnised! 
The slow inflow of additional black labourers and the general 
shortage being experienced by the whole industry in 1891 caused grave 
concern. In an attempt to overcome the problem various companies' began 
to recognise the advantages of minimizing the competition between them 
in the labour market. It was largely on the instigation of Lionel 
Phillips that 'the 
t ,104 men pract~ce. 
first steps were taken to alter the prevailing employ-
In addressing the March 1891 half yearly general 
meeting of the Ferreira Company, he referred also to the increasing 
competi tion for labour from the various railway comp'anies then involved 
in the scramble to link the Witwatersrand t~ the coast. 'To counter 
this challenge and in order to minimize the competition between them-
selves, the Chamber of Mines, on Phillips's initiative, encouraged the 
adoption of a system of monthly payment for black employees, as a means 
of ensuring some stability in the otherwise free-floating black popu-
lation. Before this the practice of weekly employment was generally 
accepted, so that no mine manager could be sure of his next weeks labour 
complement. Phillips saw the weekly employment system as "pernicious", 
as labour did not stay long enough to become efficient at underground 
105 
work. The validity of the statement is questionable, as given the 
nature of their allotted tasks, unskilled work on one mine was unlikely 
103. Ibid., p.s37, 31 January 1891. 
104. Fraser, M. and Jeeves, A., op.cit., pp.37ff. 
105. The Standard and Diggers' News, 13 May 1891, and see below, 
Chapter VI, pp.2s7ff. 
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to differ radically from that on another. A more likely objective 
sought by Phillips was to reduce the competition between companies for 
labour, which was currently raising the price of the commodity in 
mining accounts at a time when high costs were already jeopardising the 
recovery of the industry as a whole. The problem which the Chamber of 
Mines faced was to keep the various mines who accepted any proposal 
from breaking rank and thus enjoying the short term advantages of doing 
" so. News that day of such an incident caused Phillips to lash out at 
the short sightedness of the management of the company concerned. 
If, alternatively, we accept that the argument expounded by Phillips, 
namely, "Any system which kept the native longer at work in one 
particular mine must be of benefit to the whole industry", then a more 
fundamental change in the current interpretation of employment practice 
presents itself. The high cost of white labour on the Witwatersrand was 
already a recognised problem in 1891. Labour disputes involving white 
workers had recently resulted 
t d . th th . 106 connec e W~ e m~nes. 
in a strike of artisans not directly 
The threat of a spillover of white 
workers' discontent into the mining industry was widely feared and 
debated. A more stable black mine worker population would undoubtedly 
be that much easier to train as replacements for white miners, or merely 
as a threat with which to bargain with these white miners. Possibly 
Phillips hoped that in this way a more docile and cheaper labour force 
could ultimately be established. Thus it might be suggested that it 
was rather a combination of generally rising labour costs and the threat 
of militancy amongst white workers which· prompted the singling out of 
black labour for greater coercion. The year 1891 was obviously a 
turning point in labour relations. Had trade unionism not emerged 
amongst the white workers, the continuing shortage of black labourers 
might well have encouraged a move towards greater labour efficiency and 
the employment of more whites. The temporary success of Phillips's 
monthly payment scheme for blacks showed the employers what co-operation 
could do to reduce labour costs. It was also firmly believed by many 
employers that in the longer term ~lacks would be more readily available 
as a source of labour. While the drive towards the lIultra-
exploitability" of black labour lay in the future, the first tentative 
steps in that direction were taken in 1891 under the guidance of Lionel 
106. See below, Chapter VI, pp.249ff. 
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Phillips. The reaction 
107 
elsewhere. 
of black workers towards these measures is 
discussed More significant in the immediate context of 
this chapter is that it was the critical stage in the development of 
the Ferreira and other mines at the time which prompted the reaction 
by Phillips. 
The January 1891 production figure of 4 000 ounces seems to have 
brought little joy to the hearts of European shareholders. Much more 
was expected of the "good thing" they had been invited to participate 
in. An irate Phillips estimated that production could be pushed to about 
5 000 tons or 5 ' 000 ounces a month b~t this would result in an increasing 
loss of gold over the amalgam plates. 
"Please let me know what will content 
He icily reguested London to, 
108 
shareholders ... " Phillips was 
surely justified, f or the monetary value of the month's production at 
72s. an ounce was £14 400 or 32 per cent of the issued capital of £45 000. 
Shareholders had, however, been promised a yield of an ounce of gold per 
ton and this was not forthcoming. Furthermore, as the figures below 
indicate, working costs remained very high. 
In the period down to the end of March 1891, representing little 
over three months activity, 13 891 tons of ore were crushed, comprising 
1 481 tons of main reef and 12 410 tons of south reef, at a cost of 
18s. 8,79d. per ton. With the addition of an amount of 15s. per ton for 
development redemption on the 12 972 tons mined in 'the per'iod, the total 
cost was increased to £22 741 13s. lld. or 32"s. 8,91d. per ton. 
The 13 891 tons , crushed yielded 12 155,25 ounces of gold, or 17,65 dwts . 
per ton. The gold was valued at £44425 5s. 6d., leaving a profit on 
operations for the period of £21 683 lls. 3d. 109 In the following half 
year period ending on 30 September 1891, 28 163 tons of ore were crushed 
at a total cost of 34s. 10,62d. per ton. The increase in costs compared 
to the previous period was attributed to the increasing hardness of the 
rock being worked in the second level. Weighing against this was the 
fact that the Worcester Company's twenty stamps were taken into operation 
on 1 August, resulting in a considerable reduction in milling expenses, 
and that the new pumping engines fdr the supply of water to the mill 
107. See below, Chapter VI, pp.262ff. 
108. H.E.149, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, p.547, 
7 February 1891. 
109. The Standard and Diggers' News, 13 May 1891. 
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started on 1 June with a resultant saving of 47,5 per cent in the fuel 
expenses. Total costs for the period were £49 094 17s. ld., while the 
gold yield was 22 461,76 ounces representing a decline on the previous 
period to an average of 15,95 dwts. per ton. The gold was valued at 
£80 850 4s. Od., leaving a profit on operations for the six months of 
£31 755 6s. l1d. 110 
The mine development and redemption account was a principle 
introduced by Phillips with the commencement of operations, whereby the 
expenses incurred in opening of developing a particular level, including 
tunnel driving and the sinking of wi~zes, were charged. The balance so 
incurred was redeemed as extraction of are from that level took place. 
On the basis of assays taken in the newly opened drive, was determined 
the amount and quality of the ore in a given level. The total cost of 
the development of the level was then divided by the number of tons of 
ore the l eve l was anticipated to yield, to give an average development 
cost per ton. The total development cost was credited to a "development 
account" and debited to the "redemption account" as each level was 
exhausted, thereafter becoming a direct charge to mining expenditure. 
The object was -that, in the case of the board deciding to develop the 
mine at a greater speed than the rate at which extraction took place, 
there would be a separate account which reflected this development in 
excess of extraction, and which would not dispropor.ti"onate.ly raise work-
ing costs in any period. Development costs were thus apportioned to the 
specific body of ore, irrespective of when it was crushed, rather than 
to the general working costs of the month -in which the development took 
place. 
In the first period of operations considered above it will be noted 
that 1 481 tons of the total of 13 891 tons crushed were from the main 
reef. The decision to dilute the ore from the south reef with this 
111 
rock was taken in Februarya The high value of the south reef are 
meant that it could not be crushed too rapidly if the amalgam plates 
were t o pick up a significant percentage of the total gold content. 
Weakening of the gold concentration' o f the are passing over the plates 
meant that the actual tonnage crushed per stamp per day could be 
110. The Standard and Diggers' News, 25 November 1891. 
111. H.E.149, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, p.563, 
11 February 1891. 
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significantly increased. The main reef ore in itself contributed about 
five pennyweights of gold. The rationale for the exercise in economic 
terms was the reduced marginal cost incurred from putting more ore 
through the mill. As mining and hauling costs were no more for poorer 
ores it was discovered that, "very low grade rock may pay worked with 
richer, which by itself would leave a 10ss.,,112 As Phillips suggested, 
the ratio of rich to poor ore would have to be considered carefully, 
so that marginal costs per ton did not exceed average cost. Careful 
assays of the ore were also necessary which would keep the Company's 
113 
assayer, Dr Simon, busy once the necessary laboratory was complete. 
The Ferreira Company was the first to establish its own laboratory 
for carrying out analyses of the gold content of the ore as it passed 
through the various processing stages. Automatic sampling devices were 
also installed. The need and emphasis placed on regular sampling and 
accurate assaying of the ore emerged mainly as a result of the known 
incidence of pyritic are in the lower levels of the mine. The high 
crushing rate of the forty stamp mill ensured that the free milling ores 
of the first level were soon exhausted and the stage reached where the 
intractable pyritic ore was confronted. The laboratory was only one 
aspect of the more sophisticated technology required to confront the 
problem . Within the mill itself new machinery was essential if these 
ores with their high iron sulphide content were to,be captured before 
passing out with the tailings. As the gold particles tended to be coated 
with a layer of pyritic material the reaction between the gold and the 
mercury of the amalgam plates was prevented. It was thus necessary to 
institute another process to catch these particles. In September 1891 
the Company acquired a set of Frue Vanners to coincide with the crushing 
of pyritic ores. Even then the results of this, the most sophisticated 
of the "concentrating" devices kn0wn at the time, was less than 
satisfactory and a high proportion of the gold continued to escape in 
the tailings. The Vanners succeeded only in preventing the 
from deteriorating further, as can be seen from the figures 
112. Ibid. 
113. Ibid., p . 547, 7 February 1891. 
situation 
114 below: 
114. Compiled from monthly reports published in The Standard and 
Diggers' News and The Star newspapers. 
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Influence of Frue Vanners on Gold Production 
Percentage gold Percentage gold Percentage gold 
Date caught in amalg. caught as concen. left in tailings 
April 1891 69,10 2,90 28 ,00 
May 1891 66,72 3,47 29,81 
June 1891 68,16 2,80 29,03 
September 1891 67,11 1,72 31,17 
October 1891 66,48 4,02 29,50 
The concentrates gathered by the Frue Vanners represented a saleable 
commodity_ The treatment of the concentrates involved a process of first 
roasting them in a furnace, . after which the gold was leached from the 
oxidized material by a chlorine solution, from which the gold was 
subsequently precipitated. The erection of such a plant with the necessary 
furnaces was a costly outlay and companies like the Ferreira chose rather 
to sell the concentrates at a discount to those mines, like the R0binson, 
which opened the first viab l e chlorine plant on the field in 1890. 
Concentrates served for a few years as a valuable source of revenue to the 
Company. For example in the financial year ending 31 March 1893, out of 
a total gold revenue of £198 469 14s. 
£32 997 Os. Od., or 16,63 per cent of 
7d., concentrates accounted for 
115 total gold revenue. The 
continued loss of close to thirty per cent of the gold was cause for 
, 
serious concern. The extent of this sentiment is reflected in the search 
for an alternative process which would retain a significant part of this 
gold. 
As early as January 1891 steps were taken by Lionel Phillips to 
induce the African Gold Recovery Company, holders of the MacArthur-
Forrest cyanide patent, to establish a small plant on the property for 
116 
the treatment of the concentrates. The Ferrei ra Company would pay 
5s. per ounce royal ty for 
for each per cent over 80 
80 per cent or less of gold recovery and 6s. 
117 per cent extracted. The fate of these 
115. Goldman, e.s., South African Mines: Their Position, Results 
and Development (1895-96), Vol. I, p.90. 
116. The use of the process for the treatment of concentrates is 
unusual, the process being developed originally for the treating 
of tailings. It is possible that Phillips was in error on the 
point. 
117. H.E.149, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, pp.500ff, 
3 January 1891. 
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negotiations is not known but in May Phi l l i ps reported that the pantentees 
had declined to tre at the Company's tailings as b e ing of too iowa grade 
for them. 118 Nevertheless, by September the Company embarked on ,the 
ere ction of its own cyanide plant unde r l i c ence. 119 The plant, c apable 
of tre ating 4 000 tons of tailings a month, was completed in November 
1891 at an approximate cost of £5 000 . The Company also secured the 
right to treat the Worces ter Company's tailings, while the royalty 
payable to the MacArthur-Forrest patentees was set at 9 per cent of the 
120 
value of the gold recovered. The introduction of the cyanide plant 
also made a significant contribution to the amount of gold won and hence 
to mine reve nues . On average an amount of 80 per cent of the gold in 
the tailings was recov ered. In the financial year ending 31 March 1893, 
the cyanide works contributed £40 556 12s. 10d. of the total gold 
revenue, or 20,44 per cent. In 1895 the decision was taken to 
the plant to a new site in order to make room for the tailings 
remove 
121 dumps. 
As will be noticed from the above, expenditure on capital account 
continued throughout 1891, much to the disgust of the major French 
shareholders. Phillips was driven to comment, "It is quite useless for 
Mr Kann to cry ,out about capital expenditure, for without the appliances 
we cannot get the profits . . . ,,122 In March alone an amount of £3 743 
spent on capital improvements in the mine, 123 but in addition t o was 
the amounts expended on Frue Vanners and the cyani~e 'plant, a rock 
drilling plant comprising twelve drills and their compresso rs were 
ordered in April. 124 An amount of £12 000 was mentioned as the cost 
of these and other sundry items~ In part, this expenditure was 
inevitable. It is inconceivable that shareholders with any insight 
into the industry could believe that their Company could successfully 
operate without some form of concentrating plant, particularly once 
pyritic ores were worked. A cyanide plant became a necessity after it 
118. Ibid . , p.658, 16 May 1891. 
11 9. The Standard and Diggers' News, 25 November 1891. 
120. H.E . 149, p. 751, 22 August 1891 . 
121. Goldman, C.S., op.cit. (1895-96), Vol. I , p.l10. 
122 . H.E.149 , L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, pp.744ff, 
15 August 1891. 
123. Ibid., p.598, 7 March 1891 . 
124. Ibid . , p.632, 11 April 1891. 
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was clear that the Frue Vanners on their own were unlikely to signif-
icantly reduce the amount of gold escaping in the tailings. Possibly 
shareholders were misled into believing that the large amounts of ~oney 
raised in the loans of 1889-90 would be sufficient to the task. 125 
Phillips pointed out that perhaps the greatest mistake was made in 
trying to keep the nominal capital of the Company as low as possible. 
The result was that part of the profits needed to be diverted into 
capital expenditure, besides servicing debts . 126 
During the six months down to 31 March 1891 the Company still 
carried ~ considerable loan repayment burden, so that the working profit 
of £21 683 lis. 7d, was eliminated against repayments on capital account . 
Thus despite the sale of most of the 11 000 reserve shares to offset 
the debt, an amount of £30 228 lis. Od. was carried forward into the 
next six-month period as a deficit against the second instalment of 
payment for the reserve shares. Subsequently, an amount of £39 563 7s.Od. 
was received in final settlement for the reserve shares, together ·with 
the nominal amount of £708 for previously unsold shares, to complete the 
issue. Thus by the end of April 1891 the Company's debts were removed 
and a credit balance of £10 042 16s. Od. carried forward to be added to 
the working profit for the next period. 
In the directors' report for the period ending 31 September 1891 
the average yield per month fell below the 4 000 oances promised by 
Phillips. There were two main reasons for the decline. Increasing 
quantities of ore from the second level, which was pyritic, 
while the ore from this level also showed a decline in gold 
were crushed, 
127 
content. 
In July the announcement of a reduction in the total June crushing 
brought down share prices from £9,75 to £10, to £6,75. 128 Nevertheless, 
despite the poorer than anticipated production, a healthy operating 
profit of £3 1 750 6s. lid. was shown, and a dividend of 50 per cent on 
the issued capital of £44 000 declared in anticipation of future results. 
125. H.E.57, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.97, 24 July 1891. 
126. H.E.149, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, pp.744ff, 
15 August 1891. 
127. H.E.57, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.144, 12 September 1891. 
128. I bid . , p . 92, 18 July 1891. 
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Subsequent to the publication of the September report, agreement was 
reached for the sale of the remaining 1 000 reserve shares. They were 
sold at E9 las . each in November, bringing the issued in line with. the 
nominal capital at E45 000. 129 
The general dissatisfaction of the European shareholders and 
connections with the progress of the Ferreira Company continued into 
1892. In December 1891 the disquieting news that Rcdolphe Kann was 
gradually running down his shareholding in the Company was passed on 
130 from London. The ruling market price of between E9 las. and E10 was 
now considered too high for the results forthcoming from the Company. 
Again, the high expenditure on capital account, which for the period 
ending 31 March 1892 amounted to E28 000, was viewed as excessive. 131 
The Company was evaluated as being over capitalized for the unspectacular 
results shown and for its limited working life. Only the small amount 
of E7 169 las. was written off for depreciation in September 1891, an 
amount of less than five per cent on the estimated investment of nearly 
ElSa 000. In March 1891 nothing was written off. 
An immediate remedy seemed to suggest itself in the payment of 
substantial dividends. Thus in January 1892 a dividend of 75 per cent 
was announced amounting to E33 750. 132 At the May meeting it was 
announced that current shareholders would no longer be expected to 
I1 suffer for permanent works which are being carried out for the benefit 
133 
of future operations of the Company. " The policy, which had merit 
in principle, could become reckless . The declaration of 125 per cent 
in dividends in the first financial year of operation of the reorganised 
Company certainly marked it out for historical note, and did much to 
bolster the entire Witwatersrand I s image amongst small European 
investors. But for those with insight, the action was indeed reckless. 
It would have been far wiser to have declared a smaller dividend which 
could be maintained on a monthly basis while capital redemption reserves 
were accumulated to reduce the balance sheet liabilities on capital 
account. Phillips, as chairman of the Company, with the backing of 
129. Ibid. , p.229, 5 November 1891. 
130. Ibid. , p. 275, 5 December 1891. 
131. South African Mining Journal, Vol. I, 32, pp.576-77 , 14 May 1892. 
132. Ibid. , Vol. I, 15, p.248, 9 January 1892. 
133. Ibid. , Vol. I, 32, pp. 576-77, 14 May 1892. 
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H. Eckstein and Company, chose rather to gamble on the prospect of 
amalgamation extending the life of the Company and hence the period over 
which the capital investment could be depreciated. But even if such a 
policy succeeded, the expectations of shareholders would demand the 
continued payment of such substantial dividends. 
The pressures on the Company to maintain high dividend payments 
very soon led to trouble. In May Phillips again estimated the payment 
of a dividend of between 50 and 75 per cent in AugUst,134 while Wernher, 
135 Beit and Company urged an amount of 50 per cent. The amount of the 
dividend seems to have by now become. largely divorced in the minds of 
Phillips and his principals from the realities of the situation. As 
far as the mine was concerned the position was deteriorating. In June 
it was reported that the reef being worked was so small that a significant 
proportion of casing rock was being crushed. While Johns prepared to 
institute a process for the sorting of ore prior to its crushing, assays 
f rom the 
yielding 
recently opened fifth level 
136 
only 4 dwts. to the ton. 
showed the usually rich south reef 
Again, Johns's scheme for ore 
sorting, while raising the yield per ton of ore crushed, also meant 
exhausting the .mine more rapidly as the pace of mining increased to 
keep up with milling demands. Meanwhile the gold yield per ton of ore 
continued to decline, 
137 
on 31 March 1893. 
averaging 14,17 dwts. for the financial year ending 
Phillips estimated that the 
138 for the third and fourth levels was 10 dwts .. 
,average assay value 
Despite all the evidence which suggested caution, the only comprom-
ise offered by Phillips was to reduce the amount of the proposed dividend 
from 50 to 30 per cent. It was necessary for Phillips to "speak to 
members of the Board privately" to win their support for the proposal, 
while H. Eckstein and Company promised to guarantee the necessary funds 
139 for the payment should the Company not have these by the payment date. 
134. H.E.150, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, p . 15, 
21 May 1892 . 
135. Ibid., p.78, 18 June 1892. 
136. Ibid., pp.99ff, 25 June 1892. 
137. Goldman, C.S., op.cit. (1895-96), Vol. I, p.l04. 
138. H.E.IS0, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, pp.99ff, 
2S June 1892. 
139. 
, 
H.E.1S1, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, p.4, 
9 July 1892. 
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The dividend was duly declared on 1 July. By the end of that month the 
value of cash and stores in hand amounted to only £6 150. All capital 
expenditure was stopped while the board sat back to anxiously watch 
for the tedious trickling of profits into the Company's coffers. 
By September profits still stood £6 500 short of the amount required 
for the dividend. A repentant and worried Phillips wrote, "I am sorry 
we declared the Dividend. I 't is the greatest mistake to anticipate 
140 
results, which are always worst when they should be best." 
As one untruth begets another, it now became necessary to disguise 
the miscalculation of the premature announcement of so large a dividend. 
One option was to sell the nearly 50 000 tons of tailings which the 
Company had accumulated since the commencement of operations. Such a 
sale, by virtue of its magnitude, was bound to invoke press and 
subsequently shareholder comment. The easier and less conspicuous way 
out 
the 
of the dilemma was to 
' t 1 t 141 cap1 a accoun. 
raise a loan from H. Eckstein and Company on 
Even the adoption of this option left Phillips 
feeling uneasy as such a loan could also raise comment at a share-
holder meeting. The perfect solution was found in the trust deed. 
Phillips, on close scrutiny of the document discovered that under Clause 
39, if no quorum was present either at the first or an adjourned meeting 
of shareholders, then that meeting stood over indefinitely.142 It 
logically followed that if there was no meeting th~re would be no need 
to publish a financial statement . 
The six monthly general meeting was duly called for 10 November 
1892. In the interim both London and Johannesburg busied themselves 
collecting proxy votes which were 
subsequently adjourned meeting on 
duly withheld from this and the 
143 12 November . The ever constant 
The Star could be relied upon for the mild reprimand which kept the 
general public unenlightened as to the real cause of the stay away. 
It wrote, "It was very much to be regretted that in an important Con;tpany 
such as the Ferreira, the shareholders could not be got to turn up, a 
fact due to their position being so wonderfully good.,,144 
140. Ibid. , pp.99ff, 4 September 1892. 
141. Ibid. , p.124, 16 September 1892. 
142. Ibid. , p.147, 24 September 1892. 
143. The Star, 12 November 1892. 
144. The Star, 15 November 1892 . 
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Fortunately for Phillips, the prospects for the Company again began 
to brighten towards the end of the year, a factor which no doubt 
sweetened the large European shareholders towards the machinations in 
Johannesburg; that is if any of them ever discovered the truth. The 
September results reflected the benefits of the sorting process for ore, 
with a profit for the month of over £9 000. Thus the deficit on the 
half 
the 
year ending 
dividend. 145 
30 September was reduced to £7 800 after the payment of 
This happier turn of events continued through October, 
and in fact down to the end of the financial year, encouraging Phillips 
to once more raise the issue of dividend payments with London. He 
considered it essential that a further substantial dividend be paid, 
once more suggesting an amount of 50 per cent of the issued capital in 
146 
early October. Such a payment, which would already represent a 
reduction on the previous years total payment of 125 per cent, was seen 
as necessary if the image of the Company was to be preserved. The 
earliest that a payment could be made was February 1893. There was also 
the point that another substantial dividend in that financial year mi ght 
win over any dissentient shareholders and prevent too many embarrassi ng 
questions being asked about the lack of a quorum at the May meeting. 
But it was again unlikely that even given the improved resul ts, a 
sufficiently large surplus would be built up in time to back a dividend 
of the required magnitude. Phillips hoped that the payment, when the 
final amount was decided, could at least be covered bY the cash holding 
and supported by the value of stores if necessary.f47 
Assay results from the lower levels of the mine which were opened 
during the course of 1892 and 1893 suggested that th·e south reef again 
improved in gold content with depth. It would seem that the fall i n 
are quality was restricted to the third, fourth and fifth levels. The 
problem in 1892 was to get development undertaken quickly enough below 
these levels, for once this was done, it was then again possible to 
blend richer and poorer ores from the various levels. The sixth level, 
at 620 feet, was started towards the end of 1892 and promised better 
148 prospects, assaying up to 18 ozs. 6 dwts. to the ton and being some 
145. H.E.151, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, pp.176-77, 
8 October 1892 . 
146. Ibid. , P .1 89, 10 October 1892. 
147. Ibid . , p.3 76, 31 December 1892. 
148. Ibid. , p.433, 28 January 1893. 
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3 feet 6 inches wide. 149 In January 1893 Phillips, mindful of past 
mistakes, suggested it would be impossible to declare a dividend of more 
150 
than 25 per cent. The news of the sixth level altered attitudes in 
both London and Johannesburg and a dividend of 55 per cent was duly 
declared in March 1893, bringing the dividend payment for the financial 
year up to 85 per cent of the issued capital. The meeting of share-
holders passed smoothly, so much so that the directors were voted a 
bonus of 500 guineas for their troubles. 151 No one bothered to ask 
where such a sum might come from. 
The process of ore sorting, by which as much as possible of the 
barren casing rock was removed from the ore prior to crushing, meant 
that an even larger quantity of rock and ore had to be mined in relation 
to each ton crushed. The process was developed on the Ferreira mine to 
a high level of sophistication, with a special series of sorting floors 
and tables being patented by Johns. For the additional cost of these 
facilities and the labour of about eight workers, some forty to fifty 
per cent of the rock coming from the mine was sorted out and rejected 
. h hI' , , II' t 152 as waste, Wlt t e resu tant savlng 1n ml lng cos s. 
Of immediate significance to the directors of the Ferreira Company, 
H. Eckstein and Company and their London principals, was the effect such 
sorting had on shortening the life of the existing Company. Capital 
expenditure had meanwhile continued unabated and l~rgely undepreciated. 
The directors' report submitted to shareholders in May 1893 again 
announced that an amount of £31 500, equal to 70 per cent of issued 
capital had been spent on capital account since the commencement of 
operations. IS3 The decision which was to exercise the minds of all 
the parties involved in the management of the Ferreira Company was, 
whether or not to attempt to extend the life of the mine by amalgamation. 
As already indicated, it was not a new problem, but the events of 1892 
again brought it into clear focus. There were also events beyond the 
149. Th e Star, 3 February 1893, and H.E.151, L. Phillips to Wernher, 
Beit and Company, p.458, 4 February 1893. 
150. H.E.151, L . Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, p.398, 
9 January 1891. 
151 . South African Mining Journal, Vol.II, 33, pp. 519-20, 13 May 1893. 
152. Hatch, F.H. and Chalmers, J.A., The Gold Mines o f the Rand, 
pp.153ff. 
153. South African Mining Journal, Vol.II, 33, pp.519-20, 13 May 1893. 
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Company which were brought into the equation. Those dealing with the 
Wemmer Company have been covered in the previous chapter. But beyond 
the concept of linkages between various outcrop companies, the hig.h 
capital outlay required by the first deep level development, the 
1 1 .. 154 b Stanhope Geldenhuis Deep Leve Go d Mlnlng Company, rought home 
the virtues of amalgamation between outcrop and deep level companies. 
Joining the fates of the deep level properties to those on the outcrop 
might prove a way of obviating the necessity for the deep level companies 
to start from scratch in their development. In turn, as in the case of 
the Ferreira Company, it offered the outcrop companies an opportunity 
of depreciating their capital equipment over a longer period of time. 155 
Another factor which had to be taken into consideration in deter-
mining the life of the Company was the angle of the slope of the reef. 
The angle of the reef near the surface varied between 72 0 and 760 to the 
horizontal. As greater depths were reached the reef was found to 
flatten, so that at the 420 foot level it varied between 67 0 and 520 
and at the 620 foot level between 49 0 and 360 . In this respect the 
Ferreira Company was fortunate. The angle of the reef near the surface 
o 0 
of the Simmer and Jack property was only 15 to 20. On the other hand 
the dip of the outcrop on the Salisbury property was 850 . 156 The 
closer to vertical the reef was, the more ore any claim contained. 
Nevertheless, all properties on the Witwatersrand qt some point experi-
enced a flattening out of the reef . For all ,companies then, the e xtent 
of this flattening had a direct bearing on the amount o£ ore in their 
properties, and hence on the life of the company which owned the claims. 
The rich south reef ore from the first and parts of the second 
levels allowed Johns to dilute this ~aterial with poorer stuff from the 
main reef. This allowed these levels to be worked out at a relatively 
slower rate than would otherwise have been the case. The fall in gold 
content in the third and fourth levels meant that the policy of dilution 
was no longer desirable and all crushing of the main reef ceased for the 
greater part of 1891 and 1892. While dilution, or ore mixing, again 
became possible at the sixth level" and parts of the main reef leader 
154 . Goldman, C.S. , op .cit. (1892), pp.229ff. 
155. See above, Chapter III, pp.98ff, for the example of the Simmer 
and Jack Company . 
156. Hatch, F.H. and Chalmers, J.A., op.cit., p.91n. 
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also became payable below that depth, the rapid working of the poorer 
levels caused attention to focus on the life span of the mine~ 
The amalgamation of the Ferreira and Wemmer Companies was contem-
plated by Phillips from 1891 onwards when he took an interest in the 
affairs of the Wemmer Company . His interest, and that of the firm 
H. Eckstein and Company, in such an amalgamation was then principally 
motivated by two considerations a On the one hand such an amalgamation 
would result in economic rationalisation. Staff and costly machinery 
could be saved in this way. Popular prejudice was, however, very strong 
against any amalgamation. The Standard and Diggers' News placed them-
selves at the helm . of the movement to prevent any such consolidation. 
The reason for the strength of popular opinion on the issue must be 
t raced back to tile similar movement on the diamond fields, where 
amalgamation finally resulted in the creation of De Beers Consolidated 
Mines in 1888 . The consolidation of the diamond mining industry saw 
the exclusion of the small South African capitalist from direct 
participation. The small gold mining companies south of Johannesburg, 
as some of their names imply, were initially dominated by local South 
African capital. With time this holding invariably became diluted but 
as late as 1891 some of these companies' boards still sat in towns like 
157 Worcester and Pietermaritzburg and preserved their local background. 
For these local shareholders the second motivation for amalgamation 
by the large firms like H. Eckstein and Company, and one clearly 
recognised, was the profit or controlling interest such-amalgamations 
would give to the vendors. The earlier rebuff of H. Eckstein and 
158 Company from the Wemmer board is a clear indication of the attitude 
encountered . The technical and financial expertise offered to these 
small companies was welcomed; any threat, real or imagined, to their 
independence was not. In this regard H. Eckstein and Company, as the 
leading financial concern on the field, was regarded with the greatest 
suspicion. The relationship between this firm and its London principals 
was never hidden in Johannesburg, and the role of Wernher, Beit and 
Company's predecessor, Jules Porges and Company, in s ecuring the 
amalgamation of the Kimberley fields was wel l known. As Phillips 
157. Fraser, M. and Jeeves, A., op.cit., p . 49. 
158. See above, Chapter IV, pp.126ff. 
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commented, "People are afraid we are going to gain control of everything 
worth having. ,,159 He incorrectly attributed this sentiment to 
jealousy. Little men too can be greedy. 
For its part, events on the Rand moved too rapidly for a firm like 
H. Eckstein and Company to establish a strong bridgehead from which to 
operate towards amalgamation, even had it seriously wanted to. From 
what has been written above and in subsequent chapters, it is clear 
that the firm's and its principals' interests always tended to the 
financial manipulation, rather than the control and operation of any 
particular company. In a letter as .late as 1892, Phillips again raised 
the issue of whether it would not be more profitable to work the 
companies, particularly the deep level properties, rather than specula-
ting in their shares. 160 It is also doubtful if their capital 
resources would have been equal to the task of wholesale amalgamation. 
After the 1889 collapse of the stock market, when the need for a more 
balanced approach to mining and finance became clear, the vista of the 
deep levels dawned and the resources available for the outcrop amal-
gamations remained limited. The resultant popular compromise manifested 
itself in joint milling and pumping projects; schemes which went some 
way towards achieving the economic advantages of amalgamation without 
the unpopular loss of independence. 
But equally, the years 1891-92 brought the issue of the limited 
life-span of all outcrop mines clearly into focus. In this regard, 
the Ferreira Company, working only one reef was amongst the first to 
recognise the problem. Below the sixth level the reef ran against the 
southern boundary of the property. Given the comparative newness of 
the machinery and the limited provision made for depreciation, any form 
of amalgamation was clearly in the Company's interest. To the immediate 
south of the Company's land lay a block of claims known as the "south 
Ferreira Claims", owned by H. Eckstein and Company. The debate which 
exercised the minds of the men of the firm in 1892 was, whether greater 
advantage lay in amalgamating these claims with the Ferreira Company or 
throwing them in with the Wemmer, Ferreira and Worcester Deep Level 
Gold Mining Company. The deep level company was floated in May 1889 
159. H.E.149, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, pp.709-10, 
11 July 1891. 
160. Fraser, M. and Jeeves, A., op.cit., p.60. 
188 
by a syndicate including C.W. Neebe and J. Charlton on 37 claims 
situated on the dip of the abovementioned properties. H. Eckstein and 
Company had been caught napping but the possession of the South Ferreira 
Claims, lying between that Company and the deep level property gave 
them a good bargaining tool . Despite what seemed a reasonable nominal 
capital of £100 000, the vendors took £55 000 in payment for the deep 
level property, leaving only £15 000 for working capital. 161 This 
situation guaranteed the company a still birth. A reconstruction offer 
was made in 1890 but came to nothing. On 18 June 1891, however, a 
162 
successful reconstruction bid was made by Carl Hanau, which again 
brought the property within the financial orbit of H. Eckstein and 
Company. The inclusion of the South Ferreira Claims in the Ferreira 
Company would, Phillips estimated, extend the life of that Company by 
163 
about three and a half years if crushing continued with the 40 stamps. 
Thus the addition of these claims would not significantly extend the 
life of the Ferreira Company, unless more of the main reef leader . proved 
payable in this section. The profitability of working more main reef 
leader largely depended on a reduction of the working costs . Johns was 
firmly convinced that the only way in which the marginal working cost 
per ton could be reduced was by extending the s cope and scale of 
operations. To achieve this amalgamation was essential. In turn, as 
Phillips pointed out, were the mine to close within a year or two, the 
machinery, while it might fetch a reasonable price, would never cover 
the full capital outlay. Once more the directors would find themselves 
in trouble if shareholders anticipated a return of their capital on 
liquidation. For this reason it was decided to give these claims to 
the Ferreira . They cost the Company £25 000, payable in instalments 
over a period of 27 months with interest. 164 
In the interim, negotiations continued behind the scenes for closer 
amalgamation between the Wemmer and Ferreira Companies. But as Phillips 
recognised, the best chance for such a step was lost in July 1891. 
Then, with the first regular monthly production figures from the 
161. Goldman, C.S., op.cit. (1892), p . 2S6. 
162. Ibid., p. 2S7. 
163. H.E.1S1, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, p.263, 
19 November 1892. 
164 . South African Mining Journal, Vol.III, 7, 18 November 1893. 
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Ferreira coinciding with the fresh purchase of 8 000 Wemmer shares by 
H. Eckstein and Company in April 1891, the 
a share swapping agreement with the Wemmer 
conditions seemed 
165 
shareholders. 
ideal for 
The .chance 
had, however, been lost due to the lack of any Ferreira shares being 
available and the nature of the holding of the Ferreira stock. The lack 
of confidence felt by the large European shareholders in Phillips's 
performance severely limited his ability to act quickly in the exchange 
of shares. 
Corner House 
t ' 166 gama ~on. 
The enlarged holding of Wemmer stock would have given the 
sufficient power in both companies to effect an amal-
The rapid running down of their shares in the Ferreira 
Company by both H. Ecks tein and Comp'any and Wernher, Bei t and Company 
at the beginning of 1891 had cost them the possibility of amalgamating 
the two companies . The opportunity again arose in 1893, when the Wemmer 
Company's second reorganisation created a fresh need for working 
capital . Anothe r H. Eckstein and Company partner, G. Rouliot, was 
instructed to begin planning the amalgamation bid. 167 The progress of 
these negotiations might also have prompted the Ferreira board to 
declare the 55 per cent dividend in March 1893. A major consideration 
of such amalgamation was the economic rationalisation which could be 
effected. Both companies, already under the management of Johns, were 
struggling to reduce their working costs. Johns calculated that 
administratively a saving of £1 327 12s. could result annually, 
achieved in a reduction of directors' fees and general of~ice expenses. 
Similarly, an amount of £4 718 ls. 5d. could be saved on mine operations, 
nearly half of which, or £2 236, resulting from a reduction in the 
salaries and wages of key personnel like the extra mine manager, 
engineers, carpenters, drivers and stokers. The largest single saving 
of £2 482 9s. 5d. would accrue from removing the need for the Ferreira 
Company to sink another shaft on the Bijou claims. 168 
Once more the planned amalgamation never reached fruition. The 
main reason for this was that the focus of amalgamation had by 1893 
, 
165. Se e above, Chapter IV, pp.124ff. 
166 . H.E.149, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, pp.744ff, 
15 August 1891. 
167. H.E.151, L. Phillips to Wernher, Beit and Company, p.433, 
28 January 1893 . 
168. Ibid., p.475, 11 February 1893. 
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turned towards the south. Amalgamation with an established mine like 
the Wemmer Company, while resulting in cost savings, would involve large 
amounts of capital and minimal profit margins for the vendors. 169 
Even more important was that while the Wemmer, with its three workable 
reefs had a longer life than the Ferreira, it was not calculated to be 
significantly longer, and therefore did not offer an ideal solution to 
the Ferreira Company's problems. 
The large amounts of capital required for the development of the 
deep level mines suggested an even greater rationalization if the shafts 
of the outcrop properties could be extended to work the deep level 
claims. Here the relative geographic and financial positions of the 
Ferreira and the wemmer, Ferreira and Worcester Deep Level Company made 
amalgamation the ideal solution. The Ferreira lay to the immediate north 
of the deep level company and roughly in line with the central part of 
it. Hence it was in the best position of the outcrop properties to 
extend operations into the claims of this company. Again, while the 
Ferreira was heavily over capitalised in terms of the working life of 
the min~ the deep level company would need a major capital infusion if 
it was to deve~op the necessary infrastructure for exploiting its 
property. An amount of at least £150 000 was mentioned at the meeting 
considering the amalgamation. 170 An additional advantage was that 
Wernher, Bei t and Company had become the dominant s,hareholders in the 
171 deep level company. 
The growing involvement and strategic planning by H. Eckstein and 
Company and their London principals in the deep levels is borne out in 
their correspondence, and ultimately reached fruition in the formation 
of Rand Mines Limited in 1893. Referring to the Ferreira Company, 
Johannesburg was reminded that in any amalgamation this Company was not 
to bargain away any claims or water rights which might prove useful to 
172 
what was known before its flotation as the IIRand Deep Level Company". 
169. Ibid., p.458, 4 February 1893. 
170. South African Mining Journal, Vol . III, 47, pp.819-20, 
25 August 1894. 
171. H.E.59, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.146 , 29 September 1893. 
172. Fraser, M. and Jeeves, A. , op.cit., p.76. 
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It was only a year later in August 1894 that the long struggle to 
effect some form of amalgamation for the Ferreira's survival was ratified 
by shareholders. Agreement between the two boards as to the details of 
t .he consolidation were reached in March, 173 although official report an 
drafted by Johns, on which the amalgamation purported to be based, was 
only published in May 174 and divulged to the press in July. 175 
In this statement it was admitted that the remaining life of the 
Ferreira mine was very short, about four years. Optimistic estimates, 
which included the milling of main reef leader, only extended this span 
by one year. Against this backdrop there was the large capital invest-
ment; over £30 000 on the two main shafts alone, which could not all 
be redeemed in the event of the closing of the mine. Alternatively, 
the extended scale of operations envisaged in the proposed amalgamation 
could well result in lower working costs which would bring a larger 
proportion of the Ferreira's main reef leader within payable limits: 
the very act of amalgamation could thus ultimately extend the working 
life of the existing mine. 
The terms of the amalgamation were for the Ferreira Company to 
double its nominal capital to £90 000 by the creation of a further 
45 000 £1 shares. Of these 44 000 would be issued to the shareholders 
of the Wemmer, Ferreira and Worcester Deep Level Company as payment for 
the property owned by that Company. The balance of the shares would be 
held in reserve. The respective cash assets of the two companies were 
not included in the deal. Those of the deep level com~ny were distri-
buted to shareholders in the ordinary course of liquidation and that 
company then ceased to exist. At the special ratification meeting of 
the deep level company held on 14 August 1894, the following advantages 
for the shareholders were mentioned. Firstly, the company's shareholders 
were not called upon to provide any money in the deal, as the Ferreira 
Company's plant and equipment, subject to further additions , was equal 
to the requirements of both properties. The deep level shareholders 
would also be eligible to participate immediately in any further 
dividend payments by the Ferreira Company made from the working of the 
173. South African Mining Journal, Vol. III, 47, pp.819ff, 25 August 
1894. 
174. H.E.59, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.413, 28 March 1894. 
175. South African Mining Journal, Vol. III, 42, p.711, 21 July 1894. 
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outcrop property. Here indeed was a good incentive for agreement. 
Regular dividends were paid by the Ferreira amounting to 100 per cent in 
the financial year ending on 31 March 1894 to give existing shareholders 
the benefit of accumulated reserves prior to the amalgamation. 176 
The acquisition of the services of Harry Johns as manager of the new 
company was also considered as a distinct advantage. Finally, the 
acceptance of the proposals would leave the cash assets of the deep 
level company available for distribution. 177 The acceptance of these 
proposals was in large part a foregone conclusion, as Rand Mines Limited, 
or more strictly speaking, Wernher, Beit and Company were "very large 
178 
shareholders II in the deep level company. 
At the same time that the negotiations were in progress with the 
deep level company, the Ferrira Company entered into an agreement with 
Rand Mines Limited in which a certain six claims, known as the "water 
right claims" held on the Turffontein Spruit, were exchanged for £3 000 
in cash and a single claim owned by Rand Mines Limited. The claim lay 
between those being negotiated for with the deep level company. The 
nature of the deal reflects the long term planning being undert·aken by 
the principals~ and is also an example of the slow process of tidying 
up of the patchwork of ownerships of claims dating from the earliest 
proclamation of the field. The immediate details of the deal leave no 
doubt as to where the bargaining power lay, when it is remembered that 
the Ferreira Company had to pay £35 000 for the South Ferreira Claims. 
It is now necessary to turn our attention to the working costs of 
the mine in the period leading up to the amalgamation . In his report 
published in May 1894, Johns noted that parts of the main reef leader 
could well become payable should the working costs of the mine be lowered. 
In turn, any increase in the amount of ore available for crushing would 
lengthen the life of the mine. Given this consideration an investigation 
of the cost structure becomes enlightening. Unfortunately, the nature 
of the information available is not sufficiently detailed for more than 
a superficial analysis. Below is a table of the comparative working 
costs for the period between 1890 and 1894: 179 
176 . Goldman, C.S., op.cit. (1895-96), p.108. 
177 . South African Mining Journal, Vol. III, 47, pp.819-20, 
25 August 1894 . 
178. Ibid. 
179. Goldman, C.S . , op.cit. (1895-96), p.103. 
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Working Costs 1890-1894 
Cost Cost 
Half year Tonnage % Tonnage % Total cost per ton per ton 
ending mined change milled change less deprec. mined milled 
March 1891 13891 13891 £22741.13.11 32,74s. 32,74s. 
1891 
50,68 50,68 
41930. 0 29,78 Sept. 28163 28163 7. 29,78 
-12,77 -12,77 
March 1892 24567 24567 41070. 1.11 33,44 33,44 
Year ending 14,34 - 0,73 
March 1893 57360 48777 106993.16. 3 37,31 43,87 
Sept. 1893 35953 
20,23 
24736 
1,41 
53401.16. 3 29,71 43,18 
March 1894 34259 
- 4,71 
22477 
- 9,13 
50531. 6. 1 29,50 44,96 
Dec. 1894 44724 
23,40 
25100 
10,45 54783.16. 0 24,50 43,65 
It is interesting that the costs calculated on the basis of the 
total amount of ore mined show a definite downward trend with the increase 
in the quantity of ore mined with the major exception of the year ending 
in March 1893. In contrast, the cost per ton of ore milled rose, . 
reflecting simply the distribution of total cost over the fairly constant 
amount of ore being crushed~ More interesting is the rise in total costs 
and the percentage increase or decrease in costs between periods, shown 
in the table below: 
Percentage Changes in Working Costs 
Total cost Cost per Cost per 
less deprec. % change ton mined % change ton milled % change 
£22741.13.11 32,74s. 32.,74s. 
41930. 7. 0 
45,76 
29,78 
- 9,04 
29,78 
- 9,04 
41070. 1.11 
- 2,05 
33,44 
10,95 
33,44 
10,95 
106993.16 . 3 
23,23 
37,31 
10,37 
43,87 
23,78 
50531. 6. 1 
- 5,54 
29,50 
-20,93 2,42 
44,96 
54783.16. 0 
7,76 
24,50 
-16,95 
43,65 
- 2,91 
While no definite trend emerges, it is clear that the perce ntage decreases 
in the average cost per ton mined are significantly greater than the 
increases, while the opposite is tr'ue in the case of milling figures, 
and in the case of total costs which generally reflect an upward trend. 
From the above it will be noted that working costs remained generally 
high in comparison with those of other companies, such as the Simmer and 
Jack, or for the average of the industry.180 
180 . See below, Chapter VI, pp.242ff. 
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The high average cost per ton milled continued to be a problem. 
In November 1893 the high working costs of the Company were singled out 
for comment in the press. It was suggested that the usual reasons for 
high working costs did not apply in the case of the Ferreira Company, 
which was in possession of the very latest equipment and machinery. 
It was accepted that the hardness of the rock worked increased with 
depth but weighing against this were the facts that the reef was not 
particularly narrow or faulted. Milling too seemed to be carried on at 
or near the maximum potential of the mill. Nevertheless, in the half 
year down to the end of September 1893, total costs amounted to £62 606 
as against the tonnage milled of 24 736 tons, giving the high average 
cost of £2 11s. 6d: per ton, of which mining and milling accounted for 
£2 5s. 10d., a figure oonsidered excessive. 181 The total cost figure 
quoted did, however, include an amount for depreciation which might 
otherwise be excluded. Unfortunately, no specific breakdown of mining 
costs was presented in the financial statements of the Company sO,that 
it is difficult to isolate any particular item which was disproportion-
ately high. What statements are available do suggest that general 
charges and maintenance costs, which were not directly related to mining 
and milling were partly dispersed into those a ccounts, and tended to be 
unusually high for a mining company. For the quarter ending 31 December 
1894 general charges amounted to £2 874 6s. 10d. and maintenance to 
£ 2 759 14s. 11d. or £5 634 1s. 9d. out of a tota l ~ost of £24 557 12s. 
182 10d., an amount of 22,94 per cent. We are left in the dark as to 
what exactly was charged to such accounts but if a c.alculated guess 
may be made, the n general charges normally covered the operation of the 
mine office, administrative salaries, stationery, licence fees and the 
likes, while maintenance referred to the general upkeep of machinery and 
equipment both on the surface and underground, as well as to estate 
management. An expenditure of over twenty per cent on such items on a 
mine with virtually new equipment was excessive and one can only 
speculate whether these accounts were used as a conduit for the estab-
lishment of a secret reserve. 
No figures are indicated for the cost of labour, which usually 
constituted the largest single factor in mining costs. That these were 
181. South African !lining Journal, Vol. III, 8, p.116, 25 November 1893. 
182. Goldman, C.S., op.cit. (1895-96), p . 106. 
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considered excessive is borne out in the campaign by Lionel Phillips to 
see them reduced. That little specific mention was made to either high 
labour costs or other expenses generally in the reports and statements 
of the directors, suggests that at least to these individuals, the cost 
structure was not considered excessive. Given that the Company only ' 
worked one, narrow reef it can be argued that a high level of average 
costs was inevitable and as already indicated, Johns aimed for profit 
maximization through output maximization rather than cost minimization. 
one of the items which raised the cost of mining was the ore 
sorting process. As Hatch and Chalmers have suggested, the real cos t 
183 per ton of rock mined was about 148. While the actual expense of 
sorting only amounted to about 5d. per ton, the cost of mining the 
additional rock, which averaged 45,9 per cent of that mined in May 1894, 
was not considered in calculating milling costs. 184 Given the fairly 
narrow width of the south reef, which only averaged 10 inches, the 
process did result in substantial gains, probably a saving of 10s~ per 
t on on the quantity of rock mined,185 although this saving tended only 
186 to be reflected in lower milling costs as can be seen below: 
Advantages of Ore Sorting 
Period Ore Ore % Rock Value of Value of Value of addn 
ending mined milled removed are mined are milled gold won 
tons tons dwts. dwts. E. . s. d. 
March 57794 48777 15,6 19,38 22,69 28899 . 17.4,8 1893 
Sept. 35953 24736 31,19 19,70 27,95 36526.14.9,6 1893 
March 34259 22477 34,36 22,49 33,50 52559.17.9,4 1894 
Dec. 66543 36784 44,72 19,33 33,76 109547. 4.5,4 1894 
Direct 
saving 
E. 
6825 
9360 
10282 
14657 
The significance of maintaining a high milling rate and hence a lower 
marginal cost was clearly recognised by Johns. The mill was kept at 
maximum production even though this meant a certain loss of gold over the 
183. Hatch, F.H. and Chalmers, J.A., op.cit., pp.264-65. 
184 . Goldman, C.S., op.cit . (1895-96), p.107, and South African 
Mining Journal, Vol. III, 40, p.668, 7 July 189 4. 
185. Goldman, C.S., op.cit. (1895-96), p.107. 
186. Ibid. 
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amalgam p l ates. Already a portent of future developments in the 
industry, by 1894 Johns was increasingly using the cyanide process as a 
IIback stoP!! in gold recovery. The South African Mining Journal conunented 
on this, asking why a sixteen per cent difference in the recovery rates 
of the Ferreira and adjoining Wemmer Companies could be justified. 187 
The Wemmer Company was recovering over 70 per cent of the gold yield by 
the amalgam plates, the Ferreira only 54 per cent. The answer lay in 
the fact that the Wemmer cyanide plant only came into production in 
188 September 1894. But while the journal sought a reason in the 
scientific experimentation between the ores of the two adjoining 
properties, the real explanation lay rather in the field of costs. 
The skilled amalgamator was an individual commanding a salary second 
only to that of the mine manager. The amalgam plates had to be care-
fully dressed and closely watched. Such was the task of a skilled 
craftsman which was easily defeated by refractory ores. Similarly, 
there was a limit to the amount of ore which could be passed over.the 
plates in a given period before their effectiveness in retaining gold 
was impaired . While Johns sought the maximum output possible from the 
mill, it was inevitable that the proportion of gold caught on the plates 
would diminish. The technology of the cyanide process was soon to see 
the demise of another of the skills associated with the early mining 
industry, while the low cost and efficiency of the cyanide process 
ensured the undermining of both the amalgamating and conc~ntrating 
processes. 
Another cost factor which became increasingly important to the 
Ferreira Company was the expenditure on dynamite . The hardness of the 
rock i n the lower levels of the mine necessitated the use of more 
powerful explosives. As Blainey has already suggested , this situation 
brought about a growing conflict between the mining companies and their 
189 
representatives and the Government monopoly holders. At least one 
incident relating to the Ferreira and Wemmer Companies was reported in 
the press in 1894. 190 The system of quotas which the Government 
187. South African Mining Journal, Vol.III, 39, p.644, 30 June 1894. 
188. See above, Chapter IV, p.139. 
189. Blainey, G., "Lost Causes of the Jameson Raid", Economic History 
Review, ss, XVIII, 2 , (1965), pp.350-366. 
190. South African Mining Journal, Vol.III, 15, p.222, 13 January 1894. 
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resorted to following the cancellation of the Lippert monopoly at the 
end of 1892, resulted in recurring shortages of dynamite throughout 1893 
and 1894. 191 These companies were amongst the many who experienced 
shortages with the resultant effect on production. Also the high cost 
of explosives, which varied over time from £6 10s~ Ode a case before 
the opening of the local "factory" in 1889 to £4 lOs. Od. in 1894,192 
considerably increased mining costs. 
Once again, in May 1894, an · unsuccessful attempt was made to hold 
the half yearly meeting. This time, however, there was nothing more 
sinister in the lack of a quorum than the fact that too few shares or 
proxies were repre~ented in Johannesburg. South African gold mining 
stocks became very popular with European investors during the course of 
1894, and while Wernher, Beit and Company and H. Eckstein and Company 
had bought shares in the Company for the purposes of moving the 
193 
amalgamation, most of these shares were unloaded soon afterwards. 
Some of their holding was, however, passed on to Rand Mines Limited . 194 
Hence the reason for a lack of quorum lay largely in the hands of the 
European investors. The South African Mining Journal commented on this 
fact, suggesting that local investors should replace the loss by a 
greater investment in the deep level properties. 195 On this occasion 
the Company did not overlook the publication of a financial statement. 
A working profit of £66 359 for the half year sugg~sted a good reason 
for doing so. A similar glowing financial report was published in 
August 1894, the last before the amalgamation with the deep level 
company. Gold recovery from all sources was equal fo 10z. 12,848 dwts., 
the highest in the Company's history. Working profits amounted to 
£56 970 18s. 6d., or equal to 253 per cent on the capital of the 
Company. In addition to the completion of the purchase of the South 
Ferreira Claims, the past year had seen the payment of £67 500 or 150 
t f th 't 1 f th . d' 'd d 196 per cen 0 e cap1 a 0 e Company 1n 1V1 en s. 
191. Etheredge, D.A . , The Early History of the Chamber of Mines, 
Johannesburg, 1887-1897, (M.A., Thesis), pp.56ff. 
192. Ibid. 
193. H.E.60, Wernher, Beit and Company to H. Eckstein and Company, 
p.67, 21 September 1894. 
194. Ibid., pp.41-42, 17 August 1894. 
195 . South African Mining Journal, Vol.III, 33, p.514, 19 May 1894. 
196. Ibid., Vol. III, 46, pp.798-99, 18 August 1894. 
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Thus by the time the Ferreira Company became a deep level property 
in August 1894 its dividend paying ability had assured it a place in 
the history of the Witwatersrand as one of the more successful companies. 
From its inception down to the beginning of 1895 nine dividend payments 
were made, amounting to £287 000, equal to 525 per cent of the nominal 
capital of the Company in that period. It was, however, only with the 
coming of the amalgamation in 1894 that the true prosperity of the 
Company might be said to have commenced. 
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CHAPTER VI 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNAL INTEGRATION 
OF THE MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS OF THE SAMPLE COMPANIES 
In analysing the attitudes and actions of the managements of the 
mining companies of the study a specific framework is adopted which can 
be applie d indiscriminately to the various histories of the companies. 
The framework implies two categories of involvement by management, 
namely, an internal and external integration! involving that management 
in the internal decision making processes of the company as discussed 
in this chapter, and in its broader external relations, considered in 
the following chapter. 
This chapter considers the attitudes and actions of the respective 
company managements in the day to day internal operation of their " 
companies. Within the context of the late nineteenth century much of 
the decision making by company managers, irrespective of the nature of 
the particular . company, was dominated by the pursuit of profits. The 
awareness and conception of the functions of management as recognised 
today were still in their infancy in the closing decades of that century 
and the rationale for the existence of the joint stock enterprise was 
measured entirely in terms of the winning anq distribution of profits 
to shareholders. For a company operating in the mining-industry, always 
considered a high risk enterprise, these imperatives" were felt that much 
more keenly. He n c e it is accurate to state that the internal 
integration of the companies of the study was dominated by a productivity 
approach which aimed at profit maximization through the incentives to 
minimize costs and maximise output. An analysis of the witwatersrand 
gold mining industry in this respect is made considerably easier because 
the mining companies faced a seemingly infinitely elastic demand curve " 
for their product and were thus spared any competition in the market 
place for the sale of their produc~ . Each company was in a position 
to increase its output indefinitely within the restraints of its own 
1 . lIIntegrationli in the context of this work denotes the multiplicity 
of inter-relationships which exist between the management of the 
company and its e nvironment, both within and without the firm. 
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property without facing any constraints from other companies operating 
in the same field or beyond it. The major considerations for deter-
mining the profitability of a particular mining company came to rest on 
how management dealt with the issues of reducing the costs of operation 
and at the same time maximizing output. 
Within the analysis of the internal integration of the various 
companies, whether considering the maximization of output or the 
minimization of costs, attention must be given to the various functions 
of mining which elicited differing forms and approaches of management. 
Within the Witwatersrand gold mining, industry two distinct forms of 
activity were pursued in the winning of the metal, namely, mining, with 
all the various activities thereby implied from the sinking of shafts 
to the actual removal of the ore, and reduction, or those processes 
related to the extraction of the metal from the ore. Within each of 
these two main categories management functions included decision making 
which had a direct bearing upon the activities and processes of men and 
machines and their interaction. It is thus possible to sub-categorize 
separate sections for labour and technology, always recognising the 
need and capac~ty for interaction between them. 
In order to facilitate the analysis, this chapter is divided into 
two sections, the first covering the years between the discovery of 
gold on the Wi twatersrand in 1886 and the collapse' of the Johannesbur,g 
stock Exchange boom in the early months of 1889, while the second deals 
with the period of recovery down to 1895. 
Period I: 1886-1889 
In turning .our attention to the four mining companies it is 
~ecessary to bear in mind some of the physical distinctions between 
them. The Witwatersrand and Simmer and Jack Companies both came to own 
the farms on which they operated, while their establishment to work the 
mynpacht rights of those farms ensured them a scale of operations 
considerably larger than those of the two smaller central Rand companies. 
In contrast, the Wemmer and Ferrei~a Companies were blessed with certain 
reefs which were far richer than those of the two bigger organisations. 
These differences inevitably influenced the management policies of the 
respective companies. 
The most striking feature of all four of the companies was the 
limited provision made for working capital in their original prospectuses. 
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It seems unlikely that much emphasis was placed on the capital require-
ments of any of the early Witwatersrand companies prior to their 
formation. Knowledge of the essential prerequisites for successful reef 
gold mining appears to have been remarkably limited on the Witwatersrand 
in mid-1886. It is possible that this lack of understanding was at 
least partly attributable to the boom conditions prevailing in 
Barberton at the time and the similar spate of company promotions which 
only occurred on the Rand in the second half of 1887, which kept most 
men with the necessary technical competence away from the witwatersrand. 
Similarly, the novelty of the discovery in terms of its size and the 
nature of its reefs, together with the initially misleading reports of 
the rich nature of the deposits, left the company promoters with the 
mistaken impressions that, once started, mining operations could be 
self-financing in terms of the larger capital outlays required. 
I nformation on the ore requirements per stamp of a mill per day, as a 
determinant of mine development, and calculations of the total cost of 
equipment and initial mining development, were either completely absent 
or disregarded. There is no other way in which the minimal provision 
for working capital can be explained, unless it is to suggest that 
unbridled optimism led those floating the companies to believe that 
such was the wealth of the discovery that initial profits would more 
than offset the capital requirements of the companies as they arose. 
Nevertheless, such a view seems hardly justifiable when it is considered 
that most of the companies formed to work the deposit ~re floated more 
than a year after the initial discovery of the reef,· that is, after 
March 1887. By then the Barberton boom was a thing of the past and 
presented a fresh lesson for any Rand company promoter ready to learn; 
such was the nature of the times, however, that all too few were so 
willing. 2 The spectacular results of the ear liest companies brought 
into operation, such as the Jubilee and Wemmer Companies, while 
3 
essentially superficial in the evidence they presented were, 
nevertheless, looked upon by too many as an example of what the entire 
Witwatersrand was capable of achieving. 
An investigation of thirty seven Witwatersrand gold mining companies 
formed between September 1886 and September 1887 reveals an average total 
2. See above, Chapter I, pp.9ff. 
3. See above, Chapter I, p.20 and Chapter IV, pp.107ff. 
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capital of £43 216, and an average working capital of £10 470, or a 
mere 24,23 per cent of the total capital. Of the four companies under 
consideration, the Witwatersrand Company with a working capital of 
£15 000 out of a total of £210 ODD, or 7,14 per 
lowest ratio of working to total capital of any 
cent, presented the 
4 
company in the survey. 
Formed a year later, in September 1887, the Simmer and Jack Company 
made only slightly better provision with an amount of £20 000 for 
working capital of a significantly smaller total capital of £75 ODD, 
or 26,67 per cent of total capital. While the amount of £20 000 
remained small in terms of the necessary working capital requirements 
of the company, such a sum measured against the survey of other 
companies indicates that it was the second largest provision for any 
company floated during the first year. The largest amount allocated 
for working capital was £35 000 in the case of the Paarl Pretoria Gold 
Mining company.5 In turn, it was the Wemmer Company which devoted 
the largest proportion of its total nominal capital for working capital, 
allocating £10 000 of its £12 000 of total capital for this purpose, 
or some 83,33 per cent. Finally, the Ferreira Company spent half of 
its original nominal capital of £12 000 in the initial vain attempt to 
bring the property into production. It is perhaps worth noting that 
two companies, the Empire and Moss Rose Companies started their existence 
with as limited a working capital as £3 000. 6 
The statistics referred to above are drawn from the prospectuses of 
the various companies and it is thus possible that discrepancies arose 
between what provision was made for working capital and the final amount 
so allocated. In the case of the Witwatersrand Company it is important 
to bear in mind Knight's personal investment in equipment for the 
Company. He claimed to have spent an amount in excess of £21 000, 
which, while probably reclaimed from vendor stock, is not revealed in 
the above calcu l ations. 7 Added to the £15 000 made provision for in 
the prospectus, a working capital of £36 000 reflects the Company in a 
better light with working capital making up 17,14 per cent of total 
capital. While similar details of other companies' expenditure prior 
4. See Appendix I below. 
5 . Ibid. 
6. Ibid. 
7. See above, Chapter II, p.28. 
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to flotation are not available it is difficult to gauge more than a 
general impression. 
If a generalization can be made, it is to suggest that all these 
companies suffered from an over capitalization on vendor stock and a 
paucity of working capital. This statement is borne out by the fact 
that by 1888 all four of the companies under consideration were forced 
to increase their total nominal capital as a way of finding fresh work-
ing capital. That they resorted to the issue of fresh stock as the 
means by which to raise this capital was simply a reflection of the 
buoyant state of the local share market. Had this situation not 
prevailed it is possible that the future history of the Witwatersrand 
gold mining industry would have taken an entirely different course with 
numerous bankrupties of mining companies and a move to amalgamation 
similar to that then drawing to a conclusion in the diamond mining 
industry. Similarly, while banking institutions were willing enough to 
grant loans to companies against minimal security between 1886 and 1888, 
the tide turned in 1889 and loan capital became increasingly expensive 
and difficult to raise. 8 
The weak f.inancial position of the companies by 1888 resulted in 
two distinct trends, depending on the size of the company concerned. 
For the companies in possession of larger properties, the options for 
raising fresh working capital were wider in that i~ was considered a 
rational alternative to acquire the necessary. funds by the sale of parts 
of their properties. The evidence suggests that the managements of both 
the Witwatersrand and Simmer and Jack Companies seriously considered the 
optimum size of a mining property to be considerably smaller than those 
under their supervision and thus took steps to sell off as many claims 
as was considered necessary.9 An opposite trend is indicated amongst 
the smaller companies, where the same high ore to capital ratios saw a 
drive towards closer co-operation, if not amalgamation, between companies. 
In both the Wemmer and Ferreira Companies, attempts were made to seek 
closer amalgamation but with only limited success, suggesting the 
greater difficulties confronting th~ nature of this option as a 
solution to financial embarrassment. 10 
8. Henry, J.A., The First Hundred Years of the Standard Bank, pp.94ff. 
9. See above, Chapter II, p.39, and Chapter III, pp.69ff. 
10. See above, Chapter IV, pp.114,134 and Chapter V, pp.186ff. 
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An interesting feature of both the movements towards seeking closer 
amalgamation and the sale of claims, was the involvement of H. Eckstein 
and Company, notably their active participation in the attempts to 
amalgamate the small companies of the central Rand, and their interest 
in the attempt to split the Simmer and Jack Company's property. On one 
level these actions would suggest that the firm wished to see a 
rationalization of the industry into medium sized concerns. How valid 
such a conclusion is, is debatable in so far as the participation of 
the firm in the affairs of individual companies ever represented a 
permanent commitment. There is a strong case to be made out of the 
strength of the evidence presented in this work, that the activities of 
H. Eckstein and Company and their London principals, Wernher, Beit and 
Company, were essentially speculatively motivated and that their involve-
ment in any venture was usually determined by a search for quick 
speculative profits. It was only after 1889, when the London principals 
found the source of funds for arbitrage operations drying up, that the 
firm decided on a more substantial approach in the encouragement of 
sound mining practices. Yet even then, by judiciously supplying the 
chosen companies with technical expertise, which remained loyal to the 
firm, it was possible to maintain an excellent intelligence service on 
which to continue its speculative activities while gathering a steady 
income from a selected "stable" of minesa 
Viewed from the angle of the mining companies under consideration 
it is clear that each company reflects the overriding concern 
of profit maximization in their activ~ties prior to the collapse 
of the share market in 1889. Besides the endogenous considerations 
which such maximization held out for the raising of scarce working 
capital, there was also the exogenous factor of profit as the single 
most important rationale for the existence of a capitalist joint-stock 
organisation a on one level the exogenous and endogenous considerations 
overlapped, in that a profitable, dividend paying company stood a better 
chance of attracting additional funds by further share issues. In 
keeping with nineteenth century capitalism, there was a need to reflect 
a profit and handsome dividends for an expectant shareholding. Writers 
at the time suggested that a minimum return on gold mining investment 
should be in the order of twenty five per cent on paid up capital, thus 
providing adequate cover for the high risk factor involved. 11 Such 
11. Glanville, E., The South African Goldfields, p.33, quoting 
w. St. John Carr. 
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views were particularly true of the early years of the Witwatersrand, 
and as late as 1895 Goldman had to point out the relatively secure 
nature of Rand mining investment with its regular reef structure ~s a 
reason for accep~ing a lower return. 12 Any investment in an untried 
gold field required a commitment on the part of the investor which 
included a large speculative risk. Fortunately for the successful 
launching of the Witwatersrand industry such a speculative atmosphere 
had already been created in South Africa with the earlier mineral 
d ' , 13 ~scover~es. The proclamation of the field in September 1886 coin-
cided with a boom in the market for Barberton gold shares, while in 
Kimberley a market for diamond and gold mining shares was already well 
established. It is thus important to remember that the Witwatersrand 
had to compete for its capital requirements against these alternative 
counters. 
Knowledgeable Kimberley investors like Alfred Beit were aware of 
the inherent weaknesses of the Barberton fields and were thus rather 
prepared to risk investment on the Witwatersrand. 14 But as Emden has 
suggested, there was little enough information here on which to base 
their investment decisions. 15 For the general investment public there 
was even less to guide their investment patterns. Kimberley and 
Barberton in 1886 were at least productive, while the Rand sought their 
commitment on the strength of promises. Undoubtedly, the wild reports 
and novelty of the discovery encouraged some to risk thei~ savings on 
the possibility of great wealth, but as an untried field there was a 
limit to the capital which the Witwatersrand could draw. It is quite 
possible that this situation contributed to the limited extent to which 
the early companies called upon the public for funds and the limited 
provision made for working capital in their prospectuses. Such a view 
suggests a tremendous, and possibly inevitable, gamble on the part of 
the company promoters. It also placed a greater emphasis on the need 
for quick and spectacular returns if shareholders were not to withdraw 
their support. The concern of the smaller companies in this regard 
was that much greater. Not only were their initial investments that 
12. Goldman, C. S., South African Mines: Their Position, Results and 
Development (1895-96), Vol. I, p. xiv. 
13. Schumann, C.G.W., Structural Changes and Business Cycles in South 
Africa, 1806-1936, pp.33-34. 
14 . Cartwright, A.P., The Corner House, pp.29-30 . 
15. Emden, P.H., Randlords, p.347, note 10. 
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much smaller but they also tended to rely on a more critical shareholding. 
While the Wemmer and Ferreira Companies were fortunate in drawing a 
great deal of their support locally, other small companies like the 
Worcester, Grahamstown, Cradock and Tarka Companies, drew their capital 
from distant localized sources who, while prepared to take the initial 
risks, knew the limits of their resources. 16 The early demise of many 
of these companies bears testimony to this fact. Thus while specific 
information was limited on how much capital was needed, so was the 
possibility of a~quiring excessive amounts. The Witwatersrand Company 
pioneered the way by offering 6 000 shares of £10 each to the Kimberley 
, 17 
public. That only 1 100 were applied for suggested the need for a 
major scaling down "in the aspirations of those company promoters who 
followed; if not in their own expectations, at least insofar as the 
capacity and willingness of the general investing public was concerned. 
Consideration of the internal integration of the companies 
reflects the early preoccupation of management at all levels with-profit 
maximization. Here a major consideration in the case of the Wemmer 
Company was the choice of reef mined. By working the rich south reef 
exclusively the Company's management was certainly indulging in profit 
maximization I although here a second element in the exogenous factor 
clearly surfaces. Besides the considerations already discussed, namely, 
profit maximization for the reimbursement of shareholders and to make 
good the shortfall on the provision of original working capital, the 
prevailing circumstances also allowed for a considerable speculative 
element. Hence the announcement of spectacular results had a direct 
bearing on share prices, which in addition to enriching shareholders, 
allowed a fringe of directors and associates to directly manipulate out-
put for the benefit of such speculative activity. A similar trend is 
clearly visible in the early utterances of Knight and others regarding 
the value of 
share prices 
the Witwatersrand Company's are as a means of keeping 
18 
up. 
The extent to which the rise in share prices was used as a means 
of overcoming the shortfall of working capital differed between companies. 
16. See above, Chapter I, pp.16ff. 
17. See above, Chapter II, 'pp.25ff. 
18. See above, Chapter II, pp.31, 38. 
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In the case of the Witwatersrand Company it seems unlikely that the share 
market was used directly for raising additional funds for the Company. 
It seems more probable that the rise in share prices was required by 
William Knight and his fellow directors so that they could profit by 
unloading their inflated holdings of vendors' shares and for 
reimbursing Knight for his outlay on equipment. The Simmer and Jack 
Company ~ used the rise of the market for the sale of reserve shares but 
had no reason beyond that for specifically engineering higher share 
prices before 1890 . The slow start shown by the Ferreira Company and 
its closing down soon afterwards at the end of 1887 suggests that its 
working capital was exhausted too soon for it even to attempt to use 
the market as a means of raising fresh working capital. Thereafter its 
capital requirements were largely met by a series of loans from 
H. Eckstein and Company. High share prices clearly operated in favour 
of the Wemmer Company's search for additional working capital, the 
fresh issue of 5 000 shares in early 1888 resulting in a profit of 
£15 906 which was used in the elimination of a deficit on capital 
19 
account. 
The early exploitative mining practiced by the Wemmer Company can 
be considered from two perspectives. On one level it could be, and 
probably was, justified by management as being legitimate in terms of 
the overall profit maximization criterion. Beyond this there is also 
the consideration that the initial spectacular assays from the reef on 
this property might have influenced management in the decision to 
provide only a limited working capital, given the external constraints 
on its availability, and anticipating that future capital requirements 
could be generated from mining or speculative profits. Discounting 
such a view with regard to any of the companies, however, was the need 
for all companies to show early dividends, and the alacrity with which 
these were paid by companies irrespective of the need for working 
capital or the establishment of substantial reserve funds . The positive 
influence of an early payment of dividends on share prices was clearly 
recognised. The Jubilee Company paid its first dividend of five per 
cent on 20 May 1887, within five months of the formation of the Company 
and at the end of its first month of production, while the Wemmer Company 
19. See above, Chapter IV, p.lll. 
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paid a spectacular forty per cent on 23 July 1887, only three months 
after the commencement of operations. 20 Whatever the perspective, 
however, there remains the overall judgement that as a decision made by 
a management group participating in a reef mining venture, the exploita-
tion of only the richest reef in a mine was shortsighted and bound to 
generate difficulties in the future. Similarly, the payment of an early 
dividend before reserve funds could be established reflected the general 
inexperience of the management. 
Another feature of the longer term output, and hence profit 
maximization goal of internal integration, is the size of the mining 
property and the machinery used by the various companies. No doubt the 
length of a property along the line of the reef outcrop can be seen as 
a function of the competition generated between the initial claim 
peggers, the syndicates and individuals who bought them out, and 
ultimately between the companies formed to work the claims. For the 
Witwatersrand and Simmer and Jack Companies, formed as they were to 
exploit the mynpachts of the farms Driefontein and Elandsfontein No.1 
respectively, their large size reflects the lack of competition due to 
the Government policy of granting such rights on proclaimed farms. 
As is seen in the case of the Simmer and Jack Company, the late pegging 
of the owner's claims or mynpacht brought the peggers into dispute 
with those lessees who had preceded them. Nevertheless, while the 
grazing rights of the lessees were upheld, it was the holders of the 
mynpacht rights who eventually triumphed in the dispute, gaining a 
21 
considerable proportion of the outcrop claims in the process. As an 
early mover in the pegging of the Driefontein mynpacht, William Knight 
was able to gain a spectacular length of claims along the outcrop which 
represented the head of the T-shaped property, while only laying claim 
beyond these to the valley floor to the south as a source of water 
22 
supply. In contrast, the Wemmer and Ferreira Companies, lying c lose 
to the initial discovery on Langlaagte, were floated to work a relatively 
small number of claims, reflecting the jostling and claim jumping which 
characterized the competi tion for every square inch of ground along the 
20. Goldman, C.S., The Financial, Statistical, and General History of 
the Gold and other Companies of Witwatersrand, South Africa (1892), 
pp.12A, 26A. 
21. See above, Map facing p.61. 
22. See above, Map facing p.24. 
23 
outcrops of the centra l Rand. 
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Similarly, the location of their water 
rights at a greater distance from the claims again reflects the compet-
ition which fragmented the area and represented the true Witwatersrand 
"rush". The large properties of the Witwatersrand and Sinuner and Jack 
Companies ensured them a considerable lifespan and hence profit 
maximization. If anything, this consideration was subjugated to the 
more pressing demands equated in the eyes of management with success, 
namely, early payments of dividends and the raising of working capital 
for the developm~nt of smaller companies. In contrast, the limited 
size of the two smaller companies threatened them with an early curtail-
ment of operations and necessitated the purchase of additional claims 
for the attainment ·of longer term profit maximization through a 
reduction of total marginal cost. 
The takeover of the Wemmer Extension Company by the Wemmer Company 
on mutually advantageous terms was certainly an early example of co-
operation and suggests a reasoned attempt by management to establ~sh a 
more viable proposition for output and hence profit maximization. 
In taking this step directorate management revealed a remarkable astute-
ness, closely motivated by the longer term considerations of length of 
working life and operating costs. Yet in another direction this longer 
term planning was absent, namely in the expansion of the property in a 
southward direction once the reef had been proved to extend below a few 
hundred feet. Here several considerations must be borne in mind. 
During the period 1889 to 1894 the Wemmer Company found itself in 
financial straits which demanded the concentration of any surplus 
revenue on the development of the existing property and plant. It could 
simply not afford such an expansionist policy. Also during this period 
the affairs of the Company became increasingly interwoven with those of 
H. Eckstein and Company, the leading firm in the development of the 
first row of deep level mines, so that Wemmer management probably did 
not see its function, once cohtrolled by H. Eckstein and Company, as 
extending to the indefinite perpetuation of the Company, but rather as 
centering on profit maximization from the existing property. 
In the case of the Simmer and Jack and Witwatersrand Companies, 
the very large size of their properties, rather than giving rise to 
23. See above, Map facing p.106 and facing p.144. 
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expansionist policies on the part of management, encouraged the opposite 
trend and both Companies sought to shed blocks of claims in the years 
down to 1889. As already indicated the sale of such blocks of claims 
was recognised as a means of realizing a profit for shareholders and 
raising necessary working capital. Clearly the emphasis for the 
Witwatersrand management lay with profit distribution rather than 
capital accumulation, reflecting the capitulation by them of ever 
profitably operating the Company. The sale of three blocks of a total 
of 204 claims for an amount of £210 000 and 15 000 company shares, 
represented the only profit won by the Witwatersrand Company in the 
period, while the inability of the Simmer and Jack Company to separate 
the eastern portion of the mynpacht was viewed by the directorate as a 
distressing failure. 
The early Ferreira management seems to have given little considera-
tion to a possible expansion of the Company's property, and with good 
reason, for the limited working of the mine left some doubt in th~ 
minds of management about the viability of the existing claims. It 
required the forethought and capital of H. Eckstein and Company's 
participation in its affairs to plunge the Company into the capital 
investment necessary for proper development of the mine and to give 
consideration to the expansion of the property through the acquisition 
of the Bijou Claims and subsequently the South Ferreira Block. It is, 
however, worth noting that even in the case of H. Eckstein and Company 
the decision to expand the Company southward coincided with the failure 
of the first round of amalgamation plans which intended the unification 
of the Ferreira with its neighbouring companies. It was then decided, 
pr.obably on the strength of assay results of the south reef, to 
expand the scale of operations of the Company and to look southwards 
for the ore reserves which would render the proposition viable and 
help to reduce the marginal cost per ton of ore milled. 
A facility which the Witwatersrand and Simmer and Jack Companies 
exploited for both profit maximization and cost reduction was the 
ownership of the farms on which they operated. In terms of the Gold 
Law of the South African Republic, the freehold owner of a farm 
proclaimed a public digging was entitled to receive half of the licence 
revenue paid to the state for prospectors and diggers licences and all 
of that accruing from the sale or lease of stands for building purposes. 24 
24. See above, Chapter I, pp.14-15. 
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For the Witwatersrand Company the loss of a court action against the 
freehold owner resulted in the closing off of all future licence 
revenue from the farm Driefontein, from which Knight had come to expect 
a steady income. The only solution lay in the purchase of the freehold 
and this was duly done. Thereafter the Company settled back to enjoy a 
steady income from its estate which played a significant part in the 
affairs of the company.25 In the subsequent period it also decided 
to capitalize on its ability to supply water to the surrounding mines 
from the water rights held on the foot of the T-shaped mynpacht. Here 
then was an income source, which, beyond the initial purchase price of 
the farm, involved a minimal outlay while guaranteeing a steady income 
from the various m~nes and individual prospectors who operated on the 
property~ Likewise, the Company's own expenditure in this regard was 
significantly reduced. 
The Simmer and Jack Company was far more ambitious in the exploita-
tion of its estate than was the Witwatersrand Company. Like the latter 
Company, the decision was taken early to acquire the freehold of the 
farm Elandsfontein No.1 from its owners, Messrs Meyer, Simmer and Jack. 
Unlike the Witwatersrand Company, which was content to rest with the 
receipt of licence revenue from its estate down to 1889, the Simmer and 
Jack Company set about the active exploitation of its freehold. The 
necessary permission was acquired from the Government for the establish-
ment of the village of Germiston in which stands were surveyed and 
beaconed off prior to their lease to the general public. 'Plantations 
of trees to meet the future timber needs o f the mine were soon planted 
and every effort made to maximize the revenue from the estate. The 
village of Germiston continued to thrive under the close watch of the 
Company's board with shops and a hotel being added to the collection 
of private dwellings. Such was the success of the venture that the 
village was chosen as the terminus of the Cape and Netherlands Company's 
railway systems in 1892. 26 
The lack of any detailed plans for the systematic exploitation of 
their properties by three of the Companies, namely, the Wemmer, Ferreira 
and Witwatersrand, indicates that in their haste to win returns from the 
25. See above, Chapter II, pp.44ff. 
26. See above, Chapter III, pp.67ff. 
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ore, such considerations were ignored or brushed aside in the short term. 
The ultimate cost of their actions is borne out in the subsequent 
capital shortages faced by them. In the case of all three companies 
their early mining development was subsequently condemned by competent 
authorities as being wasteful and of little future value in the systematic 
exploitation of their mines. It is clear that in the case of them all, 
this shortsightedness resulted in higher working costs than would 
otherwise have prevailed and so assisted in bringing about the diffi-
culties s o soon experienced by them. It is true that William Knight did 
have a definite plan of action, namely, the quarrying of as much ore as 
possible from the length of outcrop for as long as possible. He saw in 
this method a means of saving on the wages of skilled miners, which he 
considered a substantial cost reduction. Nevertheless, the short-
sightedness of such a policy does not require much elaboration, as 
sooner or later capital intensive pit mining wou ld be required along 
with the necessary skilled expertise. 
In contrast to the other three companies, the Simmer and Jack 
Company was quick to adopt a fairly comprehensive and successful plan 
for the opening up of the property. That it would have followed the 
prevalent example of open cast mining had suitable conditions prevailed 
is undoubted, but the shallowness of the slope of the reef soon 
terminated this practice and called for more sophisticated techniques. 
A factor which might also have swayed management in this decision was 
that commencing operations a year after the initial activities of the 
Witwatersrand and Jubilee Companies, a clearer idea was held regarding 
the depth of the reef, which allayed fears of it pinching out at no 
considerable depth. The local topography also catered for the mining 
of a substantial body of ore by means of driving an adit level into 
the hillside. A shaft of this nature was considerably cheaper to drive, 
as well as being quicker, so that the results gained from it were 
enjoyed that much sooner. Water could be drained from the mine and the 
ore trammed out by gravity, both significantly reducing the cost of 
mining the ore between the adit and the surface. Hence it is clear 
that the adoption of sound mining principles in the case of the Simmer 
and Jack Company bore certain clearly identifiable short term cost 
advantages, and it was for this reason that they were adopted so early 
in the history of the Company. The planned development also reflects 
the responsible and experienced management the Company enjoyed in the 
person of Mr William Pope. 
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Of the specific measures adopted by the companies which resulted in 
cost reductions, those concerning labour are perhaps the most significant. 
In considering labour as a factor influencing the internal integration 
of a company it is necessary to bear in mind that many moves in this 
regard also had a bearing on the external integration of the company 
as an employer of labour competing in a relatively open labour market. 
It is also essential to view the joint sto9k company as an employer 
of both management and labour. 
In considering the role of the company in the employment of a 
management group it is significant to note that only one of the four 
companies of the study retained the same mine or general manager 
throughout the period down to 1889, namely, the Witwatersrand Company, 
whose manager Mr A.A. Stanton resigned following the partition of the 
mine property in that year. For the other three companies the problem 
of finding either competent or compatible managers proved an enduring 
one and this dismal record seems to have been duplicated in a consider-
able number of the early Rand mining companies. The failure of early 
Witwatersrand management to meet the demands of the situation were 
often reflected upon by the Johannesburg press, particularly in the 
aftermath of the 1889 stock exchange boom, when it was clearly recognised 
by all that the future of the industry rested in the hands of this group 
of men. The reasons for the poor performance of the Rand industry down 
to that time were seen to lie in two separate, if related, quarters. 
The incompetence of many early mine managers was recognised but it was 
also seen that the directors were at fault. As The Diggers' News noted, 
" ... no improvement will be manifest until directors look to dividends 
instead of how best to encourage share speculation ... 27 The emphasis 
on crushing rich are as a means of influencing share prices was recognised 
for the evil it was, but even The Diggers' News was only so bold as to 
make the necessary recriminations after the collapse of the boom. The 
effect of this policy of bleeding the mines of their rich ore was evident 
in the affairs of companies like the Wemmer and the Robinson, who in the 
aftermath of the boom struggled to reduce working costs and maintain 
output of gold at reasonably constant levels. What was now required of 
directorate management was a commitment to conduct the mining of their 
properties on ordinary business principles . 
27. The Diggers' News (Johannesburg), 6 April 1889. 
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It is clear that the incumbents of managerial posts demanded and 
received high salaries from the outset . That such salaries showed little 
distinction regarding qualification or competence encouraged a l ethargy 
only partly attributable to personality. Many mine managers seem to 
have been mere overseers who acted according to the speculative 
dictates of their boards of directors. As The Diggers' News suggested, 
while the emphasis lay with share speculation rather than production, 
it mattered little to a company's shareholders and directors alike 
h th th t t ' h' f'eld . 28 weer e manager was campe en ~n ~s • 
It is interesting to reflect on the influence of Kimberley mining 
practice on the early days of the Witwatersrand and the lack of 
initiative .for innovation in early Rand management. At Kimberley, mining 
practice centred on the open cast mining of the diamondiferous pipes 
from where the material was transported over considerable distances to 
the weathering and processing floors. 29 While by the second half of 
the 1880's such methods of open cast mining were giving way to shaft or 
pit mining in the face of an increasing incidence of ground slide·s in 
the open mines, the more sophisticated method was also recognised as 
being more capital intensive~30 The close resemblance to early 
Witwatersrand mining practice is striking but while open cast operations 
were suitable for deposits extending over several square acres, the 
method was hardly applicable to a body of conglomerate reef whose width 
was generally measured in inches, even if it did extend over several 
hundred yards on some of the properties. No doubt those who initiated 
the open trenches which characterised the early Rand also had ulterior 
motives. Not only was it considered a means of "pr0vingll the reef, 
but William Knight saw in the method a means for minimizing the need 
for and cost of skilled miners. 31 Quarrying was a technique which 
could be undertaken by unskilled black labourers under the supervision 
of billiard room attendants. Clearly the level of Kimberley mine manage-
ment before 1886 was low and not trained in the skills required for 
mining the reef. A curious sidelight is the fact that many Kimberley 
managers tended to become Rand capitalists, as was certainly the case 
with W. Knight, H. Eckstein and L. Phillips. 
28. The Diggers' News, 25 May 1889 . 
29. Reunert, T. , Diamonds and Gold in South Africa, pp.23-36 . 
30. See above, Chapter I, pp . . 8ff . 
31. See above, Chapter II, p. 35. 
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The failure of the Witwatersrand to recruit an effective management 
strata can perhaps be attributed to the nature of the discovery. The 
Rand was not a gold field which evolved throu gh the usual phases of a 
mining frontier, where a rush of individual diggers operated until 
circumstances forced them to sellout to, or form, companies with the 
necessary working capital to continue deeper mining. Under these 
circumstances the experience necessary for the successful management of 
the peculiarities of a particular deposit can be gathered locally and 
a management group evolves as a function of time and circumstances. 
The Witwatersrand was rushed in the conventional manner by the usual 
collection of fortune seekers, but as one newspaper correspondent 
commented in July 1886,32 
!lBy this time it is presumed that every inch of gold bearing 
ground has been marked out into claims by those who rushed 
the place ..• but the diggings not being al l uvial, it is 
difficult to discover what the majority will do with their 
claims, which are unworkable without capital ... " 
These independent claims, like those of Ignatius Ferreira, were soon 
bought out by syndicates of capitalists operating from the larger 
commercial centres of South Africa, who then set about floating the gold 
mining companies. 33 The original claimholders now either stood back 
in anticipation of employment on the mines or returned to their homes 
or prospecting that much richer or poorer for the experience, while 
the company promoters scouted about in search of individuals with good 
enough credentials or plausible enough tales to manage the new operations . 
34 A knowledge of reef mining was at a premium, as were the other skills 
necessary to ensure the success of the field. As late as November 1887 
a press editorial called for "gold experts, chemists and engineers, 
mechanics, etc. to have some evidence of their experience . ,,35 It is 
surprising that while companies were prepared to invest considerable sums 
of money in acquiring modern machinery from the United States and Europe 
to work the are, there was such a singular lack in the importing of 
skilled mining management expertise. Undoubtedly, the seeming expense 
of such labour against the relatively cheaper "colonial" man was one 
32. The Daily Independent (Kimberley), 19 July 1886. 
33 . See above, Chapter I, pp . 15ff. 
34. Reunert, T., op.cit., p . 196. 
35. The Eastern Star (Grahamstown and Johannesburg), 11 November 1887. 
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consideration but even these demanded, and received, high wages on the 
Rand. Two reasons for this shortcoming are suggested. Firstly, given 
the competitive nature of the capita l market prevailing in South 
Africa, not only for the whole new industry, but also between companies 
in the Rand industry, the haste to show quick returns, already 
exacerbated in the long lead times for the delivery of mining and 
milling equipment, prompted a fairly haphazard selection of men for 
management positions from those available in situ in order to prepare 
sites for machinery and the commencement of mining activities . 
Secondly, the Witwatersrand was the first major non-alluvial gold 
discovery which demanded the application of skilled mining techniques 
from the outset. These skills were, however, v i rtually impossible to 
attract before the field had been proved as a workable and profitable 
proposition. The only technically competent mining engineer in South 
Africa at the time, Gardiner Williams, gave the field a bleak prognosis 
and accepted what was considered a more stable position in the diamond 
. . . d 36 m~n~ng ~n ustry. 
The Wemmer Company's first manager came from Brazil and was 
probably like so much of the human flotsam which the improved trans-
portation of the nineteenth century carried from one rush to the next. 
His successors down to the appointment of J.H. Johns seem to have 
suffered a similar lack of competence and in the years down to 1889 to 
have been dominated in their activiti es by the speculative dictates of 
the board of directors. The early managers displayed a singular lack 
of ability to deal with the important consideration of cost reduction 
as a function of overall profit maximization. 
The relatively short tenure of Knox as manager of the Simmer and 
Jack Company proves the lie in the assumption o f competence as the 
inevitable corollary of experience from another gold field. Knox's 
Australian mining experience did not assure him a continuing position 
with the Company once the services of a more competent man were 
available in Mr William Pope. The new manager, Pope, served in this 
capacity down to the take-over of the Simmer and Jack Company by The 
Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa Limited in 1894. All we know 
about Pope's background is that he had previously served as the manager 
of the Pigg's Peak Gold Mining Company in the eastern Transvaal and 
36. Taylor, J.B., A Pioneer Looks Back, p.132. Williams became 
manager of the De Beers mine. 
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that soon after joining the Simmer and Jack, the Company assisted with 
the expenses of bringing out his wife and family from England to join 
him. 37 That the Company should have gone to such expense suggests a 
' strong desire on the part of the board of directors to retain the 
services of a man whom they considered justified the additional expense. 
In contrast, the nature of Pope's initial contract with the Company was 
for an annually renewable term . Such a contract was probably considered 
to be in the best interests of both parties. It might be inferred from 
his background that Pope had probably gained some experience in reef 
mining, either in Cornwall or elsewhere, prior to his arrival in South 
Africa, where he had "made good" his reputation on the De Kaap field. 
An interesting sidelight on his appointment was that on being confirmed 
to the position, the board of directors gave him an allowance of fifteen 
guineas with which "to make himself conversant with Witwatersrand 
mining",38 a clear indication of the positive approach towards their 
responsibilities by the board and also reflecting an awareness of the 
unique nature of the Rand conglomerate which required a certain amount 
of adjustment on the part of the new manager. 
The activities of the Simmer and Jack Company are also likely to 
have benefited from the presence of George Farrar, who' served both as 
managing director and chairman over a considerable period of time. 
Farrar was a qualified engineer who first arrived in South Africa in 
1879 to assess the potential of the local market for agriCUltural 
machinery. Finding the sale of mining equipment more lucrative he soon 
39 became involved in mining promotion and management. His expertise 
and that of his brother, Sidney, who subsequently served the Company as 
consulting engineer, were bound to be of substantial benefit to its 
operations at a time when engineering knowledge of any description was 
at a premium. 
It is difficult to decide on the degree to which George Farrar's 
involvement with the Simmer and Jack Company was directly related to 
the operations of the family firm of Howard, Farrar and Company'. There 
is evidence to suggest that lucrative contracts were given to the firm 
37. Cory Library, MS16 007, Minutes of Directors Meetings of the 
Simmer and Jack Gold Mining Company, 4 December 1888. 
38. Ibid., 17 September 1888. 
39. Kubicek, R.V., Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice, p.133. 
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which might otherwise have been placed elsewhere, and as already 
mentioned, his brother was appointed to the position of consulting 
engineer. At least one author was moved to comment on the prevalence 
40 
of such activities on the field when he wrote, 
"Directors get elected to seats upon Boards in order to 
secure for themselves or friends fat contracts to supply 
mi ning materials to the several companies they are deputed 
to watch over. II 
It seems unnecessary to add that the standard of business ethics was 
never very high on the Witwatersrand during the period under review. 
As a Company with a large mining area and estate to operate, the 
Simmer and Jack Company soon recognised the advantages of a management 
structure. As early as January 1889 the board asked for sweeping powers 
in order that it might better manage the affairs of the estate. Creat ed 
solely as a mining company, the board were not initially given the 
necessary powers for the sal e or leasing of parts of the property . 
These powers were now called for and granted in order that the board 
might generally conduct the affairs of the estate without the necessity 
41 
of constant recourse to shareholders. 
The position of managing director was created in the Simmer and 
Jack Company virtually from the outset of operations in 1887. The 
functions of the incumbent were to liaise directly wi th the mine manager 
and to authorise and settle minor issues regarding the mine without the 
necessity of having first to consult the board. All his decisions had, 
however, to be ratified by the board. George Farrar was the first 
appointed to the position. In July 1889 the question of the remuneration 
of the managing director was raised. In view of the amount of time 
involved by the incumbent in pursuing the affairs of the Company, it was 
felt that the managing director should receive some compensation over 
and above the usual directors' fees. The precedent had already been 
established in some of the smaller companies which had voted their 
managing directors monthly salaries of between £20 and £30. Farrar 
relinquished the position at the beginning of 1889 and the mid-year 
meeting decided to reward him with a bonus of £600 for past services, 
payable when the board felt the financial position of the Company 
40. Glanville, E., op.cit., pp.120-21. 
41. The Eastern Star, 23 January 1889. 
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could afford it.42 R.R. Hollins was appointed to succeed Farrar but 
43 
received no salary. The financially embarrassed position in which 
the Company found itself in 1889 precluded the luxury of a paid managing 
director and it was on l y towards the end of 1890 that the issue of the 
. 1 ., d 44 payment for the services of this off~cia was aga1n ra1 se . 
It is difficult to assess the contribution of Mr A.A. Stanton as 
manager of the Witwatersrand Company on the limited information available. 
Inheriting the position from William Knight who managed the mine in its 
formative months, and who remained the largest single shareholder down 
to 1888, it is highly probable that Stanton's initiative was strictly 
curtailed by Knight who retained the position of managing director down 
to late 1888. As already indicated, Knight. held certain fixed ideas 
45 
regarding the early development. of the property, and it. is unlikely 
that Stanton was given much opportunit.y to alt.er the pat.tern of operations 
established by Knight.. The cost effectiveness of Stanton's management 
must thus be closely relat.ed to the overall objectives of Knight's own 
views and approach to mining. Against this background stanton's 
contribution, no matter how effective, was negated by the long term 
disadvantages of the policy adopt.ed by William Knight. The extensive 
quarrying of the ore along the outcrop left a trench which had to be 
filled in before proper st.oping of the reef i .n proximity to it. could be 
undertaken. The belated commencement of shaft mining also represented 
a delay in the training of personne l to undertake that work, or at least 
necessitated the poaching of such staff from other mines at considerable 
cost.. 
The poor grade of are mined 
despite early utterances in this 
on the Witwatersrand Company property, 
46 
regard, made t.he t.ype of mining 
pursued, namely, the open cast operations, cost effective only in the 
very short term. The depletion of working capital on this form of mining 
without the possibilit.y of substant.ial short term ret.urns guaranteed the 
Company financial problems in the medium to long term . Open cast mining 
42. The Diggers' News, 30 July 1889. 
43. The Star (Johannesburg) , 24 August 1889. 
44. Cory Library, MS 16007, op.cit. , 17 December 1890. 
45. See above, Chapter II, p.35. 
46. See above, Chapter II, p. 31. 
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could only have been justified on the Witwatersrand in the case of prop-
erties with very rich ore and a shortage of working capital for shaft 
sinking and stope mining, when the capital deficiency could be eliminated 
by the short term cost advantages of using this method. The Wemmer 
Company can be categorised in this group of companies, but it lost any 
advantage gained by the use of this method in the declaration of ear ly 
and ill-considered dividend payments. It is doubtful if the Witwaters-
rand Company even reflected a small profit from the pursuit of this 
method. Like the management of the Wemmer Company, that of the 
Witwatersrand Company indicates very little consideration in the early 
years for cos t saving. Knight clearly recognised the advantages to be 
gained from large scale operation and from the employment of cheap 
black labour, but did not know how best to apply them to his benefit 
within the Witwatersrand context. An extensive assaying and development 
of the various reefs, followed by the choice of a mill and machinery 
best suited to cater for the progress made in opening the mine, would 
have saved Knight his reputation and enhanced his fortune. 
The early management of the Ferreira mine ref lects the extent to 
which William Knight's methods set the standard for the early 
Witwatersrand field. Open cast mining predominated here too. While 
Knight could at least justify his actions on the strength of the extent 
of the out crop , some 3,5 miles, on his property, a similar technique on 
one the size of the Ferreira mine was c learly inappropria~e, unless 
spectacular results were forthcoming to make up for capital shortfalls 
in the short term. While information on the early operations of the 
manager Johnstone is scant, it seems probable that he employed the 
quarrying technique for as long as possible before resorting to shaft 
mining. It is quite possible, however, that this activity was no t 
restricted to the rich south reef, so that scarce capital was expended 
on the futile opening up of unpayable reef. No early dividends were 
declared and it is possible, · given the results of the trial crushing 
tStrub ' ' 11 47 h 1 a en s m~, t at some limited profit accumu l ation took pace 
t o assist the scant provision of working capital. Nevertheless, a 
dilution of the south reef with other material wou ld have raised both 
the average and total working costs, making for a reduction in total 
profits. High working costs, attributable to the payability of only 
47. See above, Chapter V, p.147. 
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the south reef in the upper levels of the mine, were a persistent feature 
of the early history of the Company. It i s thus unlikely that results 
as spectacular as those of the neighbouring Wemmer Company were forth-
coming. The closing down of the mill at the end of 1887 and dismissal 
of Johnstone, while on one level reflecting his incompetence, must also 
be considered in the light of the growing influence of H. Eckstein and 
Company on the affairs of the Ferreira Company. Although high handed, 
the termination of the manager's services formed part of a major 
restructuring of the Company's operations and was probably only weighed 
in terms of an immediate cost saving. The failure of the two succeeding 
managers suggests the poverty of the class of man available on the Rand 
and the inability of even a firm of the stature of H. Eckstein and 
Company to deal effectively with the difficulty. It was only with the 
appointment of Harry Johns in early 1889 that the problem was overcome, 
and even then' Johns was to establish the reputation of being an 
, , ff ' 48 expens~ve, ~f e ect~ve, manager. 
In considering the employment of labour as a factor in cost mini-
mization, several points must be stressed at the outset. The first is 
the close link between the early Rand industry and Kimber l ey. In this 
regard the new industry unhesitatingly adopted not only the mode of 
capitalist production, as has already been stressed , but also the 
employment practice developed at Kimberley. The new industry had a lso 
to compete with the diamond fields for the supply of labour. 
As SiebOrger has suggested, many of ·the diggers who congregated on 
the early diamond fields were white farmers who brought their African 
or Col oured labourers with' them. While not explicitly outlining the 
initial stages of the developing employment practice, he goes on to 
describe the supercession of these farm labourers by tribesmen who saw 
in the diamond fields the opportunity for accumulating the necessary 
funds for the purchase of firearms and other status symbols within 
their tribal societies. The actions of Richard Southey, Lieutenant 
Governor of Griqualand West between January 1873 and August 1875, and 
private individuals like John Edwards in the recruitment of this labour 
are well documented. The success of their endeavours and the popularity 
of the diamond mines as a mode of temporary employment for African 
48. See above, Chapters IV and V, for evidence of high working costs 
under Johns's management. 
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tribesmen from throughout southern Africa was well established by the 
time of the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886. 49 
In comparison to the diamond fields the Witwatersrand mines required 
a considerable labour complement from the outset of both skilled miners 
and unskilled labourers. For both these types of labour the new gold 
field had to compete with existing employers in South Africa and abroad. 
The discovery of the Sheba Reef at Barberton in 1885 and the opening of 
many of the surrounding quartz reefs by new mining companies in 1886, 
together with the development of shaft mining at Kimberley from 1883 
onwards, neces~itated the increasing use of skilled white miners. 
Undoubtedly., . some of these men were attracted to the Rand as part of 
the "rush" along with other skilled miners and artisans frpm beyond 
South Africa, but the · high wages which had to be offered to this class 
of European workmen suggests their relative scarcity, as does the , ease 
with which only relatively competent miners found employment on the Rand 
as managers. Once again the unique nature of the Witwatersrand dis-
covery, which required their skills from the outset, weighed against 
their voluntary arrival prior to .the "proving" of the field . The 
relative inaccessibility of the Witwatersrand was also a deterrent to 
any skilled artisan from the ·industrializing nations who had come to 
expect a standard of ·living which the Witwatersrand in its early stages 
was incapable of offering. The remarkably rapid metamorphosis of 
Johannesburg from mining camp to a centre offering a wide· range of 
facilities to the public reflects the recognition and pace with which 
the problem was rectified. 50 
Within the South African context, crude as Barberton and Kimberley 
might have appeared in the eyes of outsiders, they nevertheless 
represented an advance on the tent and corrugated iron town of Johannes-
burg in 1886 and 1887. While fever soon eliminated the De Kaap fields 
as serious contenders, Kimberley continued to offer an attractive 
alternative venue of employment for both skilled and unskilled labourers 
throughout the remaining years of the nineteenth century. Likewise, 
49. SiebOrger, R.F., The Recrui·tment and Organisation of African 
Labour for the Kimberley Diamond Mines, 1871-1888, Unpublished 
M.A. thesis, Rhodes University, 1975, Chapters I to III. 
50. Neame, L.E., City Built on Gold, pp.8-22. 
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both these centres were to a greater or lesser extent seeking the same 
type of skilled miners and artisans required by the early Witwatersrand 
companies. Added to the dilemma was the high cost of living which 
prevailed in the South African Republic due to the long distances from 
the coast, its relative underdevelopment which necessitated the importa-
tion of even basic necessities of life, and the 
erected by the Government as a means of raising 
high tariff 
51 
revenue. 
structure 
It was thus 
inevitable that wages would be considerably higher than in the rest of 
South Africa, but there was the additional factor of the need to offer 
even more than a compensatingly higher wage simply to compete for 
skilled workers. It was only with the closing of the Dutoitspan and 
Bultfontein diamond mines at Kimberley at the end of 1892 that the 
competition for 
diminished. 52 
skilled labour from that place can be said to have 
As Doxey has suggested, the eastern Transvaal gold 
fields also fe lt the pressure of competition from Kimberley for miners. 53 
It is doubtful if the creation of the De Beers Consolidated Mines 
Limited in March 1888 resulted in the redundancy of many skilled workers, 
as with the rapid development of shaft mining which followed the amal-
gamation the need for this type of labour is likely to have grown. 
SiebOrger nevertheless points out that following this event, the number 
of African unskilled labourers contracted from 85 180 in 1888 to only 
45 624 in 1890, a reduction also stimul ated by the general economic 
recession. 54 In any event the Witwatersrand had by March 1888 seen 
the initial development of many of the properties and the enthusiasm 
with which open cast mining was embraced suggests the general paucity 
of skilled miners. 
Turning to the situation governing the supply of African unskilled 
labour, Doxey has suggested three main considerations. Firstly, that 
the huge demand for unskilled labour created by the early Witwatersrand 
came at a time when there were competing demands for that labour. 
Secondly, the African had not yet reached a stage where his material 
wants were sufficiently strong to induce him to enter the labour market 
51. Van der Poel, J., Railways and customs Policies in South Africa, 
1885-1910, pp. 17, 55. 
52. Reunert, T., op . cit., p.62. 
53. Doxey, G.V., The Industrial Colour Bar in South Africa, pp.40-41. 
54. Sieborger, R.F., op.cit., pp.149-50. 
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readily, and finally, that the Rand early developed a bad reputation as 
55 
a place of employment. It is worth adding that the disproportionate 
demand for such unskilled workers arose out of the scarcity of skilled 
miners. The shortage and difficulty in procuring skilled miners and 
artis ans, and the resultant high wages they commanded, resulted in 
greater emphasis being placed on the procurement and use of unskilled 
black workers. Assisting this tendency was the shortage of working 
capital which encouraged early management to seek a cost effective way 
of winning gold from their properties. The shortage of black labour was 
therefore immediate and became the chie~ criterion determining the 
amount of ore mined from the open trenches. The statement of William 
Knight that, " ... the natives soon get into the way of it", and the 
shortage of African labourers experienced by him bear re-emphasis. 56 
The short age of unskilled labour was clearly recognised as an easier 
problem to resolve than was the scarcity of skilled workers. The Simmer 
and Jack Company experienced a similar shortage of unskilled labourers 
and Knox sent to Natal for a contingent of Zulu workers, which as 
Sieb5rger has noted, were considered the best and most honest of the 
workers on the diamond fields. 57 The Witwatersrand had thus to break 
into the market for migratory unskilled labourers already established by 
and for the supply of the Kimberley diamond industry . After 1888 the 
task was made lighter by the consolidation of the diamond industry and 
the consequent falling off in the number of black unskilled workers 
required, but by then some sort of precedent had already been established 
regarding employment on the Witwatersrand. 
The scarcity of African workers in the initial stages of the 
Witwatersrand industry was probably met by direct attempts to divert the 
stream of workers passing to Kimberley from the northern and eastern 
Transvaal. By 1886-87 the Kimberley field had been offering employment 
to black labourers for some fifteen years. It does not seem too much 
to suggest that by then a fairly accurate idea of wages and employment 
conditions prevailing at Kimberley were reasonably widespread in the 
areas from which the mines drew their labour. Potential Witwatersrand 
employers could thus only have succeeded in winning these workers by 
55. Doxey, G.V., op.cit., pp . 45ff. 
56. See above, Chapter II, p . 35. 
57. SiebOrger, R.F., op.cit., pp.16-17. 
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the offer of higher wages. For their part, Africans journeying from 
the northern Transvaal and Portuguese East Afri c a would have seriously 
considered the advantage gained from an employment opportunity that was 
much closer to their homes. Nevertheless, SiebOrger asserts that the 
discovery of the Witwatersrand did not initially result in a serious 
decline in the labour supply for the diamond fields,58 and contemporary 
evidence suggests that many Africans used the Witwatersrand as a 
temporary sojourn where money could be earned to help them acquire food 
f th ' ' mb 1 59 and provisions for the remainder a e Journey to K~ er ey. If 
this was the case then it would seem that the Rand was indeed fortunate 
in that greater numbers of blacks must have been coming on to the labour 
market in 1886-87, ' and that at least a certain proportion of these 
workers were prepared to offer their labour on the new gold field. 
Alternatively, the new Witwatersrand managers were themselves successful 
in their recruiting bids beyond what might initially have been expected. 
The extent to which African workers were brought to the Rand , by 
prospective employers is, however, difficult to determine. It seems 
possible that men like William Knight, J.B. Robinson and the members 
of the Eckstein group, could have arranged for the diversion of workers 
to the new field. Their standing in Kimberley and an intimate knowledge 
of the recruitment system applied there, could well have resulted in 
such a move. Such a step would, . undoubted l y, have been executed 
clandestinely so as not to provoke public comment in Kimberley. It 
would also, of necessity, have had to be finely attuned to the needs of 
both Kimberley and the Rand, so as not to have caused any embarrassing 
labour shortages in Kimberley. 
The greatest concern of Witwatersrand management in the years down 
to 1889, with regard to labour, was the question of supply rather than 
cost. The awareness of a dire need for cost minimization as a means of 
achieving profit seems largely to have been ignored. It was anticipated 
that the re,turns of gold from most mines would be more than sufficient 
to offset working costs and result in substantial profits. Similarly, 
while larger profits were being made by companies on their share 
operations such a view was perhaps inevitable, and the directors of most 
companies seem to have taken only a belated interest in this factor, as 
58. I b id. 
59. The Eastern Star, 14 May 1888 . 
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60 for example in the case of the Wemmer Company. Initially, while 
expectations of fabulous returns in excess of one ounce of gold per ton 
of ore were general, the relatively low cost at which Africans could be 
hired, even if at higher rates than prevailed elsewhere, probably 
concealed the total cost of this vital factor of production. Far 
greater quantities of the limited working capital were being channelled 
into equipment and machinery and the emphasis rested rather with the 
need for a quick return on this outlay_ Most managers therefore 
probably considered that they could well afford the internecine labour 
poaching and the slowly spiralling cost of increased wages which 
inevitably resulted. In the words of an editorial of the local press 
in 1888 61 , 
"The best managed company cannot satisfactorily prosecute 
its work unless the supply of labour at command is, if not 
practically unlimited, at least reliable, and sufficiently 
to be depended upon to keep work both at the mine and at 
the mill constantly goin'g. That, however, is unfortunately 
far from being the case at present." 
It is here that the second point raised by Doxey becomes relevant, 
if not strictly in the context in which it was originally stated, 
namely, that the African had not yet reached a stage where his material 
wants were sufficiently strong to induce him readily to enter the labour 
market. Considering the broad 's tructure of the total black population 
of southern Africa at the time, Doxey's assertion is undoubtedly correct, 
but it would seem that a significant group did recognise the potential 
of the labour market and came increasingly to exploit it for their own 
benefit. As Sieborger has suggested, the Kimberley fields had by the 
mid 1880's developed not only a permanent African population, which 
the compound system subsequently acted against, but had also developed 
to a point where black mine workers were regularly returning to the 
62 fields to seek further terms of employment. The extent to which this 
latter phenomenon was the result of coercion or choice is not fully 
explored, but Sieborger tends to favour an interpretation based on 
choice. By early 1888 the complaint regarding the supply of African 
labour to the Witwatersrand was not that it was unobtainable, but rather 
60. See above, Chapter IV, p.111. 
61. The Eastern Star, 14 May 1888. 
62. Sieborger, R.F., op.cit., pp.159ff. 
that it was unreliable. 
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63 Once more in the words of the local press, 
"The supply of labour is most unreliable. One week hands 
are plentiful; next week, without any apparent cause, the 
mine and battery is left with hardly sufficient hands to 
keep it going, and stoppages at night, with attendant heavy 
losses, are unfortunately too frequent of late." 
The immediate inference to be drawn from this statement is that the 
situation was caused by labour poaching, which in tUrn suggests a 
shortage of labour in the overall. There can be no denying that this was 
partly the case, but it is interesting that the editorial attributed the 
broader Shortages to the prevailing working conditions. The chief source 
of labour was seen .to corne from the northern Transvaal, and while such 
workers were considered to be of "poor stamina ll and unable to cope with 
the constant changes of temperature, especially the cold and wet under-
ground conditions,64 "sudden and extensive migrations of labourers will 
continue ll • 65 The migrations referred to were to Kimberley, where it 
was generally recognised that these workers preferred the dry underground 
conditions. As already indicated, for many Africans the Witwatersrand 
was merely a stepping stone, where they were prepared to work until they 
had earned sufficient to "carry them on their way to Kimberley ... 66 
It is doubtful, however, if the migration t o Kimberley was the only 
aspect in the unreliability of the Rand African labour force. The 
emphasis on weekly fluctuations rather reflects the extent to which this 
labour force were willing and carefully attuned to the competition and 
labour poaching which characterised the early Rand. Prevailing conditions 
and the offer of temporary employment on the journey to Kimberley tell 
only part of the story. Clearly there were those Africans on the Rand 
who were there because of the offer of higher wages and the realization 
that a strong bargaining tool existed in the system of weekly employment 
for raising those wages by playing off one employer against another. 
Undoubtedly the problem which the choice of working on the Rand or 
Kimberley fields offered potential work seekers was partially obviated 
63. The Eastern Star, 14 May 1888. 
64. Probably one of the earliest references to the pneumonia which 
killed thousands of work seekers from north of latitude 22 
degrees south b e fore a ban was imposed on the importation of 
these Africans in 1913. 
65. The Eastern Star, 14 May 1888. 
66. Ibid. 
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by the consolidation of the diamond mining industry in 1888 , but the 
fact that the situation was exploited by African labourers, gave to these 
workers a far freer labour market than has been recognised by many 
commentators on labour matters in South Africa. Not only were a 
signif i cant group of Africans by the mid 1880's aware of the increasing ' 
employment opportunities being offered but they were also wi lling to seek 
employment in the mining industry. Undoubtedly the situation altered i n 
the 1890's when, as a resu l t of the rapid expansion of the gold mining 
industry, the demand for labour outstripped the supply of those Africans 
willing to offer their labour in this field, but for the initial years of 
the Witwatersrand industry it is incorrect to assert that the shortfal l 
i n supply at anyone t i me was entirely due to a lack of material wants or 
sufficiently strong inducements on the part of the potential labour force. 
African workers for the Witwa tersrand mines were forthcoming but in the 
prevailing free market conditions they were prepared to playoff one 
employer against the next and the whole Rand industry against its 
counterpart in Kimberley. The initial difficulty for Witwatersrand 
employers lay rather in breaking into the existing labour market and 
employment patterns established for the supply of labour to the Kimberley 
mines. Having achi eved this breakthrough however, a situation was created 
which simply widened the empl oyment opportunities which could be exploited 
by the African labour force. 
The factor which enhanced the difficulties for Rand employers was 
that the industry soon developed a bad reputation as an empl oyer, thus 
playing into the hands of their Kimberley competitors. Conditions in 
1886 and early 1887 on the Rand were very similar t o those prevailing 
in Kimberley . The oxidized upper reaches of the reef near the surface 
were relatively easy to work and the methods employed were very similar 
to those prevailing in the open Kimberley workings. It would seem that 
the African l abourers general l y shared an aversion for underground work 
and this could well have been a further factor prompting the ge neral 
adoption of open cast mining operations on the Rand . Hence it is 
probably accurate to say that the Rand in 1886 and early 1887 had fewer 
underground workings than the Kimberley field where shaft mining was 
becoming regularly employed in the Kimberley mine. By 1888, however , 
shaft mining was becoming standard .practice on the Rand, while Kimber l ey 
still operated the Dutoitspan and Bultfontein mines as open workings. 
Thus the initial open trenches of the Rand were a familiar sight to those 
passing to seek employment in Kimber l ey and could have served as an 
229 
inducement for these workers to linger or stay on at the Witwatersrand. 
The shaft mining increasingly adopted on the Rand in 1888 inherited 
a damp legacy from the open cast operations . In the wet summers of 
1887 and 1888 the open trenches soon filled with water making their 
draining and working a more tiresome and costly business than was 
originally anticipated . The inducement was to begin underground opera-
tions but even then the trenches above served as reserv0irs from which 
water percolated down into the workings. Thus it was not the harshness 
of the highveld winter which deterred potential workers, for similar 
conditions prevailed in Kimberley, but rather the damp underground 
conditions. At the comparatively shallow depths of the Rand pits in 
1888-89, with few workings going 
temperature differed little from 
below 300 feet, the surrounding rock 
67 
the surface and was probably made 
cooler by the proximity of the water. Another factor was that very few 
companies had made adequate provision for the draining of their mines. 
It is not surprising therefore that the winter of 1888 brought on .the 
first major exodus of workers from the Rand . Without the provision of 
adequate protective clothing and accommodation, working conditions were 
68 
terrible. Commenting on these conditions the local press wrote, 
"Last week the cold was so intense that work at the shafts 
was quite impossible. water froze on the platforms at the 
Ferreira and Wemmer shafts as it was emptied from the 
buckets. With some little attention to the comfort of the 
natives, there will, we are" sure, be less difficul.ty 
experienced in keeping them .. " 
To add to the discomfort of these workers was the fact that during 
this severe winter Johannesburg was all but cut off from the coast and 
near famine conditions came to prevail. Under these circumstances the 
African workers were underfed, where the feeding of their staff was 
practiced by any of the companies at all. By mid June a considerable 
number of companies had ceased to operate or had curtailed their 
activi ties, "in consequence of 
of what is obtainable, as well 
the scar ci ty of 
69 
as for fuel .. " 
labour, and the high cost 
The shortage of labour 
67. Truscott, S.J., The Witwatersrand Goldfield: Banket and Mining 
Practice, pp .. 388ff, estimated the increase in rock temperature 
for the Rand as 1 degree rise for every 250 feet of depth. 
68. The Eastern Star, 30 May 1888. 
69. The Eastern Star, 11 June 1888. 
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was so acute that mine managers were offering premiums ranging between 
55. and 20s. to touts for every labourer brought in and many Europeans 
found employment in this way. As the press wryly commented, the 
provision of better accommodation and 
a large extent, obviated the need for 
working conditions would have, to 
th . 70 h e pract~ce. T e Rand thus 
early gained a bad reputation as a place of employment, to which the 
later use of coercion can be seen as a logical progression in the drive 
by mine managers to rehabilitate their companies. 
As far as the specific companies of this study are concerned, with 
the exception of the Ferreira and Simmer and Jack Companies which by May 
1888 had quarters of some description for their African workers, no 
mention is made of 'any such provision. Even in the case of the Simmer and 
Jack Company, the facility took the form of a wood 
while providing some form of shelter, was far from 
and iron 
71 ideal. 
shed which, 
The 
Wemmer Company records make no mention of labour and it is according l y 
difficult to draw conclusions. A fall in monthly tonnage crushed .did, 
however, occur from May 1888, which suggests that the Company also 
72 
experienced a labour shortage. A press report in June 1888 suggested 
that the Witwatersrand Company's battery had shut down for want of 
labour. 73 While the report was later denied by the manager,74 it is 
obvious that any company as labour intensive in operation as the 
Witwatersrand Company was from the outset, was bound to feel the pinch. 
The Ferreira Company also suffered a severe shortage of l~our in the 
winter months of 1888, no doubt mainly because water in the mine 
75 
constituted a serious problem. The Simmer and Jack Company, given 
the scale of its operations, was 
working costs was duly commented 
bound to 
76 
upon. 
suffer, and the increase in 
The lack of adequate facilities for the housing of African workers 
must also be viewed against the background of the minimal working 
capital with which the companies were initially provided. With the 
70. The Eastern Star, 30 May 1888. 
71. See above, Chapter III, p.80. 
72. Goldman, C.S . , op . cit. (1892) , p.55B. 
73. The Eastern Star , 14 June 1888. 
74. The Eastern Star, 15 June 1888. 
75. See above, Chapter V, p. 154. 
76. See above, Chapter III, pp.80-81. 
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bulk of these limited funds expended on the provision of often inadequate 
machinery, little remained for the e s tablishment of proper surface 
£acilities for staff. Here too, in terms of an overtly racialist 
society, and because of their greater scarcity and bargaining power, 
provision of suitable accommodation for white employees received more 
immediate atte ntion. In any event, it is quite possible that following 
the early Kimberley trend, African employees were expected to provide 
their own shelter and accommodation. The nature of such accommodation 
was likely to be flimsy, given the transient nature of the work force 
and the lack of adequate natural building material such as saplings 
and thatching grass in the vicinity. It is doubtful whether these 
dwellings were built on mine property as this would have restricted 
the movement of the owner in seeking employment on different mines. 
Even this statement presupposes that the worker would receive adequate 
time for the construction of such accommodation, which does not 
necessarily follow given that most companies operated 
working week . 
a seven day 
In summary it can be said that while many of the problems and trends 
which later came to dominate the employment pattern for black labour saw 
their origins in this early period before 1889, it is unlikely that the 
employers of that labour clearly recognised or foresaw the course which 
events . would take. The total cost of this labour in relation to overall 
costs was not yet clearly understood and the emphasis rested on the 
procurement of sufficient workers rather than their total or individual 
cost. The workers themselves had to weigh up the advantages of the 
Witwatersrand in terms of closer proximity to their homes and the 
possibly slightly higher wages than those paid at Kimberley, as against 
the poor and insalubrious working conditions of the Rand by comparison 
to Kimberley. 
The type and positioning of machinery was also a factor used by 
management to minimize costs. This was crucial to the thinking of 
William Knight in determining the equipment to be installed by the 
Witwatersrand Company. Knight ordered the machinery for the mine very 
soon after he gained the lease on the title of the farm Driefontein's 
mynpacht. Obviously the choice of the 100 stamp mill for the purpose 
of working an essentially unproved property represented a gamble of 
the first order. The choice of Messrs Robey, Jordan and Company as 
the suppliers of the plant could only have been motivated by the usual 
considerations of price, lead time, reputation for meeting contracts, 
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and quality of craftsmanship. Nevertheless, we have the statement by 
Hennen Jennings that the mill was a new departure for the Company and 
the subsequent history of the plant suggests that it was not a happy 
77 
one. What then decided Knight in his choice? We shall never know, 
possibly it was the price at which the equipment could be obtained, it 
is equally possible that Knight might have had previous dealings with 
this company in the supply of machinery for the diamond mines he 
managed. To suggest, however, that Knight was buying plant without any 
knowledge of mining requirements is obviously incorrect, and he no doubt 
sought the best material available, at least in so far as he assessed 
the situation . Provision was made for automatic feeders for the stamps, 
although they were ·only installed some four months after the commencement 
of milling operations. Likewise, Frue Vanners were acquired for the 
gathering of concentrates and thus the completion of the amalgamation 
process as it was known at the time. The emphasis thus seems to have 
lain in an attempt to maximize output rather than the minimization of the 
cost of operations; a logical choice given the unproved nature of the 
property at the time of ordering. But having made the purchase, which 
absorbed considerably more funds than Knight had originally intended, 
cost consciousness seems to have overtaken the enterprise. The change 
in attitude was notably due to the poor results from the first trial 
crushings, as rather than yielding in excess of one ounce of gold per 
ton of ore, the first crushing from Struben 's mill yielded only 
78 12,5 dwts. 
The equipment purchased by Knight was for the reduction of ore only. 
No mention in his early account to Mathers suggests the procurement of 
hauling gear or pumping equipment for working the mine. 79 With regard 
to the battery, however, no expense was spared and there is even the 
suggestion that the items bought included a dynamo for the generation of 
electricity to allow for night work in the mill. 80 The imbalance 
between mine and mill was not rectified in" the early years of operation, 
and while the comparative neglect of the mine represented a saving on 
capital expenditure, it could only have helped to raise working costs 
77. See above, Chapter II, p. 33. 
78. See above, Chapter II, p .31. 
79. Mathers, E. P. , The Goldfields Revisited, Chapter 29. 
80. Ibid. , p.274. 
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in the long term. It is highly improbable, owing to the mining technique 
used and the lack of sufficient labour that the mine could ever have 
supplied enough ore to keep the full 100 stamp mill working continuously, 
presuming always that it had been capable of doing so. 
Cost consciousness was displayed in the choice of a mill site, as 
well as in the inadequate preparation of its foundations. Some 
controversy surrounds the merits of the foundations prepared for the 
mill. Mathers wrote , "there is a fine solid foundation for the batteries 
made of first rate stone",S1 yet successive mining engineers condemned 
the work, suggesting that it was a major cause of the recurrent break-
downs of the mill. 82 The stone was quarried locally and it is likely 
that considerations of cost and a haste to bring the mill into operation 
led to its weakness. 
Knight also established a trend with the positioning of the mill. 
Situated a considerable distance from the limine", it was mistakenly 
believed that it would be cheaper to run the ore over the distance to 
the mill than to pump water in the opposite . direction. The ore was 
initially transported by ox-cart although these were later replaced by 
a tramline. The Diggers' News indicates that by 1891 the transport of 
ore over considerable distances 
companies between £100 and £300 
between mine and mill was costing some 
83 
a week. Knight's intention was that 
by positioning the mill low in the valley to the south of the outcrop 
workings, g ravity could be used to run both ore and the necessary water 
to the site. Undoubtedly the plan of carrying ore to the water was in 
part a perpetuation of the Kimberley mining practice of tramming ore to 
the weathering and sorting floors, but it also had an element of merit 
in it which might equally have been a legacy of Knight's Kimberley 
experience. The lower cost of pumping water to a mill located near the 
pit head, or quarry in this case, seems a logical approach until the 
fuel situation is considered. In terms of such a plan two separate 
engines are required to run the mill and water pumps in their separate 
locations. By positioning the mill at, or in close proximity to, the 
water supply, both functions can be performed by a single engine, as 
was the case in all four of the companies studied. Not only did this 
81. Ibid., p.274. 
82. See above, Chapter II, pp.42, 44. 
83. The Diggers' News, 10 April 1891. 
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save the additional capital expenditure on a second steam engine, but 
i ·t also reduced fuel bills at a time when tile supply of fuel was at best 
precarious on tile treeless highveld. The outlay on such a pumping 
engine would also have had to be considerable given the gradients and 
distances of seldom less than a mile over which water had to be raised 
and the enormous quantities required in the reduction process. The 
amount of water needed was estimated at 2 000 gallons per ton of ore 
84 
crushed. 
The discovery of coal deposits in close proximity to the Vaal River 
was made in 1879 by George William Stow. Witil tile financial support of 
Samuel Marks an organisation was established to work the find while in 
1891 tile first coal from tile site was transported tile 300 miles to 
Kimberley by ox wagon. The deposit was worked more regularly after the 
discovery of the Rand in 1886 but it was not until 1892 that "De Suid 
Afrikaansche en Oranje Vrystaatsche Kalen en Mineralen Vereenigingll was 
established to exploit the find systematically. Prior to tilis the 
quantity and supply of coal from tile find was erratic, altilough a press 
report in mid-1888 suggested tilat coal from tilis source was being 
85 
supplied to Johannesburg at 13s. a bag. In 1886 tile situation was 
less stable and William Knight hoped to reduce tile cost of his fuel 
bills by substituting peat found on Driefontein for the coal supplied 
from "Steen Coal Spruit", which was costing between 40s. and 50s. a ton. 
He also hoped tilat the arrival of summer would see a considerable 
reduction in tile price. 86 The Venter and Vogelstruis collieries were 
situated in tile Middelburg district some 48 miles east of Johannesburg 
and besides supplying tile Witwatersrand Company also met orders from 
the Wemmer and Stanhope companies. 87 It was only following the dis-
covery of substantial coal deposits at Boksburg in December 1887 that a 
marked improvement in the supply and price of coal swung the situation 
in favour of locating mills close to tile mine pit heads. By then many 
companies, including those considered in this study with the exception 
of the Simmer and Jack Company, were already committed to established 
84. liThe Gold Mining Companies on the Witwatersrand", p.9, a booklet 
to accompany Bacon's Map of the Goldfields, 1895; 
85. The Eastern Star, 1 June 1888. 
86 . Mathers, E.P., op.cit., p.274 . 
87. The Eastern Star, 17 October 1887. 
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mill locations up to two miles away from their mines. But even then 
transport continued to be the Achilles heel of the coal supply to the 
Witwatersrand until the opening of the Rand tram line between Boksburg 
and Krugersdorp in early 1891 allowed for the regular supply of coal 
throughout the year. The winter of 1888 saw a tremendous escalation in 
the price of coal as i "t became virtually unobtainable on the Rand. 
Wood too increased rapidly in price from the same cause of a lack of 
transport, rising from between E3 and E4 
E7 a load. As a press editorial pointed 
a wagon 
88 
out, 
load to between E6 and 
"It is not that there is not an abundance of good coal close 
at hand. There are numerous mines within easy reach capable 
of furnishing an almost inexhaustable supply, but ... unless 
carriage is at hand and always to be relied upon, any serious 
stoppage of traffic must jeopardise the work at the batteries." 
In August 1889 the Coal Trust Company came into existence with the 
specific intention of buying up coal mines and working them lion the most 
approved and economical system". This monopoly, while controlled' by the 
Ecksteins and other Rand financiers, did make a positive contribution in 
regularising both the supply and price of coal supplied to the gold 
mines. A substantial net profit of E3 000 a month was recorded in 1891, 
yet no serious complaint was raised about the price of coal from 
Witwatersrand managers. 89 A further serious interruption in the supply 
of coal occurred in early 1893 when heavy rains caused wash-aways on 
the Rand tram line. Several of the Boksburg coal mines were also 
flooded. Eyes were turned to Messrs Lewis and Marks' Vereeniging mines 
to come to the rescue. Unfortunately these mines were already involved 
in the major contract of supplying the Cape Government Railways require-
ments and the shortage on the Rand thus persisted throughout February 
90 
of that year. By the end of February the Ferreira Company had been 
91 forced to close down its rock drilling plant as a result of the shortage. " 
In future years company managers were exhorted to build up stccks 
of coal prior to the onset of winter and they continued to count them-
88. The Eastern Star, 14 May 1888. 
89. The Star, 12 July 1891. 
90. The Star, 14 February 1893. 
91. The Star, 27 February 1893. 
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selves fortunate the fewer boiler fires they had to keep burning. With 
the improvement in the supply situation a gauge of successful management 
lay in the speed with which the mining companies adapted to the new 
circumstances and relocated their batteries to achieve a greater cost 
effectiveness in the operation of the plant. 
Period II: 1889 to 1894 
The highlight of this period is the reconstruction of many of the 
Witwatersrand companies in the aftermath of the stock exchange boem and 
the growing awareness en the part of mining companies' senior manage-
ment of the need to concentrate on winning profits from their mines 
rather than the steck exchange. The collapse of the share market 
initially heralded a period when the more optimistic and dissolute sought 
signs, nO". matter how weak, in the recovery of their beloved share market. 
By the end of 1889 hope was fading for a quick recovery of the market 
amongst even the hardest of the speculators and the realization spread 
that it would only be through the dividend paying capacity of the mining 
companies that any recovery of the share market would come. By the end 
of 1894 this position had been reached. 
In the light of these changed circumstances profit maximization 
took on a new meaning. Profits would in future have to be won from the 
mines and in order to "achieve these the companies had to make the 
necessary adjustments. Most companies along the main reef had by 1889 
proved their ability to produce gold: what was now required was that they 
did so profitably. Faced with a fixed price for their commodity the 
potential to show a surplus rested entirely on the costs involved in 
winning the gold~ A new cost consciousness beset t he industry which has 
remained with it to the present. A clearer understanding also dawned on 
the relationship between the scale of production and costs. In turn, 
the fall in yields per ton, occasioned by the working of larger quantities 
of pyritic are, necessitated a further emphasis on cost effectiveness', 
at least until such time as a process for extracting a greater prop-
ortion of the gold contained in the ore was adopted. 
The speculative bubble of 1888-89 burst amid the growing realization 
amongst investors that prevailing conditions in the Witwatersrand 
industry were far from healthy. The immediate cause of the collapse is 
often attributed to the "pyritic are" scare, namely, that as the oxidized 
ares in proximity to the surface were worked out, those containing a 
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greater proportion of refractive sulphites were encountered which 
rendered up less gold by the traditional.malagamation process of 
reduction. Such ore required new and costly techniques to work the 
92 gold. The situation on the Rand can be compared to a similar crisis 
which occurred on the diamond fields upon the encountering of the "blue 
ground". There, many "diggers sold up their claims in the belief that 
no more diamonds would be found once the oxidized "y;ellow ground" was 
worked out. It is not to belittle the psychological impact of the news 
that pyritic ore had been encountered in 1889, to suggest that it was 
not the only cause. The speculative mania which reached its peak in 
ear l y 1889 drew much of its sustenance from the issuing of stock in 
companies floated to work the "outside" reefs, namely, the Kimberley, 
Bird and Livingstone reef series. We should not under-rate the role of 
the main reef series companies in the speculation, but must remember 
that most of the companies formed to work the main reef were floated by 
the end of 1887. Nevertheless, such concernS as the Wemmer Company 
effectively used the boom for further share issues. There was, however, 
a growing realization that these 11 secondary II reef companies were never 
likely to pay under the prevailing conditions, and as The Star 
93 
commented, 
liTo a very large extent the recent flotation of new Companies, 
and the underwriting of nearly all their capital here, is 
answerable for it [the crisis]." 
There was also the awareness that the exhaustion of the outcrop would 
require deeper mining with the increased risks and capital outlay whi ch 
such mining necessitated. It was the combination of these factors which 
helped to sober the market in the face of the poor past performance of 
most companies. 
The course of the year 1889 saw ·~the commencement of a new trend 
of serious and committed mining along the main reef. In the weeks 
following March there were, no doubt, many companies who simply paid 
lip service to the concept of proper mining in the hopes of breathing 
life into the falling share market, but as The Star noted at the begin-
ning of April, the malaise now besetting the Rand was of the same genre 
92. Fraser, M. and Jeeves, A., All That Glittered, p.27, and Morrell, 
W.P., The Gold Rushes, p.349. 
93. The Star, 5 April 1889 . 
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as that which had systematically reduced both Kimberley and Barberton 
to a sense of realism in the past. The crisis would continue until 
!I ••• all the Companies are fairly at work and paying regular dividends.,,94 
The proper development and opening of the mines was considered one of 
the most vital steps. Up to now few mines were worked on such a scale 
that their batteries did not soon outstrip their production, causing 
the mills to lapse into periodic idleness. 95 Regular production would 
not only ensure the maximum utilization of all resources, thus ensuring 
maximum output, but would also serve to reduce working costs. 
The emphasis placed on improvement was in keeping with the new 
trend towards greater profitability. All four of the companies con-
sidered in this study underwent improvement and reorganisation of some 
description in these years, along with numerous other companies. 
Coming at a time when the share market was deteriorating rapidly and 
when local and international banking institutions were shy of further 
involvement in the Rand industry, the means by which the necessary 
finances for this capital investment were raised is an interesting 
aspect of the trend. The collapse of the stock exchange left many of 
the local banks seriously embarrassed and forced some, including the 
Cape of Good Hope Bank, to close their doors. Cut off from any direct 
links with Johannesburg, other than the telegraph, Cape and other 
Colonial banks were unable directly to influence the activities of 
their Johannesburg branch managers. There followed a gen~ral over-
extension of credit for share speculation, followed by a too vigorous 
retraction of these facilities. Similarly, in Europe the Baring crisis 
ensured a termination of funds for an industry as speculative as gold 
mining. The downward trend in share prices continued to about March 
of 1890. The market value of thirty "best known" shares, with a 
nominal value of £7 174 
1889 to £9 421 000 on 4 
000, dropped from £24 813 000 on 15 February 
96 March 1890. Thus the speculative crisis of 
1889 can be said t",have given rise to the banking crisis of 1890 and 
the ensuing economic recession. 97 The Rand mining companies, cut 
off from their traditional sources of funds, turned increasingly to 
94. Ibid. 
95. The Star, 15 Hay 1889. 
96. Schumann, C.G.W., op.cit . , p.88. 
97. Ibid. 
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private loan companies or the firms of the emerging "group" structure, 
such as H. Eckstein and Company, who had either excess funds or access 
to these, as a means of raising the resources for improvements. Most 
of these funds originated in Britain where, for example, the Transvaal 
Mortgage, Loan and Finance Company and Wernher, Beit and Company, 
were situated. Interest rates on such loans varied according to the 
conditions and circumstances of the loan but most varied between six 
and twelve to twenty per cent. 
For the Ferreira Company a series of loans were arranged through 
the auspices of H. Eckstein and Company and their London principals at 
various rates. The initial loan was for £55 000 at 8 per cent, while 
the second bond, 
was issued at 12 
given the Company's tardiness in repaying the first, 
98 per cent. Similarly, the Simmer and Jack Company 
paid rates of between ten and twelve 
Transvaal Mortgage, Loan and Finance 
per cent for 
99 Company. 
its loans from the 
The amounts raised by 
the various companies are also worth noting. In all the Ferriera 
Company borrowed approximately £105 000 in addition to the amount of 
£25 500 raised from the sale of reserve shares; the Simmer and Jack 
Company borrowed £55 000 besides reinvesting an amount of over £50 000 
from profits in the period down to June 1891 alone. The Witwatersrand 
Company borrowed £10 000 from the National Bank in July 1891, when the 
banking sector again felt confident of the Rand's future, and in 
addition ploughed £22 500 of windfall profit from the sale! of claims 
into development and improvements. That these amounts were inadequate 
to the task required of the Witwatersrand Company's management is borne 
out in the closure first of 
the remainder of the period 
the mill and subsequently of the mine for 
100 down to 1894. The Wemmer Company was 
fortunate in that its good reputation as a gold producer allowed it to 
raise an amount of £20 000 by means of a share issue in 1889. 101 As 
already indicated, the likely buyer of this scrip was H. Eckstein and 
Company, one of the few organisations with the funds and faith to take 
up a block of 5 000 shares at £4 each. The Wemmer's nominal capital was 
again raised from £40 000 to £55 000 in September 1890 but it was not 
98. See above, Chapter V, pp.159-60, 165, 167. 
99. See above, Chapter III, pp.76, 78. 
100. See above, Chapter II, p.48. 
101. See above, Chapter IV, p.lli. 
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before 1891 that the Company was able to sell 8 000 of these shares to 
reduce the burgeoning debt of nearly £24 000. Despite these increases 
in nominal capital and the sale of the shares at substantial profits, 
the Wemmer Company was forced to resort to loans, with significant 
amounts being borrowed from the Heidelberg and Witwatersrand 
. 102 
Compan~es. 
In a ll four of the companies considered, the funds so raised were 
poured into improvements and the proper development of the i r mines. 
In the case of the Wemmer and Witwatersrand Companies too little was 
actually accomplished to result in any marked improvement in the 
overall prospects of these concerns in 1891. Thereafter the Witwaters-
rand Company closed down until 1894, deciding rather to let a portion 
of its ground on tribute to raise capital and test an area of its 
property. For the Wemmer Company the year 1891 saw it still burdened 
with an unprofitable operation which forced it into the acceptance of 
domination by H. Eckstein and Company in a bid to achieve profitaqility.103 
It is also true that all the companies of the study seri"ously under-
estimated the costs of the exercise they were embarked upon . In the case 
of the Wemmer Company the shortage of funds resulted in the decision to 
compromise on the improvements ini t ially envisaged in the Woodhouse plan, 
rather than make any sacrifice of the financial independence of the 
Company . For the Witwatersrand Company, its past history and faulty 
battery deterred its directors from incurring any greater indebtedness 
in the attempt to rescue the Company. 
In no other company was the under-estimation of capital requirements 
so marked as in the case of the Ferreira Company. The ini tial estimates 
in March 1889 put the amount needed for the expansion project at between 
£40 000 and £50 000. An amount of £25 500 was raised from the sale of 
reserve shares, but being insufficient to meet requirements, the first 
loan of £55 000 was raised from H. Eckstein and Company. Despite these 
infusions of funds, by April 1891 the Company's debts amounted to 
£111 000. 104 It was the voracious appetite of the Company for funds 
which severely strained its relationship with the firm of H. Eckstein 
and Company, and gave the latter some idea of what financial commitments 
102. See above, Chapter IV, P.120 and Chapter II, pp.55-56. 
103. See above, Chapter IV, pp.129-30. 
104. See above, Chapter v, p.165. 
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lay ahead in the development of the deep level companies . When com-
pleted the improvement scheme left the Ferriera Company with a property 
fully equipped and second to none on the field in terms of i ts 
sophistication and technical excellence. These factors had now to be 
weighed against the limited life of the existing property and the 
remaining relatively high cost structure. 
The Simmer and Jack Company recognised in its improvement programme 
that maximizing output would assist to reduce working costs per ton and 
thus maximize profit. The intention was to raise the c~ushing capacity 
of the mi l l from 25 to 80 stamps and to develop the mine proportionately. 
It was initially anticipated that the necessary equipment wou l d involve 
an outlay of approximately £20 000 and a total expenditure of £49 000 
with mine development. The funds were to be raised from the sal e of 
10 000 newly issued shares and the floating of ten and a half claims of 
the eastern portion of the property as a separate company. The collapse 
of the share market rendered the first alternative unviable while-
squabbling amongst the shareholders regarding the nature and composit ion 
of the second option, forced the Company into taking a loan of 
£30 000 f r om the Transvaal Mortgage, Loan and Finance Company. The 
continued profitability of the 25 stamp mill encouraged the board to be 
more venturous and it was subsequently decided to add a further twenty 
stamps to those on order, as well as increasing the outlay on other 
equipment. A further loan of £25 000 at ten per cent was . arranged 
through the same loan company in March 1890 to cover the additional 
expenditure and shortfalls on initial estimates . Even then expenditure 
on equipment was f ar from complete and the Company went on to add a 
cyanide plant, erected by the Rand Central Ore Reduction Company, to 
its capital outlay before the end of 1894 . The success of the initial 
i mprovement scheme in the increased profits it won for the Company 
decided the board by 1892 to embark on a further venture which would see 
105 the more extensive development of the eastern portion of the property. 
It was the delay in implementing these ideas which created the opening 
for the take-over negotiations by The Conso l idated Gold Fields of South 
Africa Limited. 106 
105. See above, Chapter III, pp . 92ff. 
106. See above, Chapter III, pp.95ff. 
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The improvements and reorganisation which took place in the years 
after 1889 rendered the companies of the Rand increasingly vulnerable 
and heightened their commitment to success. Faced with high finance 
charges and the mortgaging of their properties, the inducement to restart 
their mills and show satisfactory profits was great. In the examples 
given above this sentiment is clearest in the case of the Ferreira 
Company_ The commitment to success was, however, governed by a 
predominant sentiment that the development of the mines should be under-
taken along thorough lines. The management of the Wemmer Company was 
an exception amongst the four companies of this thinking and its 
attitude and willingness to compromise cost it dearly; while the manage-
ment of the Witwatersrand Company was never so seriously committed to 
the successful mining of the property and always viewed the value of 
the estate before that of the mineral wealth. As The Diggers' News noted 
in August 1889,107 
"It is pleasing to note the vast improvements that are being 
carried out in regard to mining and battery work. In the 
early days a cheese paring policy was pursued that has long 
since borne its fruit .. a Anyone taking the trouble to visit 
any newly erected batteries wil l at once perceive the 
improvements a Instead of temporary sheds, and make-shift 
arrangements, everything is being done solidly and well. II 
Thus while development costs soared beyond the expectations of the 
managements of most companies , the imperative for genuine .working profits 
grew stronger. I t is possible that much of this initial improvement was 
undertaken by some companies essentially as "window dressingll , which 
would ensure them a better reputation when share prices again lifted and 
"mining" centred on the stock exchange. The boom never materialised and 
all companies alike had soon to settle down to the serious business of 
working their mines effectively and efficiently to overcame their 
indebtedness and to yield dividends to a critical shareholding. The 
imperative of genuine working profits was increasingly recognised to 
rest on cost reduction and output maximization. In the words of The 
. , 108 D.lggers News, 
"The fact is gradually intruding itself that there is a greater 
necessity for economy in mining in this district. The expenses 
107. The Diggers' News, 1 August 1889. 
108. The Diggers' News, 17 October 1889. 
243 
are far too high and a reduction is necessary if dividends 
are to be more generally paid ... II 
It was perhaps inevitable that not all company managements were 
equally aware of the necessity for cost reduction, just as not all of 
them were equally well equipped successfully to reduce their cost 
structures. Amongst the four companies, it is possibly significant that 
the larger properties with poorer quality ores were more successful in 
reducing their costs than the smaller, richer companies operating on a 
smaller scale and with thinner reefs. In both the Simmer and Jack 
and the Witwatersrand Companies there was some measure of success in 
the years down to the end of 1894 in reducing their working costs to 
below 20 shillings . per ton,. although in both cases the calculation of 
these costs usually excluded the development costs of the mine. The 
effectiveness of such action is clear in the case of the Simmer and 
Jack Company, where the low cost structure resulted in a steady flow 
of profit which assisted with the expense of development and expansion 
and helped to place the Company on a sound financial footing. For 
the Witwatersrand Company, the profit from 10\/ working costs, which 
were as low as 15s. 3d. per ton for March 1891, were nevertheless 
outweighed by the erratic nature of the deposits and the high develop-
ment costs. Under these .circumstances the Company was unable to raise 
itself by its own bootstraps and was forced to close down when 
H. Eckstein and Company proved unwilling to risk further capital 
involvement in its affairs. 
Unfortunately, the exact factors contributing to the successful 
reduction of working costs by the two companies are not clear from what 
little information we have of their activities. We know that in the 
case of the Witwatersrand Company an American manager, Henry Morris, 
was specifically appointed because of his reputation for reducing 
working costs, and that he subsequently succeeded in working the mine 
at a profit of two shillings per ton. How he achieved this position is, 
however, unknown. In the case of the Simmer and Jack Company more 
evidence has survived. We know that the close proximity of the payable 
reefs to each other reduced the amount of cross-cutting and dead work 
in the mine, so reducing mining costs . Railways for moving are under-
ground were introduced at an early stage. The mill was well positioned 
to allow for a gravitational flow of the tailings away from the site. 
The recurrent labour shortages experienced suggest an unwillingness to 
offer highly competitive wages. The exact weighting of the significance 
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of these several factors is impossible to determine but their combined 
contribution in reducing working costs is clear, even before the 
introduction of the additional stamping power of the new battery further 
lowered marginal costs and allowed for an effective reduction in the 
109 quality of the ore crushed. 
A similar awareness of the necessity to reduce working costs 
undoubtedly prevailed in the Wemmer and Ferreira Companies but the 
richer quality of their ore and the smaller scale of their operations 
allowed, and resulted, in higher cost structures. Working single or thin 
reefs significantly reduced the quantity of ore crushed, resulting in 
higher marginal costs per ton of ore treated. Between January 1889 and 
July 1890 the Simmer and Jack Company crushed an average of 1 436,40 tons 
of ore per month, with the lowest monthly figure of 1 211 tons and the 
highest 1 700 tons. 110 In contrast, the Wemmer Company over a similar 
nineteen month period between October 1889 and April 1891 crushed a 
monthly average of 697,82 tons with a range between 300 and 1 109.tons 
111 per month. Under these circumstances it is comprehensible that 
working costs would be lower in the former case as a result of the scale 
of production. Similarly, while the average monthly yield per ton of 
ore was 15,37 dwts. in the case of the Simmer and Jack Company, it was 
18,87 dwts. for the Wemmer Company over the same nineteen month periods. 
In the Wemmer Company management recognised the need to reduce 
working costs in the period down to March 1889, which motivated the 
decision to call for the reorganisation of the property. Similarly, it 
was the unexpectedly high cost of implementing the improvements in the 
second period which resulted in the cut-backs, thus sacrificing a good 
deal of the potential advantage of the envisaged alterations. Some cost 
saving was nevertheless achieved~ The repositioning of the mill at the 
mine must have saved considerably on transportation costs~ The use of 
rock drills would eventually have reduced the labour cost of hand 
drillers, as fewer staff were required to operate the machines. The net 
result of these and other unspecified savings was a reduction of working 
costs from 36s. per ton to 32s. 9,25d. per ton by April 1891. While 
costs were some las. per ton lower for the Simmer and Jack Company, at 
109. See above, Chapter III, PP.87ff. 
110. Goldman, C.S., op.cit . (1892), p.48B. 
111. Ibid., p. 55B. 
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a price of roughly 3s. 6d. per dwt. for gold, the 3,5 dwts. difference 
in the average yield for the Wemmer Company more than compensated for 
the higher cost structure. 
The decision by the Wemmer Company management to forego the pur-
chase of the new mill ~ay also be interpreted as a cost saving device in 
that a considerable proportion of capital expenditure was drawn from 
working profits. The effectiveness of the savings is highly questionable 
whichever way it is viewed~ The decision certainly served to curtail 
the maximization of output envisaged in the plans and is reflected in 
the problems subsequently experienced in reducing milling costs. The 
failure to maximize reduction output resulted in higher marginal costs 
of production, as is reflected in a limited way by the comparison of 
112 the six month periods ending in April and September 1891. Viewed 
from the perspective of the Wemmer management, however, the "new" mill 
fulfilled many of their aspirations. Its location and structure were 
admirably commented on in the press and some cost saving from its. 
t · .. tabl 113 opera ~on was 1neV1 e. The failure to grasp the fuller economic 
implications of their decision is clear from the subsequent behaviour 
of the board. It required the practical demonstration of their short-
sightedness in continued high costs and breakdowns of the mill to 
convince them of their er~or.1 1 4 Under the control of J.ff . Johns the 
Company was again subjected to a major reorganisation, the emphasis of 
which was the maximization of production. Under this strategy the 
Company finally 
relatively high 
achieved a high level of profitability despite a 
115 
cost structure. 
It is no exaggeration to suggest that cost consciousness in the 
case of the Ferreira Company revolved essentially on the level of 
marginal costs. The failure of the early amalgamation schemes decided 
H. Eckstein and Company on a medium sized production unit which would 
be capable of returning 4 000 ounces of gold per month from a crushing 
of 4 000 tons of ore. No expense was spared in preparing the mine to 
meet this commitment, which was undertaken by J.H. Johns, certainly 
112. See above, Chapter IV, pp.120ff. 
113. See above, Chapter IV, pp.115-16. 
114. See above, Chapter IV, pp.126ff. 
115. See above, Chapter IV, p.133. 
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one of the most competent of the early Rand managers. When brought into 
production in 1891, working costs averaged 34s. 10,62d. per ton for the 
first period of production. While considered excessive by the press, 
any consideration of the cost structure of the Company must take into 
account the fact that only the thin south reef was supplying the greater 
part of the ore being crushed. Dilution with material from the main 
reef and main reef leader was experimented with and was subsequently 
found to assist considerably in facilitating the reduction process and 
116 
reducing the marginal cost per ton of ore worked. The Ferreira 
Company continued to operate down to 1894 with what was considered a high 
cost structure . Undoubtedly, the level of profits produced could have 
been higher were these costs reduced but the Company did operate profit-
ably and J.H. Johns turned rather to the maximization of output through 
the installation of an ore sorting process and the erection of a cyanide 
117 plant, to achieve this goal. 
The high working costs of the Ferreira and Wemmer Companies w.ere 
considered excessive for the period in which they occurred, but in 1889 
a figure of about 36s. per ton was considered a good average for the 
field,118 and excessive only in so far as it rendered the working of 
ore of less than 10 to 12 dwts. per ton unprofitable, a situation which 
affected a good deal of the Rand companies. Of the 180 gold mining 
companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in October 1889, 
only 34 contributed to the output for that month . Furthermore, only 
seven of the 34 companies contributed 23 226 ounces or 72,50 per cent 
of the total monthly output of 32 035 ounces . Compared to the figures 
for the previous October's output, only the minimal increase of 8 000 
119 
ounces had occurred, despite a considerable increase in stamping power. 
Under these circumstances the payment of dividends was minimal. 
The serious imbalance between producing and non-producing mines at 
the end of 1889 was closely related to the cost structures of these 
companies. While a good deal of the blame for this poor state of affairs 
could be laid at the doors of the companies and their managements, there 
were also certain exogenous factors which contributed to the rise in 
116. See above, Chapter V, p. 176. 
117. See above, Chapter V, pp.184ff. 
118. The Dig9:ers ' News , 9 November 1889. 
119. The Star, 14 November 1889. 
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costs. Not least of these influences was the serious drought which 
affected most of the interior in the spring of 1889. Still deprived of 
rail links with the coast owing to the political machinations of the 
120 Transvaal Government, the ever-growing population of the Witwaters-
rand relied entirely on the ox-wagon for the import of equipment and 
provisions. unable to find grass for the trek-oxen, the supply of trans-
port riders fell off to a point where the Chamber of Mines undertook the 
payment of a bonus to the owners of all wagons which reached Johannesburg 
with 
this 
supplies. 
121 
way. 
Down to 10 November 1889 the Chamber paid out £1 426 
Good rains in December ended the problem and it was 
in 
noted in the local press that the cost of living was again receding. 
The price of good board and lodging was now 32s. 6d. a week, down from 
122 
about 50s. a week at the height of the drought. Morrell has suggested 
that the drought was magnified by the mining magnates and storekeepers 
in an endeavour to force the Government into agreeing to the building 
of rail links with the outside world. 123 President Kruger nevertheless 
refused to allow the construction of the southern rail link in March 
1890, but concessions were made to the Witwatersrand by the lowering of 
customs duties on many articles of food in daily use, while the grand 
124 
"ad valor ern II rate was reduced to five per cent. Several duties 
were retained on produce which could be produced locally, while the 
usual duties had also to be paid on goods imported through the Cape and 
Natal ports. Only orange Free State produce entered the Transvaal free 
of duty. The reduction in customs duties was clearly a sop to detract 
from the rejection by Kruger of the southern rail link, but any lowering 
of rates inevitably 
the Rand. 125 on 
had a beneficial effect on the prices paid for goods 
Of the four companies of the study it is only the Simmer and Jack 
Company which makes specific reference in its reports to the influence 
120. Van der Poel, J ., op.cit., pp.25ff. 
121. The Diggers' News, 14 November 1889. 
122. The Diggers' News, 28 December 1889. 
123 . Morrell, W.P., op.cit., p.349. 
124. Van der Poel, J., op.cit., p.55 . 
125. For a detailed analysis of the intricate relationship between 
political and economic development in the South African 
Republic, see Van der Poel, J., op.cit., passim, and MaraiS, 
J.S., The Fall of Kruger's Republic, passim . 
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of the drought on working costs . It is possible that the reason for this 
was that the other companies were not too severely affected by it. 
The Ferreira Company was not operating at the time and while the drought 
would have resulted in delays in the delivery of equipment and a lack 
of labour for development, besides a retarding influence the drought 
would have had little effect on its cost structure. Likewise, the 
Wemmer Company experienced water shortages and was forced to delay the 
commencement of crushing with the relocated battery. The Witwatersrand 
Company was virtually unaffected in so far as it had all but curtailed 
its mining activities while the new management planned its future 
development. Nevertheless, besides water shortages there waG a general 
decampment of Afriean workers and an inadequate supply of food and other 
provisions with which to feed and maintain the labour force. As the 
Simmer and Jack report suggested, working costs were adversely affected 
for any Company in full operation. 126 
The drought and resultant rise in prices which directly influenced 
the working costs of the Rand mining industry invoked a lively awareness 
of cost consciousness along the outcrop. In November a comparison was 
made in The Diggers' News between working costs in America and 
Witwatersrand which suggested the scope for improvement in the 
on the 
127 latter: 
Wi twatersrand America 
per ton per ton 
Cost of mining 18s. 8d . 7s. 1d. 
Transport costs 1s. 9d. 1s. O,Sd. 
Reduction costs 8s. 10d. 2s. 6d. 
General costs 7s . 2d. 3s. 2d. 
£1 16s. Sd. Us. 9,Sd. 
The Witwatersrand figures, drawn from the Crown Reef Gold Mining 
Company, were seen as a good reflection of the costs on most mines. 
Considering reduction costs, it was suggested that little could be done 
to improve on the discrepancy as most American mills were water powered. 
Nevertheless, it was anticipated that the completion of the Boksburg 
tramway would result in a decrease in the price of coal and subsequently 
126. See above, Chapter III, pp.80-81. 
127. The Diggers' News, 9 November 1889. 
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in reduction costs for the Rand industry. It was also hoped that the 
improvement in agriculture, stimulated by the demands of the industry, 
would see a reduction in food prices. 128 The article went on to single 
out the cost of labour as the most important contributing factor 
to the high cost structure of the Rand industry. In keeping with an 
earlier article on the same subject, the newspaper condemned any direct 
comparison in cost structures between countries or c9ntinents, 
suggesting that the essential criterion was the relationship between 
k o d 1 129 Th ° , N°t war ~ng costs an ore va ues. To e D~ggers ews, ~ was 
essential that profits be made and dividends paid. A high cost 
structure was preventing the payment of such dividends and it therefore 
followed that the knife be applied where best it would achieve results, 
namely, in a reduction of wages, irrespective of the colour of the wage 
earner. It was also suggested that the salaries of managers might be 
cut and regulated according to their ability to produce profits. 
130 Writing in an editorial the paper noted, 
"Kafir labour costs a large sum, but it is extremely doubtful 
whether the men earn the wages they receive. White labour 
also presents many difficulties. If the white men at work 
in a mine are not in receipt of what may be called in 
comparison with other gold fields abnormal wages, they make 
up the difference by shirking work a 0 • " 
At the same time it was recognised that the scarcity of white 
miners and the high cost of living for them would make "the practice 
of economy in this direction almost an impossibility at present." 
What The Diggers' News failed to emphasise was that attempts to reduce 
the level of white workers' wages had already resulted in a drive 
towards combination amongst the artisans of particular trades a 
The actions of the white engine drivers in August and September 
of 1889, while ultimately only indirectly affecting the mines, serves 
as a reasonab~y well documented example of early Witwatersrand trade 
unionism. A meeting of interested engine drivers was called at the 
Queen's Hotel on 2 August to consider the establishment of a combina-
tion for higher wages and shorter working hours. The chairman, George 
Greenfield, considered a twelve hour working day too long, suggesting 
128. Ibid. 
129. The Diggers' News, 17 October 1889. 
130. The Diggers' News, 3 October 1889 . 
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that one of the objectives of the body to be formed should be the 
introduction of an eight hour day . He mentioned the recent success of 
the carpenters and masons who, through combination, had achieved a wage 
increase to 305. a day_ It was also made clear that the intention was 
to involve the engine drivers on the mines in the combination, it being 
pointed out that Chilean miners refused to go underground under an 
engine driver who worked longer than eight hours a day.131 It was 
decided to call a mass meeting of engine drivers later in the month and 
a gathering of fifty of them was held on 24 August. The objectives of 
the intended combination were again spelled out with an elaboration 
absent at the former meeting. It was suggested that the eight hour day 
would create employment for three men where previously only two had 
worked, thus creating jobs for the currently unemployed. The question 
of unemployed white engine drivers was considered serious, especially 
in the light of the hiring of Africans in this occupation. As the 
132 
chairman, Bird, pointed out, 
"He regretted to say that niggers were being employed as 
engine drivers at some mines, and he need only point out 
the folly of entrusting the lives of Europeans to the 
tender mercies of natives to show the need for hearty 
support from all sections of mechanics." 
This attitude was reiterated by another speaker who stated that, "There 
were dozens of men out of work, and yet they might walk from Roodepoort 
to Boksburg and then find that these suckers had been before them." 
Clearly the substitution of cheap black for expensive white labour has 
a long history on the Witwatersrand . Despite this position, the 
meeting also saw as an objective an increase in the wages of European 
engine drivers to £1 a day_ 
The agitation amongst engine drivers for improved conditions of 
service struck a chord of sympathy amongst white skilled artisans. 
Faced with the closure of many of the marginal mines in the wake of 
the stock market collapse and with the rising price of provisions as 
a result of the drought, which also closed some mills for want of water, 
conditions were ripe for worker unrest . By early September the engine 
drivers had been joined by blacksmiths, wagon makers "and men engaged 
131. The Star, 3 August 1889. 
132. The Star, 25 Augus·t 1889. 
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in kindred trades", who had common cause in opposing the move by employers 
to increase the working week from 51 to 54 hours, supposedly as a result 
of the onset of summer and longer daylight hours. The real cause for 
the action of the employers seems more likely to fall within the orbit 
of the increased demands being made on the manufacturers of small goods 
in the engineering trades for the mining industry. Given the state of 
reorganisation of many of the mines, with the temporary closure of mills 
while new equipment was installed and mining development undertaken, it 
is clear that many men like engine drivers were facing a period of 
unemployment and that the bargaining position of those still at work was 
weakened. Thus it was in the engineering trades, enjoying a temporary 
boom as a result of ' the major mining reorganisation, that the strike 
developed, opposing the proposed longer working week and demanding an 
increase of 25 per cent in wagesa 
Commenting on the situation, The Star conceded the legitimacy of 
engine drivers working excessive hours but suggested that the call. for 
higher wages "can only be set down as mere bravado, and need not be 
seriously entertained." The newspaper saw as the cause for the demands 
for higher wages the recent increases in those paid to masons and joiners 
due to the curr ent building boom, and thus 'warned the engineers against 
striking, suggesting that the employers were supported in their stand by 
the mining companies. It was also suggested, although no evidence for 
this appears, that certain of the mining companies, when faced with 
similar demands, had chosen to shut down their batteries "until they 
could import men", supposedly on contract at favourable prices to the 
mining companies. 133 
On 9 September 1889 white employees in the engineering trades in 
Johannesburg went on strike, following the rejection by employers of 
their pay demands and call for shorter working hours. In addition there 
was a rejection of the employers' intention of reducing the overtime 
rate from time and a half to time and a quarter. The strike did not 
survive the month and the employees had to accept the conditions speci-
fied by their mas ters . Their action had not gained the strikers popular 
support beyond the immediate engineering trades. The Diggers' News, 
while pointing out that the employers had largely brought about the 
133. The Star, 7 September 1889. 
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134 problem of high wages themselves, nevertheless also felt that the 
135 
strikers were unreasonable in their demands. It was pointed out 
that working hours had already been reduced from the previous summer's 
average. Likewise it was felt that, as wages had risen by twenty per 
cent in the course of 1889, the wage demands were unreasonable and that 
a reduction in overtime pay on the first two hours of additional work 
was reasonable. It was suggested that the employers had met the men in 
a fair spirit and that,136 
II •• • the men carmot be praised for having gone on strike, when 
a little thought would have shown them there was a disposition 
to treat them fairly ••• Our sympathies are not with the 
capitalists by any means, but they are not always to blame ... 
Wages were' abnormal owing to the demand for all kinds of 
building and mining material, machinery, etc., but the day 
will corne, by the influx of people on the one hand, and a 
slackening of demand on the other, when wages will find their 
level. Why hasten this day by striking and causing capitalists 
to introduce more men than can ultimately find work ... " 
For their part, the engineering workers, along with all wage- earners 
had had to face the rapid escalation in the cost of living which struck 
the Witwatersrand in the winter and spring of 1889, and they thus saw 
the strike as an attempt to achieve compensation. In general, however, 
it was clear that the sentiment of the press and capitalists alike was 
that some sacrifice would have to be made by workers if the Witwaters-
rand mining industry was to be saved from disaster. While the majority 
of mining companies remained unprofitable the security of· everyone on 
the Rand was threatened. 
The strike gave rise to the calling of a meeting of the representa-
tives of the mining companies to consider the situation. The companies 
clearly saw that their position was vulnerable despite the weakened 
state of certain groups of artisans. Many mines operated twelve hour 
shifts with mechanics coming on between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. and engine 
drivers operating from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., with the usual intervals for 
meals. The initial reaction of the meeting was to black-list all 
strikers and members of associations, but such a provocative step was 
not taken and a committee was rather appointed, under the chairmanship 
134. The Diggers' News, 10 September 1889. 
135. The Diggers' News, 12 September 1889. 
136. Ibid. 
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of George Goch, to investigate the employment structure on the mines and 
1 . ld b h' 137 see if any uniformity of emp oyment pract~ce cou e ac 1eved. The 
united stand presented by the mining companies probably prevented any 
possibility of the strike spreading to certain mines, but it also clearly 
indicated to the early Rand capitalists that African workers' wages was 
an area in which cost reduction would be more easily achieved. 
Attempts were made, nevertheless, to achieve savings in the wages 
of white workers. Such activity required united action on the part of 
the various companies and an element of stealth now that the threat of 
strike action by the workers was a recognised possibility_ Meantime, 
H. Eckstein·and Company were becoming increasingly involved in the drive 
138 
to reduce all workers' wages, 
liThe wages paid to mine~s and artisans is enormous. I have 
convened a private. meeting of managers to take place next 
Sunday and I shall insist on heavy reductions being made at 
once. I think a saving of E150 000 a year can be easily 
effected on this head alone. To avoid a possible strike, 
I shall advise managers in informing their men of the 
reduction, to say that they not only have definite orders 
to reduce pay, but to reduce the staff. The fact of a few 
men being dismissed from each company simultaneously (even 
though the staff be reduced for the moment to a trifle 
below requirements) will have a good moral effect on those 
kept on ... 11 
Just how effective the "moral suasion" tactic was, is difficult to 
gauge. There was a lowering in white miners' wages along . the main reef 
but it was not always taken lying down. On 2 June 1890 the white miners 
of the Angle Tharsis Gold Mining Company, unhappy about the wage 
reduction, blew up the manager's house with dynamite before decamping. 139 
Similar desertions followed the wage reductions on other mines, but as 
the' press reported, with some satisfaction, IItheir posts were filled 
within hours. ,,140 The general discontent over the lowering of wages 
continued into 1891, when The Standard and Diggers' News commented that 
the mining companies might well soon face "a combined demand from their 
white employees for an increase in wages." Once more the press was far 
from sympathetic, pointing out that the prevailing wages of between 
137 . The Star, 13 September 1889. 
138. Fraser, M. and Jeeves, A., op.cit., p.3? 
139. The Star, 2 June 1890. 
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£4 lOs. and £5 las . a week was one which the miner "not so very 
unwillingly 
and his lot 
accepted and lived on 
141 generally harder." 
in times when living was more expensive 
The reason why this discontent did 
not well into strike action was the high prevailing level of unemployment. 
The mining companies were employing as many whites as they needed, and 
as shown, this figure was already artificially reduced by deliberate 
policy. In turn, as the press suggested, "coloured labour cuts them 
out of that field of humble usefulness [physical labour], and they are 
compelled to continue in idleness.,,142 The same report went on to 
question the productivity of black labour, stating, 
"There can be no doubt that in our mines at this moment 
seven or eleven Kafirs are employed to do at considerable 
cost what a couple of white men could as easily undertake 
and perform at the same or even smaller cost." 
A similar sentiment against the productivity of black labour was 
expressed in a letter which appeared in The Star earlier that year, 
requesting the greater employment of white miners on the field. 14~ 
The writer claimed to have approached several of the mining companies 
offering the services of white miners to work parts of their mines on 
a contractual basis for a price equal to the cost of black labour, but 
was told that white miners were not required. At one mine where black 
work~rs had recently deserted en masse, the offer to contract with 
white labour had been refused by the manager who indicated that he 
144 
would rather wait until the Africans returned than accept ·white workers. 
Discontent amongst white mine workers remained endemi c throughout the 
remainder of the period down t o 1894 and the Witwatersrand Employees and 
Mechanics Union steadily gained support and membership. 145 While no 
direct confrontation marked the period down to 1894, the foundations for 
such strife had clearly been laid in the years under review. 
141. The Standard and Diggers' News (Johannesburg), 3 April 1891. 
142. The Standard and Diggers' News, 24 July 1891. 
143. The Star, 21 May 1891. 
144. Truscott, S.J., op.cit., pp.362ff, indicates that the practice of 
letting out the stapes on contract was fairly common on the Rand. 
The unit in use for measuring the work was the square fathom. 
Materials and labour were usually supplied by the mining company 
and charged to the contractor. The advantage for the company 
lay in the relatively low cost and high productivity of such a 
working arrangement. 
145. The Star, 16 January 1893. 
255 
The preference for African labour must be considered in terms of 
the initial reasons for this sentiment. The most obvious area for 
examination is that of the cost of labour in general. In an attempt to 
indicate the costs involved in mining and milling per month for the 
average company, The Diggers' News published the following table, 
146 
indicating the labour costs, 
Milling Expenses 
1 head amalgamator £30 
3 amalgamators at £20 60 
3 engine drivers at £18 54 
1 engineer 30 
30 Kafirs at 16/- a week 100 (sic) 
Meat and meal for do. 30 
304 
Mine and General Expenses 
Manager £80 
Clerk 25 
Storekeeper 25 
Carpenter 30 
1 assistant 20 
Blacksmith 30 
1 assistant 20 
1 Kafir overseer 25 
30 miners at £20 600 
250 Kafirs at 15/- a week 750 
Mea t and meal for do . 250 
1 855 
304 
Total labour cost: £2 159 
From the above it will be seen that African labour and its maintenance 
constituted 42,76 per cent of the labour cost of milling and 53,90 per 
cent of that of mining and general charges, or 52,34 per cent of the 
total cost of labour. While other information to support the inference 
drawn from these figures is lacking, they must of necessity be treated 
with some scepticism. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that in 
terms of value, the total amount of salaries and wages paid to Europeans 
roughly approximated that of African wages and provisions. In evidence 
to the Industrial Commission in 1896, Hennen Jennings stated that for 
the six principal companies on the Rand the cost of black wages and food 
constituted 27,87 
k ' 147 wor .lng costs. 
per cent and white labour 30,18 per cent of total 
Thus even at what were then consider'ed excessive 
rates, the wages of African labourers did not actually constitute the 
146. The Diggers' News, 22 March 1890. 
147. Truscott, S.J., op . cit., p.448. 
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single largest component of mining costs. It is evident from the above 
table that six African workers could be hired for the cost of the lo"est 
paid white worker, namely, the engine drivers, whom, as we have already 
seen, were being threatened with such substitution. Thus it would seem 
that the lower unit cost per African worker, together with the lack of 
any legislative protection or effective trade unionism on the part of 
white workers, inclined the mining companies in favour of increased 
African employment. Likewise, the complete absence of any militancy or 
form of combination on their part, made the African a more desirable 
work force. 
Counting agai~st the African labourer, however, was the 
unreliability of supply. As Sieberger has suggested with regard to the 
diamond fields, the supply of black workers was a function of several 
factors, ranging from climatic conditions and the whims of a tribal 
chief, to the immediate requirements of the individual worker. 148 The 
ebb and flow of workers to and from the Witwatersrand was, given the 
open competition between the managers of the various mines, a major 
determinant of the cost of that labour. Any factor which diminished 
the numbers of workers arriving was thus of the greatest significance. 
One such crisis occurred in July 1889 when, in the space of a fortnight, 
over 5 000 Africans left the Witwatersrand. The main reason for their 
departure was not specified but at least two suggestions were offered 
by the press, namely, that a rumour had spread about that farmers on 
their migration routes to Johannesburg intended stopping their exit 
from that place for six mo~ths, while the second view was that a war was 
about to break out in the Transvaal. 149 A more plausible explanation 
seems to lie within the broader events of 1889. The c ollapse of the 
stock exchange and the closure of many of the small "outside" companies 
rendered up a fair number of workers, who, given the reorganisation 
programmes of many of the remaining companies, remained unemployed. 
There is also the consideration that many Africans would have desired 
to return home for the spring planting of crops, while, as 
indicated, the winter months were already unpopular with black labourers. 
Mr Arnold, the Government Registrar of Natives for the Witwatersrand, 
blamed the recruiting agents for the trouble. The concept of the agent 
148 . Sieberger, R.F . , op . cit., pp.25ff. 
149. The Star, 17 and 24 July 1889. 
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or tout developed on the Kimberley fields where individual Europeans 
would pounce on the Africans before they arrived at the fields, offering 
to find them employment and clearing the necessary legal documentation 
of registration and the issuing of a pass in return for a fee. In an 
attempt to curb the practice Arnold issued a notice requiring all agents 
to register with his office and pay a licence fee. The licences were 
promptly taken out and the practice continued unabated, whereupon Arnold 
took the step of banning these agents from his office. He felt that the 
agents had subsequently spread the war rumour with the intention of 
creating the prevailing labour scarcity and knowing full well that it 
would raise the premiums offer~d by the mine managers for any labour 
they brought in. One agent reported having supplied twenty Africans to 
a Krugersdorp mine at £1 per head, while the average premium was between 
150 5s. and 6s. per worker. Exactly how influential the agents were 
amongst the Africans working on the mines is difficult to determine. 
It does, however, seem unlikely that an unsubstantiated rumour could send 
over 5 000 Africans away in so limited a period of time, unless other 
circumstances made such a move desirable to them. For their part the 
agents, far from being eliminated, continued to flourish as a Rand 
institution throughout the period down to 1894, The Standard and Diggers' 
News devoting an editorial in 1892 to the hidden costs of the system 
which were not always taken into consideration when the costs of black 
151 labour were calculated. 
Commenting on the unreliability of the African labour force, The 
Diggers' News saw the formation of the Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines in 
1889 as a direct result of the problem. At the first meeting of that 
body, an attempt was made to persuade the Government to institute a 
system of compulsory monthly labour agreements for Africans and the 
152 issue of passes to those employed. A system of monthly employment, 
it was believed, would help to stabilize the floating African labour 
force. A lack of consensus in the Chamber wrecked this first attempt 
at greater labour control but the idea was not allowed to lie dormant 
indefinitely. By the end of that year, as a first step towards assess-
ing the African labour situation, the Chamber of Mines issued a 
150. The Star, 24 July 1889. 
15 1 . The Standard and Diggers' News, 18 February 1892. 
152. The Diggers' News, 25 July 1889. 
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questionnaire to all mine managers. The response of management was duly 
153 published as follows: 
Could native wages be lowered? 
Would monthly payments be more satisfactory? 
Are you troubled by desertion? 
Could the compound system be advantageously adopted? 
Would it be advisable to let Kafirs feed themselves 
if the compound system were adopted? 
Compared to white wages are black wages too high? 
Yes No 
60 
57 
45 
20 
8 
23 
7 
9 
21 
32 
56 
63 
certainly the most interesting figures on the table are those relating 
to the consideration of black wages being too high. -It was generally 
recognised that they were not but at the same time it was accepted that 
black wages was an area in which substantial cost savings could be 
achieved. The statistics relating to the rate of desertion are also 
important, the high number of companies suggesting that they had no 
problem in this regard indicating that while the problem was still 
prevalent, some managements had found a way of overcoming it. Like 
the situation at Kimberley, it was found that some companies were 
developing a permanent or semi-permanent labour force of Africans who 
returned regularly to the same mine. 154 It was probably this situation 
which also accounted for the unwillingness of the majority of the sample 
to advocate the compound system, although here the expense of 
administering it was also a consideration. Beyond this, the questionnaire 
g.ave the Chamber a clear mandate to pursue ~e implementation of a 
monthly employment system. 
An anonymous letter in The Star in February 1890 spelled out the 
requirements which, it was hoped, the adoption of a monthly system of 
employment would ensure. "An abundance of native labour, however, is 
not our only requirement, we need quality as well. II The growing need 
for skilled and semi-skilled Africans to fill positions like "drilling 
boys" and engtne drivers was clearly recognised, as was the fact that 
153. The Diggers' News, 13 January 1890, 
the final question, can be found in 
the Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines, 
154. The Diggers' News, 23 January 1890. 
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259 
the investment in training would only show a return if the labour force 
was made more permanent. It was seen as a "misfortune ll that the black 
workers were not permanently resident on the Rand, as this would have 
assisted immeasurably in the creation of a more skilled labour force. 155 
The deepening recession of 1890 in the mining industry, as more and 
more of the weaker companies closed down and others continued with their 
reorganisation, proved an ideal time for an experiment with the 
prevailing labour system. The temporary surplus of black workers meant 
that some leeway existed before companies would feel the pinch of any 
boycott of the mines by these workers. The surplus had also resulted 
in African labourers accepting lower wages and by April 1890 they were 
receiving between lOs. and 128. 6d. where previously rates as high as 
156 20s. a week were common~ The prevailing economic climate also saw 
a reduction in employment opportunities for whites and it was estimated 
that skilled artisans were leaving the Rand at a rate of 200 to 300 a 
week. Nevertheless, the situation was recognised as being temporary 
and that wage rates would again rise unless consensus was reached 
between the companies on maintaining them at that level . Given the 
falling rate of wages, the more immediate problem was seen as the 
introduction of a monthly employment system for blacks, which, by 
creating a more stable black population, would help in the longer term 
substitution of black for white skilled workers. 
The success of a radical change in employment practice hinged on 
the level of participation of the interested parties. Not only would 
this include the mining companies but also the Netherlands Railway 
Company and its contractors. The lack of unanimous support for the 
system of monthly payments is borne out in the discussions at a meeting 
157 
called by the Chamber of Mines in May 1890 . The two main issues of 
contention regarding the proposed scheme related to the heavy penalty 
of ESOO for any breach of the agreement, and the uniform introduction 
of the scheme. Hermann Eckstein, as chairman of the Chamber, proposed 
that the monthly wages only be paid after five weeks, thus giving the 
employers an even stronger hand in guaranteeing the continued employment 
of the worker. The idea did not receive much support, the employers 
155. The Star, 25 February 1890 . 
156. The Star, 15 April 1890. 
157 . The Standard and Diggers' News, 9 May 1890. 
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recognising the abuses which could arise and the unnecessary further 
damage such a step would cause to the reputation of the Witwatersrand as 
a place of employment. In 1892 the press strongly condemned the system 
of withholding wages from black workers, then fairly prevalent amongst 
the contractors, as it was recognised that it would lose the industry 
the confidence of these workers. 158 The reserve expressed at the May 
1890 meeting decided those attending to give the system a trial period 
beginning on 1 July 1890 and running for six months. At the end of 
the year a further extension of six months was agreed to. 
By mid-1891 the system of monthly employment for blacks was in 
ruins. Not all the companies had joined and many of those who had gave 
only grudging support. Large companies like the Langlaagte Estate Gold 
Mlning Company held aloof, while resistance fr0rn the African workers 
themselves was such that it was reported that " ... the kafir has fallen 
off in quantity and quality." While it was agreed that the system gave 
two or three weeks of more-or-1ess trained work from a labourer, it was 
also found that they saved more of their earnings in this way, 
159 
" .. . enabling them to return home sooner." As this report suggested, 
the "problem" of black labour would continue until some form of IIproper 
organisation II was instituted. Until then, "Only one thing can, since 
slavery is abolished, keep the dark gentleman at his work, and that is 
good pay - or the prospect of it." 
The successful launching of the monthly payment system in July 1890 
encouraged the Chamber of Mines, under the instigation of H. Eckstein and 
Company, to seek a further reduction i n African workers' wages. In July 
1890 Lionel Phillips was appointed chairman of a sub-committee to 
investigate a general reduction in workers' wages. Explaining his 
strategy to the London office in August, he indicated that the best way 
of operating was to get the individual companies to submit copies of their 
160 
monthly pay sheets to the Chamber . Phillips recognised the weakness 
of the black workers, writing, 
lilt may be as well to avoid sending in copies of pay to 
White men, as it would look like [we are] intending combined 
action against them and might lead to the men forming a 
158. The Star, 24 May 1892. 
159. The Standard and Diggers' News, 21 July 189 1 . 
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Union against their employers. The real saving is to be 
made by reducing the Kaffirs." 
Phillips's intention was to institute a general reduction in African 
wages to 408. a month, including the cost of food, believing also in a 
backward sloping supply curve for these workers. liThe less we pay the 
longer they will stay each time and the more efficient they wil l 
become •.• II 
A meeting of mine managers was called for 25 September 1890. The 
pattern of wages which emerged from the sheets submitted to Phillips 
indicates the dissention which existed in the industry at the time. 
Sixty three companies forwarded their pay sheets, fram which it was 
deduced that between them they employed 9 617 Africans at rates 
varying between 43s. 9d. and 78s. 8d. per month. These figures were 
161 further broken down as follows: 
Number of Number of Africans 
Companies employed 
4 464 
25 3 069 
18 2 000 
11 4 084 
5 
Average number 
per mine Rates of Wages 
116 43s.9d. - 50s. 
122,76 50s . - 60s. 
111,11 60s. - 65s. 
255,25 65s. - 70s. 
70s. - 78s.8d. 
The most important inference to be drawn from these statistics is 
that it was the larger employers, hiring over 200 workers each who also 
paid the highest wages. Clearly, they would not allow their position 
to be jeopardized by an agreement and would only go along with the scheme 
so long as it benefited them. Phillips's scheme thus rested on an 
unstable foundation. A strong feeling was expressed at the meeting that 
black workers should not be seen as an amorphous mass and that any 
scheme, rather th&n being a simple percentage reduction, or the estab-
lishment of an average maximum, should cater for the reward of skills. 
After a fair deal of haggling, it was decided that the maximum wage for 
unskilled labour be fixed at 40s. per month, a full lOs. higher than 
that initially proposed by Phillips. Further, on the instigation of 
Mr Richards, the manager of the Laanglaagte Estate Company, one of the 
161 . The Star, 25 September 1890. 
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largest employers of labour, it was decided to implement a three-tier 
system of wages. Fifty per cent of the African l abour force would be 
employed at a maximum of 408 . per month, while the next thirty per cent 
would receive a maximum of 50s. per month, and the remaining twenty per 
162 
cent would be paid at the discretion of the company. If this 
twenty per cent received an average of 70s. a month, Phillips 
calculated that the average pay would be 49s., or a saving of 13s. a 
month on the previous average, or an approximate saving to the industry 
163 
of £100 000 a year. 
In passing Phillips remarked, "How the Kaffirs will take it is 
of course another matter, but I think being a general combined movement 
they will bow to the inevitable ... ,,163 His complacency was a little 
premature. In October a case was reported of African workers burning 
down the house of the secretary and paymaster of the Meyer and Charlton 
ld . . . . th d . 164 b Go M~n1ng Company ~n protest aga1nst e re uct10n. By Decem er 
1890 most companies were experiencing difficulty in procuring an 
adequate labour supply, while at least one company was forced to close 
165 down its mill as a result. 
In early January a case was brought before the local magistrate of 
Johannesburg regarding the strike of 159 African workers of the JUmpers 
Gold Mining Company. These black workers, in what was probably the 
earliest strike by African employees on the Rand, protested against 
being made to work on Sundays without extra pay. The three workers' 
representatives were duly fined lOs., with the option of a week's 
imprisonment. 166 Likewise, mass desertions occurred from the Central 
Langlaagte Gold Mining Company's property when black workers refused to 
accept a reduction in wages from £3 per month to between £2 lOs. and 
£2 12s. in terms of the new system . Reporting this incident The Star 
in an editorial tried to pass much of the blame for the labour shortage 
onto the Netherlands Railway Company and its concessionnaires, $uggesting 
that workers from the east coast were being stopped and forced either 
162. The Star, 26 September 1890. 
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to work on the railways or return home. There was undoubtedly a great 
demand for labour from the railway company but it is doubtful if it and 
its agents, or even the Government could have exerted sufficient pressure 
to prevent workers making their way to Johannesburg had the l ure been 
167 
strong enough. Strikes by black workers continued even after the 
collapse of Phillips's scheme. One such strike was that by 600 workers 
at the Unified Gold Mining Company who struck against a proposed 
reduction of wages in 1892. Commenting on this strike The Star noted, 
"Curiously enough - and what may ultimately become a very serious matter 
along the Rand - the various tribes more or less amalgamated, and sank 
their own little differences to unite in common action against their 
168 
employers." 
By December 1890 the impression was growing that an increasing 
number of companies were not strictly adhering to the terms of the 
agreement, thus making the situation more difficult f or those who did . 169 
In January the secretary of the Simmer and Jack Company was instructed 
to report to the Chamber of Mines a breach of the regulations on the part 
170 
of the New Primrose Gold Mining Company. With the onset of winter, 
always a period of seasonal labour shortage, many companies were 
confronted with critical deficits of workers and chose to abandon the 
scheme. One such company was the Simmer and Jack. By 15 June 1891 
the manager reported to the board that the total African staff amounted 
to 753 workers, comprising 274 in the 40s. maximum category, 233 at 50s. 
and 256 at 60s. and over . The chairman reported that it was impossible 
to continue working under the Chamber's regulations and the secretary 
was duly instructed to inform that body that the Company must reluctantly 
retire from the scheme until labour in general became cheaper or accepted 
t f . d 171 ra es 0 pay were 1ncrease . 
Thus the first attempt at a general wage reduction ended in failure, 
not so much because of disagreement between employers as because of the 
actions of the black employees. Phillips's belief in the backward 
167. The Star , 10 January 1891. 
168. The Star, 19 July 1891. 
169. The Star f 22 December 1890 . 
170. Cory Libr ary MS16 007, op.cit., 19 January 1891. 
171. Ibid, 15 June 1891. 
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sloping supply curve for African labour had been severely tried, for as 
one correspondent noted, "What takes off the large gang of boys almost 
daily seen winding their way to Kimberley? - simply the high rate of 
172 pay there." Similarly, the entire exercise for reducing the wages 
of both black and white workers, in an endeavour to reduce the cost 
structure of the industry, had met with only limited success by the 
end of 1894. 
At the same time the companies of the study and the industry in 
general were endeavouring to increase their profits by maximizing 
output~ The drive to optimize production depended on several factors, 
such as the size and crushing capacity of the mill, the actual yield 
of gold per ton, and the amount of gold lost in the tailings, on the 
reduction side. As far as mining was concerned output maximization 
depended on the state of deve lopment of the underground workings, the 
quality of ore in different parts of the mine, and the ability and 
regularity with which the ore requirements of the mill could be m~t. 
The major threat facing the maximi zation of output in the years 
after 1889 was the pyritic ore crisis. As already indicated, there 
has been an attempt to shift too large a portion of the problems which 
beset the industry in 1889 on to the first contact with pyritic ore. 
It shoul d not be forgotten that Gardiner Williams, in 1886 , declared that 
at a depth of over 200 feet the appearance of sulphides in the reef 
formation was likely to give rise to problems. That so many companies 
reached the critical level in the development of their mines in late 
1888 or 1889 is as much a further reflection of their slow rate of 
development, as an indication of the cause of the stock exchange collapse. 
Undoubtedly, such news, disquieting as it was to speculators, was 
likely to influence trends on the stock exchange, but a healthy industry 
would have faced the collapse of the market and the challenge of pyr i tic 
ore.with equanimity. Even then the boom in the stock exchange had 
reached unrealistic heights and if it had not been the rumour of pyritic 
ore, some other factor would have led to a similar conclusion. 
Assisting in the collapse of the market, and making its appearance at a 
time when the sickly industry was in dire need of working capi tal, the 
presence of pyritic are exacerbated the crisis. The refractory nature 
of such ore meant a lower return on every ton of ore crushed as less 
172. The Standard and Diggers' News, 17 July 1891 . 
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gold was captured by the conventional reduction processes, thus emphas-
ising the need for an immediate reduction in working costs to render the 
reduced Output profitable. The alternative was to search for a process 
which would recover more of the gold now being lost in the tailings. 
That the industry was unprepared to cope with the new difficulty 
as ·it arose is again a ref lection on the di~ectoral management of the 
respective companies. Clearly, Williams's warning went unheeded in the 
prevailing mood of "mining for the share market" which prevailed before 
1889 . Likewise, there seems to have been a widespread and naive belief 
down to 1889 that all but a minute amount of the gold was captured by 
the existing amalgamation processes. The Witwatersrand Company, supplied 
with Frue Vanners from the outset for concentrating the 
from the tailings, chose to abandon these appliances as 
heavier particles 
173 
unnecessary. 
In turn, as late as May 1889, Mr Eloff, the Mining Commissioner for 
Witwatersrand, was compelled to issue a notice warning companies and 
others who allowed their tailings to run into the spruits and other 
water courses, that they were liable to lose their water rights. 174 
The harshness of the warning was clearly a reflection of the frequency 
of the transgression and of the innocence of knowledge of the value of 
such material or of a practical process for its treatment. 
An awareness of the value of tailings for the gold they still 
contained was slow in coming to the Witwatersrand. Extraction by 
amalgamation only resulted in the capture of between 55 and 70 per cent 
of the gold content of the ore put through the mill. 175 An editorial 
comment in the press in August 1889 suggested that even a t this late 
date amalgamation was far from perfectly carried out on many mines and 
176 the need was stressed for conscientious amalgamators. With basic 
amalgamation poorly carried out on many of the properties it is not 
surprising that little attention was paid to the tailings in which up 
to half of the gold content of the ore was allowed to escape. The 
years 1889 and 1890 were thus marked by a campaign in the press and 
elsewhere to create an awareness of the value of tailings, which was 
173. See above, Chapter II, p. 32 . 
174. The Diggers' News, 7 May 1889 . 
175. Hatch, F.H. and Chalmers, J.A., The Gold Mines of the Rand, 
p . 199. 
176. The Diggers' News, 1 August 1889. 
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in turn closely related to the pyritic ore problem. A leader article in 
January 1890 emphasised the value of tailings accumulated on the mines, 
suggesting that those of the Wemmer Company still contained half an 
ounce of gold to the ton, which could be of great value once a process 
for treating them effiCiently and cost effectively was discovered. 177 
The management of the Rand industry failed dismally in determining 
and planning for the longer term requirements of the reduction process. 
The MacArthur-Forrest cyanide process, which proved the salvation of 
the industry, was patented in 1887. It is doubtful if the majority 
of Rand mine managers and directors had heard of the process before 
1890. The process was actually introduced into South Africa at the 
instigation of Barberton entrepreneurs, of whom John Jack was one, in 
1889, while it was not before 1891 that it was generally adopted on the 
Witwatersrand. The process accounted for the recovery of some 35 000 
ounces of gold that year. The following table reflects the rapid and 
effective adoption of the cyanide process after 1891: 178 
Gold won by Gold won Cyanide Reduction as 
Year Amalgamation by Cyanide percentage of total 
1891 694 372 OZ8. 34 862 OZ5. 4,78 
1892 1 005 421 178 688 15,09 
1893 1 147 960 330 510 22,36 
The search for an effective means for the treatment of pyritic ore 
only commenced in earnest towards the end of 1889 on the Rand. Once 
more the press felt incumbent to warn companies that if they were not 
to burn their fingers financially, a good deal of systematic evaluation 
·179 
of the various patents being offered in this regard was essential. 
The search for an economical and practical solution to the problem of 
falling yields ended with the adoption of the cyanide process, but it 
began with a host of patents, the efficacy of most of which was doubtful. 
A good example of such a process was the Julian Amalg.amating Machine 
180 tried on the Wemmer Company's property. 
177. The Diggers' News, 16 January 1890. 
178. The Moon Annual 1894, "The McArthur(sic)-Forrest Process. What 
it has done f or the Rand." 
179. The Diggers' News, 31 December 1889 . 
180. See above, Chapter IV, pp.117-19. 
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The problem was not a very complex one . Witwatersrand ores were 
of a relatively simple composition and thus not too difficult to treat. 
The ore contained relatively small quantities of the oxides and 
sulphides of copper, arsenic, antimony and bismuth, which plagued the 
reduction processes of some American mines. The c omposition was, in 
many respects, ideal for the cyanide process and also lent itself to 
the more complex technique of the Plattner's chlorination process . 
The loss of increasing quantities of gold over the amalgamation 
plates encouraged most mines to adopt some form of concentrating device 
which would capture the heavier particles of the escaping tailings. 
The most effective means in this regard were the percussion tables of 
the Frue Vanner or Seoular variety, although cheaper substitutes down 
to coarse corduroy blanketing was also fairly effective. These con-
centrates had then to be subjected to some additional treatment. 
A fair proportion of the gold in the tailings continued to escape and 
it was considered practical by several companies both to concentr~te 
their tailings and use the cyanide process, after the introduction of 
the latter method. The value of the concentrates was dependent on the 
value of gold in the original ore. The Frue Vanner and Scoular tables 
gave concentrates of from two to three per cent of the ore-bulk passed 
through the mill, such concentrates varying in value from four ounces 
181 to eight ounces of gold per ton. Given the prevailing economic 
climate and the financial position of most of the compani~s, they were 
not in a position to work these concentrates themselves. Under these 
circumstances the concentrates were sold to those mining companies, 
like the Robinson Company, who established their own chlorination plants, 
or to independent operators. One such independent operator was the 
South African Metallurgical Company, established to use the Newbury-
182 Vautin chlorination patent. The process was not altogether success-
ful and the 
Vautin from 
company collapsed 
183 Johannesburg. 
in 1891 after the disappearance of Mr 
The Robinson Company's plant, which used 
the Plattner process, was certainly the largest and most successful of 
these plants on the Rand. It was also highly effective, with less than 
181. Wilson Moore, C., "Development of the Mining Industry of 
Witwatersrand ll , p .6 , in The Moon Annual 1893. 
182. The Star, 25 November 1889. 
183. The Standard and Diggers' News, 1 May 1891. 
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0,5 dwts. of gold remaining per ton of concentrate after treatment. 184 
The plant was under the s upe r vision of 
introduced from America by H ~ Eckstein 
Mr Charles · Butters, 
185 
and Company. 
especially 
The chlorination process brought temporary respite to the Rand 
industry, with profits of up to 14s . per ton of ore originally milled 
on 8 ounce concentrate. When borne in mind that milling costs on some 
mines did not exceed 3s. 6d., the value of the concentrating process 
186 becomes apparent. But while considerable quantities of gold 
continued to escape in the tailings, a process which could win back 
this gold was desirable. The elaboration and perfection of the process 
introduced to Barberton by the African Gold Recovery Company was under-
taken by the Rand Central Ore Reduction Company. By November 1890 the 
demonstration experiments on the Salisbury Gold Mining Company's 
property were completed. The commercial applicability of the process 
for Rand ores was still at stake and it was thus decided that the Gold 
Recovery Syndicate erect a pilot plant on the Robinson Company's property, 
an agreement being signed with that company for the treatment of 10 000 
tons of tailings. OVer 8 000 ounces of bullion were recovered and the 
success of the venture was such that the 
take over the plant on completion of the 
Robinson Company agreed to 
187 
contract. The expense of 
treating a ton of tailings by cyanide was calculated at about 5s. 6d. 
in 1893. While this placed the very poorest tailings beyond the pale, 
at an average extraction rate in excess of 70 per cent, t .ailings of 
three to four pennyweights,if treated in bulk, yield a profit. 188 
Thus the cyanide process allowed for a further maximization of 
output. While the additional processes of chlorination and cyaniding 
were bound to raise working costs, their disproportionate contribution 
to total output assured them a place in the reduction processes of most 
mines, whether undertaken by the individual mines or not. In the long 
run, the complex and more dangerous nature of the chlorination process, 
which first required the roasting of the concentrates prior to their 
leaching with chlorine solution or gas, and its resultant higher cost, 
184. The Star, 2 December 1891. 
185. The Star, 6 October 1891. 
186. Wilson Moore, C., op.cit., p.6. 
187. Letcher, 0., The Gold Mines of Southern Africa, pp.l00-l0l. 
188. Wilson Moore, C., op.cit., p.6, 
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ensured the lasting success of the cyanide process. The weaker solutions 
of cyanide required and the reduced handling of the material not only 
made for a safer process but its effectiveness rendered the use of the 
concentrating, and ultimately the amalgamating, processes unnecessary. 
Another area in which certain companies sought output maximizati on 
in the years down to 1894 was in the ore sorting process. Not only did 
this method reduce the amount of ore fed through the mill for a given 
output of gold, hence enhancing the efficiency of the mill, but it also 
required a proportionate increase in the output of the mine in order to 
compensate for the material rejected in sorting. The method was ideally 
suited to those mines with narrow reefs and well developed underground 
workings. In working such mines it was inevitable that a fairly large 
proportion of the casing rock surrounding the ore reef was broken up 
and mixed with the ore in mining operations. This dilution of the ore 
resulted in lower yields and higher working costs. The successful 
implementation of the system, however, rested on the extent to which the 
mine was developed, as it placed an increased strain on the underground 
workings. The idea of are sorting is attributed to J.H. Johns, and it 
is a reflection of his emphas is on the proper development of the under-
ground 
Wemmer 
works that the system was 
and Ferreira mines. 189 
successfully implemented on both the 
The influence of J.H. Johns on both the Wemmer and Ferreira Companies 
after 1891 was so great that for all practical purposes the analysis of 
their activities down to 1894 can be considered simultaneously. On both 
properties Johns recognised that in dealing with the narrow, rich reefs, 
a substantial reduction in working costs was of secondary importance 
and would flow as a natural result of a reduction in marginal costs with 
the maximization of output. Hence his management in both cases was 
marked by the rapid development of the respective Companies' mines and 
the introduction of all the necessary appliances which would ensure the 
attainment of his goal. His success in this venture was assured but it 
hastened the emergence of yet another problem for the directoral manage-
ment of these Companies, namely, that of how best to cope with the 
limited lifespans of the mines at current rates of exploitation. For 
the Wemmer Company the problem of a limited lifespan was less pressing, 
in that a large proportion of the capital investment in Johns's 
189 . See above, Chapter IV, pp.137ff, and Chapter V, pp.184ff. 
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reorganisation 
. t 11 190 ~n erna y. 
plan, an amount of over £80 000, was generated 
Nevertheless, by 1894 the decision had been taken to 
undergo further expansion of the property. For the Ferreira Company 
the situation differed in that much of the investment i n improvements 
was undertaken with borrowed funds. The anxiety of the creditors for 
the repayment of these loans necessitated output optimization in the 
short term for the refunding of this money and the payment of substantial 
dividends for certain favoured clients and friends of Wernher, Beit and 
Company. The situation rapidly reduced the ore reserve of the mine and 
19 1 
again raised the question of the lifespan of the property. Long 
term output maximization was again assured with the amalgamation of 
the Ferreira Company with the deep level claims to the south. 
output maximization is also reflected in the decision of three of 
the four companies to increase the size and crushing capacity of their 
batteries. The Witwatersrand Company was the exception in that it did 
not do so. The reason for this is that its crushing capacity was-
already greatly in excess of the mine's ability to supp l y it. Rather, 
the situation develop ed where after July 1891, the mill was closed down 
entirely while all efforts were concentrated on the development of the 
mine. Thus the uneven balance between mine and mill, following the sale 
of virtually all the mine development work with the claims which went to 
form the Balmoral Company, left the Witwatersrand Company down to 1894 
in a poor position to attempt output maximization. 192 Attention rather 
turned to the leasing of a portion of the property on tribute as a means 
of gaining some income for the failing company. 
The Simmer and Jack Company shows an interesting trend in management 
thought in the years after 1891. In 1889 the directorate were still keen 
to split the property in an attempt to maximize profits and gain working 
capital for the retained portion of the ground. By July 1890 the board 
h ad changed its mind, recognising the long term advantages to be gained 
from maximizing production as a factor in cost reduction and for its own 
sake. Clearly in keeping with this trend was the decision, once cost 
reductions had been achieved through the use of an enlarged mill, to 
190. See above, Chapter IV, p.136. 
191. See above, Chapter V, pp.187-91. 
192. See above, Chapter II, p.41. 
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reduce the ore grade worked. Immediate profit maximization, once a 
regular inflow of profit was established, was clearly sacrificed in 
return for longer term output maximization in the extension of the life 
of the mine. The sophistication of management thought which this move 
represented cannot be too strongly stressed . Beyond this, the Company's 
management showed an awareness of the benef i ts to be gained from a more 
advanced system of reduction . Cautious, however, in the face of the 
veritable barrage of new patented processes being offered, management 
chose to remain essentially aloof until one of these processes had 
proved its superiority. It was thus not until 1892 that the Company 
decided in favour of the cyanide process . 193 
It is clear that the attitude of the management group in the 
Witwatersrand mi ning industry underwent a transition towards the 
responsibilities and prospects for that industry in the years after 
1889. It was in the period between 1889 and 1894 that the true 
foundations of the Rand gold mining industry were laid. Prior to. this 
very little serious mining was undertaken and the crisis of 1889 
awakened those connected with the industry to the technological and 
financial requirements for successful reef gold mining. 
193 . See above, Chapter III, pp.89-90. 
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CHAPTER VII 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EXTERNAL INTEGRATION OF 
THE MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS OF THE SAMPLE COMPANIES 
In the previous chapter the functions of management in the 
immediate operation of the various companies were reviewed in order to 
evaluate the extent to which they succeeded in attaining their ultimate 
objective, namely, the winning of profits. for their shareholders and 
to analyse the errors and successes of judgement in decision making. 
Now the focus shifts from the internal organisation to the interaction 
of the various companies with their broader environment, whether this 
was with other companies operating within the same industry or in the 
wider sense with the economy and society within which the whole 
1 industry operated. 
The activities of the various companies and their representatives 
with the broader environment may be viewed in terms of either co-
operation or conflict. Within the cognisant aspirations of nineteenth 
century industrial capitalism and the over-riding motivation of the 
pursuit of profits, it was inevitable that this situatio~ would 
encourage either co-operation or conflict in a competitive environment. 
Circumstances dictated whether the goal of the maximization of profits 
was best achieved by co-operation or competition. Thus the early years 
of the Witwatersrand industry were marked by fierce competition between 
the mining companies for labour, the extent and detrimental influence 
of which on the cost structure of the companies ultimately led to 
agreements for wage reductions. Another example of co-operation within 
the industry was the format~on of the Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines 
1. For the purposes of this study the analysis in relation to the 
economy and society is confined to those of the South African 
Republic although it is recognised that the development of 
the Witwatersrand was destined, to interact with and leave its 
mark on the economy and SOCiety of Southern Africa and beyond 
in the longer term. 
See Kubicek, R.V., Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice, 
passim, as a good example of a study of the industry encompassing 
a broader view. 
273 
to serve as a united mouthpiece for the industry. Even here, however, 
there were some companies which chose to hold aloof of the organisation 
while in 1896-97 an Association of Mines was established in opposition 
2 
to the Chamber. 
The analysis of the external integration of the companies involves 
two broad categories relating to the relationships between the companies 
of the study and the rest of the Witwatersrand mining industry - the 
endogenous integration - and those relating to the rest of the economy 
and society - the exogenous integration. Thus, for example, the 
competition for labour can be seen in two perspectives, firstly between 
the various mining companies of the Witwatersrand, the endogenous 
situation, and beyond that between these mines and those at Kimberley 
or the railway companies involved in constructing the links between the 
coastal ports and the Rand. Similarly in the exogenous sphere, the 
relationship is between the companies and their representative 
organisation, the Chamber of Mines, and the Government of the Soqth 
African Republic. 
OUr investigation of the external integration of the companies 
considered in this study starts with an analysis of the schemes to 
achieve endogenous co-operation, that is, those attempts to attain 
amalgamation and co-operation within the industry, whether in the form 
of the merging of separate companies, their individual fu~ctions, or 
in the broader sphere with led to the formation of the Witwatersrand 
Chamber of Mines. This amalgamation aspect of co- operation within the 
industry involves three distinct levels. Attempts were made from the 
outset to strive for the overall amalgamation of the numerous small 
syndicates and companies which 9ccupied the claims along the main reef. 
Jacobsson claims that in 1886 and early 1887 Cecil Rhodes, inspired 
by his success in amalgamating the various companies operating in the 
De Beers Mine at Kimberley, and sensing the ultimate climax of his 
ideals for the consolidation of the diamond fields, put forward 
similar proposals for the Witwatersrand. 3 While agreement could not 
be reached and the scheme was soon abandoned, it may be that the 
formation of The Gold Fields of South Africa Limited, with its large 
2. Etheredge, D.A. , The Early History of the Chamber of Mines, 
Johannesburg : 1887-1897, Chapter Seven. 
3. Jacobsson, D. , Fifty Golden Years of the Rand, 1886-1936, p.49. 
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capita l and broad 
could affect su ch 
trust deed, was 
l 'd . 4 conso 1 atl0n. 
intended as a n organisation which 
Superficially this appear s to 
contradict the hesitancy of Rhodes in committing himself to large scale 
investment on the new gold field reported by sauer~5 It is, however, 
possible to reconcile the creation of Rhodes's company with his 
reticence, in that if the whole Witwatersrand was consigned to one or 
several large companies, then irrespective of the doubts raised with 
regard to the extent of the reef or the problem of pyritic ore, such a 
c ompany or ventures could surely succe ed on the strength of the known 
assets of the reef. 
The issue of amalgamation was again raised in the difficult period 
of 1889 and early 1890. By now, however, the idea of an overall 
consolidation was becoming increasingly tenuous as the extent of 
capital investment in the industry ensured that it would be a virtually 
impossible goal for any single organisation to achieve. Furthermore, 
the poor performance of the Rand companies made it likely that any body 
seeking consolidation in 1890 would be highly selective in its choice 
of properties. The form of amalgamation now sought after aimed rather 
at achieving an economic rationalisation and reduction in working 
costs. In the words of an 1890 press editorial,6 
" ... the only amalgamation which honest men will attempt, 
or wise men will sanction, are those which may be obviously 
calculated to increase the output of the precious metal, 
while decreasing the cost of producing it." 
The attempts to achieve greater economies of scale did not begin 
with the collapse of the 1889 stock exchange boom. Clear e vidence of 
this is found in the amalgamation of the Wemmer and Wemmer Extension 
Companies in 1887. 7 Similarly, the increased interest shown in the 
Ferreira Company by H. Eckstein and Company after October 1887 
immediately gave rise to rumours of a proposed amalgamation between 
the Wemmer and Ferreira companies. 8 Another possible massive amal-
gamation of the small central Rand companies was reported in the press 
4. Ibid. 
5. Sauer, H. , Ex Africa, Chapter VI. 
6. The Star (Johannesburg) , 19 March 1890 . 
7. See above, Chapter IV, p. 107 . 
8. See above, Chapter V, p.150. 
9 in December 1888. 
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While nothing came of these rumours it is likely 
that they rested on substantial evidence given the attitudes of Rhodes 
and the Wernher, Beit group towards these small companies. After 1889 
several further attempts were made to amalgamate the Wemmer and 
Ferreira Companies without success. 10 Moves to link the Ferreira 
with the Worcester, Robinson and Langlaagte Companies also proved 
futile. 11 It cannot be doubted, however, that similar attempts at 
amalgamation met with greater success in the case of other companies, 
12 
such as the creation of the May Consolidated Gold Mining Company. 
The reasons for the failure of the amalgamation attempts between the 
wemmer and Ferrei~a Companies are that such consolidation was never 
considered vital to survival by the boards of the respective companies 
and that it never occupied a position of primary importance in the 
approach of H. Eckstein and Company and their London principals, 
Wernher, Beit and Company, towards the companies. These firms were 
more interested in the immediate or potential profitability of the 
companies and were thus prepared to sacrifice such long term objectives 
as amalgamation in favour of early gains. The extent to which this 
pOlicy on the part of these firms curtailed their opportunities for 
achieving a more far-reaching consolidation of the Rand industry is 
clear a 
The events in the case of the 'Ferreira Company which ultimately 
led to a change in priorities on the part of Wernher, Beit and Company 
was the rapid rate at which the Ferreira Company worked its payable 
south reef after 1891. The demand for a quick return of the capital 
loaned to the Company and the emphasis placed on the payment of 
spectacular dividends, deprived the Company of the opportunity of 
establishing any form of depreciation reserve account. circumstances 
thus left the Company with a limited life span and a large accumulation 
of undepreciated and relatively new equipment on its hands. Under 
these Circumstances, and given Wernher, Beit and Company's previous 
involvement in the Company, it was clearly in the best interests of 
9. See above, Chapter V, p.1S7 . 
10. See above, Chapter V, p.162. 
11. Ibid . 
12. Goldman, C.S., The Financial, Statistical, and General History 
of the Gold and other Companies -of Witwatersrand South Africa, 
(1892), p.138. 
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all to prolong the life of the Ferreira mine by seeking an amalgamation 
13 
with the company owning the deep level claims to the south. 
A further amalgamation was that between the Simmer and Jack Company 
and the large blocks of claims owned by The Consolidated Gold Fields of 
South Africa Limited in 1894. 14 For The Consolidated Gold Fields the 
move represented the first large acquisition in a significant return 
of interest in the Witwatersrand, while for the Simmer and Jack Company 
the move stood for an assured future as a deep level company. The 
steps taken by the Simmer and Jack Board were the first move by the 
representatives of any of the sample companies to prolong the life of 
their company for ' its own sake. Once again, as in the case of the 
Ferreira Company's situation, the outcrop mine gained a substantial 
increase in life expectancy while the deep level claims were spared a 
fair proportion of the capital investment required for opening up their 
ground. As early as 1890 Lionel Phillips had hinted at such a course 
of action for the industry suggesting,15 
" I do not think that deep levels will be worked by them-
selves. It takes an immense working capital to open properties 
on the reefs and the probable end of all deep levels will be 
absorption by the parent companies. lI 
A similar course of action was advocated by the press in 1892,16 and 
judging from the evidence already given this policy was not infrequently 
adopted by the outcrop companies. Thus the period between 1892 and 
1895 represented a transition in the industry, for while certain deep 
level properties were opened as separate ventures in these years, the 
evidence also suggests that a fair number of outcrop companies were 
linked to deep-level claims to the south in such a way that with time 
they became deep-level propositions.. With this evidence in mind it 
is essential that any future debate on the Blainey thesis should 
17 
specifically define the term "deep-levell!. 
13. See above, Chapter V, pp.189ff. 
14. See above, Chapter III, pp .95ff. 
15. Fraser, M. and Jeeves, A., All That Glittered, p.45. 
16. The Standard and Diggers' News (Johannesburg), 21 April 1892. 
17. Blainey, C., "Lost Causes of the Jameson Raid" in Economic 
History Review, ss, XVIII, 2 (1965), pp.350-366. 
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The third form of amalgamation or co-operation was a partial 
arrangement between companies with the intention of achieving certain 
set objectives. Perhaps the clearest example of such amalgamation was 
the establishment of the joint milling project between the Ferreira and 
worcester companies18 and the siting of thi s mill on the property of 
the Robinson company.19 A similar venture for a joint pumping scheme 
between the Ferreira and Wemmer Companies finally collapsed when the 
wemmer Company withdrew from the agreement after finding that an 
adequate water supply was forthcoming from its mine . 20 The short-
sightedness of this decision is borne out in that the Wemmer Company 
was ultimately forced to join the pumping scheme i naugurated by the 
Salisbury and Jubilee Companies in December 1892 . 21 A similar example 
of co-operation between companies occurred when the Simmer and Jack 
Company decided to increase the size of its mill to 100 stamps in 1889. 
The increased water requirements led to a search for an additional 
water right . Because the water right so sought had already been 'granted 
to the Stanhope Geldenhuis Deep Level Company, the Simmer and Jack 
Board was obliged to treat with that company for some sort of equitable 
arrangement, with the result that the Simmer and Jack Company erected 
22 
the necessary darn wall in return for the right to use the water. 
It is evi dent from the examples presented above that the level of 
co-operation varied. The joint milling project of the Ferreira and 
worcester Companies was clearly a far greater commitment ·on the part 
of those companies than was the joint water right agreement of the 
Simmer and Jack and Stanhope Geldenhuis companies, in that the former 
agreement was integral to the cost structures of those companies. 
Undoubtedly, the convenience and accessibility of the Stanhope 
Geldenhuis water right decided the Simmer and Jack board that the costs 
of the erection of a dam wall were outweighed by the proximity and 
availability of the potential water supply, but had the Stanhope 
Geldenhuis Company only decided to sell the water at a given price 
per unit, then the situation would have altered. As it was, the Simmer 
and Jack Company faced only the fixed costs of construction and the 
18. See above, Chapter V, p.164. 
19 . See above, Chapter V, p . 162. 
20 . See above, Chapter IV, p . 114 and Chapter V, p. 162. 
21. See above, Chapter IV, p . 133. 
22 . See above, Chapter III, pp . 81-82 . 
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pumping plant, and the subsequent minimal maintenance costs. The joint 
milling arrangement, however, resulted in a lowering of the marginal 
costs of all factors related to the reduction processes of both companies 
and was thus vital to the success of these organisations given the 
relationship of these costs to the total cost structure of any company. 
Such reciprocity between companies was essential in relation to the 
reduction of total working costs and also to the lowering of the total 
capital investment faced by these small outcrop companies. The extent 
to which such co-operation was achieved in the industry in the 1890's 
is difficult to establish, but CUrle, writing at the end of the decade, 
felt it suffiCiently important to renew the plea for closer co-operation 
in the sharing of shaft facilities, cyanide plants, mills, technology, 
and in any other way likely to result in substantial savings. 23 
With the passing of the age of the outcrop mines, however, the 
need for such reciprocity between companies was largely elevated from 
the level of equipment and plant to that of technology and finance. 
As Denny examined in some detail, the viability of the deep level 
ventures required increasing economies of scale in size of plant, 
t d 1 f '1" 24 d th· h proper y, an genera ac~ ~t~es. Un er ese c~rcumstances t e 
opportunities for co-operation between companies became less relevant 
outside the spheres of technology and finance as the economies of scale 
for plant and equipment became subject to diminishing returns. It was 
here that the "group system" came into its own, growing out of the 
various partnerships established for financial and property speculation 
in the early days of the field. Wernher, Beit and Company was undoubtedly 
the most important of the emerging groups down to 1912, but there were 
others such as Barnato Brothers, which subsequently became Johannesburg 
consolidated Investments, The Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa 
Limited, S. Neumann and Company, J.B. Robinson, A. Haerz and Company, 
which later became Union Corporation, and various others. 25 The 
relationship between Wernher, Beit and Company and the various companies 
of this study in terms of the provision of finance and the supply of 
23. Curle, J.H., The Gold Mines of the World, pp.36-77. 
24. Denny, G.A., The Deep Level Mines of the Rand and their Future 
Development: Considered from a Commercial Point of View, 
passime 
25. Emden, P.H., Randlords, pp.206ff. 
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men of technical competence does not require repetition and it was from 
such beginnings that the group system of control arose. 
In discussing the group system, Letcher points out that it renders 
the subsidiary companies those technical services which would not 
otherwise be available to them except at a far greater cost. The 
consultant experts in engineering, metallurgy and other fields are 
provided by the holding firms. 26 It is thus clear that the origins 
of the group system in the provision of technical services can be traced 
back to the operations of organisations like Wernher, Beit and Company 
and their Johannesburg representatives from virtually the outset of the 
industry. 
Another of the main reasons advanced for the adoption of the group 
system was the growing requirement for funds and the time lags involved 
in the opening up of the deep level mines. 27 Once again the experience 
gained by Wernher, Beit and Company when financing the Ferreira ~ompany 
down to the recommencement of production in 1891 served the firm in 
good stead. While the extent of the commitment required by the Ferreira 
company was a major cause of concern in 1891, it nevertheless served as 
a portent of the capital requirements of the deep levels. The Ferreira 
Company also provides a useful example of yet another feature of the 
future financial arrangements which distinguish the group system, namely, 
the joint participation of the various groups in new ventures. The 
funds necessary for the extensive development and improvement of the 
plant of the Ferreira Company were raised by Wernher, Beit and Company, 
and besides their own commitment included loans from the Rothschilds, 
28 Kann and Neumann. In this way the financial risk was spread between 
the participants. While it is probably incorrect to speak of 
S. Neumann as representing a "group" in 1890, and the involvement of 
the others was purely in financial terms, the principle of risk spreading 
is clearly evident in the capitalisation of the Ferreira loan. 
TUrning to the evidence of the Witwatersrand Company, another 
feature of the emerging group system is revealed. Commenting on the 
events which resulted in the resignation of the board of directors on 
26. Letcher, 0., The Gold Mines of South Africa, p.412. 
27. Emden, P.H. op.cit., p.20S. 
28. See above, Chapter V, pp.160, 167. 
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20 March 1894, the South African Mining Journal noted that the principle 
of certain firms' involvement in the affairs of various companies, based 
on prestige rather than financial holding, was a well established 
principle on the Rand. 29 In reviewing the activities of Wernher, Beit 
and Company and H. Eckstein and Company in their dealings with the 
various companies of the study the significance of the statement becomes 
30 
clear. Virtually from the outset of the industry these firms, 
through the careful distribution of technical and financial support, 
were able to gain information on and influence in the affairs of a large 
number of companies. The rebuff by the shareholders of the Witwatersrand 
Company in 1894 was, however, of limited effect as the requirements of 
the industry ensured a continuing and expanding role for such expertise. 
The further requirements of risk spreading and a wide involvement for 
the achievement of economies of scale ensured that "control" in terms 
of the group system did not always require a majority shareholding. 
31 Rather, in the words of OWen Letcher, 
" ... it is rarely the case that a dominating preponderance 
of shares is held by the House concerned •.. The word 
'controlling' must not, therefore, be accepted as meaning 
actual domination of financial interest, but rather a 
system of administration which has been evolved and is 
maintained whereby financial assistance is available in 
case of need, and all the departmental services of the 
corporation are at the disposal of the component and 
subsidiary enterprises." 
The evidence drawn from the examples of the Witwatersrand and Ferreira 
Companies suggests the early beginnings of what was subsequently to 
emerge as the "group system". 
Another area in which endogenous co-operation is revealed in the 
companies of the study is in the Witwatersrand Company's decision in 
May 1892 to lease a portion of the property on tribute. 32 The concept 
of leasing areas for mining purposes in this way was not new and had 
been practiced previously in South Africa at Kimberley in the aftermath 
of the 1881 boom, when several unprofitable companies were let in this 
33 
way. The lease was usually for a considerable duration with a set 
29. See above, Chapter II, p.60 . 
30. See above, Chapter II, p.60, and Chapter IV, pp.126ff. 
31. Letcher, 0 . , op.cit., p.411. 
32. See above, Chapter II, p.50. 
33. Reunert, T., Diamonds and Gold in South Africa, p . 40. 
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rental and some form of profit-sharing arrangement between the parent 
company and the tributor when such profits exceeded a certain amount. 
The tributor was always ensured the majority of the profits. In this 
way, depending on its faith in the inherent wealth of the property, the 
parent company could reach an agreement which would ensure a higher 
revenue from the leased ground than was likely to accrue from a normal 
lease or from its own operations. The tributors were usually hard 
working men or partnerships who recognised the potential value of the 
property and relied on its profitable exploitation for their survival. 
Their success in Kimberley enabled large monthly payments to be made 
to the parent companies who, in certain cases, were then able to resume 
'34 dividend payments. A similar scheme was suggested for the 
Witwatersrand in 1890 when many companies found that high m~n~ng costs 
and poor management were depriving them of their profitability . 35 
Lionel Phillips first advocated such a system for the Witwatersrand 
company in 1890 although nothing came of these negotiations. 36 As is 
clear from the example of the Witwatersrand Company, the tributors were 
successful in making their portion of the property yield a profit and 
in this way ensured a considerable income for the parent company . 
Beyond the level of amalgamation and co-operation indicated in the 
examples given above, certainly the greatest area of successful co-
operation within the industry was in the formation of the. Witwatersrand 
Chamber of Mines. Although originally founded towards the end of 1887, 
it was, however, the reconstituted body formed in October 1889 which 
survived to become the powerful mouthpiece of the mining industry in 
South Africa. 37 The success of the organisation formed in october 
1889 rested on the fact that it was truly representative of the mining 
industry . The "Old Chamberll, as its predecess or became known, tended 
to admit the financier rather than practical mining men while mine 
I • 1,38 
managers I • •• were debarred or, at least, discouraged from membersh~p. 
Membership was individual rather than on the basis of representation of 
mining companies, although the Old Chamber was probably largely financed 
34. The Star, 21 July 1890, Letter to the editor from H. Stevens. 
35. Ibid. 
36. See above, Chapter II, p . 50. 
37. Etheredge, D.A., op.cit., p.l . 
38. Ibid., p.4. 
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by contributions from these organisations. As in the case of the later 
reconstituted Chamber, the activities of the old body were many and 
varied, ranging from the collection of monthly statistics on the 
industry to the encouragement of the reading of scientific papers. 
Its relationship with the state as a mouthpiece for the industry was 
limited because the Government never recognised the Chamber officially. 
Despite this lack of recognition, various memorials were sent to 
Pretoria by the Old Chamber on behalf of the industry, ranging from 
appeals for a revision of the Gold Law to protests against the granting 
of patents which it was felt might have a detrimental effect on the cost 
structure of the industry.39 The Old Chamber was, nevertheless, seldom 
a really effective body and was essentially moribund for much of the 
year prior to its reconstitution in 1889. 40 Etheredge attributes the 
failure of this organisation to its membership structure and the failure 
of the leading emerging groups of Wernher, Beit and Company and J. B. 
Robinson to support it.41 
"In June 1889 an unsuccessful attempt was made to reconstitute the 
Chamber. The failure of this move did, however, concentrate the 
attention of same of the leading personalities of the industry, 
including Hermann Eckstein, on the necessity for such a move and on 
5 October 1889 the second reconstituted Chamber held its first meeting. 
35 mb '21d'ff " ,42 Some me ers were present represent~ng ~ erent m~.nl.ng companl.es. 
It was from such hesitant origins that the future powerful mouthpiece 
of the industry developed. By the end of 1894 the Chamber had grown 
to 109 members represent'ing 71 companies which produced 96 per cent of 
the total gold output of the Witwatersrand for that year. 43 
The new Chamber listed amongst its functions and objectives the 
promotion and protection of the mining industry of the Witwatersrand 
and the consideration of public discussion on questions arising there-
from; the promotion of legislative and other measures affecting the 
industry; the collection and circulation of statistics pertaining to 
the industry; co-operation with the Department of Mines on the exchange 
39. Ibid., pp . 5-9. 
40. Ibid., p.9. 
41. Ibid., p.13. 
42. The Diggers' News (Johannesburg), 8 October 1889. 
43. Etheredge, D.A., op.cit., p. 24. 
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of information; the procurement of information relating to specific 
mines and companies; the establishment of a library and museum for the 
use of members; to act as arbitrators in the settlement of disputes 
arising out of mining; and various other functions relating to the 
purchase and sale of Chamber property, the investment and borrowing of 
"money, and the 
oration of the 
obtaining of an Act of the Volksraad for the incorp-
44 45 Chamber. As Etheredge has suggested, 
and 
" ... the underlying object for the Chamber was to protect 
and foster the interests of the owners of the mines as 
against a Government it considered oppressive and as against 
its employees (a native labour force) which it considered 
overpaid" 
II to provide a means whereby the mining companies could 
act in concert ..• It brought about a loose federation of 
the companies and facilitated co-operation and consultation 
amongst them. II 
Like its predecessor, the new· Chamber sought official recognition. 
The Volksraad, however, fearing that such a move would enhance the power 
of that body, rejected all overtures for an act of incorporation down 
to 1897. 46 The Government did, nevertheless, recognise the authorita-
tive standing of the Chamber and respected its advice, as is clear 
from the sequence of events surrounding the food shortages of October 
47 1889 and the revision of the Gold Law. 
The major area in which the Chamber of Mines strove for the attain-
ment of co-operation within the industry was in the establishment of a 
uniform policy for the treatment of African labourers. In the years 
down to 1894 the first attempts were made to introduce a system of 
monthly payments and to impose maximum wage levels. These matters have 
already received considerable attention48 and it is only necessary to 
emphasise their relationship to the endogenous co-operation between 
the various mining companies of the Witwatersrand industry. It is 
similarly clear that these activities on the part of the Chamber arose 
44. Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines, Second Annual Report for 1890, p.5. 
45 . Etheredge, D.A., op.cit .. p.l? 
46. Ibid . , pp.29-34. 
47. Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines, First Annual Report for 1889, 
pp.12 13, and see below, pp.288ff. 
48. See above, Chapter VI, pp.255ff. 
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out of a growing awareness and concern on the part of its members of the 
detrimental influence which the prevailing spirit of endogenous 
competition between th~ companies was having on the cost structure of 
the industry. In 1890 it was estimated that African labour was costing 
the mines £45 000 per month prior to the first attempt at a reduction 
of wages. In August of that year the average rate of pay was 63s. 4d. 
exclusive of food and shelter. By October it was reduced to 48s. 10d . 
and in December 1890 it was again lowered to 44s. per month, resulting 
in a saving of some £15 000 a month to the industry.49 Despite this 
attempt at successful co-operation between the various mining companies, 
with obvious adv~tages in cost saving, the system of wage reduction 
was clearly vulnerable, not only from the offer of competitive wages 
from those companies within the industry which held aloof of any such 
scheme, but also from competitive wages offered by employers in the 
rest of the economy. 
Chamber in an Annual 
This fact was recognised and spelled out by the 
50 Report, 
11 The local industry is subject to outside competition 
in the labour market. Other mining districts offer wages 
almost as high as the Rand, the Railways being constructed 
in Natal and the Cape Colony draw away large number(s) of 
Kaffirs, and the Boksburg Tramway is employing 1 500 to 
2 000 Kaffirs at a very high rate of pay." 
Thus it was clear that the success or disintegration of ~y scheme for 
endogenous co-operation in the sphere of labour employment rested on 
the knife-edge of willing participation by the companies, and that any 
hint of a better deal regarding the supply of this relatively scarce 
resource was likely to lead to the collapse of the arrangement . The 
seasonal scarcity of labour in the winter months of 1891 resulted in 
the rapid demise of the project. 51 
Beyond the area of labour most of the endogenous competition within 
the Witwatersrand gold mining industry was confined to the scramble to 
stake out claims and water rights and the Subsequent drive to win 
investment capital. Competition was largely restricted to the acquisition 
of these scarce resources due to the non-competitive nature of the sales 
49. Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines, Second Annual Report for 1890, 
p.12. 
50. Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines, First Annual Report for 1889, 
p.l0. 
51. See above, Chapter VI, p.260. 
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function. Faced with a fixed price for gold and a virtually unlimited 
demand for i t at that price, competition within the industry rested on 
those factors determining output. Undoubtedly, there was competition in 
the acquisition of claims and water rights in the early months following 
the announcement of the discovery of the field but the extent to which 
these aspects were inherited by directoral and mine management from 
the initial pro.spectors and promoters is difficult to ascertain. We do 
have evidence of the Simmer and Jack company's conflict with the 
holders of the grazing licence on the farm Elandsfontein which delayed 
the commencement of the Company's operations . There is also the case 
of that Company's . later search for an additional water right which 
brought it into opposition with the Stanhope Geldenhuis Deep Level 
52 Company. Both these incidents suggest that such competition for 
claims and water rights extended beyond the initial scramble for 
properties. Similarly, it is possible to see both the Simmer and Jack 
and the Ferreira Companies in competition with the respective deep level 
propositions to the south of them in the bid for the inclusion of the 
deep level claims into these companies. 53 
In the case of water rights, competition also grew with the passage 
of time when additional · companies, particularly those on the deep level 
claims, were floated to work the reef. Commenting on the need for a 
more equitable distribution of water rights in order to grant the new 
companies access to exi sting water sources, an editorial in the 
54 Johannesburg press noted, 
"The happy go lucky fashion in which water rights were 
granted in the early days has not proved conducive to the 
benefit of mining. When the right of granting water rights 
rested with the Diggers' Committee, all that was needed 
apparently was an application. It mattered little whether 
the applicant was a mine owner or not, so long as he was 
first in the field his application was granted. Long 
stretches of water sluits were also granted to bona fide 
companies, without the slightest regard to the future, and 
now if anyone will take the trouble to inspect, he will 
see that two companies, in some cases, take up the whole 
of a water sluit, .. _ nearly a mile in extent. II 
52. See above, Chapter III, pp.81-82. 
53. See above, Chapter III, pp.97ff, and Chapter V, pp.187ff. 
54. The Diggers' News, 21 May 1889. 
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The competition for claims was given a greater intensity by the 
provisions of the Gold Law which offered l i ttle permanency of tenure 
and allowed for claim jumping where all requirements of the Act were 
not complied with. Thus although the amended Gold Law of 1885 made 
provision for the holding of amalgamated blocks of up to twelve claims, 
it still remained necessary for a company holding more than one such 
area to show evidence on a regular basis of the working of each res-
pective block. As late as 1895 it was even proposed by Government 
that each amalgamated block should be separately surveyed and beaconed 
55 
off, and it required prompt action by the Chapter of Mines to defeat 
the suggestion. It is correct to say that the Law of 1885 was in most 
respects geared to the administration of small alluvial gold fields 
where surety of tenure was not of paramount importance, given that the 
diggers were wont to wander off in search of better prospects once the 
better part of a claim or claims had been picked out. In contrast to 
this situation it was soon realised that the Witwatersrand field 'had a 
potential which could be measured in decades and the companies formed 
to work the claims thus called for greater security of their tenure. 
While companies like the Jumpers Gold Mining Company took their names 
from the early scramble and repeated jumping of properties, once a 
semblance of order was established and capital invested in plant and 
mine development, the threat from claim jumpers took on a new signific-
ance. While the onus rested with the companies or owners of claims to 
indicate the exact extent and correct boundaries of their properties, 
and to maintain the necessary beacons, the slightest deviation or doubt 
in the exercise of surveys or the positioning of peacons rendered the 
property liable to jumping by anyone. one important example of such 
jumping occurred in 1889 when, due to technical errors on the part of 
the Paarl Pretoria Gold Mining Company in the transfer of its property 
in an amalgamation with the Central Langlaagte Gold Mining Company, a 
block of claims were duly jumped. The jumper's case was upheld in the 
Pretoria High Court and the claims in question were subsequently floated 
56 
as part of the Royal Langlaagte Gold Mining Company. The example 
of Young and the Witwatersrand Company, while not specifically referring 
55. W.C.M., Seventh Annual Report for 1895, pp.95-96. 
56. The Star, 26 November 1889. 
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57 to that Company's mining claims, is another example in this regard. 
It was generally felt by the mining companies and those connected 
with them that the situation where responsibility for the proof of owner-
ship and correctness of surveys rested with the owner rather than the 
jumper was unjustifiably harsh. Hence appeals were made by the Chamber 
of Mines to the Government for an appropriate amendment of the Gold Law 
in 1889, " ... by which the locking up of water by persons applying for 
water rights without any intention of using them may be prevented" and 
, .... by which an indefeasible title can be obtained to claims and other 
58 
mining property. II In an interview with President Kruger on 25 
February 1890, Hermann Eckstein, as President of the Chamber of Mines, 
elicited an assurance from Kruger that, " ... he would do his best to 
induce the Volksraad to give every regularly constituted concern, or 
company, a clear and indisputable title to their property, thus to make 
jumping an impossibility.,,59 The matter was subsequently taken up by 
the Volksraad in 1891 and the appropriate amendments to the Gold Law 
introdu ced. 60 
The endogenous competition which emerged in the industry with 
regard to the acquisition of capital has already been discussed. 61 
The ability of a company to draw capital in the early years of the 
industry depended to a large extent on its capacity to offer share-
holders dividends on their investment. But the ability of a company 
such as the Wemmer to pay dividends was closely related to the quantity 
of its best are worked. Hence, where companies plundered their richest 
ores merely for the sake of early dividend payments, such a move, while 
placing them in a favourable position vis-a-vis their competitors, was 
not necessarily in the long term best interests of either company or 
shareholder. Nevertheless, such dividend payments undoubtedly placed 
a company like the Wemmer in a far better position in relation to 
other non dividend paying companies as regards the raising of fresh 
capital on the market. 62 
57. See above, Chapter II, pp.48-49. 
58. W.C.M., First Annual Report for 1889, p.12 . 
59. W.C.M., Second Annual Report for 1890, p . 15. 
60. See below, p.289. 
61. See above, Chaper VI, pp.204ff. 
62. See above, Chapter IV, p.lll. 
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The exogenous factors concern the integration of the companies in 
particular and the industry in general into the rest of the economy and 
society. Here the relationship between the industry, as represented by 
the Chamber of Mines, and the Government and Volksraad of the South 
African Republic, is an area of major importance, bringing the industry 
into both co-operation and conflict with the Government. 
The greatest area of co-operation between the State and the Chamber 
of Mines representing the mining industry was in relation to the amending 
of the Gold Law and the promulgation of mining regulations. From an 
early date the Government adopted the attitude that the mining industry 
should play an active role in the promulgation of legislation directly 
affecting it. Thus it was 
drafting of the first Gold 
that Harry Struben was involved in the 
63 Law, and subsequent amendments were made 
after consultation with the miners. From the outset of its formation in 
1889, the reconstituted Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines took an active 
interest in the Gold Law and was not slow in advising the Government of 
changes which it considered essential for the smooth operation of the 
Witwatersrand industry. Towards this end the Chamber established a 
committee in 1889 and the following year recommended to the Volksraad 
that a joint committee of members of the Raad and Chamber be established 
64 to draft an entirely new law. While this suggestion was not adopted 
by the Volksraad, in June 1891 the Minister of Mines called a conference 
of Mining Commissioners to consider possible amendments to the Gold Law 
which would be proposed to the Volksraad at its next session. In 
keeping with Government policy in this regard, the Chamber of Mines was 
invited to send two representatives to the Pretoria meeting. Mr G.H. 
Goch and the Chamber's legal adviser, C.H.B. Leonard, were duly chosen 
to represent the industry's interests. The gathering debated for nearly 
a fortnight, during which time a comprehensive list of amendments were 
submitted for discussion by the industry's spokesmen. The Chamber was 
jubilant in that these proposals were accepted "almost in their entirety 
by the conference and were afterwards adopted by the Volksraad with only 
minor modification. ,,65 So pleased was the Executive of the Chamber with 
the handling of the conference that it was decided to vote the two 
63. Struben, H.W., Recollections of Adventures, 1850-1911, pp.137ff. 
64. Etheredge, D.A., op.cit., p.83. 
65. W.C.M., Third Annual Report for 1891, p.12. 
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representatives a remuneration of £550. 66 
Certainly the greatest achievement for the industry at the 1891 
Mining Commissioners' Conference was the abolition of the concept of 
jumping of claims and the granting of surety of tenure to legitimate 
claimholders. Similarly, the regulations relating to water rights and 
the ownership of mynpacht rights were clarified so that mortgages could 
in future be 
renewable in 
effected on these claims. Mynpacht rights were also made 
. 67 perpetu~ty. Clause 21 of the Law was amended to give 
the Mining Commissioners power to prohibit the pegging off of gardens, 
buildings, depositing areas, and ground with tailing heaps on them, 
and severe penalties were prescribed for wilfully attempting to encroach 
68 
upon the rights of others by pegging. Goch's influence as a director 
of the Witwatersrand Company faced with the pending 
Young, on the passage of this amendment can only be 
action against 
69 guessed at. 
While not meeting all of the requirements regarding security of tenure 
for stands held by a company beyond its mynpacht, the clause went a 
long way towards clarifying the position of companies as the owners of 
machinery sites and water rights. Clause 21 as proposed by the conference 
was, however, modified by the Volksraad on the instigation of the 
Government and in this new form generated a good deal of anxiety in the 
industry. Thus while in general the amendments proposed in 1891 were 
adopted into the Gold Law of 1892 with the full support of the mining 
industry, the amended clause 21 became a point of conflict between the 
Government and the Chamber of Mines throughout the remaining years of 
the South A£rican Republic. 
The Government's amendment to clause 21 wholly altered the Law with 
respect to prospecting and mi ning under townships and "be\»'aarplaatsen." 
Bewaarplaatsen originally referred to the depositing sites of the mines 
for their tailings and waste rock but with time grew to mean any area 
under which mining was prohibited, such as the ground over which the 
companies held water rights or stands for tailings and machinery. 
The first section of the amendment prohibited prospecting and mining 
under such places, while the second empowered the state to grant 
66. Ibid . , p.43. 
67 . W. C.M . , Third Annual Report for 1891, pp.41ff. 
68. Ibid. 
69 . See above, Chapter II, pp.48-49. 
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permission to do so upon application being made. The southern slopes 
of the Witwatersrand and the water courses thereon were chosen as the 
ideal situation for the siting of the early mills and dumping areas 
which were thus usually located south of the lower boundaries of the 
outcrop companies to maximize the use of gravitational flow of water 
and ore to these positions. With the passage of time it became known 
that the reef dipped away under these sites and their potential value 
was thus enhanced. It was generally felt by the managements of the 
various companies on the outcrop that their possession of the surface 
rights to such mill sites and depositing areas assured them a priority 
claim to the mineral rights. Similarly, much of the planning and 
purchasing of the deep level claims by firms like Wernher, Beit and 
Company was undertaken with this assumption in mind. Clause 21 of the 
Gold Law of 1892 dispelled any such illusion. The position of the 
bewaarplaatsen in relation to the various companies was such that the 
loss of the right to mine under them could make for a more complex 
situation, either in the mining of the initial row of deep level 
properties, or in the shortening of the lives of the outcrop companies. 
Similarly, if the mining rights of the bewaarplaatsen were acquired by 
outside parties the possession of them WD.lld serve as a usef"ul bar-
gaining tool for gaining entree to the deep level ventures or for 
subsequently disposing of these claims or rights to such companies 
at considerable profit. 
The immediate response by the mining companies to protect their 
interests was to make application for the mining rights under their 
bewaarplaatsen. They were soon informed by Pretoria that only applica-
tions received after 1 September 1892 would be considered, and then on 
a priority 
was due to 
basis, that being the 
. t f 70 come ~n 0 orce. 
date on which the amended Gold Law 
New applications were subsequently 
lodged in September but the Witwatersrand mines were to be kept in 
suspense for several years to come. 
It seems probable that the issue of the bewaarplaatsen was 
initiated by a syndicate in which E.A. Lippert was prominent and which 
hoped to be granted a concession to mine under the bewaarplaatsen 
irrespective of who held the surface rights. The party clearly had 
ulterior motives for the position and scattered nature of the 
70 . W.e.M., Fourth Annual Report for 1892, p.7. 
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bewaarplaatsen of the various companies would have made their mining 
by one organisation prohibitively expensive, particularly as most of 
them were situated on deep level ground which required large con-
solidated blocks of claims as a prerequisite for the economies of scale 
required for profitable mining. Allegations made by the South African 
Mining Journal suggested that the syndicate was spending money freely 
in Pretoria to gain their Objective. 71 Such· measures provoked the 
inevitable reaction and Phillips wrote to Beit in 1894 to suggest that 
the cost of swaying the issue was likely to be about £25 000. 72 The 
direction of the swing, whether for the general interest of the mining 
industry or those , of Wernher, Beit and Company, is not clear. As 
Marais indicates, however, not even this amount was sufficient to gain 
a favourable resolution to the issue which remained undecided at the 
collapse of the Republic. 73 
Despite the difficulties experienced by the companies in the early 
years of the Witwatersrand regarding security of tenure and the later 
resolution of the bewaarplaatsen issue, the industry was generally 
fortunate in that the Gold Law of the South African Republic placed a 
higher proportion of the profits from the mines in the hands of the 
capitalists and shareholders than the mining laws of any other 
74 
country. The Gold Law made provision for a tax of two and a half 
per cent of gold production to be levied on mining companies as an 
alternative to the payment of licence fees but it was oniy in 1898 
when, with the prospect of war looming nearer, the State decided to 
exercise this option with regard to the gross yield of mynpachts being 
profitably worked. 75 Prior to this the State was content to rely on 
a revenue drawn from licences and the indirect taxes of its concessions 
policy and high import duties on food and other items like mining 
equipment, which, in raising the costs to the industry, affected the 
profitability of the companies. The attitude of the Government is 
epitomized in the statement made to Mathers by President Kruger in 
1887,76 
71. Etheredge, D.A., op.cit., p.85. 
72. Ibid. 
73. Marais, J.S., The Fall of Kruger's Republic, p.20. 
74. Ibid., p.3. 
75. Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek Law No.15 of 1898, and see below, p.297ff. 
76. Mathers, E.P., The Gold Fields Revisited, p.240. 
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"If a company has paid their licences to Government, it 
is of no consequence to the Government whether they lose 
their gold or keep it; it is no business of mine to 
interfere . " 
Another source of Government revenue, and one which brought it into 
conflict with the mining industry was the system of concessions. The 
first such concession was that granted to Alois Nellmapius for distilling 
liquor. 77 Others were to follow, the most taxing and annoying of which 
for the mining industry was that granted for the manufacture and supply 
of dynamite in the Republic, granted to E.A. Lippert in 1888. The 
concession, valid for sixteen years, gave the holder the exclusive 
right to manufacture and trade in dynamite in the South African Republic. 
It prohibited the import of manufactured dynamite, although the holder 
was entitled to import all materials and equipment for its making free 
of duty and imports were allowed as the monopoly of the concessionaire 
until such times as the local factory was completed. The manufacturing 
plant had to be erected within a year and the maximum sale price was not 
to exceed £7 lOs. per 50lb. case. In return 
annual rental of £3 750 and a royalty of 2s. 
the Government received 
78 
on each case sold. 
an 
The Old Chamber did not oppose the granting of the dynamite con-
cession but from 1890 onwards the reconstituted Chamber adopted an 
increasir>:]ly strident stand against "De ZUid Afrikaansche Maatschappij 
van Ontplofbare Stoffen Beperk", the company formed by Lippert to 
exploit the concession. Initially the Chamber asked for the appoint-
ment of a commission of inquiry to investigate the charges that the 
dynamite supplied by the concessionaires was of an 
was resulting in an increasing number of accidents 
inferior quality 
. 79 
underground~ 
and 
A commission of inquiry was ultimately appointed in November 1890 which 
reported that the local product was satisfactory and of similar quality 
to that previously imported. 80 This finding left the Chamber's 
IIDynamite Sub-Committee" dissatisfied and their views seemed justified 
following a spate of dynamite accidents in the mines towards the end 
of 1891 and early in 1892. 81 Following these events, and increasing 
77. See above, Chapter I, P·5 note 18. 
78. Etheredge, D.A. , op.cit., p.42. 
79. Ibid. , p . 46. 
80. Ibid., pp.47-48. 
81. Ibid. , p . 51. 
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diplomatic pressure, the Volksraad appointed another commission to 
82 investigate the monopoly. It was against this background that evidence 
surfaced that, in contravention of the concession, the dynamite company 
was importing processed dynamite. 83 The State had little choice but 
to cancel the concession and by the end of 1892 the Chamber of Mines 
looked forward to some form of free trade in the product. Such optimism 
was unwarranted and by October ·1893 the Government assumed a monopoly 
for the importation of dynamite with the former dynamite company acting 
84 
as its agent . Hence by the end of 1894 the Chamber had achieved 
little towards its goal of a free trade in dynamite which would reduce 
the price of this . important product for the mining i ndustry. One of 
the conditions of the new contract with the dynamite company was that 
the maximum price which coUld be charged for the commodity was reduced 
85 to E4 15s . per case of 50lbs. The dynamite concession thus served 
to heighten tensions between the mining industry and the State and the 
cost of explosives in 1895 constituted twelve per cent of the total 
working costs of the mining industry . 86 
In 1892 the Chamber of Mines singled out for attack the patents 
held by the African Gold Recovery Company on the MacArthur-Forrest 
Cyanide Process for the extraction of gold, as part of a general campaign 
against the granting of patents deemed harmful to the mining industry. 
In June that year evidence came to hand that the State would soon grant 
a cyanide concession on similar lines to that already operating for 
dynamite . S7 With strong protest from the Chamber the application for 
the concession was held over by the Volksraad until the following year. 
As the matter would be raised in the following session of the Raad, 
the Chamber decided to take the initiative with an attack not only 
against the granting of further concessions bu t also against the cyanide 
patent holders. For this action it received the s tern rebuke of the 
press which pointed out the valuable contribution made by the cyanide 
82 . Ibid . , pp .43-51. 
83. Ibid., pp . 52-56. 
84. Ibid., pp.61ff. 
85 . Ibid., p.61. 
86 . Hatch, F.H. and Chalmers, J.A . , The Gold Mines of the Rand, p.271. 
87 . W.C . M. , Fourth Annual ' Report for 1892, pp.66ff. 
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process to the profitability of many Rand mining companies. 88 It was 
decided, nevertheless, to test the legality of the cyanide patent in 
the High Court, the Chamber basing its case on the fact that the 
African Gold Recovery Company's patents covered previously known 
chemical processes. Similarly, a successful attack was made against 
the granting of the cyanide concession, which was rejected by the 
Volksraad in 1893. 89 In keeping with this policy a joint committee 
was formed in 1894 composed of members of the Chamber, the Chemical and 
Metallurgical Society, and of the Eng"ineers' and Architects' Association, 
for the purpose of examining all applications for patents, the granting 
of which would affect the industry, and to advise the Chamber of Mines 
on which 
. 90 
ones to oppose. 
The threat posed to the patents held by the African Gold Recovery 
Caupany by the Chamber of Mines drove that company into the arms of 
the State, which now sought the creation of a cyanide monopoly along 
the same lines as the dynamite monopoly, with Mr W.W. Webster, manager 
91 
of the African Gold Recovery Company, acting as agent. On 28 May 
1894 the Executive Committee of the Chamber of Mines was informed of 
the contemplated monopoly by which the present patent holders would 
receive five per cent of a uniform royalty of seven and a half per cent 
92 to be charged for the use of the patent. Immediate steps were taken 
to counter the measure as it was recognised that the cyanide process 
" ... had become a part of the regular operation of gold mining on the 
Witwatersrand, and the go ld so obtained is an important factor in the 
profitable working of the mines. 11 93 A deputation was sent to Pretoria 
where it was received by the State President and Executive Council. 
The Chamber based its arguments against the granting of the monopoly 
on two points, namely, that patents had a l so been granted for other 
cyanide processes besides the MacArthur-Forrest one and that the 
holders of these would be done an injustice if the monopoly was granted. 
Secondly, the validity of the MacArthur-Forrest process was being 
88. The Star, 11 November 1892. 
89. W.C.M. , Fifth Annual Re~rt for 1893, pp.10, 158. 
90. W.C.M. , Sixth Annual ReEort for 1894, p.11. 
91. Ibid. 
92. Fraser, M. and Jeeves, A. , op.cit. , p.77. 
93. w.e.M., Sixth Annual ReEort for 1894, p.205. 
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challenged in the High Court and if the case pending was decided against 
the African Gold Recovery Company no further royalty would be payable. 
The establishment of a State monopoly would then deprive the mining 
companies of their rights under law and reveal the Government's action 
for what it was. In this second argument the stand of the Chamber was 
assisted by the technicality that it was unconstitutional for the 
Volksraad to consider the issue of the establishment of the monopoly 
without giving three months notice in the Government Gazette. SUch 
notice would, however, push the matter beyond the current sitting of 
the Raad and the decision of the High Court, anticipated to be 
favourable to the Chamber, would be known before the 1895 sitting. 
Under these circumstances the Government had no option but to capitulate 
on the issue, the State President giving the Chamber's delegation of 
L. Phillips and A. Goerz the assurance that no further industrial 
94 
monopolies would be granted. 
It is difficult to believe that the policy of the Government of 
the South African Republic regarding the granting of concessions and 
the establishing of monopolies, such as those discussed above, was 
entirely motivated by the need for revenue. The annual rental on the 
dynamite concession of £3 750 · and the low royalty of two shillings per 
case could not have accounted for a substantial inflow of income for 
the State . As Marais has suggested nepotism and corruption were never 
far from the surface in the civil service in Pretoria and it is rather 
in this direction that a reason for such action might be sought. 95 
The Witwatersrand, nevertheless, became the chief source of revenue 
for the Republic, both directly from the sale of licences for mining 
and prospecting and indirectly through the massive increase in import 
duties payable on the food and mining equipment brought into the State. 
The fact that the Witwatersrand would carry the country financially 
was soon recognised by the mining community and commented on by the 
Johannesburg press which, as early as January 1888, noted that the 
monthly contribution of the town and mines to State revenues amounted 
to approximately £30 000, while the revenue collected by the Gold 
commissioner during 1887 had nearly doubled. 96 The Department of 
94. Ibid., pp.209ff. 
95 . Marais, J . S . , op.cit., pp.19-20. 
96. The Eastern Star (Grahamstown), 10 January 1888. 
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Mines gave as the total income from the industry for the years 1888 to 
97 1893 as follows: 
Year state Revenue from Mining 
1888 £399 616 11 s. 9'>d. 
1889 723 048 6 5 
1890 518 610 17 1 
1891 357 055 19 8 
1892 563 585 10 10\( 
1893 823 471 6 2 
Such revenue was, _ however, also derived from mini"ng areas beyond the 
Witwatersrand . It, nevertheless, provides a good example of the 
magnitude of the revenue derived from the mining industry, the largest 
contribution being made by the Witwatersrand. The size of this revenue 
payment was considered excessive in relation to those made by mining 
areas in other parts of the world, and an editorial early in 1890 noted 
that the situation on the Australian gold fields was far more favourable 
to the gold miners. 98 
"In Victoria in 1888 dividends to the value of £525 281 
ls . 9d . were paid. The value of gold won was about £2 500 000, 
but the entire Government revenue derived from mining, 
inc luding licences and every other direct charge on the 
industry was only £19 236 2s. 7d. Contrast these figures 
with the amount paid to Government (Transvaal) on an earning 
of £1 200 000 and the heavy handicap which the mining 
industry suffers here will be at once apparent." 
Thus it was claimed that while direct charges on the mining industry in 
Victoria provided only about one per cent of State r evenue, in the South 
African Republic the figure amounted to about twenty five per cent. 
What the newspaper failed to take into consideration was the fact that 
there was no profits tax on the mining companies in the South African 
Republic. 
With the passage of time the contribution of the mining industry 
to State coffers was a l so seen as excessive in terms of the net returns 
enjoyed by the industry. The standard of the civil service remained 
poor and fell short of the expectations to which the managerial and 
97. Rapport van het Hoofd van Mijnwezen, 1 Mei 1893 tot 1 Mei 1894. 
98. The Diggers' News, 21 February 1890 . 
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technical staffs of the mines felt themselves to be entitled. 99 It was 
not before 1893, however I that the leading mining magnates were drawn 
into a participation in politics as a possible solution to the 
difficulties created by a lax adminis t ration. 100 The conflict between 
the Government and certain of the firms thereafter assumed a role which 
extended beyond the economic sphere. 
It was inevitable that the attitude of the state towards the mining 
industry, which as already indicated, fluctuated between active co-
operation in certain areas to outright conflict in others, should have 
coloured the attitude of the managements of the mining companies towards 
the Pretoria authorities. It is probably accurate to assume even on 
the limited evidence available, that the actions of the Government in 
connection to its concessions and monopoly policy created a great deal 
of annoyance amongst a body of men already confronted with a wide range 
of factors contributing towards the high cost structure of the industry. 
Likewise it was generally felt that the industry was sorely taxed in 
terms of the various licence fees and import duties at a time when few 
of the companies found themselves in a sound financial position. 
Against such a background, rumours such as those of October 1891, that 
the Government was about to exercise its right to impose the two and 
a half per cent tax on total gold production, were greeted with feelings 
f h ' d h '1' 101 o appre ens~on an ost~ ~ty. 
The r e action of the mining companies to the news of a possible 
introduction of a direct gold tax was swift and effective. Such a tax 
could only be levied on the basis of monthly production figures sub-
mitted by the companies to the Mining Commissioners of the various 
mining districts. By January 1892 it was reported that the Minister of 
Mines had written to the Mining Commissioners complaining that companies 
were not complying with the regulation requiring them to submit monthly 
102 
returns. The regulation was introduced in November 1889 and besides 
the necessity for submitting monthly production figures also required 
information on the proceedings of regular meetings, plans of works, 
99 . Marais, J . S . , op . cit., p.19. 
100 . Ibid. , pp.62-63 . 
101. ~e Standard and Di92ers' News, 20 October 1891. 
102. ~e Standard and Dig2ers' News, 1 February 1892 . 
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financial statements, and addi tions to capi tal and machinery.l03 
The lack of an effective civil service and assistants to the Mining 
Commissioners of the various mining districts ensured that compliance 
with the regulation rested heavily on the good will of the managements 
of the companies . 
Strict compliance with the regulation for the submission of returns 
was something which many companies found not to be in their own best 
interests even prior to the 1891 scare. As already outlined in the 
104 
case of the Ferreira Company many of the mines aimed at a system 
of the averaging of monthly output. Wide fluctuations in the returns 
presented every month were unlikely to instil confidence in shareholders, 
particularly if they were as demanding as those of the Ferreira Company. 
In any event, a certain amount of gold wa s usually retained by the 
companies either in the form of dressed amalgam plates or in the raw 
gold needed for preparing them. Thus the figures submitted to the 
Chamber of Mines and the Mining Commissioners were never more than 
rough approximations of the true output of the companies for any month 
and the leeway in accuracy of measurement rested on the aspirations 
and good will of the managements. This state of affairs drew rebuke 
from the press in 1890 when it was recognised that a reflection of the 
largest possible monthly yield from the field was an essential 
.. f th . f . 'f' d 105 prerequ~s~te or e restorat~on 0 overseas ~nvestors con ~ ence. 
It was pointed out that if gold was being withheld by the companies, 
" in order that they may be able to issue sensational reports when 
I the market I becomes once more susceptible to influences of that 
character . . . n, then they were rendering the field a disservice. More 
, 
accurate was the assertion that the companies intended using the 
withheld gold to average out their monthly production figures during 
the winter months when labour, fuel and water were scarce and stores 
more expensive . 106 I t is thus clear that even under normal circum-
stances the production figures submitted by the companies were not a 
true reflection of monthly output and that any endeavour on the part 
of Government to introduce a tax based on such figures would have b een 
103 . The Diggers' News, 9 November 1889. 
104. See above, Chapter V, p.172. 
105 . The Star, 10 May 1890. 
106 . I bid. 
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ineffective without a considerable increase in the staff and efficiency 
of the Department of Mines. Hence the imposition of a tax on gold 
00 tput was not contemplated again before 1898 when the threat of war 
made any measure likely to result in an increase in State revenue 
attractive. 
The deficiency in the civil service likewise made the implementation 
107 
of a code of mining regulations impossible before 1 September 1893. 
The code was drawn up with the assistance of the Chamber of Mines and 
made provision for the appointment of Mining Inspectors to enforce the 
regulations pertaining mainly to the implementation of safety · standards 
in the mines . By· the fo l lowing year, however, it was admitted in the 
Chamber's Annual Report that in practice the measures had not proved 
satisfactory. lOB The State Mining Engineer found the measures so 
defective that he issued an entirely new draft amendment of the 
regulations . At the request of the Chamber, the time given for the 
submission of objections to the new draft regulations WdS extended, 
thus allowing the Chamber to submit a memorial to Pretoria noting its 
qualifications to the measure and appealing for a commission to inquire 
into the whole matter of mining regulations. 109 A commi ssion was duly 
appointed in 1895. 110 
The need for a code of mining regulations was a very real one. 
The 1893 Annual Report of the State Mining Engineer indicated that 204 
of the 224 deaths and 488 of the 594 injuries registered in the 
ubi ' d th' d 111 Wh ' l th f . h Rep ~c occurre on e W~twatersran . ~ e ese igures m~g t 
only reflect the poor state of record-keeping in the rest of the 
country, and while not all deaths and injuries recorded on the 
Witwatersrand were the result of mine accidents, it is probably 
accurate to suggest that a fair proportion of them were so caused. 
As the report noted, despite the introduction of the mining regulations 
in that year, a large number of mining companies were ignoring the 
measures and operating illegally with danger to life and limb, so that 
107. W. C.M. , Fifth Annual Re!20rt for 1893, p .7. 
108. W.C.M. , Sixth Annual Re!2ort for 1894, p .l0. 
109. Ibid. 
110. W.C.M. , Seventh Annual Re!20rt for 1895, pp.96-97. 
111. RaEl20rt van der Staats Mijninsenieur over het jaar 1893 . 
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in virtually every case of a mine accident a contravention of the 
1 · . d 112 regu at~ons ex~ste . 
Sporadic comment on the lax safety precautions of the mines was also 
forthcoming from the press. In August 1889 it was noted that the number 
of mining accidents was greatly on the increase. It was felt that the 
cause of this situation was the lack of adequate supervision, 
particularly of inexperienced black workers, in the clearing up opera-
113 
tions after blasting had taken place underground. Again in 1890 
comment was made on the number of accidents. In the absence of a 
Government safety inspector it was seen that,114 
IT ••• belts in a machine may be unguarded, shafts dangerous 
owing to defective timbering, head gear ropes chafed beyond 
the chance of safety, and a thousand other things I wrong , 
in a mine, and yet there is no one responsible for neglect 
of culpability •..• Remonstrance is of no avail. Managers 
of mines are callous to the matter, and seem to think that 
the lives and limbs of their employees is no concern of 
theirs. II 
The press called for the establishment of a private organisation to act 
if the Minister of Mines failed in this regard. No doubt it was hoped 
that the newly reconstituted Chamber of Mines would accept the challenge 
of policing the mine managers. To the extent that such accidents made 
no or little inroad on the profitability of the companies, such action 
was unlikely, as the Chamber represented t he owners of the mines. 
As if accepting the inevitability of the situation, the article 
concluded by chiding managers to assume the initial responsibility, 
115 
on moral if not financial grounds. 
The extent to which the various mining companies pursued minimal 
safety regulations on their own initiative, and the influence such 
measures had on the reputation of particular mines as places of employ-
ment is virtually impossible to determine as only major disasters were 
reported in the press and there is a conspicuous absence of accounts 
of accidents in the annual reports. Knowledge of the reputation of 
companies for safety was no doubt passed on by word of mouth. 
112. Ibid. 
113. The Diggers' News, 13 August 1889. 
114 . The Diggers' News, 17 April 1890. 
115. Ibid . 
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In 1892 the mining companies, through the action of the Chamber 
of Mines, made some form of contribution towards the s ituation regarding 
the health of the community in financing the completion of the new wing 
of the Johannesburg Hospital. In May the Hospital Board issued an 
appeal to the mining companies for subscriptions and the following month 
the Chamber formally extended the appeal to the companies. It was 
pointed out that the State had already contributed £3 3 000 towards the 
venture and that further aid from that quarter was unlikely. It was 
hoped to raise £5 000 from the companies and a scale of donations was 
suggested with direct advantages to the companies . Hence a first class 
donation of £200 would give the donor company preferential rights to 
two beds for two years, a second class contribution of £100 would yield 
a preferential right to one bed for two years and a third class of £50 
wou ld ensure the right to one bed for one year. In this wayan amount 
of £3 469 lOs . was raised by 39 companies, the Simmer and Jack Company 
bestowing £200, whil e the Ferreira gave £100 and the Wemmer £50. 
The Witwatersrand Company was not amongst those who contributed . 116 
Even then qualifications for the donation were not complete, the 
Chamber requesting a seat on the Hospital Board. On 8 September 1892 
Mr W.Y. Campbell was duly elected as the Chamber's representative. II? 
The gesture on the part of the companies who contributed might be 
interpreted as an example of exogenous co-operation, but when the 
specific conditions under which it was made are considered, it is 
doubtful if any term other than 'self interest ' can be applied. 
Closer to the mark of true exogenous co-operation were the 
activities on the part of the Chamber in alleviating the food shortages 
of l ate 1889. Again, however, the peculiar circumstances prevailing 
in early Johannesburg left the Chamber with little option in this 
regard as it formed the predominant group of employers who stood to 
lose most from a general exodus of population. The Chamber was, 
nevertheless, also the only organisation which possessed the necessary 
machinery for undertaking research into the problem and attempting to 
co-ordinate a solution. Thus in October 1889, following the continued 
delay of the spring rains, it was the Chamber which instituted a fairly 
detailed evaluation of the available food supply in the town, as well 
116. W.C.M., Fourth Annual Report for 1892, pp.98-99. 
II? Ibid . 
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as that in transit to Johannesburg. It was found that these sources 
would not be sufficient to meet the needs of the community and as a 
first step towards a solution telegrams were sent to the Landdrosts and 
Magistrates of the major South African towns requesting information on 
the availability of meal and grain supplies in their areas and of any 
transport willing to carry it to Johannesburg. At the sam~ time the 
Chamber entered into correspondence with the Government requesting 
aid for the community and the suspension of the high import duties 
payable on grain and meal imported into the Republic from the British 
Colonies. In response the State agreed provisionally to suspend the 
duty on meal, flour, butter and tinned meats and also contributed 
£5 000 for the alleviation of dis tress. The fund was used to pay a 
bonus of £20 to each of the first 250 wagoners who brought into the 
Republic supplies of flour, maize and maize meal after the date of the· 
announcement. Requests made to the Cape and Natal Governments to lower 
their railway rates on food consigned for the Transvaal fell on deaf 
ears, but the Natal administration was prepared to offer a bonus of 
£20 to each of the 
with food supplies 
first fifty wagons 
118 for the Rand. 
leaving their railway terminus 
The success of the bonus scheme is measured in the fact that 329 
wagons appli ed for the reward. Of these applications 47 were disallowed 
and a fur ther partial bonus was given to 282 wagoners. The amount of 
produce brought in was 660 200 lbs. of maize, 2 310 000 lbs. of meal, 
55 000 lbs. of flour, 156 000 lbs. of wheat and 394 282 lbs. of 
general provisions. 119 Johannesburg would not starve. Good rains 
also fell at the end of October ensuring the return of the spring 
vegetation which in turn made wagoners more willing to participate in 
the carrying trade towards Johannesburg. For its part the Chamber used 
the incident to launch a concerted campaign for the construction of 
rail links between Johannesburg and the coast. 
118. W.e.M., First Annual Report for 1889, pp.5ff. 
119. Ibid., p.13. 
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The relationship which developed between the new mining industry 
and tile citizens of the South African Republic was also significant. The 
discovery of the Witwatersrand represented a climax in a progression of 
120 gold discoveries dating back to the early 1870's. Hence it is 
possible to agree with Preller that a growing awareness of the mineral 
wealth of their country was becoming a feature in the perspective of 
many burgers , an increasing number of whom wished to participate in the 
wealth generated from this source. 121 Undoubtedly there were many who 
abandoned their farms for a spell of fortune seeking on the alluvial 
fields and evidence exists to suggest that a f air proportion of the early 
Witwatersrand claims were pegged out by citizens of the Republic. 122 
We know that Schalk Meyer remained a participating shareholder in the 
Simmer and Jack Company for quite some time after its formation, while 
Colonel Ferreira sat on the board of the Company named after him for at 
123 least a year and could well have remained a shareholder thereafter. 
Perhaps the greatest participation by burgers and their capital, however, 
was the case of the Paarl Pretoria Gold Mining Company, whose initial 
board comprised Rev. S.J. du Toit, Gen. P. Joubert, J.J. Malan, 
C.W.H. Kohler, Dr van Wyk, J .S. Marais and P.B. de Ville. 124 It is 
undoubtedly true, however, that many of the initial Boer claimholders 
soon sold their claims to foreign capitalists and returned to their 
pastoral way of life as they lacked the capital for the successful 
development of their properties. Nevertheless, enterprising men would 
still have carried away with them amounts of money ranging from tens to 
hundreds of pounds, which they considered ample reward for the effort of 
driving in a few boundary stakes. We can only speculate as to how this 
cash injection was spent but it is possible that some went towards the 
purchase of more land or wagons and livestock. For the more enterprising 
the wagons and oxen could be turned to good account in the carrying 
trade which developed between the coast or rail terminuses and the new 
mining camp. Nevertheless, Marais is right to assert that only a small 
proportion of the wealth generated by the Rand found its way into the 
120. See above, Chapter I, p.3. 
121. Prelle r, G.S., Argonauts of the Rand, pp.120ff. 
122. See above, Chapter I, p.16. 
123. See above, Chapter III, p.65, and Chapter V, p.150. 
124. Goldman, C.S., ap.cit . (1892), p.182. 
125 pockets of the Boers. 
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For the greater part the population was 
unaffected by the Witwatersrand discovery before 1895. Besides those 
few directly involved in company promotion and speculation, the transport 
riders, the few unscrupulous politicians, and those who now either 
directed their farming operations towards the newly created market or 
participated in the emerging service sector in some other way, few were 
affected. Even here Marais points out that the market gardening and 
dairy farming in the vicinity of Johannesburg" was mostly in the 
hands of foreigners. 1I126 The closing of the rail links with the coast 
also spelled the demise of the transport riding business. 
The main point to be borne in mind in considering the interaction 
of the Witwatersrand with the wider economy of the South African 
Republic is the relatively undeveloped state of that economy in 1886. 
Unlike so much of the previous mineral discovery in the State, the 
Witwatersrand emerged from the outset as both a capital and labour 
intensive industry. It was thus an exotic implant which before 1895 
had had little time to interact with and influence the broader economy 
of the State beyond the important aspects of the employment of a large 
number of Africans resident in the State and the generation of a State 
revenue which was massive by comparison with anything previously 
received. Even the secondary industry which grew up in the years down 
to 1895, whether encouraged by the Government concession policy or 
developing independently, like the engineering works of Messrs Begbie 
and Holleman or Hubert Davies, 127 was largely geared towards the 
supply of the mining industry and staffed by foreigners. 
The expenditure of State revenue was channelled into three main 
areas, namely, the development of a civil service, the construction of 
railways, and the equipping of the arsenal with modern military hardware. 
Regarding the latter two areas of expenditure it is clear that much of 
the money spent in purchases of this nature flowed out of the State. 
Even the skilled personnel of the railway company, as was the case with 
much of the civil service, were expatriate Hollanders and thus considered 
foreigners by the Boer inhabitants of the Republic. Thus a large 
125. Marais, J . S . , op . cit., p.4. 
126. Ibid. 
127 . The Star, 28 October 1891, gives a description of a visit to the 
works of Messrs Begbie and Holleman. 
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percentage of State expenditure had little direct influence on either 
the traditional white inhabitants or on the general economy before 1895. 
The impact that a more efficient civil service and the railway network 
were to have on the economy lay in the future, while what limited 
effect they did exercise was rather viewed in a negative light. Any 
improvement in the tax collecting efficiency of the State machinery while 
little tangible benefit was visible was only likely to provoke 
hostility. 128 Similarly, the increase in the mobility of the African 
labour force commuting to the mines or railway construction camps was 
seen as a threat to the security of the white overlords and a factor 
which would ultimately threaten their status . 
The extent to which the wages earned by African mine workers were 
spent in Johannesburg as opposed to outlying trading stores has not been 
determined, and similarly the influence of their purchasing power on the 
prices of land, cattle and other commodities in their home environment 
requires further research. Undoubtedly, however, the income generated 
by the black mine workers went some way towards assisting in the 
s'uccessful emergence of an African peasantry in South Africa before 
1910 and evidence exists that the purchase of land by Africans in the 
Republic increased after 1886. 129 The emergence of an African 
peasantry was, however, one of the factors limiting the supply of labour 
to the mining industry and was thus increasingly countereq by the 
Chamber of Mines. The rapid rise in the demand for African labour 
experienced after 1892, as the mining industry recovered from the 
1889-91 recession, saw an unsuccessful attempt to recruit underground 
labour from the Cape and the establishment of the Chamber's Native 
Labour Department with William Grant as the first Native Labour 
Commissioner. 130 
While the efforts of the Chamber of Mines in the recruitment of 
African labour met with only limited success in the years dqwn to 1895, 
the activities of individual companies and firms enjoyed greater promise. 
It was soon rec<::qnised by the lar·ge capitalist firms that the extensive 
128. Gordon, C.T., The Growth of Boer Opposition to Kruger, 1.890-95, 
passim. 
129. Bundy, C., The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry, 
pp . 197ff. 
130. W.e.M., Fifth Annual Report for 1893, p.3. 
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tracts of land acquired initially for prospecting purposes and the pre-
emption of mineral rights could be put to use to serve as labour 
131 pools. J.B. Taylor describes how H. Eckstein and Company bought 
three million acres for these purposes in the zoutpansberg, Waterberg 
and Lichtenberg districts, ultimately forming the Transvaal Consolidated 
Land Company, which settled Africans as tenants and squatters on these 
132 farms. The Africans could then be coerced into 'periodic spells of 
labour on the mines to pay for their tenancy. Beyond these measures 
individual companies also undertook their own recruiting drives. One 
such company was the Ferreira which, following its reconstruction and 
the recommencement of operations in 1891, sent out recruiting agents 
to enlist African workers for the mine. Evidence of these activities 
emerged when one of the Company's African employees was apprehended by 
the police near Pretoria on the charge that he was press-ganging 
Africans on their way to seek work in Pretoria and diverting them to 
the mine. The charge was denied, it being suggested that the recruiter 
was rather engaged, " • •. in the legitimate occupation of escorting and 
pioneering a batch of raw umfaans to the Ferreira Company's mine for 
which they had been secured. n As the press p ointed out, what had 
probably happened was that other companies' Iladvance agents" had 
molested the man in the prosecution of his work and "... endeavoured 
to jump his company of niggersj there has been trouble in consequence, 
and the police, misinterpreting appearances have altogether mistaken 
, h ,133 the rl.g ts and ~ongs of the case. II 
A similar incident of police interference in the passage of African 
workers on their way to the mines was reported in 1891 and resulted in 
the Chamber of Mines sending a letter to the State Secretary in protest. 
What had happened was that certain police officers, either in the employ 
of the Netherlands Railway Company or the Gover~ent, were turning back 
or detaining potential mine workers in the proximity of the Mocambique 
border at Komatipoort, where the railway company had recently commenced 
operations 
Portuguese 
on the building 
t ' 134 errl.tory. 
of the line to link Pretoria with the 
131. Denoon, D., Southern Africa Since 1800 , pp.130-31. 
132. Taylor, J.B., A Pioneer Looks Back, p . 142. 
133. The Standard and Diggers' News, 24 July 1891. 
134. W.C.M. , Third Annual Report for 1891, p.49. 
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The increasing competition between the Rand mining companies and 
the rest of the economy, especially the various railway construction 
. f lab b' d 135 h proJects, or our has already een d~scusse . Sue competition 
from the railway companies was of limited duration, for once the 
construction of the actual lines was completed, far fewer labourers were 
required for the maintenance and running of the lines. As the Annual 
Report of the Netherlands Railway Company for 1890 noted, the personnel 
of the Rand Tramline consisted of approximately 142 whites and 140 
11k leur lingen II .136 Thus while such competition undoubtedly deprived 
the mines of some of their potential labour the issue was never 
considered serious . enough to evoke the concerted action of the Chamber 
of Mines . The need for some form of wage agreement for African labour 
with the various railway companies was advocated by the press in 
1890,137 but the attitude adopted by the Chamber was that the speedy 
completion of rail links with the outside world would be of far greater 
value to the industry than any effort for uniform wages which might be 
used by the State o r railway companies as an excuse for further delays 
in the construction of railway links into the Republic . Hence the 
Second Annual Report of the Chamber noted that the greatest efforts had 
been made in advocating the rapid construction of railways,138 and the 
State President on a visit to Johannesburg in March 1890 gave the 
assurance that early railway extension was a priority of the State. 
Thus the first railway communication between Johannesburg· and the coast 
via the Cape and orange Free state was completed on 8 September, and· 
139 
the f i rst through train from the coast arrived on 15 September 1892. 
Once more the exigencies of the situation had forced some degree of 
co-operation on the part of the Government in meeting the needs of the 
Witwatersrand mining industry. 
Exact figures regarding the distribution of mining revenue for the 
ear l y years of the industry are not available. There is similarly a 
135. See above, p.284. 
136 . Verslag der Nederlandsche Zuid-Afrikaansche Spoorweg Maatschappij 
1890. 
137 . The Diggers' News, 9 June 1890. 
138. W.C.M., Second Annual Report for 1890, p.11. 
139. The Star, 15 September 1892. 
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lack of national income figures for the Republic. Under these circum-
stances it is impossible to give a numerical estimate of the relative 
importance of the industry in the economy~ It is clear, however, that 
the Witwatersrand mining industry had a profound effect on the economy 
not only of the South African Republic but of all the South African 
states in the longer term. The rate of inflow of immigrants attracted 
to the mining industry exercised a powerful psychological influence on 
the political framework of the State as well as heralding a massive 
140 
surge in the demand for agricul.tural and other products. Before 
1895 this demand had achieved little in stimulating local prcduction 
and Johannesburg r~lied on imported foodstuffs. The Witwatersrand 
mines also served as a financial "magnet" which attracted between £116 
and £134 million in equity and loan capital in the years down to 
1913 141 for direct investment in the industry besides also encouraging 
investment in other fields like railway construction. The Witwatersrand 
industry was destined to become the "growth sector" for all of 
southern Africa. 
140. Marais, J.S., op.cit., pp.lff. 
141. Kubicek, R.V., op.cit., pp.21ff. 
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APPENDIX I 
Original 
Nominal Vendor Working Reserve 
Company Name capital Shares Capital Shares 
Aurora £30 000 24 000 6 000 
Banket 120 000 90 000 20 000 1 000 
Bantjes 95 000 70 000 13 000 12 000 
Beatrice 20 000 12 000 6 000 2 000 
Benoni 20 000 14 000 6 000 
Botha I s Reef 139 000 139 000 (?) 
City & Suburban 50 000 34 000 16 000 
Croesus 25 000 17 500 5 000 2 500 
Edinburgh 22 000 14 000 4 000 4 000 
Empire 33 000 28 000 3 000 2 000 
Evelyn 12 000 8 600 3 400 
Ferreira 12 000 6 000 6 000 
Geldenhuis Est. 80 000 62 000 13 000 5 000 
George Goch 15 000 10 000 5 000 
Paarl Pretoria 60 000 25 000 35 000 
Henry Nourse 35 000 24 000 11 000 
Heriot 50 000 40 000 10 000 
Johannesburg 15 000 9 300 5 700 Pioneer 
Jubilee 15 000 9 000 6 000 
Jumpers 42 000 27 000 15 000 
Metropoli tan 20 000 10 000 10 000 
l10rkel 60 000 45 000 10 000 5 000 
Moss Rose 15 000 12 000 3 000 
Nabob 50 000 39 000 7 500 3 500 
Primrose 35 000 20 000 10 000 5 000 
Paarl Ophir 12 000 12 OOO(?J 
Ruby 9 000 3 500 5 500 
Salisbury 15 000 10 000 5 000 
Simmer & Jack 75 000 52 000 20 000 3 000 
Spes Bona 26 000 17 950 6 000 2 050 
Stanhope 30 000 23 000 7 000 
Star 35 000 27 500 5 000 2 500 
Tharsis 50 000 40 000 5 000 5 000 
Wenuner 12 000 10 000 2 000 
Wi twatersrand 210 000 . 195 000 15 000 
Wolhuter 40 000 29 000 11 000 
Worcester 15 000 10 000 5 000 
37 £1 599 000 £1 228 850 £387 400 £88 050 
~ .. -
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